# INVESTIGATION: Ukraine and its allies build defense space sovereignty

> In June 2026, amid fighting in the Donbas, drone strikes on Russian refineries, and a state of emergency declared in Crimea, Ukraine announced something extraordinary: starting in 2026, it is developing defense satellites in collaboration with partner countries, with the goal of creating a national constellation by 2030–2035. This constellation is meant to provide real-time ana

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-ukraine-et-ses-allies-construisent-une-souverainete-spatiale-de-defense

## Introduction: Ukraine launches a space conquest in wartime

### A historic announcement amid the chaos

In **June 2026**, amid fighting in the **Donbas**, drone strikes on Russian refineries, and a state of emergency declared in **Crimea**, **Ukraine** announced something extraordinary: starting in **2026**, it is developing **defense satellites** in collaboration with partner countries, with the goal of creating a **national constellation** by **2030–2035**. This constellation is meant to provide real-time analysis integrated into the defense technologies of the **Ukrainian Armed Forces**.

This announcement did not make mainstream headlines — eclipsed by daily battlefield dispatches. Yet it may represent one of the most strategically important developments of the conflict. A country at war that invests in its sovereign space capability is not a country fighting to survive — it is a country planning its victory and its future.

### The Drak satellite — Czech-Ukrainian cooperation

At the heart of this initiative is the **Drak** satellite, co-developed by the Czech **Brno Space Cluster** and Ukrainian company **TRL Space**. This satellite is a key element of the future **Suziria** constellation (the Ukrainian word for "constellation"), designed to provide military-grade space intelligence to the **Ukrainian Armed Forces**. The partnership with the **Czech Republic** — one of Ukraine's strongest partners within the **EU** — illustrates the Ukrainian strategy: build space sovereignty through targeted partnerships rather than developing everything in-house.

The **Brno Space Cluster**, based in the **Czech Republic**'s second city, is an industrial and academic ecosystem specializing in space technologies. Its collaboration with Ukrainian companies illustrates a broader trend: Central European space industry is building bridges with Ukraine not only out of solidarity, but because the war has generated technological expertise and demand that both sides have an interest in sharing.

*A Ukrainian company developing a satellite with a Czech technology cluster during an existential war. I find that reality deeply inspiring and slightly vertiginous. The war forced Ukraine to invent a defense space industry at breakneck speed — and the Ukrainians are clearly rising to the challenge.*

## The Suziria constellation — architecture and ambitions

### Target 2030–2035 — a medium-term vision

The **Suziria** constellation is planned to reach **operational capability** by **2030–2035**. That timeframe is significant: it extends far beyond the immediate frame of the current war. By investing in a **sovereign space infrastructure** whose full benefits will only be harvested after the war, Ukraine is affirming its confidence in its future as a sovereign state. It is a **political** declaration as much as a **technical** one.

The architecture of the **Suziria** constellation is not fully public for security reasons. What is known is that the goal is to provide **real-time analysis** integrated into Ukrainian forces' command-and-control systems — a capability similar to what American or French military satellites offer their armed forces, but developed sovereignly by and for Ukraine.

### Integration with existing defense systems

To be effective, the **Suziria** constellation must integrate with Ukraine's existing defense systems — digital command networks, drone networks, precision artillery. This integration is technically complex but strategically essential. The value of a reconnaissance satellite is only realized if the data it produces can be exploited in near-real time by fighters on the ground.

Ukraine's experience with commercial satellite data from **ICEYE** and **Maxar** proved that this integration is possible and that it transforms tactical operations. The **Suziria** constellation aims to operate with even lower latency and greater tasking flexibility — critical advantages in the fast-moving combat that characterizes modern warfare.

*The real revolution will not be the satellite itself — it will be the integration. Fresh satellite data arriving directly on a battalion commander's tablet, feeding directly into a strike decision. Ukraine learned how to do that with commercial satellites. Suziria is the same thing, but with total sovereignty and total flexibility.*

## The context — why Ukraine needs its own space capability

### The limits of dependence on allied satellites

Since the start of the war, **Ukraine** has relied heavily on its allies' satellites — American (**Maxar**, **Planet**), Finnish (**ICEYE**), and data shared by allied governments. That dependence has its advantages — access to cutting-edge capability without massive upfront investment — but also inherent limits. Allies can impose usage conditions, geographic or temporal restrictions, or simply experience outages and delays that do not match Ukrainian operational needs.

The war also revealed that satellite data availability is a **decisive military factor**. Periods when satellite coverage was reduced — clouds, technical problems, **tasking delays** — corresponded to moments of tactical uncertainty for Ukrainian forces. A **sovereign constellation** eliminates these external dependencies and ensures **continuous availability**.

### Ground station vulnerability — a Ukrainian lesson

Ukraine itself demonstrated, by striking the **space centers at Vladimir and Dubna**, that ground stations of military satellites constitute vulnerable strategic targets. That lesson applies in reverse to its own installations: the ground stations of a future **Suziria** constellation will need to be protected, dispersed, and resilient against potential Russian counter-strikes. This is a security challenge that Ukrainian planners are incorporating into the system's design.

The solution lies in decentralizing control stations and hardening them physically. International partners such as the **Czech Republic** can also play a role by hosting backup stations outside Ukrainian territory, reducing the risk that a single strike might deprive the constellation of its ground control.

*Ukraine strikes Russian space antennas near Moscow and simultaneously plans its own defense constellation. There is in that simultaneity a remarkable strategic coherence. Destroying the enemy's eyes while building your own — that is exactly what great military powers do. Ukraine is becoming one of them.*

## ICEYE and the partnership with European private industry

### The ICEYE model — commercial power in military service

The **Suziria** project sits within a broader ecosystem of commercial space companies working with **Ukraine**. **ICEYE**, the Finnish **SAR** satellite company that announced it would double its capacity by **late 2027**, has been a crucial partner for Ukraine since the first weeks of the war. Its satellites — which see through clouds and darkness — have provided essential data for strike planning and damage assessment.

**ICEYE CEO Rafal Modrzewski** has been pushing his **Constellation Europe** project — **1,000 satellites** combining observation, surveillance, and defense — inspired in part by the lessons drawn from supporting Ukraine. Ukrainian demand has thus helped accelerate the development of a broader European space capability, creating a virtuous cycle between immediate defense needs and long-term technological development.

### Other industrial partners

Beyond **ICEYE** and the **Brno Space Cluster**, other industrial partners are contributing to the development of Ukrainian space capabilities. French companies specializing in precision optics, British suppliers of small-satellite propulsion systems, German experts in image-processing software — the industrial ecosystem surrounding the **Suziria** project is European in its composition and resolutely oriented toward Ukrainian sovereignty in its purpose.

This architecture of multiple partnerships is deliberate. It avoids exclusive dependence on a single partner — with all the political and industrial risks that entails — while allowing access to the best technologies available in Europe. It is a distributed sovereignty approach that reflects Ukraine's growing industrial sophistication.

*When I study the industrial ecosystem around Suziria — Finns, Czechs, Britons, French, Ukrainians — I see something new: a distributed European defense space industry being built around Ukrainian needs. It was not planned that way. It is better than planned. And it will reshape European space geopolitics for decades.*

## Strikes on Russian space centers — context and confirmation

### Satellite confirms the hit on Vladimir

Just days before the announcement about developing the **Suziria** constellation, satellite imagery was confirming damage to the **space communications centers at Vladimir and Dubna**. **Militarnyi** published on **June 27, 2026** an analysis of satellite images clearly showing collapsed antennas and destroyed support structures at the **Vladimir** center. The timing is not coincidental: Ukraine is striking Russia's military space capabilities while building its own.

The satellite confirmation of Ukrainian strikes on Russian space centers is itself emblematic. It is a commercial satellite — likely from **ICEYE** or **Planet** — that provided the images used to assess the damage to Russian military antennas. The loop is complete: the tools of commercial space sovereignty serve to document the destruction of the enemy's military space capabilities.

### The spatial asymmetry being built

By striking the **Vladimir and Dubna** centers, Ukraine has degraded Russia's ground-based military space capabilities. By developing **Suziria**, it is building its own sovereign capabilities. The spatial asymmetry is being built simultaneously in both directions: Moscow sees its infrastructure degrade while **Kyiv** builds its own. Over the long term, this dynamic favors Ukraine if Western support maintains the necessary financing and partnerships.

Russia, despite its Soviet space heritage and continued investment in military satellites, faces structural difficulties: embargo on Western electronic components, difficulty maintaining and renewing its satellite constellations, brain drain from the space sector since sanctions began. This context reinforces the relative advantage Ukraine is building with its partners.

*Russia, the country that put the first satellite in orbit, is now under embargo on electronic chips and watching its space centers destroyed by Ukrainian drones. Meanwhile, Ukraine — which had no satellites of its own four years ago — is developing a constellation with European partners. If history could speak, it would be laughing.*

## Ukraine's defense industry — from zero to world-class

### Production multiplied by 50 in four years

European Commissioner for Defense **Andrius Kubilius** made a remarkable statement at **Eurosatory 2026**: Ukraine has "**the most innovative defense industry in the world**." This claim, which would have seemed absurd in **2021**, is backed by the numbers. **Ukrainian defense production** has been multiplied by **50** since **2022**, reaching a volume comparable to countries like **Germany** or **France**. It is an industrial growth rate without precedent in modern history.

This growth happened under extreme pressure — with Russian strikes regularly targeting Ukrainian defense factories — and with initially limited resources. It illustrates an extraordinary capacity for industrial and technological adaptation that has become one of Ukraine's most precious strategic assets.

### Drones — the catalyst for industrial innovation

At the heart of this industrial revolution are **drones**. Ukraine has developed a drone production industry that ranges from small **FPV** units weighing a few hundred grams to long-range strike drones capable of reaching Moscow. This industry is decentralized, resilient to strikes, and capable of innovating rapidly by integrating battlefield feedback in weeks rather than years.

**Defense satellites** fit within this same logic of accelerated innovation. The operational needs identified on the ground — a need for constant reconnaissance, target confirmation, tracking of enemy movements — generated demand that pushed industry to develop quickly. **TRL Space** and the **Brno Space Cluster** are responding to that demand with the same urgency as drone manufacturers respond to frontline needs.

*Ukraine's defense industry surpassing Germany and France in volume — that is the information that should make every European capital rethink its own industrial lag. While Berlin debates defense policy, Kyiv builds. While Paris hesitates on arms deliveries, Ukraine makes its own weapons. The lesson is embarrassing for Western Europe.*

## The Suziria constellation versus Russian space capabilities

### A technological David against a degraded Goliath

The comparison between the **Suziria** constellation's ambitions and Russia's military space capabilities is instructive. Russia has a considerable space heritage — dozens of military satellites in orbit, navigation systems (**GLONASS**), electronic intelligence gathering from space. But this heritage is under pressure: sanctions limit electronic component imports, maintenance is becoming difficult, and satellites cannot be replaced at the needed rate.

**Suziria** will not exceed Russian capabilities in number or sophistication in the near term. But it does not need to. It simply needs to give Ukraine what it needs for its own operations — a permanent and sovereign window on its territory and combat zones. For that specific role, a targeted and well-integrated constellation can surpass a larger but less adapted system in practical effectiveness.

### Complementarity with NATO capabilities

The **Suziria** constellation will not aim to replace allied satellites but to complement them. In a post-war scenario where Ukraine would be a member or near-member of **NATO**, its constellation would integrate into the allied architecture, adding a sovereign capability and geographic resilience in the region. This is precisely the model of countries like **France** or the **United Kingdom**, which maintain national space capabilities while participating in alliance architectures.

This complementarity makes the **Suziria** project strategically attractive to Ukraine's allies: a partner that develops its own surveillance capability is a less costly partner in terms of intelligence sharing and more capable of contributing to collective security. That is a solid argument for international funding of the project.

*Ukraine developing its satellites to join NATO's space security architecture — that is a coherent and convincing vision. It is not hubris; it is serious strategic planning. And it is exactly the kind of long-term vision that should convince skeptics that supporting Ukraine is an investment, not an expense.*

## Technical and financial challenges of the program

### The constraints of a wartime program

Developing a satellite constellation in wartime poses considerable logistical and financial challenges. Ukrainian engineers work under difficult conditions — with the permanent threat of Russian strikes on civilian and industrial infrastructure. Design offices must be protected, prototypes secured, sensitive data shielded from Russian espionage.

These constraints inevitably slow development. But they also force creative solutions — extreme decentralization of teams, system redundancy, maximum use of cloud and distributed architectures. Ukraine's experience of resilience under pressure applies to the space sector as well.

### Financing — public and private actors

Financing for the **Suziria** constellation combines public and private sources. The Ukrainian state — which already devotes more than **50 percent of its national budget to defense** — contributes through contracts with the armed forces. International partners provide bilateral financing within the framework of military-technical cooperation agreements. And private investors — Ukrainian and foreign — see in this sector a post-war commercial opportunity.

The financing structure reflects the complexity of a program developed under extraordinary circumstances. Long-term financing assurance is one of the program's main challenges. That is why the institutional anchoring of partnerships — with the **Brno Space Cluster**, with the European space sector — is crucial for ensuring continuity beyond annual budget cycles.

*Financing a space program in wartime is betting on the future in the most difficult present imaginable. I know of no more complex intellectual and moral challenge for a Ukrainian public decision-maker. And yet they are doing it. That wager on the future is itself an act of resistance — proof that Ukraine refuses to exist only in the present of the war.*

## The geopolitical dimension — space as a sovereignty marker

### Sputnik, Ariane, and now Suziria

Space history is a history of national sovereignty expressed through technology. **Sputnik** was a proclamation of Soviet power. **Ariane** was Europe's affirmation of space independence from the United States. Chinese and Indian space programs are recognized markers of national power. **Suziria** fits this tradition: it is Ukraine's affirmation that it is a sovereign state planning its future beyond the war.

This geopolitical message is not trivial. In the context of potential peace negotiations, a country developing a sovereign satellite constellation sends a clear signal: it is not prepared to be reduced to the status of a neutralized buffer zone between Russia and the West. It is a state projecting itself into the future with its own strategic capabilities. That message will strengthen Ukraine's position in any discussion about its post-conflict status.

### Ukraine as a model for European defense space

Ukraine's experience in military space sovereignty — rapidly developing targeted capabilities through distributed European partnerships — offers a model for other European nations seeking to strengthen their strategic space independence. Countries like **Poland**, the Baltic states, or **Romania**, which are seeking to develop their own defense capabilities, can draw inspiration from the Ukrainian approach.

In this sense, **Suziria** is not only a Ukrainian program — it is a catalyst for the development of a more distributed, resilient, and sovereign European defense space architecture. Ukraine, by developing this program under the most difficult conditions imaginable, is demonstrating that it is possible. That is a demonstration with considerable educational value for the entire continent.

*Suziria as a model for European defense space — an idea that would have been laughable before 2022. Today, countries like Poland and the Balts follow the Ukrainian program with the same attention they give to Ukrainian drone development. Ukraine has become a defense innovation laboratory for all of Europe.*

## The Czech-Ukrainian partnership — a model of regional cooperation

### The Czech Republic — a discreet but determined ally

The **Czech Republic** has been one of Ukraine's most consistent and effective partners since the start of the war. It initiated international artillery ammunition collection to supply shells to Ukraine. Its defense industry, heir to Bohemia's industrial traditions, produces equipment that has proven its value on the Ukrainian front. And now its space cluster in **Brno** is contributing to the development of Ukrainian satellites.

The partnership on the **Drak** satellite perfectly illustrates the Czech model of support for Ukraine: pragmatic, discreet, focused on the concrete rather than rhetoric. While some European countries were debating arms deliveries, the **Czech Republic** was building satellites with Ukrainian companies. That is the kind of solidarity that genuinely changes the course of events.

### The Brno ecosystem — a space city at the heart of Europe

The **Brno Space Cluster** is the expression of a broader European phenomenon: the emergence of space centers of excellence in medium-sized cities combining university research, technology startups, and large industrial companies. **Brno**, with its respected technical universities and diversified industrial fabric, has developed space expertise that has made it a credible partner for serious defense projects.

This model — distributed excellence, inter-company cooperation, strong academic anchoring — is exactly what Europe should develop further to reduce its dependence on national or American programs in the defense space domain. **Brno** and the **Drak** project are a demonstration of what is possible when European industrial policy meets strategic necessity.

*Brno — a Czech city whose space importance few people knew about before 2022 — is developing satellites for the Ukrainian armed forces. That is the kind of fact that does not make front pages but says something important about how European security is really built: not in the grand declarations of summits, but in the workshops of provincial industrial clusters.*

## Implications for the future of war and peace

### Space sovereignty as a negotiating factor

In any future peace negotiation, Ukrainian space sovereignty will carry real value. A Ukraine that has its own reconnaissance and communications satellites is a Ukraine that cannot be blinded by a reduction in allied intelligence sharing. That is a strategic independence that strengthens Ukraine's position in any discussion of post-conflict security guarantees.

Russia will not fail to seek to limit Ukrainian military capabilities in any peace agreement — potentially including space capabilities. Ukraine's response to this challenge will be to demonstrate that its **Suziria** constellation is defensive in nature — observation and intelligence — and that limiting these capabilities would amount to stripping Ukraine of the means to protect itself against future aggression.

### A post-war Ukraine with its own stars

The vision behind **Suziria** goes beyond the immediate needs of the war. It sketches a post-conflict Ukraine that possesses its own surveillance, communication, and space defense tools. This is the vision of a fully sovereign state, integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, but capable of ensuring its own defense without depending entirely on its allies' goodwill.

That is the vision **Zelensky** and his team have for their country. And the wartime investments in **Suziria** are its concrete demonstration. Every component developed, every partnership signed, is a nation-building act that transcends the war and affirms Ukraine's permanence as a state.

*I conclude this investigation with a strengthened conviction: Ukraine developing its satellites in wartime is not simply surviving — it is forging a national identity as a technological power. Suziria is the Ukrainian name for strategic hope. And it shines above the trenches of the Donbas.*

## International recognition — allies back the program

### European financing of Ukrainian defense programs

The development of the **Suziria** constellation and the **Drak** satellite benefits from European political and financial support that extends beyond simple Czech-Ukrainian bilateral cooperation. The **European Union**, through its defense and industry support mechanisms, recognizes that Ukrainian defense capabilities directly contribute to European security. This institutional support is crucial for the program's sustainability beyond national political cycles.

The **European Defence Agency (EDA)** and the funds of the European Peace Facility are positioned to be integrated into the financing of programs like **Suziria**, creating an institutional link between Ukraine and European defense structures that transcends the immediate wartime context.

### The political signal of industrial support

When companies like **MBDA** sign partnership memoranda with Ukrainian industrial players at **Eurosatory 2026**, or when the **Brno Space Cluster** co-develops the **Drak** satellite, these are political acts as much as industrial ones. These partnerships create lasting mutual interests that strengthen the network of support for Ukraine beyond governmental decisions. It is the construction of a pan-European industrial community of interest around Ukrainian defense.

This community will be an asset in the post-war years. It will create industrial and commercial pressures in favor of maintaining close relations with Ukraine, helping anchor the country in the European economic and security space in a durable way.

*European defense companies signing contracts with Ukraine are conducting foreign policy without knowing it — or knowing it very well. Every contract is another thread in the web connecting Ukraine to Europe. And in ten years, that web will be too dense for anyone to cut the tie.*

## Lessons from the war for the global space industry

### What the conflict has taught satellite designers

The war in Ukraine has provided the global space industry with operational lessons of inestimable value. **SAR** satellite designers have learned to optimize resolution and revisit cadence based on tactical needs — not just commercial or scientific ones. Image-processing software engineers have developed algorithms capable of automatically identifying armor, troop concentrations, and ammunition depots with increasing precision.

These technological advances — born from **Ukraine**'s urgent needs and the capabilities of **companies like ICEYE** — will be integrated into the next generations of commercial and military satellites. **Ukraine** has thus indirectly contributed to the improvement of global satellite capabilities, transforming a military necessity into a global technological advance. The **Suziria** constellation will benefit from those same advances in its own technical specifications.

### War as a technological accelerator

The history of technology shows that armed conflicts often accelerate technological developments that would have taken far longer in peacetime. **The Internet** was born from an American military project. **GPS** was developed for the needs of the **US military** before becoming the global infrastructure we know today. Ukraine's **Suziria** fits this tradition: an **urgent military necessity** that triggers a technological development with reach far beyond the initial context.

The **image recognition algorithms**, the **encrypted satellite-to-ground communication protocols**, the **autonomous navigation techniques for nano-satellites** — all these developments inspired by the needs of the Ukrainian war will find civilian applications in precision agriculture, natural disaster management, and environmental monitoring. Ukraine is building tomorrow's economy by responding to today's military requirements.

*The history of technology is a history of necessity accelerating invention. The Ukrainian war has accelerated the operational integration of satellites as nothing else could have. Suziria is the child of that necessity — and like all children born in adversity, it will probably be stronger than those born in comfort.*

## The post-war era — Ukraine's space program in European collective security

### Integration into the NATO-EU space architecture

In a post-conflict Ukraine integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, the **Suziria** constellation will become a **concrete contribution** to the collective space architecture of **NATO** and the **EU**. Ukrainian satellites **surveilling Eastern European territory**, operated sovereignly but integrated into allied intelligence flows, will strengthen coverage of this **geographically critical zone**.

The added value of **Suziria** for its partners will be real: a country that has its own eyes in the sky is a more reliable and less costly partner than a country entirely dependent on intelligence shared by its allies. From the perspective of a **NATO** that seeks to distribute capabilities rather than concentrate them among the large member states, **Ukraine** with **Suziria** becomes a provider, not just a consumer of intelligence.

### The Ukrainian model for small states

Ukraine's trajectory — from zero military satellite capability to a planned sovereign constellation in four years of war — offers a roadmap for other small states seeking to develop their own defense space sovereignty. This model rests on several pillars: distributed industrial partnerships, mixed public-private financing, focus on concrete operational needs rather than technological prestige, and early integration into alliance architectures.

Countries like **Georgia**, **Moldova**, the Baltic states, or even countries on **NATO**'s **Southern Flank** seeking to strengthen their surveillance capabilities are watching the Ukrainian model with interest. **Suziria** could thus become not only a Ukrainian capability, but the starting point for a distributed regional space surveillance architecture across Eastern Europe.

*Tomorrow's space Ukraine is not an abstraction — it is an industrial reality under construction today. Suziria may well be the model for a generation of small states that want their own defense stars. If so, Ukraine will have given the world far more than a lesson in military courage — it will have given it a model of accessible technological sovereignty.*

## Conclusion: Ukraine's stars are being forged in war

### A nation planning its future while fighting

This investigation into the development of the **Suziria** constellation reveals something fundamental about **Ukraine in 2026**: it is a nation that, while fighting for its survival, is methodically planning its future. Satellites for **2030–2035**, developed with European partners, integrated into defense systems, financed through multiple sources — this is a serious state program, not a technological fantasy.

### A space Ukraine — an indispensable actor of tomorrow

When the war ends — and it will end, one way or another — Ukraine will emerge as an indispensable actor in European defense space industry. Its engineers, hardened by four years of accelerated development under extreme pressure, its consolidated industrial partnerships, its unrivaled operational data — all of this constitutes considerable strategic and economic capital. **Suziria** is not simply a satellite program — it is the foundation of a Ukrainian technological power for the twenty-first century.

*Ukraine launching satellites during a war — that will be one of the most astonishing chapters in the technological history of the twenty-first century. And when historians tell it, they will speak of the same extraordinary resilience that allowed a besieged people to reinvent itself as a defense industrial power. That is Ukraine in 2026. And it is sublime.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Militarnyi — Ukraine to Develop Satellites With Partner Countries Starting in 2026 — June 28, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukraine-to-develop-satellites-with-partner-countries-starting-in-2026/)

- [Militarnyi — Satellite Imagery Confirms Attack on the Vladimir Space Communications Center — June 27, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/satellite-confirm-hit-vladimir-space-center/)

- [Defense News — ICEYE to double radar-satellite capacity by late 2027 as demand surges — June 25, 2026](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/06/25/iceye-to-double-radar-satellite-capacity-by-late-2027-as-demand-surges/)

### Secondary sources

- [United24 Media — After Dubna, Vladimir: Ukraine Hits Second Russian Space Communications Center in Two Days — June 24, 2026](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/after-dubna-vladimir-ukraine-hits-second-russian-space-communications-center-in-two-days-20126)

- [Militarnyi — Eurosatory 2026: Is Europe Ready for Modern War? — June 28, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/blogs/eurosatory-2026-is-europe-ready-for-modern-war/)

- [Militarnyi — Ukrainian Armor Signs Strategic Partnership Memorandum With MBDA — June 23, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukrainian-armor-signs-partnership-with-mbda/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Ukraine strikes Russia's only helium plant, 1,200 km from the front — June 24, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/24/ukraine-strikes-russias-only-helium-plant-and-largest-gas-complex-1200-km-from-the-front/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-ukraine-et-ses-allies-construisent-une-souverainete-spatiale-de-defense