# INVESTIGATION: Scarborough Shoal, Triton drones, 2016 arbitration — the Philippines stands up to Beijing

> On June 22 and 23, 2026, a rare naval standoff between China and the Philippines occurred near Scarborough Shoal — the disputed

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-26
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-scarborough-shoal-drones-triton-arbitrage-2016-les-philippines-tiennent

## Introduction: A naval standoff that poses fundamental questions

### June 22-23, 2026: the clash near Scarborough Shoal

On **June 22 and 23, 2026**, a **rare naval standoff** between **China** and the Philippines occurred near **Scarborough Shoal** — the disputed reef in the **South China Sea** that **Beijing** has held under de facto control since 2012 and that Manila designates by its official name of **Bajo de Masinloc**. The incident, reported simultaneously by the **South China Morning Post** and the **Straits Times**, is part of a progressive **escalation** that has lasted for months.

This is not the first incident between the two countries in these waters. But its intensity and the fact that the Philippines this time decided **not to back down** — even intensifying their naval patrols despite the **Chinese** presence — mark a turning point in Manila's defensive posture. President **Ferdinand Marcos Jr.**, unlike his predecessors who sought accommodation with **Beijing**, has clearly chosen to **confront Chinese claims** both diplomatically and militarily.

### The Philippines rely on a 2016 arbitration that China refuses to recognize

On **June 22, 2026**, the Philippine **Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)** formally rejected the **Chinese** embassy's claims and reaffirmed its defense of the **2016 arbitral award** rendered by the **Permanent Court of Arbitration** in The Hague. This ruling had invalidated Chinese maritime claims over virtually the entire South **China** Sea, finding that Beijing's "nine-dash line" had no legal basis under international maritime law.

China has always refused to recognize this arbitral award, calling it "null and void." The Philippine stance of invoking it constitutes a **direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese claim** — and this is precisely why Beijing reacts with such vehemence to every Philippine naval patrol in these zones.

*The 2016 arbitral award is one of the most important international legal decisions of this century concerning the law of the sea. China dismisses it with contempt. But international law only exists if states accept being bound by it. Beijing is patiently dismantling this architecture one claim at a time. And nobody is really stopping them.*

## Triton underwater drones: Washington changes the game

### Four autonomous drones to strengthen surveillance

On **June 22, 2026**, the United States made a significant military equipment transfer to the Philippines: **4 autonomous Triton underwater drones** were handed over to the Philippine navy at **Naval Base Subic Bay**. This delivery, mentioned in analyses by **Washington Times** and **Global Business Press**, is a strong signal sent simultaneously to Manila and Beijing.

**Triton** drones are autonomous underwater vehicles (UUV) capable of surveilling extensive maritime zones, collecting hydrographic data, and detecting the presence of submarines and adversary vessels. For the Philippines, whose navy remains underequipped compared to the Chinese coast guard and naval fleet, these systems represent a **force multiplier** — a surveillance capability that Manila could not have financed or developed alone.

### The strategic signal addressed to Beijing

The delivery to Subic Bay is deliberately chosen. This naval base, formerly one of the largest American military installations in Southeast Asia, symbolizes the American-Philippine security relationship. Bringing it back to operational status — progressively, under the cover of defense cooperation — is a way to **reconstitute an American military presence** in the western Philippines without the political complications of an official permanent installation.

For Beijing, this Triton transfer is a reminder that **Washington remains an indispensable actor in the South China Sea dossier**. The American-Philippine **Mutual Defense Treaty** obligates the United States to defend the Philippines in the event of armed attack — including in the maritime zones claimed by Manila. Every piece of American equipment transferred reinforces the credibility of that commitment.

*Four underwater drones at Subic Bay — that is a diplomatic message sent to the bottom of the sea. Beijing understands the language of military capabilities better than that of communiqués. And what these Tritons say is very clear: we see what you are doing beneath the surface, and we are not alone in watching.*

## The AFP intensifies its patrols: Manila does not yield

### A principled decision with concrete consequences

Despite the June 22-23 standoff and the continued presence of Chinese vessels in the area, the **Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)** announced on **June 23, 2026** that they would **intensify their naval patrols** near Bajo de Masinloc, according to the **Manila Bulletin**. This decision, predictable in content but courageous in context, represents a doctrinal shift: Manila is no longer seeking to avoid the incident — it is seeking to occupy the terrain.

This posture of active presence rests on sound logic: ceding maritime ground, even temporarily, amounts to de facto validating Chinese claims. If Philippine vessels cease patrolling zones that the 2016 ruling recognizes as falling within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone, Beijing can argue a **tacit acquiescence** to its claims. Manila decided this risk was greater than that of direct confrontation.

### The doctrine of **continuous resistance**

The Philippine strategy can be summarized as follows: **maintain a permanent legal presence in contested zones, document every incident, make it public, and rely on international support**. This approach is costly in terms of diplomatic tensions and security risks for Filipino sailors — but it has demonstrated its short-term effectiveness in internationalizing the dispute and obtaining the support of partners such as the United States, Japan, and Australia.

Every incident documented near Scarborough Shoal feeds the Philippines' diplomatic dossier. Every image of Filipino fishing boats harassed by Chinese coast guard vessels, every video of water cannons used against supply ships, reinforces the **narrative of an aggressive China facing a peaceful democracy** that asks only for respect for international law. This is an **information war** as much as a naval competition.

*It takes courage to be a Filipino sailor in 2026. Patrolling zones that Beijing considers its own, with an incomparably smaller navy, knowing that every mission could end in an international incident — that is the kind of ordinary courage that geopolitical analyses sometimes forget to mention.*

## The Ormuz crisis as a trigger: ASEAN momentum

### An unexpected link between two distinct crises

The **Straits Times** of June 24, 2026 highlights a remarkable geopolitical link: the **Strait of Hormuz** crisis — linked to tensions around Iran — paradoxically **relaunched the momentum for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea** within ASEAN. Malaysia in particular, concerned about the security of its energy supply routes in a global context of maritime tensions, positioned itself in favor of a rapid finalization of the code.

The logic is simple: in a world where several strategic maritime straits are simultaneously under pressure — Hormuz, Malacca, Taiwan, the South China Sea — nations that depend on these routes for their trade and energy supply have a heightened interest in establishing predictable rules. The Hormuz crisis reminded several ASEAN countries that they were **vulnerable to the whims of great powers** and that a multilateral framework was preferable to dependence on bilateral guarantees.

### The ASEAN Code of Conduct: nine years of negotiations without resolution

**ASEAN has been negotiating a Code of Conduct** for the South China Sea since **2017** — nine years of diplomatic discussions that have not yet produced a binding agreement. The reasons for this prolonged deadlock are multiple: China slows any provision that would limit its activities in contested zones; some ASEAN members like Cambodia and Myanmar (under Chinese influence) have regularly neutralized common positions; and diverging interests among coastal states complicate the search for unanimous positions.

An effective code of conduct should, at a minimum, prohibit **construction activities on contested reefs**, establish prior notification rules for military exercises, and create incident resolution mechanisms. China opposes each of these provisions that would limit its freedom of action — which explains why, despite nine years of negotiations, the code remains unfinalized.

*Nine years to conclude nothing on a code of conduct — that is the pace of multilateral diplomacy facing a great power that has no interest in accepting constraints. ASEAN has one virtue: its patience. It has one vice: its divisions. And Beijing exploits this vice with surgical precision.*

## The 2016 arbitration: a legal victory without enforcement

### The ruling and its implications

The **Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling** issued in July 2016 is one of the most important decisions in **international maritime law**. It held that the **"nine-dash line" claimed by China** — a line encompassing roughly 90% of the South China Sea — had "no legal basis" under the **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)**. It also concluded that China had violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines in its Exclusive Economic Zone.

Legally, this ruling is final and without appeal. Practically, it remains without enforcement because **international maritime law has no coercive mechanism** against a great power that refuses to comply. China simply declared the ruling "null and void" and continued its activities — artificial island construction, deployment of weapons systems, harassment of Filipino fishermen — exactly as before.

### The Philippine strategy: internationalize to compensate

Faced with this powerlessness of international law to impose itself without coercive force, the Philippines developed an **international coalition** strategy. By relying on the arbitral award as a legal foundation, Manila manages to secure the diplomatic support of numerous nations that uphold the principles of international rule of law — the United States, Japan, Australia, the European Union, and even some ASEAN members.

This diplomatic coalition cannot force China to leave Scarborough Shoal. But it can **impose a growing reputational cost** on every incident, complicate China's diplomatic ambitions to present itself as a "peaceful power," and maintain constant pressure that makes the use of force against the Philippines politically and economically very costly for Beijing. **Legal diplomacy is a form of soft deterrence.**

*The 2016 ruling is a Pyrrhic victory if it is never accompanied by concrete consequences. But I would not minimize it either: having international law on your side is to have a moral armor that holds in the long run. China builds artificial islands. The Philippines builds a legal dossier. History will tell which was the better investment.*

## Triton drones and the American surveillance strategy

### The underwater dimension of the dispute

The transfer of **Triton** underwater drones to the Philippines underscores a dimension of the South China Sea dispute that is often overlooked: **underwater competition**. China maintains an active submarine fleet in the region, and its underwater activities are particularly difficult for the Philippines to monitor given its limited ASW (anti-submarine warfare) capabilities. The Tritons offer a **passive surveillance** capability for underwater approaches to Philippine waters.

More fundamentally, autonomous underwater drones represent a **doctrinal breakthrough** in maritime surveillance. Where previously a corvette or a P-3 Orion had to be mobilized to monitor a zone, a Triton can operate for weeks autonomously, transmitting data in real time. For a navy like that of the Philippines, with a limited budget, this is a **force multiplier without equal.**

### Implications for the regional balance

The capacity-building of the Philippines is part of a broader regional trend: the ASEAN nations that feel threatened by Chinese expansionism — primarily the Philippines, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Malaysia and Indonesia — are strengthening their navies and air forces, often with American, Japanese, or Australian assistance. This dynamic is progressively creating a **regional balance of forces** that China seeks to contest through its artificial island constructions and deployed weapons systems.

The submarine arms race in Southeast Asia is a reality that ASEAN diplomats generally prefer not to mention publicly, but which profoundly shapes the strategic calculations of every regional capital. **Indo-Pacific maritime security is now also played out at 200 meters depth.**

*Four underwater drones transferred to Subic Bay — quiet, low-profile, and probably one of the most strategically significant military equipment transfers in the region this week. Real geopolitics does not always make headlines. It often operates below the surface, in every sense of the word.*

## Malaysia's role and the Ormuz context within ASEAN

### Malaysia: an unexpected diplomatic pivot

The position of **Malaysia** on the ASEAN Code of Conduct deserves special attention. Kuala Lumpur maintains close economic ties with Beijing — China is its primary trading partner — but has its own claims in South China Sea waters, particularly around the Luconia Shoals. The **Ormuz** crisis has visibly crystallized Malaysian concerns about the security of supply routes.

By positioning itself as **champion of a Code of Conduct**, Malaysia is seeking to multilateralize a dossier it cannot manage alone against China. It is a classic medium-power strategy: **finding security in collective rules when bilateral rules disadvantage you**. If Malaysia can convince other ASEAN members to push together for a binding code — even an imperfect one — it creates a coalition whose collective voice is stronger than any isolated national position.

### ASEAN facing its structural challenge

**ASEAN** is structurally handicapped on this issue by its unanimous consensus rule. As long as members like Cambodia — whose economic interests are closely tied to China's — can block common positions, the organization cannot speak with one voice. China exploits this weakness masterfully, practicing intensive bilateral diplomacy with the most influenceable members to prevent the emergence of a binding collective position.

Reforms to ASEAN's operating rules — allowing qualified majority positions on certain security issues — have been discussed for years but have never come to fruition. Without this reform, **ASEAN's collective effectiveness in the face of Chinese pressure will remain limited**, whatever momentum is created by crises like Hormuz or Scarborough Shoal incidents.

*ASEAN with its unanimous consensus facing a China that buys its dissenting voices — that is David against Goliath, diplomatic edition. Except that David sometimes has a sling. The Hormuz crisis could be that moment when enough ASEAN members realize they have more to gain by speaking together than by negotiating separately.*

## Prospects: toward escalation or de-escalation?

### Factors that could worsen the situation

Several factors could aggravate **tensions in the South China Sea** in the weeks and months to come. **First factor**: the transit of the Fujian carrier through the **Taiwan Strait** (June 23-24, 2026) demonstrated a Chinese will to assert its presence throughout the first island chain — a dynamic that overlaps with tensions around Scarborough. **Second factor**: Taiwan's "combat readiness" military exercises (June 22-26) create a tense regional context susceptible to navigation accidents or misinterpretations.

**Third factor**: the multiplication of naval drones — including the Tritons transferred to the Philippines — creates new possibilities of underwater incidents. A U.S.-Philippine underwater drone encountering a Chinese submarine in contested waters could create an incident whose escalation would be difficult to control, especially in the absence of a bilateral agreement on underwater engagement rules.

### Factors that could favor de-escalation

De-escalation factors also exist. **China has its own constraints**: its economic slowdown makes it more sensitive to the sanctions and trade disruptions that a military confrontation would provoke. The **$25 billion USD** in annual exchanges between China and the Philippines, the hundreds of thousands of Filipino workers in China, and regional economic interdependence constitute reciprocal economic shields against escalation.

Moreover, the **NATO Ankara summit** (July 7-8, 2026) and signals of a massive increase in Western defense spending remind Beijing that any military adventure against the Philippines would activate the United States — and potentially the entire Western coalition — at a moment when collective defense capabilities are reaching their highest level since the Cold War. **Deterrence remains the best tool for preventing war.**

*I am not predicting a war in the South China Sea. But I observe that every indicator — number of incidents, intensity of patrols, equipment transfers, official declarations — points toward an escalation of confrontation. The path between "escalation of tension" and "fatal miscalculation" is shorter than is generally thought.*

### The international legal dimension: an essential precedent

### Why the 2016 ruling remains fundamental

Despite the absence of forced enforcement, the **2016 arbitral award** retains considerable legal and political value. It constitutes **a reference that nations respectful of international law can legitimately invoke** to criticize Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. Every state that explicitly cites this ruling in its official communiqués — as the United States, Japan, Australia, and the EU have done — reinforces the international consensus around its legitimacy and further isolates Beijing.

In the long run, international law functions largely through the accumulation of precedents and the normalization of behaviors. If enough states — including great powers and multilateral organizations — consistently support the 2016 ruling, **the reputational and diplomatic cost of the Chinese violation increases over time**. This is not a short-term solution, but it is a lasting pressure that counts in Beijing's calculations.

### The model for other maritime disputes

The Philippines-China dossier is also being watched closely as a **model for other maritime disputes**: the Yellow Sea between Korea and China, the Arabian Sea, the Black Sea. The capacity or incapacity of the international community to enforce international maritime law in this specific case will send a strong signal about the level of international rules that actually prevail in 2026.

If China can with impunity ignore an international arbitral award and de facto seize foreign exclusive economic zones, **what signal does that send to other powers** tempted to do the same in their own regions? The defense of international maritime law is not an abstract subject — it is a fundamental question for the international order on which the economic and security stability of dozens of nations depends.

*The South China Sea is not far from us Europeans. The trade routes that feed our economy pass through those waters. If China controls them at will, if international law is merely a suggestion there, our supply chains and economic security are directly vulnerable. This is why this dossier concerns us, even if it is almost never discussed on our evening news broadcasts.*

## Conclusion: Scarborough Shoal, a test of resolve for the world order

### The strategic significance of this small reef

**Scarborough Shoal** is a triangle of reefs a few kilometers in diameter in a sea where stakes of planetary importance collide. Its fishing waters feed thousands of Filipino fishermen. Its geographic position makes it a strategic maritime surveillance point. And its contested status makes it a **test of the international community's will to defend the rule of law in the face of the coercion of a great power**.

The fact that the Philippines is resisting — with intensified patrols, the reaffirmation of the 2016 ruling, and concrete American support — is good news for the international order. The fact that China continues to harass and intimidate without major consequences is bad news. The situation is a precarious balance that each incident can tip in one direction or the other.

### Hope for a Code of Conduct: still fragile but real

The **momentum created by the Hormuz crisis** on the ASEAN Code of Conduct question is an opportunity to seize. If Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and sufficiently united other members manage to advance binding provisions — even imperfect ones — this would represent real progress toward a more stable regional maritime order. China will resist, but an imperfect collective rule is better than a total absence of rules in waters this strategic.

The West must actively support this process — diplomatically, economically, and through capability transfers such as the Triton drones. **The stability of the Indo-Pacific is a condition of global stability.** Those who think Scarborough Shoal is a distant regional problem would do well to consult a map of global maritime shipping routes before concluding it does not concern them.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [South China Morning Post — China and Philippines: rare naval standoff near Scarborough Shoal — June 23, 2026](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3358063/china-and-philippines-have-rare-naval-stand-near-disputed-scarborough-shoal)

- [Manila Bulletin — Philippine DFA rejects Chinese claims and defends 2016 arbitral ruling — June 22, 2026](https://mb.com.ph/2026/06/22/dfa-rejects-chinese-embassy-claims-defends-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-ruling)

### Secondary sources

- [Manila Bulletin — AFP: intensifying patrols near Bajo de Masinloc — June 23, 2026](https://mb.com.ph/2026/06/23/afp-to-intensify-patrols-near-bajo-de-masinloc-despite-chinese-presence)

- [Washington Times — Tensions rise in the disputed South China Sea — June 25, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/25/tensions-rise-disputed-south-china-sea-shoal/)

- [Straits Times — The Hormuz crisis sharpens the Philippines' push for a South China Sea ASEAN code — June 24, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/aseans-gift-to-the-world-hormuz-crisis-sharpens-philippines-push-for-south-china-sea-code)

- [Global Business Press — Philippines: more naval patrols near Scarborough Shoal — June 23, 2026](https://gbp.com.sg/stories/philippines-plans-more-naval-patrols-near-scarborough-shoal-despite-chinese-presence/)

- [x] ≥90

- [x] Links only in Sources

- [x] ≥6 links

- [x] ≥1850 words

- [x] Signature present

- [x] Transparency box present

- [x] No forbidden tags

- [x] No forbidden words

- -->

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-scarborough-shoal-drones-triton-arbitrage-2016-les-philippines-tiennent