# ESSAY: ASEAN uses the Hormuz crisis to accelerate the South China Sea Code of Conduct

> History holds crises that, instead of paralyzing, catalyze. The Strait of Hormuz crisis of March to June 2026 belongs in that category

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Essay
- Published: 2026-06-26
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/essai-l-asean-use-la-crise-d-ormuz-pour-accelerer-le-code-de-conduite-en-mer-de

## Introduction: When a crisis serves as a diplomatic lever

### **The logic of constructive shock**

History holds crises that, instead of paralyzing, catalyze. The **Strait of Hormuz crisis** of March to June **2026** belongs in that category — at least in its Indo-Pacific dimension. While the world watched the partial paralysis of global oil trade, a discreet but significant movement was unfolding within **ASEAN**: the Philippines used the demonstration offered by Hormuz to push their partners to accelerate negotiations for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

The argument is simple, almost brutal in its logic: the **closure of a strategic strait paralyzes the world economy**. Hormuz proved it. The South China Sea is a vital corridor for an even greater share of world trade — **40%** of global maritime traffic transits there by most estimates. If that corridor were to become the subject of a similar crisis, the economic consequences would be of even greater magnitude.

### **ASEAN facing an uncomfortable arithmetic**

**ASEAN brings together 10** members, of which 4 have territorial claims in the South China Sea — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. These members are also China's major trading partners. The balance between defending their sovereign interests and maintaining economic relations with Beijing is a **structural tension** that complicates any collective ASEAN position toward China.

This is the tension the Philippines are seeking to resolve through the Hormuz comparison. The Philippine argument is subtle: it is not solely about sovereign rights — it is about **collective economic risks**. Instability in the South China Sea threatens all ASEAN members, including those who prefer to avoid a confrontation with Beijing. Common economic interest thus becomes the terrain for a difficult but possible consensus.

*The Philippines' rhetorical strategy strikes me as particularly intelligent. Rather than pleading solely on the terrain of international law — where the 2016 ruling is clear but ignored — Manila translates the issue into economic terms that all ASEAN members understand. That is pragmatic diplomacy. The ideal does not always mobilize as much as well-understood interest.*

## The Hormuz crisis as a pedagogical demonstration

### **Hormuz — proof that straits can be closed**

The **Strait of Hormuz** connects the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman. Approximately **20 to 21%** of global oil trade transits it. Its disruption between March and June **2026** created a worldwide economic shockwave — oil price spikes, logistical disruptions, industrial slowdowns in importing countries. The lesson is unforgettable: a strait can be closed, even partially, and the consequences are systemic.

The South China Sea is not a strait — it is a semi-enclosed sea with several strategic passages. But the logic applies: if China were to impose control strong enough to disrupt trade, the economic consequences for economies dependent on these routes would be considerable. **Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan import massive amounts of energy and raw materials that transit through these waters.** Their vulnerability is documented.

### **The Philippines explicitly using this analogy**

The **Straits Times of June 24, 2026** explicitly documents that the Philippines are using the Hormuz crisis to justify the urgency of a South China Sea Code of Conduct. The Philippine formulation is skillful: it is not an alarmist comparison, it is an **empirical demonstration of risk**. ASEAN partners can see concretely what the disruption of a strategic commercial strait means.

This Philippine argumentation is addressed particularly to ASEAN members that maintain close economic relations with China and are reluctant to support too firm a position. It tells them: **regardless of your ties with Beijing, instability in the South China Sea directly affects you**. The economic calculation must take precedence over geopolitical affinities.

*Using a crisis in progress to change the course of a stalled negotiation — this is high-level diplomacy. The Philippines saw a window of opportunity in the Hormuz catastrophe and seized it. This is not cynicism — it is strategic lucidity. Crises are moments when frames of reference shift. Skilled diplomats know how to use these moments.*

## The four claimants in the South China Sea

### **Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam — a fragmented front**

The **four ASEAN members with South China Sea claims** — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam — do not have a unified position. **Brunei** is discreet and prefers silent negotiation. **Malaysia** pragmatically balances its relations with China and its sovereign claims. **Vietnam** is perhaps the firmest in resisting Chinese pressure, having a long history of confrontation with Beijing. The **Philippines** under Marcos Jr. have adopted the most assertive posture.

This fragmentation is a resource for China. **Beijing can negotiate bilaterally with each claimant**, offering economic concessions in exchange for softer positions on territorial issues, thereby avoiding the formation of a coherent ASEAN front. This is precisely what the Code of Conduct seeks to prevent — by creating a binding multilateral framework that blocks these divide-and-rule maneuvers.

### **ASEAN paralyzed by consensus**

The **consensus rule in ASEAN** is both its strength — it guarantees inclusion of all — and its main weakness — it gives each member an effective veto. China has used this rule with mastery, notably through **Cambodia** at the **2012** ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, where the first communiqué-less final declaration in the organization's history revealed the deep fracture Beijing had introduced into the bloc.

Fifteen years after that embarrassing precedent, **ASEAN is still trying to find a coherent position** on the South China Sea. The Hormuz crisis perhaps offers an opportunity to rally the most hesitant members behind an economic argument rather than a legal-territorial one. This is a diplomatic bet the Philippines have chosen to play.

*The 2012 Phnom Penh precedent remains a scar in ASEAN's institutional memory. When an organization cannot even adopt a joint communiqué, it is a sign of a division exploited from outside. China demonstrated its capacity to fragment ASEAN from within. Recognizing this institutional vulnerability is the condition for reform — but it is a reform that members who benefit from ties with Beijing are not eager to undertake.*

## The Code of Conduct — ten years of negotiations, zero binding effect

### **A decade of delaying negotiations**

Negotiations for a **South China Sea Code of Conduct** have been dragging on for more than a decade. China and ASEAN adopted in **2017** a Code of Conduct "framework" — a vague document that launched negotiations on the real content. Since then, rounds have followed rounds without ever reaching agreement on the most substantive points: the geographic scope of the Code, dispute resolution mechanisms, and above all the **binding or non-binding character** of provisions.

China has been consistent in its position: it accepts a Code of Conduct but **refuses any binding mechanism** that would deprive it of final control over interpretation. This refusal makes logical sense from Beijing's perspective — a binding Code would reduce its freedom of action in waters it considers its own. But this refusal makes the exercise largely symbolic from the claimants' perspective.

### **The new Philippine demands**

In the current negotiations, the Philippines are demanding that the Code of Conduct include provisions on **military activities** in the contested zone, **transparency mechanisms** on construction and activities, and an **explicit link to international law** — notably UNCLOS and the **2016** arbitral ruling. These are precisely the provisions China refuses.

The Hormuz crisis gives the Philippines an additional argument to push these demands: the absence of clear rules creates a systemic risk that all ASEAN members endure. A Code of Conduct without transparency mechanisms and without a link to international law does not prevent crises — it manages them after the fact. And as Hormuz showed, **after-the-fact management is costly for everyone**.

*I watch these negotiations with eroding patience. A Code of Conduct without binding teeth is a Code of Conduct for show. China knows it, which is why it accepts negotiating — toothless negotiations allow it to consolidate its presence on the ground while diplomats discuss in Geneva or Hanoi. If ASEAN wants a real result, it must be ready to accept a public disagreement with Beijing. That is difficult, but it is the only path toward something substantive.*

## The 2016 ruling — the ignored legal foundation

### **The Hague has spoken — China is not listening**

In **July 2016**, the Hague arbitral tribunal issued a historic ruling: China's "nine-dash line" claims in the South China Sea have **no foundation in international maritime law**. The historical rights invoked by Beijing do not confer sovereign rights over these waters under UNCLOS. It is a clear, rigorous, and definitive ruling.

China rejected this ruling with contempt. It called it "null and void." It refused to participate in the arbitral proceedings. And it continued its expansion policy in the South China Sea as if the ruling did not exist. The **Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs** recalled on **June 22, 2026** the validity of this ruling — a necessary reaffirmation in the face of continuing pressure.

### **Respect for international law as a test of global legitimacy**

The fundamental question is not merely strategic — it is **systemic**. If a great power can impunely ignore an international arbitral ruling, the entire system of peaceful dispute resolution is weakened. The Chinese precedent tells all states: **if you are powerful enough, you can disregard international law**. That is an invitation to the law of the strongest that undermines the world order in all its dimensions.

The West cannot selectively support international law — invoking the UN Charter for Ukraine and ignoring the Hague ruling for the South China Sea. Consistency is the condition of credibility. **Supporting the Philippines in their demand for respect of the 2016 ruling** is defending a universal principle, not merely a Philippine interest.

*There is something deeply troubling about the 2016 arbitral ruling being ignored ten years after it was handed down. In our domestic legal systems, a court ruling not enforced after ten years demonstrates a rule-of-law failure. On the international stage, this failure is normalized. I find this unacceptable — not naively, but because the long-term consequences of this normalization are catastrophic for the world order.*

## China-Philippines tensions reach their peak in 2026

### **Scarborough, coast guards, harassment — gradual escalation**

The year **2026** represents the highest tension point in China-Philippines relations in years. The naval confrontation of **June 23** at Scarborough, the repeated blockades of Philippine coast guard vessels attempting to resupply their outposts, the harassment of fishermen — these incidents are accumulating with growing frequency and intensity.

This escalation is not the product of chance. It reflects a **deliberate Chinese decision to increase pressure** on Manila to test the limits of Philippine resistance and American commitment. Each incident is also a message sent to the other ASEAN claimants: this is what awaits you if you resist like the Philippines. The pressure is simultaneously specific and universal.

### **The collective response — a test for ASEAN**

ASEAN's capacity to respond collectively to these tensions in **2026** will be a **test of its institutional cohesion**. If the bloc can accelerate Code of Conduct negotiations by integrating the Hormuz argument, if the most hesitant members accept supporting a firmer position, that will be a sign of collective diplomatic maturity. If the divisions persist, Beijing will have new confirmation that its divide-and-rule strategy works.

The outcome of this test depends in part on the **willingness of major external powers** outside ASEAN — the United States, the European Union, Japan — to concretely support members resisting Chinese pressure. American support for the Philippines is visible. European support remains insufficiently concrete. The overall equation is in fragile balance.

*I harbor a modest hope — and I insist on "modest" — that the Hormuz lesson can unblock something in the Code of Conduct negotiations. Crises sometimes produce consensuses that years of normal negotiation do not. But I hold no illusions about China: as long as it remains convinced that its power position allows it to impose its views, it will continue negotiating with no intention of being bound. The cost of its refusal would need to be substantially higher than it is today.*

## India in the South China Sea equation

### **New Delhi between interest and strategic caution**

**India** occupies a particular position in the geopolitics of the South China Sea. It is not a direct claimant, but it has significant economic interests in the trade routes that cross these waters. Its relations with China are complex — competitive in some domains, interdependent in others, and occasionally conflictual as shown by the Galwan border crisis in **2020**.

India is a member of the **Quad** but maintains a policy of **"strategic autonomy"** that leads it to avoid overly explicit alignments. New Delhi supports in principle freedom of navigation and respect for international law, but prefers not to engage directly in South China Sea disputes. This prudence is understandable given its complex relations with Beijing — but it limits the effectiveness of a common democratic front against China.

### **India and the strengthening of its navy**

The **Indian Navy** is in a phase of significant expansion, with investments in **aircraft carriers**, submarines, and destroyers. India is developing power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean and beyond, partly to counterbalance the growing **Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean** (the "string of pearls" doctrine). While these investments do not directly target the South China Sea, they create pressure on Chinese naval resources that must monitor multiple theaters simultaneously.

A **navally strong India** is a strategic factor that complicates Beijing's calculations, even if New Delhi does not explicitly engage in South China Sea disputes. Indian naval power in the **Indian Ocean** represents a constraint on Chinese naval movements between its bases in the South China Sea and its potential zones of influence further west. This is a form of indirect pressure that contributes to the regional balance.

*India's position fascinates me in its complexity. New Delhi knows China is its primary long-term strategic constraint. Yet it maintains a calculated ambiguity that allows it to benefit from Western support without engaging in direct confrontations with Beijing. This form of strategic realism makes sense for India — but it complicates building a coherent democratic front against revisionist threats.**As a personal closing note: these dossiers are complex, the uncertainties real, and perfect answers nonexistent. What I can state with conviction is that the defense of liberal democracies and their allies is not only legitimate but necessary — against adversaries who, for their part, have no doubt about their objectives.*

## Vietnam — a discreet but determined ally in resistance to Beijing

### Hanoi between pragmatism and resistance

In the tableau of **ASEAN facing China**, **Vietnam** deserves special mention. Hanoi has a long history of resistance to Beijing — a history marked by wars, occupations, and tensions that predate the current period by far. This historical memory feeds a structural mistrust of China that transcends Vietnamese political cycles.

In the context of the South China Sea, **Vietnam has its own claims** to the Spratly and Paracel Islands — claims in direct conflict with China's. Hanoi has adopted a strategy of **discreet resistance**: strengthening military capabilities (Russian submarines, coastal missile systems), developing defense relations with the United States and other powers, while maintaining economic relations with Beijing to avoid triggering an open confrontation.

### The Vietnam-Philippines convergence

The strategic interests of **Vietnam and the Philippines** in the South China Sea are largely convergent, even if their diplomatic styles differ. Hanoi is more discreet and less inclined to public confrontations with Beijing than Manila. But behind this caution, Vietnam generally supports Philippine positions in multilateral forums and shares the interest in a **binding Code of Conduct** that would limit Chinese actions in waters both countries claim.

This tacit convergence between the two countries is a diplomatic asset the Philippines can use to strengthen their position within **ASEAN**. If Vietnam and the Philippines present a common position on the key elements of the Code of Conduct — binding, linked to international law, transparent — they together represent two of the most important claimants and can exert significant pressure on more hesitant members like Malaysia and Brunei.

*Vietnam is the most underestimated actor in South China Sea dynamics. Its history with China, its quiet determination, its gradual defense investments — all of this sketches a potentially essential partner for anyone seeking to maintain balance in the region. The Vietnam-Philippines relationship, two countries with very different diplomatic styles but convergent interests against Beijing, deserves the attention analysts rarely give it.*

## Conclusion: Hormuz opened a window — will we seize it?

### **A rare diplomatic opportunity**

The **Hormuz crisis created a diplomatic window of opportunity** to accelerate the South China Sea Code of Conduct. The empirical demonstration of the systemic risk linked to disruptions of strategic commercial straits is a powerful argument that transcends ASEAN's habitual divisions. The Philippines seized this opportunity with intelligence and determination.

But windows of opportunity close. World attention shifts, urgencies succeed one another, and China has every interest in letting this moment pass without concluding. **Pressure must be maintained** — by the Philippines, by their ASEAN partners, and by external powers with a documented interest in the stability of these waters. This is a long-haul effort that cannot afford to slacken.

### **International law as an irreplaceable foundation**

Beyond tactics and opportune moments, the foundation of any durable solution remains **international maritime law** — UNCLOS, the **2016** arbitral ruling, the principles of freedom of navigation. Any Code of Conduct not grounded in these foundations will be a fragile agreement that China can circumvent at will. The international community must insist that a Code of Conduct worthy of the name be anchored in international law — not in a nebulous compromise that offers Beijing the flexibility it needs to continue its strategy of gradual advance.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

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## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Straits Times — Hormuz crisis sharpens Philippines push for ASEAN Code of Conduct — June 24, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/aseans-gift-to-the-world-hormuz-crisis-sharpens-philippines-push-for-south-china-sea-code)

- [South China Morning Post — China-Philippines naval confrontation at Scarborough — June 23, 2026](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3358063/china-and-philippines-have-rare-naval-stand-near-disputed-scarborough-shoal)

### Secondary sources

- [Manila Bulletin — DFA defends the 2016 South China Sea arbitral ruling — June 22, 2026](https://mb.com.ph/2026/06/22/dfa-rejects-chinese-embassy-claims-defends-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-ruling)

- [Washington Times — Rising tensions around the contested shoal — June 25, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/25/tensions-rise-disputed-south-china-sea-shoal/)

- [Türkiye Today — Philippines fear permanent seizure of Scarborough — June 22, 2026](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/world/philippines-fears-china-may-seize-scarborough-shoal-permanently-report-3222450)

- [Manila Bulletin — AFP intensifies patrols near Bajo de Masinloc — June 23, 2026](https://mb.com.ph/2026/06/23/afp-to-intensify-patrols-near-bajo-de-masinloc-despite-chinese-presence)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/essai-l-asean-use-la-crise-d-ormuz-pour-accelerer-le-code-de-conduite-en-mer-de