# INVESTIGATION: The Senate refuses to rein in Trump on Iran — war powers at the heart of a late-night vote

> On the night of June 25, 2026, the American Senate rejected the war powers resolution concerning Iran. That late-night vote, at the

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-26
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-le-senat-refuse-de-brider-trump-sur-l-iran-les-pouvoirs-de-guerre-au-c-u

## Introduction: A night at the Capitol that redefines American war powers

### The vote that did not constrain **Trump**

On the night of **June 25, 2026**, the American **Senate** rejected the war powers resolution concerning **Iran**. That late-night vote, at the end of a day of tensions between the **White House** and its own Republican allies, confirmed something fundamental: **Donald Trump retains virtually unlimited war powers over Iran** without requiring the formal approval of the **United States Congress**. A result that redefines the constitutional balance between the executive and the legislature in the conduct of American wars.

This vote took place in a context that is anything but hypothetical. The **war between the United States and Iran** began on **February 28, 2026**. At the time of the vote, it had been ongoing for more than **106 days**. This is not a theoretical debate about abstract war powers — it is a real conflict, with deployed soldiers, ongoing military operations, and geopolitical consequences resonating across the entire Middle East region and beyond.

### Before the vote: an explosive lunch at the Capitol

The hours preceding the vote revealed the intensity of the tensions within the Republican Party. **Trump directly confronted dissident Republican senators** at a Capitol lunch, just hours before the late-night vote. These senators, who believed that **Congress** should reclaim its constitutional role in declaring and conducting wars, found themselves face to face with a president fiercely defending his executive prerogatives.

The pressure applied during that lunch — the precise details of which trickled out slowly through Washington media — illustrates the **Trump** method: direct, personal confrontation with his own allies to ensure their loyalty on a crucial vote. That method works, as the vote outcome demonstrates. But it leaves marks on the relationship between the president and the segment of his party that believes the constitutional balance of powers deserves to be defended.

*What strikes me about this sequence is the image of Republican senators summoned to lunch by the president to be brought back in line before a major constitutional vote. We are no longer quite in the realm of parliamentary debate — we are in the realm of personal loyalty. Is this how great democracies are supposed to function? I ask the question sincerely, without pretending to have the answer.*

## The **War Powers Resolution**: history and constitutional stakes

### A 1973 text consistently circumvented

The war powers resolution that was rejected falls within the framework of the **War Powers Resolution of 1973**, adopted after Vietnam to compel American presidents to consult **Congress** before committing armed forces to prolonged conflicts. That text provides that the president must notify **Congress** within **48 hours** of committing armed forces, and that such commitment cannot exceed **60 days** without legislative authorization.

Since 1973, virtually every American president has circumvented or ignored this law, asserting that their constitutional powers as commander in chief allow them to engage in military operations without prior congressional approval. **Trump** is no exception, and his refusal to submit to legislative oversight on the war against **Iran** fits squarely within this long tradition of **expanding executive prerogatives** in military matters.

### The specific nature of the **Iran**-USA conflict of **2026**

But the context of **2026** is different in several respects. The **direct war between the United States and Iran**, triggered on February 28, **2026**, represents a conflict of a different scale and nature from recent American interventions in Syria, Libya, or Yemen. This is not a matter of pinpoint strikes against non-state groups or support operations for allied forces. It is a direct confrontation between two nation-states, with all the implications that entails for **regional stability** and **international security**.

The duration of the conflict — more than 106 days at the time of the vote — also raises practical questions about its conduct and objectives. A war lasting more than three months without formal congressional authorization represents precisely the type of situation that the **War Powers Resolution** of 1973 was intended to prevent. The **Senate**'s refusal to remind the president of this constitutional obligation speaks volumes about the evolution of relations between the two branches under the **Trump** era.

*106 days of war without a formal authorization vote from the **United States Congress**. I let that number sit for a moment. The **War Powers Resolution** was passed precisely to prevent this. It exists. It applies. And yet the **Senate** has just told the president he can carry on. This is a constitutional signal whose consequences will extend far beyond this specific conflict with **Iran**.**The War Powers Resolution of 1973 was adopted after Vietnam so that no American president could ever again drag the country into a war without congressional approval. Fifty-three years later, that law appears to have reached its constitutional limits. This is not a legislative defeat — it is a warning about the fragility of democratic safeguards when confronted with an executive determined to work around them.*

## The defense sector in overdrive: **$12.3 billion** in **venture capital** in six months

### Unprecedented attractiveness for defense investors

Alongside these constitutional stakes, the financial context of the defense sector in **2026** reveals a profound transformation in the funding of the American military industry. According to data available as of **June 2026**, global **venture capital** investors poured **$12.3 billion** into defense startups in the **first half of 2026** alone. By comparison, the entirety of **2025** saw **$9.95 billion** invested in that sector.

This spectacular acceleration reflects a paradigm shift in how investors perceive the defense sector. The **Iran-USA war**, tensions with **China**, the war in **Ukraine**, and the proliferation of regional conflicts have transformed defense technology into an **attractive investment sector** for **venture capital**, which had previously been reluctant to engage in this space for ethical or regulatory complexity reasons.

### **Anduril** Industries and the new privatization model of defense

The most emblematic example of this trend is **Anduril Industries**, the defense startup founded by Palmer Luckey. In **March 2026**, **Anduril** secured a **$20 billion contract** with the American military for anti-drone systems. This colossal contract illustrates the progressive shift of American military procurement toward **agile private technology companies**, at the expense of large traditional **Pentagon** contractors.

This model of **defense privatization** raises fundamental questions about the nature of the American military-industrial complex in the 21st century. When a Silicon Valley startup obtains a **$20 billion** contract to equip the American armed forces, it acquires considerable institutional and political influence. The alignment between the commercial interests of defense technology companies and Washington's geopolitical decisions warrants careful critical scrutiny.

***Anduril** at **$20 billion**, **$12.3 billion** in **venture capital** in six months for defense: we are witnessing the birth of a new military-technological complex that blends Silicon Valley with the **Pentagon** in ways Eisenhower could not have imagined. This is not necessarily bad — innovation is necessary to maintain military superiority. But the lack of transparency surrounding these contracts is troubling.*

## The Republican dissidents: who are the senators who defied **Trump**?

### A constitutionalist minority within the GOP

The war powers resolution could not have been debated in the **Senate** without the support of at least a few Republican senators willing to defy their own president. This **constitutionalist minority** within the Republican Party represents a political current that believes congressional prerogatives — particularly on the declaration of war — are non-negotiable, regardless of the confidence placed in the chief executive.

These senators are not necessarily anti-**Trump** on the substance of Iran policy. Some support a firm approach toward Tehran. But they believe that the form — military engagement without a formal congressional authorization vote — represents an unacceptable institutional precedent whose consequences will be felt long after the current conflict ends. Their argument is constitutional, not partisan.

### After the Capitol lunch: the majority falls in line

But after the Capitol lunch with **Trump**, the majority of wavering Republican senators rallied to the presidential position. That rally illustrates the **power of the Trumpian pressure apparatus** on its own congressional allies. Constitutional arguments, however sound, struggle to withstand the combination of personal presidential pressure, the implicit threat of a punitive primary, and group dynamics within a Republican caucus largely aligned with **Trump**.

The final result — the **rejection of the resolution** and **Trump**'s political victory — is a short-term win for the **White House**. But it is also a signal to future presidents, of whatever political stripe, that they can engage in wars without meaningful legislative constraint. It is a **major constitutional precedent** that deserves far deeper analysis than a simple partisan scorecard of the moment.

*I sense the discomfort of certain Republican senators after this vote. They know this precedent will exist for the next Democratic president. They know that what they grant **Trump** today, they cannot deny his successor. That is the tragic paradox of partisan loyalty that short-circuits long-term institutional vision. The Constitution deserves better than that.*

## The **Vance**-**Iran** talks in Geneva: a de-escalation under way?

### **Vance** in Switzerland: the inside story of a discreet diplomacy

While the **Senate** debated the war powers resolution, Vice President **J.D. Vance** was engaged in high-stakes talks in **Switzerland** on June 22, **2026**, with Iranian officials. These discussions, reported by NPR, testify to an effort by the **Trump** administration to **manage an exit from the conflict** while maintaining a position of strength.

The simultaneous occurrence of quiet diplomatic talks in Switzerland and a Senate vote on war powers creates a significant narrative dissonance. On one hand, the **Trump** administration tells its Republican allies it needs all the military flexibility possible to manage **Iran**. On the other, **Vance** is negotiating in Geneva hoping to find a de-escalation. These two dynamics are not mutually exclusive — pressure diplomacy and negotiation can coexist — but they complicate the political reading of the moment.

### New negotiations in Geneva: is a deal possible?

Reports from Aletihad dated June 21, **2026** indicated that the **United States and Iran are preparing for new negotiations in Geneva**. The existence of these negotiations confirms that, despite 106 days of war, both parties are seeking a diplomatic exit. The stakes of these negotiations are considerable: they touch not only on the **Iranian nuclear program**, but also on questions of compensation, sanctions relief, and the redefinition of the balance of power in the Gulf region.

The economic impact of a potential deal with **Iran** was already visible in **Goldman Sachs**'s revised petroleum forecasts, which lowered its fourth-quarter **2026** Brent crude price outlook from **$90 to $80 per barrel**. An Iranian de-escalation would ease pressure on global energy prices, with positive ripple effects on energy-importing Western economies.

*There is something intellectually fascinating about the simultaneity of these two processes: **Vance** negotiating peace in Geneva while the **Senate** votes to let **Trump** wage war without legislative constraint. It is the classic carrot-and-stick dialectic — but operated at a constitutional scale that leaves deep marks on institutions. I do not know if this is strategic genius or improvised chaos. Perhaps both.*

## The defense sector and private investment: a structural transformation

### From the traditional **Pentagon** to technology startups

The transformation of the American defense sector is deep and structural. The **$12.3 billion** invested by global **venture capital** in defense startups in the first half of **2026** does not represent merely a cyclical anomaly linked to the wartime context. They reflect a **paradigm shift** in the way **America** conceives, develops, and procures its military capabilities.

The large traditional defense companies — Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman — are confronted with the rise of agile technology challengers like **Anduril**, Palantir, Shield AI, and Joby Aviation. These new entrants benefit from an **accelerated innovation culture** inherited from Silicon Valley, shorter development cycles, and an ability to attract top engineers who sometimes flee the traditional organizations of the defense sector.

### The implications for American military doctrine

This shift toward defense technology startups is not without consequences for **American military doctrine**. The emphasis on anti-drone systems (the **Anduril** contract), artificial intelligence applied to the battlefield, autonomous systems, and electronic warfare reflects a vision of future warfare very different from the conventional conflicts of the 20th century.

The **war in Ukraine** has been the laboratory for this vision: FPV drones, multi-layered air defense systems, information warfare, and intensive electronic warfare have dominated the fighting. The American military is drawing lessons from that conflict to modernize its own capabilities. The **Anduril** contract for **$20 billion** for anti-drone systems is a direct illustration. The challenge is to maintain technological superiority over adversaries — **China**, **Russia**, **Iran**, North Korea — that are also investing heavily in these technologies.

*The **Anduril** contract raises a question I cannot fully resolve: when you privatize defense at this level, who defines the doctrine? The **Pentagon**, or the entrepreneur who built the system? The answer should be: the political and military authority. But when **Anduril** holds **$20 billion** in contracts, its capacity for influence over acquisition and perhaps even operational decisions is not negligible.*

## The legal context: the constitutionality of presidential war powers

### The doctrinal debate between the executive and the legislature

The battle over the war powers resolution is rooted in a **constitutional debate that is 230 years old**. The American Constitution divides war powers between **Congress** — which alone can declare war and allocate military funds — and the president — who serves as commander in chief of the armed forces. This division has always created tensions during conflicts, with each branch tending to maximize its prerogatives at the other's expense.

The historical trend since World War II is clear: American presidents have progressively expanded their war powers at the expense of **Congress**. The last formal declaration of war by the **United States Congress** dates to **1942**. Since then, all major American conflicts — Korea, Vietnam, Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan — have been conducted without a formal declaration of war, with only authorizations for the use of force or solely presidential authority.

### **Iran** as a test case for the doctrine

The **war against Iran in 2026** represents a particularly revealing test case for this doctrine of executive powers in military matters. **Trump** invokes his constitutional powers as commander in chief and, presumably, post-September 11 laws such as the AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force) to justify military engagement without a formal **Congress** vote.

But constitutional experts argue that **Iran** was not involved in the September 11 attacks and that using the AUMF to justify a war against Tehran represents an **abusive extension** of that text. The Senate's rejection of the war powers resolution means this legal question will not be resolved through the legislative route. It could be resolved judicially — if organizations or elected officials take the matter to court to challenge the constitutionality of how this war is being conducted.

*The constitutionality of this war genuinely concerns me. The 2001 AUMF was designed to respond to Al-Qaeda. Using it against **Iran** in **2026** is a legal extension that deserves to be challenged. The American judicial institutions have a role to play here. If the **Senate** is unwilling to exercise its constitutional role of overseeing presidential wars, the courts may step in.*

## Washington's allies facing the **Iran**-USA war

### Gulf partners caught between two stools

The war between the **United States** and **Iran** has placed Washington's regional partners in positions of extraordinary complexity. The **Persian Gulf** monarchies — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain — maintain close security ties with the **United States** while also maintaining **economic and sometimes political ties** with **Iran**. Geography makes them vulnerable to Iranian reprisals.

These Gulf states sought to stay out of the conflict while maintaining their American alliances. Some offered their territory for American logistical operations. Others played a discreet role in diplomatic channels. None chose direct military involvement alongside the **United States**. This caution reflects the complexity of the regional balances that the Arab Gulf partners must navigate.

### **Europe** and its stake in regional stability

For **Europe**, the **Iran**-USA war represents both a risk and a major strategic issue. A risk because the destabilization of the Middle East directly affects migration flows, hydrocarbon supplies, and security in the Mediterranean. A strategic issue because the resolution of the Iranian nuclear conflict partly determines **nuclear proliferation** in an already volatile region.

Europeans were confronted with the fait accompli of the war's outbreak on February 28, **2026**. Discussions with Washington on the **war's timeline and objectives** were tense. European partners would have preferred a longer diplomatic path. But faced with the reality of the conflict, they adapted, seeking to influence its modalities and resolution rather than oppose it head-on.

***Europe** is once again placed before the fait accompli of a unilateral American military decision. That is the structural limitation of the transatlantic partnership: the **United States** decides, **Europe** adapts. As long as this power relationship does not change — and it will only change if **Europe** equips itself with credible autonomous military capabilities — this asymmetry will persist. The **NATO** summit in **Ankara** is an opportunity to reopen the dialogue.*

## The implications for the long-term USA-**Iran** relationship

### Toward a new regional balance of power

Whatever the outcome of the Geneva talks, the **balance of power between the United States and Iran** has been profoundly reconfigured by 106 days of direct war. **Iran** has demonstrated its capacity for resistance and its willingness not to collapse quickly under American military power. The **United States** has demonstrated its conventional military superiority but also the limits of a victory that is still searching for a political definition.

In this context, a Geneva agreement would not represent Tehran's capitulation or Washington's total victory. It would be a **pragmatic arrangement** between two powers that have each demonstrated their resilience and their limits. The question of the Iranian nuclear program, sanctions, American military presence in the region, and Iranian influence in neighboring Arab countries remain open files whose resolution will extend far beyond the scope of a single agreement.

### The impacts on the arms race and defense investment

The **Iran**-USA war has also accelerated investment dynamics in defense that extend well beyond the directly involved actors. The **$12.3 billion** in **venture capital** invested in defense startups in the first half of **2026** partly reflects investors' anticipation of a more conflicted world — one in which defense technologies will be in growing, sustained demand.

This **militarization of the global technology economy** — with companies like **Anduril**, SpaceX/Starshield, Palantir, and their equivalents in **Europe**, Israel, and Asia — represents a long-term structural transformation. It is fueled not only by the **Iran**-USA conflict but also by the war in **Ukraine**, tensions in the **South China Sea**, and the proliferation of regional conflicts that make security a global investment priority.

***$12.3 billion** in six months into defense startups. That is the clearest signal I have seen that investors are anticipating a more dangerous world, not a safer one. This is not cynicism — it is realism. Wars move capital. And capital shapes the next wars. That cycle worries me as much as it fascinates me.*

## The return of **Congress**: an institution under executive pressure

### The erosion of **Congress**'s role in military affairs

The rejection of the war powers resolution fits into a long-term trend: the **erosion of Congress's role** in American military decisions. Since the Korean War, **Congress** has progressively abdicated its constitutional prerogative to declare war, settling for Authorizations for Use of Military Force with deliberately broad language that leaves presidents near-unlimited latitude.

This progressive abdication has structural causes: modern wars break out rapidly, without time for a formal legislative process. Presidents have an interest in maximizing their freedom of action. Elected members of **Congress** often prefer not to take a position on conflicts that public opinion may turn against. The result is a **constitutional drift** that concentrates in the president's hands powers that the Founding Fathers deliberately wanted to share with the legislature.

### Reforming the **War Powers Resolution**: necessary but unlikely

Constitutionalists and international law experts have for years argued the need to **reform and strengthen the War Powers Resolution** to make it a truly binding mechanism. Proposals have been put forward to require a formal authorization vote from **Congress** before any military engagement lasting more than 30 days, with automatic sanctions for non-compliance.

But these reforms run into a constant political reality: sitting presidents, of whatever political stripe, refuse to constrain their military prerogatives. And legislative majorities tend to support their own president's war decisions. The window for reforming this system typically only opens in moments of deep disillusionment following costly conflicts — as was the case for the **War Powers Resolution** of 1973, adopted in the wake of Vietnam.

*The **War Powers Resolution** of 1973 was a reaction to Vietnam. A serious reform of war powers may only come after this war with **Iran** has left wounds painful enough. It is sad to say, but that is often how institutions reform themselves: after catastrophes, not before. I hope I am wrong about this.*

## **Ukraine** in the background: the forgotten war of the moment

### **Zelensky** and the concern over a drift of attention

It would be incomplete to analyze the geopolitical context of June **2026** without mentioning what this American fixation on **Iran** means for **Ukraine**. Since the outbreak of the direct war between the **United States** and **Iran**, **Ukraine** and the heroic resistance of **Volodymyr Zelensky** have had to share American geopolitical and attentional space with a new front in the Gulf region.

This **competition for Washington's strategic resources and attention** legitimately concerns Kyiv. American military support for **Ukraine** has not collapsed, but the political and diplomatic energy devoted to **Iran** mobilizes actors and resources that, without this conflict, would have been entirely available for the Ukrainian file. **Zelensky** continues to fight with courage and determination, but he watches every Washington development with vigilance.

### **Putin** and the opportunity of a divided **America**

On the **Moscow** side, the **Iran**-USA war is watched with a mixture of interested attention and unease. If American attention is split between the Ukrainian front and the Iranian front, **Vladimir Putin** might see in this division a tactical opportunity. But at the same time, an American victory against **Iran** would weaken one of **Russia**'s circumstantial allies and strengthen American military credibility — which is not in Moscow's interest.

**Russia** has an interest in **Iran** holding on long enough to exhaust American resources and keep the **United States** bogged down in a Middle East conflict. But it has no interest in seeing **Iran** become a failed state or a state under direct American influence. This delicate balance partly explains Moscow's relative discretion on this conflict, which contrasts with its usual rhetorical activism.

***Zelensky** deserves not to be forgotten in geopolitical analysis, even when the news cycle focuses on **Iran**. He has been fighting since **2022** with a courage and tenacity that commands admiration. The **West**'s support for **Ukraine** must not be sacrificed on the altar of new American geopolitical priorities. That is a test of strategic consistency for Washington and its allies.*

## The late-night vote as a signal to Washington's allies and adversaries

### What the world took away from the **Senate** vote

The **late-night vote of June 25, 2026** in the American **Senate** was watched closely by chancelleries around the world. By rejecting the war powers resolution, the **Senate** sent the world a message: **the American president has all the freedom necessary to conduct military operations against Iran**, without formal legislative constraint. This message is received differently depending on the capital.

In **Tehran**, this vote confirms that the American interlocutor in the Geneva negotiations is **Trump** alone, with the fullness of his executive powers. That simplifies the negotiation in one sense — you know who really decides — but it complicates it in another: does **Trump**'s word durably bind the **United States** or can it be reversed by his successor? That question haunts every negotiation involving Washington since 2016.

### A signal of strength but also of unilateralism

For **Washington's allies** — **Europe**, Japan, Australia, South Korea — this vote confirms a trend toward American military unilateralism that concerns capitals operating under their own constitutional and democratic constraints for committing armed forces. These allies must contend with an American partner that can trigger conflicts without prior deliberative process and then ask them for political and logistical support.

This asymmetry in decision-making processes — an **America** that decides alone, allies that adapt — is a source of structural tension within Western alliances. **NATO** and other multilateral alliance structures have consultation mechanisms, but they do not require the **United States** to obtain allied agreement before engaging in military operations in external theaters. The next crisis will test these mechanisms once again.

*This late-night **Senate** vote reminded me of a fundamental truth: in security crises, it is rarely institutions that hold the reins — it is the man who presides. **Trump** won this vote. But in doing so, he also legitimized for his successors a level of concentration of war powers in a single man's hands that should worry every committed democrat, regardless of political affiliation.*

## The institutional fracture: when **Congress** loses its voice before the executive

### The progressive erosion of legislative checks and balances

Since the beginning of **Donald Trump**'s **second term**, the **United States Congress** has faced a methodical erosion of its constitutional prerogatives. The vote of **June 25, 2026** on the war powers resolution is not an isolated incident — it is the expression of a deep-seated trend. The **War Powers Resolution of 1973**, adopted precisely to counter presidential excesses after **Vietnam**, now finds itself neutralized by a disciplined Republican majority that chooses partisan loyalty over institutional oversight.

**Constitutionalists** observing this dynamic are sounding the alarm. When the **United States Congress** abdicates its power to declare war, it transfers to the **executive** an authority that the **Founding Fathers** deliberately distributed among the branches of government. The **war against Iran**, launched in **February 2026** and still ongoing after **106 days**, illustrates this drift in a striking fashion.

### Dissident senators facing party pressure

The **Republican senators** who voted in favor of the resolution — against the **White House**'s wishes — paid an immediate political price. In a **Republican Party** of **2026**, voting against **Trump** exposes one to primaries, funding withdrawals, and social media attacks. This institutional courage is rare, which is why it deserves to be named. **American democracy** survives precisely because of these few rebel voices reminding us that the **Senate** is not a rubber-stamp chamber.

Internationally, these dissident votes are scrutinized by **Washington**'s allies with particular attention. **NATO**, the **European Union**, and **Pacific** partners need to know that American democracy functions — that its institutions resist the concentration of power. The vote of **June 25** sends an ambiguous signal: enough dissent to show the debate exists, but not enough to change the outcome.

*There is something profoundly American about this paradox: the institutions that survived Nixon, Watergate, Clinton's impeachment, now show their limits when confronted with a president who intuitively understands that rules only hold if those who break them pay the price. The **War Powers Resolution** has never been tested so severely.*

## The war economy and its winners: the military-industrial complex in full expansion

### The **$12.3 billion** invested in defense in the first half of **2026**

The number speaks for itself: **$12.3 billion** invested in the **defense** sector in the first half of **2026**, compared to **$9.95 billion** for all of **2025**. This spectacular acceleration in **defense venture capital** is not a product of chance — it is a direct reflection of a geopolitical situation in full boil. The **war against Iran**, persistent tensions with **China** in the **South China Sea**, and the continuing **Russian** threat in **Europe** create structural demand for military technologies.

**Anduril Industries**, which secured a **$20 billion** contract in **March 2026**, is the emblem of this new war economy. Founded by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, funded by **venture capital** funds, **Anduril** represents the fusion of the technology world with the military complex. This model — agile, private, innovation-driven — is in the process of supplanting traditional defense giants like **Lockheed Martin** and **Raytheon**, which are slower and more bureaucratic.

### The ethical and strategic implications of the privatization of war

But this transformation raises fundamental questions. When decisions about autonomous weapons systems, surveillance technologies, and combat drones are made by private companies motivated by profit, who ensures ethical oversight? The **United States Congress**, already weakened on questions of **war powers**, possesses the technical capacity to evaluate these systems? The evidence suggests not. The gap between the technological capabilities of the private sector and congressional understanding is abyssal.

For **Washington**'s allies, the increasing privatization of American warfare is both an opportunity and a challenge. An opportunity, because technologies developed by companies like **Anduril** can be exported, shared, and integrated into allied defense systems. A challenge, because it creates commercial dependencies that complicate sovereign political decisions. **Europe** is learning this lesson painfully: its dependence on American defense technologies is a structural factor in its relations with **Washington**.

*I do not pretend to have all the answers on the privatization of defense. What I know is that when companies like **Anduril** hold **$20 billion** in contracts in a single transaction, war ceases to be purely a matter of state. It also becomes a matter for shareholders. And that should keep us up at night.*

## Conclusion: A presidential victory with lasting constitutional consequences

### **Trump** won the vote, but at what institutional cost?

The rejection of the war powers resolution undeniably represents a **short-term political victory for Donald Trump**. He can continue to conduct the war against **Iran** without formal legislative constraint. He demonstrated his ability to maintain his Republican coalition in the **Senate** even on a sensitive constitutional question. And he sent a signal of strength to Tehran on the eve of new diplomatic negotiations.

But this victory carries an **institutional cost** that will be paid over time. Every time **Congress** abandons a constitutional prerogative — here, the oversight of presidential wars — it makes that abandonment a little more normal, a little more permanent. The next war powers resolution will be even harder to advance, because this precedent will have been set. That is how democracies weaken: not in a single great collapse, but through the accumulation of small institutional surrenders that ultimately change the nature of the system.

### The defense of the **West** in this global context

In this context of multiple tensions — the **Iran**-USA war, the war in **Ukraine**, **China**'s rise in power, the military-technological complex in full expansion with **$12.3 billion** in **venture capital** invested in defense in the first half of **2026** — the **West** must find coherence between its growing military power and its fundamental democratic values. Those values include civilian and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, transparency in war decisions, and the institutional accountability of leaders who commit their nations to conflict.

**Zelensky's Ukraine**, which has been fighting since **2022** for its survival and for European democratic values, deserves a **West** that remains faithful to those values not only in words but also in institutional practice. A **West** that abandons parliamentary oversight of wars to gain operational flexibility no longer fully embodies the model it claims to defend. That is the profound challenge this late-night **Senate** vote poses to American democracy.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [The Guardian — Senate rejects Iran war powers resolution, Trump news — June 25, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jun/25/trump-news-at-glance-supreme-court)

- [Chosun Biz — Defense VC $12.3B H1 2026, Iran war 106 days, Anduril $20B contract — June 22, 2026](https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-international/2026/06/22/HUIUFWIKNRFV3CTC2CL46AHYXA/)

### Secondary sources

- [ArentFox Schiff — US legal and commercial context June 2026 — June 25, 2026](https://www.afslaw.com/perspectives/customs-import-compliance-blog/the-customs-and-trade-world-turns-june-2026)

- [Politico — Supreme Court and political decisions of June 25, 2026 — June 25, 2026](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/25/supreme-court-temporary-protected-status-ruling-00975658)

- [Aletihad — New US-Iran negotiations in Geneva planned — June 21, 2026](https://en.aletihad.ae/news/mena-world/4673800/us-and-iran-set-for-new-talks-in-geneva)

- [NPR — Vance and Iranian officials hold high-stakes talks in Switzerland — June 22, 2026](https://www.npr.org/2026/06/22/nx-s1-5864250/vance-and-iranian-officials-hold-high-stakes-talks-in-switzerland)

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-le-senat-refuse-de-brider-trump-sur-l-iran-les-pouvoirs-de-guerre-au-c-u