# INVESTIGATION: Zelensky speaks to Putin's friends — the whispered peace Moscow refuses to hear

> There is something deeply strange about the current situation: Zelensky sends peace messages through the friends of the man who bombs his cities every week. One could call it hypocrisy or naivety. I c

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-zelensky-parle-aux-amis-de-poutine-la-paix-murmuree-que-moscou-refuse-d

## Introduction: The message no one expected

### An explosive statement that passed almost unnoticed

On **June 26, 2026**, in his evening address, Ukrainian president **Volodymyr Zelensky** spoke a sentence that few media outlets treated with the weight it deserved: **"Putin's friends have heard from us that a meeting is possible and that ending this war is possible. Russia must now take that step toward peace."** This was not a statement of capitulation. It was not a simple diplomatic formula either. It was a calculated signal, sent through informal channels to a regime that has systematically rejected every offer of dialogue since the full-scale invasion began in **February 2022**.

This declaration came in a paradoxical context: **Zelensky** had simultaneously announced a **40-day offensive campaign** against Russian energy infrastructure, with strikes already executed against refineries in **Ufa**, more than **1,500 kilometers from the front**. Maximum military pressure and diplomatic overture running in parallel — that is **Kyiv**'s strategy in the summer of **2026**. This is not a contradiction. It is diplomacy under fire, and this investigation examines what that strategy truly reveals.

### Why this investigation is necessary

Peace declarations in wartime are rarely what they appear. They can be sincere signals, communication maneuvers aimed at Western allies, pressure on **Moscow** through intermediaries, or simply rhetorical formulas to maintain international support. This investigation examines the **verifiable facts** behind Ukraine's peace proposals in late June 2026: who are these "friends of Putin" that were contacted, what conditions does Ukraine set, and why does Russia respond with escalation rather than dialogue. The answer is as uncomfortable as it is revealing.

The stakes go far beyond Ukraine. The question of peace in Ukraine has become the central question of European security, of the credibility of multilateral institutions, and of the West's ability to honor its commitments in the face of a predatory state testing the limits of what the international community will tolerate. What is at play in the diplomatic whispers of **June 2026** will resonate for decades.

## Who are "Putin's friends" that **Zelensky** contacted?

### Informal channels as diplomatic tools in wartime

**Zelensky** did not explicitly name these "friends of Putin" in his **June 26, 2026** statement. But the immediate context provides clues. At that same moment, **Alexander Lukashenko**, the Belarusian president — who allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a launchpad for the **2022** invasion — claimed to have met **Zelensky**'s representatives to discuss peace. **Kyiv** flatly denied that claim. Simultaneously, Lukashenko was traveling to **Moscow** to meet **Vladimir Putin**. The sequence is suggestive even if it permits no definitive conclusions.

Beyond Lukashenko, Ukraine's informal channels for reaching the Kremlin have historically included Russian oligarchs with economic interests in the West, diplomats from non-aligned countries such as **Turkey**, **India**, and Gulf states, as well as members of Putin's inner circle who maintain discreet contacts with Ukrainian or Western interlocutors. These channels do not replace official diplomacy — they prepare or bypass it when direct talks are impossible.

### **Kyiv**'s denial as political act

The fact that **Kyiv** denied having met Lukashenko's representatives is itself a political act. By refusing to authenticate a channel via Belarus, Ukraine avoids granting diplomatic legitimacy to a regime that directly contributed to the Russian aggression against its territory. The distinction is precise: conveying a message **through** intermediaries is not the same as **officially meeting** those intermediaries. That is the difference between a signal and a recognition.

This nuance is crucial to understanding Ukrainian diplomacy in **2026**: **Zelensky** seeks to maintain communication with **Moscow** through deniable channels while refusing to confer legitimacy on compromised intermediaries. This is an extraordinarily difficult diplomatic balancing act to sustain under constant military and political pressure, and it illustrates the sophistication of a Ukrainian diplomacy often underestimated by outside observers.

## Ukraine's conditions for peace: what **Zelensky** actually said

### **Zelensky** is not proposing capitulation — he is setting conditions

It is essential to clarify what **Zelensky**'s overture actually means in concrete terms. He is not proposing an unconditional ceasefire. He is not proposing to negotiate over occupied Ukrainian territories. What he signals through his intermediaries is that **the war can end** if Russia agrees to recognize Ukrainian sovereignty, commits to withdrawing from occupied Ukrainian territories, and accepts a framework of accountability for war crimes committed since **2022**. These conditions have been unchanged since the **10-point peace formula** **Zelensky** first presented at the **UN** in September **2022**.

The Ukrainian peace formula specifically includes: the **restoration of territorial integrity** within **1991** borders, complete withdrawal of Russian forces, the release of all prisoners of war and deportees, a **special tribunal for war crimes**, mechanisms for **war reparations**, and **binding security guarantees** to prevent future aggression. These conditions are not negotiating positions designed to be abandoned — they are the minimum floor beneath which no Ukrainian government can sign without losing all legitimacy.

### Why Putin cannot accept these conditions

Putin responded indirectly to Ukraine's overture on **June 29, 2026**, categorically rejecting Ukraine's proposal to **mutually limit long-range strikes**. He declared that **"saving the Kyiv** regime is not part of our plans." This formulation is revealing: it does not speak of peace, it speaks of regimes and political survival. For Putin, accepting Ukraine's conditions would be tantamount to admitting that his invasion has failed — constituting an existential threat to his domestic political position.

Analyst **Ian Lesser** of the **German Marshall Fund** has noted that Russia perceives its long-range strike capability as a **deterrent advantage** it will not relinquish without major concessions. **Moscow** insists on returning to the **Istanbul 2022** terms — in essence, Ukraine's capitulation through the cession of occupied territories and drastic limitations on its military capabilities. For **Kyiv**, these terms are not a basis for negotiation: they are surrender in disguise.

## The 40-day campaign: military pressure as diplomatic leverage

### The strategic logic behind the Ufa strikes

On **June 26, 2026**, **Zelensky** announced a **40-day offensive campaign** targeting Russian energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, Ukraine was executing strikes against refineries in **Ufa**, capital of the **Bashkortostan Republic**, more than **1,500 kilometers from the front**. This distance is significant: it demonstrates the range of Ukrainian ballistic capabilities and Ukraine's ability to strike deep inside Russian territory, far from combat zones.

The strategic logic is explicit in **Zelensky**'s own declarations: **"As soon as Russia's economy contracts, its ability to carry out massive attacks also diminishes."** By targeting refineries — sources of fuel for military operations and revenue for the Russian war budget — Ukraine seeks to demonstrate to **Moscow** that the economic cost of continuing the war exceeds the expected benefits. This is the doctrine of **imposed cost**, applied at an unprecedented scale in this conflict.

### The silencing of Belarusian relay stations

In parallel with the Ufa strikes, the **Guardian** reported on **June 26, 2026** that Belarusian relay stations had been silenced as part of Ukrainian operations during that period. This information, if accurate, illustrates the informational and electronic warfare dimension of the Ukrainian campaign: disrupting the communications and propaganda relays of the **Lukashenko regime**, Putin's indispensable ally, while simultaneously maintaining pressure on Russian energy infrastructure.

This multi-front campaign — energy, electronic, diplomatic — is the signature of Ukrainian war doctrine in the summer of **2026**: not concentrating pressure on a single vulnerable point, but multiplying theaters of operation to disperse Russian resources and create relentless dilemmas for Kremlin military planners. It is a doctrine forged in four years of intensive warfare, and it shows signs of growing sophistication.

## Putin's response: refusing limits on long-range strikes

### A calculated reply designed to project strength

On **June 29, 2026**, Putin explicitly rejected Ukraine's proposal for mutual limits on long-range strikes. This response was not improvised — it is the translation of a deliberate strategy. By refusing any limit on its strike capabilities, Putin maintains a **permanent threat** over Ukrainian cities as a tool of psychological pressure on Ukraine's population and decision-makers. It is also a message to Western allies: **"Do not think you can frame our military strategy from outside."**

Putin's declaration that **"saving the Kyiv** regime is not part of our plans" deserves precise analysis. By using the word **"regime"** for Ukraine's legitimately elected government, Putin reveals his fundamental vision of the conflict: for him, this is not a war between sovereign states, but a regime-change operation against an illegitimate government. This **vision is the root** of all current diplomatic impossibilities — one does not negotiate with a government one considers illegitimate.

### The Istanbul terms: surrender disguised as a peace agreement

Russia continues to insist on returning to the terms of the **Istanbul** draft agreement from April **2022**, which Ukrainian and British sources have maintained was derailed under Kremlin pressure itself, after initial Ukrainian concessions. Those terms included drastic limitations on the size of the Ukrainian army, a ban on heavy military equipment, and a neutrality clause incompatible with any **NATO** or EU membership. In practice, accepting Istanbul 2022 would mean Ukraine **relinquishing its defense sovereignty** while leaving Russia in possession of occupied Ukrainian territory.

To understand why Ukraine cannot accept these terms, one need only imagine what would have happened had it accepted them in **2022**: a disarmed Ukraine, without binding security guarantees, facing a Russia that would never have paid an adequate price for its aggression. The next invasion would only be a matter of time. This is precisely what the Baltic states, Poland, and serious defense analysts have argued from the start — and that is why Ukraine's **position on security guarantees** is non-negotiable.

## The battle of narratives: the Lukashenko affair

### A fabricated claim designed to create a negotiation narrative

In the days preceding **Zelensky**'s **June 26** statement, **Alexander Lukashenko** had publicly claimed to have met **Zelensky**'s representatives to discuss peace. That claim was false — **Kyiv** denied it categorically. But its interest lies precisely there: Lukashenko attempted to reposition himself as a potential peace intermediary at the very moment he was traveling to **Moscow** to meet Putin. The sequence suggests possible coordination between **Moscow** and Minsk to create a diplomatic narrative favorable to Russia.

The strategy is a classic of authoritarian political communication: creating a **narrative fait accompli**. If media outlets relay Lukashenko's claim as factual, the meeting "took place" in public perception, even if it never existed. **Kyiv** responded correctly by denying rapidly and firmly. But the speed at which disinformation travels in the fragmented media environments of **2026** means the denial often reaches fewer people than the original claim.

### What the Belarusian manipulation reveals about Russian intentions

If **Moscow** were sincerely interested in peace, it would not need to create fake negotiation narratives through Lukashenko. It would simply respond directly to Ukrainian proposals. The fact that Russia prefers media manipulation to direct dialogue reveals the essential point: **Putin is not interested in a peace that would recognize Ukrainian sovereignty**. He seeks to weaken Western support for Ukraine by creating the illusion that **Kyiv** refuses to negotiate. It is an information strategy as much as a military one.

This strategy has had some success in certain segments of Western public opinion — particularly in pacifist circles that see any ceasefire proposal, regardless of its terms, as preferable to continued fighting. **Zelensky** is aware of this, which is precisely why he maintains public diplomatic signals even in the absence of a good-faith partner on the Russian side: to demonstrate to his allies that Ukraine is not an obstacle to peace, but that Russia is.

## The diplomatic front: the **Gdańsk** Reconstruction Conference

### Rebuilding Ukraine during the war as political message

On **June 25 and 26, 2026**, **Zelensky** participated in the **Ukraine Reconstruction Conference** in **Gdańsk**, Poland. Holding this conference during the war — not after — is a powerful political message: Ukraine and its allies are planning reconstruction on the basis of victory and restored sovereignty, not an ambiguous armistice. The conference brought together governments, international organizations, and private investors around concrete commitments to fund post-conflict reconstruction.

**Zelensky**'s simultaneous attendance at a reconstruction conference and his announcement of the **40-day** offensive campaign is not a contradiction — it is the same strategy seen from two angles. The political angle tells the West: **"Your support leads to a Ukraine that can be rebuilt and will survive."** The military angle tells Russia: **"The war costs you too much for you to win it."** **Both messages converge** toward the same goal: creating the conditions for a war exit in which Ukraine emerges sovereign.

### **Gdańsk** as deliberate historical symbol

**Gdańsk** as a venue is not incidental. This is the city where the **Solidarity** trade union was founded in **1980**, triggering the process that would lead to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. It is also a Polish city whose history was deeply marked by Nazi and Soviet aggression. Organizing the Ukrainian reconstruction conference in this specific city is a deliberate symbolic gesture: Ukraine inscribes itself in the continuity of European resistance to authoritarianism, and it counts on the same international solidarity that once supported Solidarity.

This symbolism is not gratuitous — it fulfills a precise political function in Ukrainian diplomatic communication. By anchoring its struggle in a recognized and valued tradition of European resistance, Ukraine strengthens its moral legitimacy in the eyes of a Western public sometimes tempted by war fatigue. Historical memory is a diplomatic weapon, and **Zelensky** wields it with remarkable skill for a wartime leader.

## The allies and the pressure for a negotiated exit

### Western pressures for compromise: a reality to be named

It would be inaccurate to present Western support for Ukraine as uniformly resolute and unconditional. In several European capitals and in **Washington**, voices — sometimes influential ones — are pushing for a territorial compromise or a provisional ceasefire. Some allies are quietly expressing concern about the human and financial cost of the conflict. While the **Trump** administration in the **United States** has at times seemed more interested in a quick exit than a just one, European allies such as **France**, the **United Kingdom**, and **Germany** have maintained firmer support for the Ukrainian position.

This pressure exists and **Zelensky** is perfectly aware of it. That is precisely why he maintains public diplomatic signals — to respond to allies asking him to demonstrate openness to peace. The **June 26** statement about "Putin's friends" is also a response to that internal Western pressure: **"See — we are sending messages. We want peace. It is Russia that refuses."** This is strategic communication as much as genuine diplomacy.

### Why an unjust peace would be worse than continued conflict

The case for a quick peace, even an imperfect one, is seductive in human terms: every day of war costs lives. But the case against an unjust peace is more fundamental: a Ukraine weakened by a forced territorial agreement would set a catastrophic precedent for international law and for European security. If Russia can seize sovereign territories by force and retain them through negotiations, every border in Europe potentially becomes negotiable. **That precedent is not worth the price of a premature end to the fighting.**

The Baltic states, **Poland**, **Finland**, and **Sweden** — nations that understand this reality from their own historical experience with Russia — are among Ukraine's most resolute allies precisely for this reason. They know that peace achieved through capitulation is not peace — it is a respite before the next aggression. Their position is not idealism. It is survival strategy based on centuries of experience with **Moscow**'s imperial ambitions.

## The question of prisoners of war and deportees

### A humanitarian file blocked by Russian political logic

Among Ukraine's peace conditions is the **release of all prisoners of war and deported civilians**, notably the **Ukrainian children** forcibly taken to Russia since **2022**. The **International Criminal Court** issued an arrest warrant against **Putin** precisely for this crime of deporting Ukrainian children. This file is fundamental: it is not a negotiating position — it is an obligation under international law that Russia is openly violating.

Estimates on the number of Ukrainian children taken to Russia vary, but human rights organizations such as **Save Ukraine** and UN investigators speak of several tens of thousands. A peace that would leave these children in Russia would be a peace with a fundamental injustice written into its terms. This is one of the reasons why the Ukrainian peace formula is not only **legitimate**, but morally necessary as a starting point for any serious negotiation.

### The humanitarian lever in Ukrainian diplomacy

**Zelensky** has regularly used the deportees file as diplomatic leverage with non-aligned countries — **Turkey**, the **Vatican**, **Gulf states** — that position themselves as potential mediators. By making the humanitarian question a public priority, Ukraine demonstrates that its peace conditions are not purely geopolitical but also deeply human. This strategy has met with partial success: some prisoner exchanges have been negotiated, and some children have been able to return to Ukraine through mediators.

But every humanitarian exchange runs up against the fundamental Russian political logic: Russia seeks to use prisoners and deportees as bargaining chips for geopolitical concessions rather than as a humanitarian issue to be resolved on its own merits. This instrumentalization of human suffering is revealing of the nature of the regime with which Ukraine is forced to negotiate — a regime that violates international law and then uses it as leverage.

## The economic logic of the war: why Putin still believes he can win

### The Russian war economy: more resilient than anticipated

One of the great surprises of this conflict has been the resilience of the Russian economy in the face of Western sanctions. Despite unprecedented sanctions in their scope, Russia has redirected its trade toward **China**, **India**, the Gulf states, and other non-aligned economies. Its military budget has more than doubled since **2022**, funding an increase in weapons production, ammunition, and drones that has allowed it to partially offset its massive front-line losses.

It is precisely this economic resilience that explains Ukraine's strategy of targeting energy infrastructure. **Zelensky** himself has theorized the link: reducing Russian energy revenue reduces the capacity to finance the war. The **Ufa** refineries are not just economic infrastructure — they are logistical arteries of the Russian war machine. Striking them is not irrational escalation: it is the logical application of imposed-cost doctrine to strategic targets.

### China's role: the silent support the West cannot ignore

Behind the resilience of Russia's war economy stands an actor that peace negotiations cannot ignore: **China**. **Beijing** has not supplied weapons to Russia at the same level as **North Korea** and **Iran** — at least not openly. But China has provided electronic components, machine tools, drone parts, and dual-use goods that directly feed Russian military production. It has also absorbed much of the Russian oil and gas cut off by Western sanctions, allowing **Moscow** to maintain its energy revenues.

Any serious peace negotiation must therefore incorporate the Chinese dimension: **without pressure on Beijing** to reduce its support for **Moscow**, Russia can sustain its war economy indefinitely. The West has begun responding to this reality through secondary sanctions against Chinese companies — with partial results. **China remains the principal geopolitical obstacle** to a just settlement of the Ukrainian conflict, even as it prefers to maintain ambiguity about the true extent of its support for Russia.

## The forgotten negotiators: the roles of Turkey, the UAE, and India

### Mediators playing both sides

Several countries have positioned themselves as potential mediators between Ukraine and Russia since **2022**: **Turkey**, the **United Arab Emirates**, **India**, and to a lesser extent **China** and the **Vatican**. These countries share a common trait: they refuse to choose between Ukraine and Russia for economic, energy, or geopolitical reasons of their own. Their ability to serve as communication channels is real — but their willingness to push for a just peace rather than a quick peace is far less certain.

**Turkey** has the most active profile: it facilitated the **2022** grain export agreement, organized prisoner exchanges, and maintained communication lines with both **Moscow** and **Kyiv** simultaneously. Its positioning as host of the **NATO Ankara** summit on **July 7 and 8, 2026** gives it an expanded role in Alliance diplomacy at the precise moment when Ukrainian questions are at the center of the agenda. It is no accident that Turkey secured this summit — it is the fruit of a deliberate strategy by **Erdoğan** to maintain his role as indispensable intermediary.

### What these mediators cannot do

The fundamental limit of all these mediators is the same: they can facilitate communications, organize limited exchanges, and perhaps help reduce the risk of accidental escalation. But they cannot substitute their will for that of the belligerents. If Putin refuses any peace that recognizes Ukrainian sovereignty over its legal territories, no mediator can force him to change position. **Mediation is only useful** when both sides are seeking an exit — and currently, only one side genuinely is.

That is why genuine **peace diplomacy** cannot be reduced to facilitating meetings and relaying messages. It must be accompanied by sufficient pressure on Russia to make the cost of continuing the war unbearable. Sanctions, strikes on energy infrastructure, continued military support for Ukraine — these are the levers that will create conditions for a just peace. Mediation diplomacy without these levers is mere diplomatic geography serving **Moscow**'s interests.

## The **NATO** **Ankara** summit: decisive test for Alliance unity

### What **Zelensky** expects from **Ankara**

The **NATO Ankara** summit on **July 7 and 8, 2026** is the next major test of Alliance unity in the face of Russia. **Zelensky** expected several concrete outcomes: firm commitments on the continuity and level of military support, a positive signal on **Ukraine's path to NATO** membership, and a collective rejection of any ceasefire proposal not accompanied by binding security guarantees. These expectations reflect the reality that Ukrainian diplomacy has been building for months — an allied consensus around a firm position.

**Zelensky**'s preparation for the summit illustrates his method: a series of bilateral meetings with the most resolutely pro-Ukraine allies — Baltic states, Poland, **United Kingdom**, Nordic countries — to build a coherent bloc within the Alliance capable of resisting pressure for premature compromises. The meeting with **Latvian president Rinkēvičs** on **June 26**, described in this investigation, is precisely part of that coordinated preparation strategy.

### **NATO** facing its moment of truth

**NATO** faces an existential test: maintain its unity and credibility in the face of an aggression directly testing the Alliance's founding principles, or allow internal divisions to signal to **Moscow** that Western cohesion has exploitable limits. For allies with shared borders with Russia, the answer is clear: **NATO** must hold firm. For other allies geographically more distant, the temptation of compromise is real, especially if their publics are weary of the conflict and its cost.

The **Ankara** summit will also be the first after the **formal accession** of several recently admitted or pending countries. The dynamic of Alliance enlargement is one of the most profound transformations induced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine — in seeking to weaken **NATO**, Putin achieved the exact opposite: an enlarged, reinforced Alliance more resolved than ever on its eastern flank. This is one of the most striking strategic paradoxes of this conflict.

## Russian losses as a peace argument: the figures behind the signal

### One and a half million soldiers — the human cost of Putin's intransigence

On **July 2, 2026**, the Ukrainian general staff published its daily estimates of Russian losses: **1,405,900 soldiers** killed or wounded since the start of the invasion. To these human losses add **12,069 tanks** destroyed, **24,861 armored vehicles**, **45,168 artillery systems**, and **385,190 drones** shot down. These figures, even accounting for the possibility of bias in Ukrainian estimates, paint a picture of a military catastrophe of a scale without equivalent in European military history since **World War II**.

These losses constitute a diplomatic argument as much as a military one. **Zelensky** cites them regularly to signal to both Western allies and potential intermediaries that Russia is paying a price that makes the continuation of the war economically and demographically unsustainable in the medium term. If Putin refuses to hear this argument today, demographic and economic pressure will ultimately impose it. The only question is one of timing and the price the Ukrainian people will have to pay to reach that point.

### The demographic asymmetry as a long-term factor

Russia has a population of roughly **144 million**, versus **43 million** for Ukraine before the war (and probably around **35-38 million** given displacement since **2022**). This demographic asymmetry explains why Ukrainian strategists count on inflicting **disproportionate losses** on Russia: to maintain the pressure until Russian losses become a domestic political problem for Putin that even state propaganda can no longer conceal. Maintaining robust Western support is the sine qua non of this strategy.

This demographic reality is also what makes conscription and mobilization proposals in Ukraine so politically painful: each Ukrainian soldier counts for more than his Russian counterpart in terms of relative demographic impact. This is why Ukraine has bet on technological superiority, drones, precision, and allied support to offset its numerical disadvantage. The campaign against **Ufa** illustrates this doctrine: strike far with precision rather than mass against mass.

## What "wanting peace" means: a conceptual analysis

### The difference between wanting the war to end and wanting peace

Wanting the war to stop is not the same as wanting peace. The end of war can take the form of military victory, armistice, capitulation, ceasefire, or negotiated agreement. Peace, in the sense international relations theorists mean it, implies not only the cessation of hostilities but also the resolution of the conflict's fundamental causes and the creation of mechanisms to prevent its recurrence. By this definition, **Zelensky wants peace**. The question is whether Putin wants the same thing — or simply the end of Ukrainian resistance.

The distinction between these two visions of "peace" is at the heart of all the diplomatic complexity of this conflict. When intermediaries or mediators speak of peace, one must always ask: which peace? A peace in which Ukraine surrenders territory and security guarantees is not a lasting peace — it is a capitulation that postpones the conflict. A peace in which Russia recognizes Ukrainian sovereignty, commits to withdrawal, and accepts accountability mechanisms is a lasting peace — but it requires Russia to accept the consequences of its aggression.

### The Ukrainian peace formula as the legal architecture of the future

**Zelensky's 10-point peace formula** is not merely a list of Ukrainian demands. It constitutes a proposal for a legal and institutional architecture for European security after the conflict. If these points were adopted, they would create important precedents: that aggression does not pay, that war crimes must be judged, that the deportation of children is punishable, and that security guarantees must be binding rather than declarative. These precedents would benefit the entire international community, not just Ukraine.

This is why the Ukrainian stakes go beyond Ukraine. A just settlement of the Ukrainian conflict would reinforce international law, the credibility of collective security guarantees, and the capacity of democracies to collectively resist authoritarian aggression. An unjust settlement would do precisely the opposite: signal to authoritarian states everywhere that aggression can pay if it is sufficiently persistent and costly to counter. **China**, watching carefully, would draw its own conclusions regarding **Taiwan**.

## Conclusion: The **possible peace** and the **just peace** — these are two different things

### What this investigation has established

This investigation has established several verifiable facts: **Zelensky** is actively sending diplomatic signals through informal channels to intermediaries close to Putin. Ukraine's conditions for peace are precise, legally grounded, and unchanged since **2022**. Russia responds with **military escalation** and rejection of Ukrainian proposals rather than a good-faith diplomatic counter-engagement. And informal channels — Lukashenko, non-aligned mediators, discreet intermediaries — are being actively exploited by **Moscow** as instruments of narrative manipulation rather than sincere dialogue.

What this investigation cannot establish: whether a peace agreement is possible within a foreseeable timeframe. The conditions for a lasting peace exist in theory — they are documented in the Ukrainian peace formula. But they can only materialize if Russia decides to accept them, or if the military, economic, and demographic cost of continuing the war becomes sufficiently unbearable to alter Putin's calculations. That moment has not yet arrived. But the **40-day campaign** **Zelensky** announced on **June 26, 2026** is precisely designed to accelerate it.

### The final message of this investigation

**Zelensky** told Putin's friends that a meeting is possible. He also continued striking Russian refineries and strengthening Ukrainian defensive capabilities. These two actions are not contradictory — they form a coherent strategy: **maintain military pressure until the moment diplomacy can produce a just peace**, not simply a quick peace. It is a risky strategy, costly in human lives, and dependent on sustained allied support. But given the circumstances, in the face of an aggressor who has shown no sincere will toward peace, it is the only strategy that can lead to a lasting outcome.

**Putin's friends** heard the message. **Moscow** chose not to respond. History will record who wanted peace and who chose war — and that distinction deserves to be documented with precision, honesty, and the rigor the moment demands.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Zelensky Evening Address: Putin's friends have heard that a meeting is possible — June 26, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/26/8041296/)

- [The Guardian — Ukraine War Briefing: Zelensky announces 40-day Russia blitz — June 26, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/ukraine-war-briefing-zelenskyy-40-day-russia-blitz)

- [Al Jazeera — Why has Putin rejected limits on long-range strikes? — June 29, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/29/russia-ukraine-war-why-has-putin-rejected-limits-on-long-range-strikes)

### Secondary sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Ukraine Russia War Updates — June 29, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/29/8041557/)

- [Kyiv Independent — If Europe Wants a Real Peace, It Must Make a Frozen War Unattractive — June 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/if-europe-wants-a-real-peace-it-must-make-a-frozen-war-unattractive/)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Russian War Losses as of July 2, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/02/8042020/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-zelensky-parle-aux-amis-de-poutine-la-paix-murmuree-que-moscou-refuse-d