# INVESTIGATION: The Hornet drone forces Russia to build a five-layer defense

> What Ukrainian engineers accomplished with the Hornet exemplifies what the war in Ukraine has produced at its best: local solutions, adapted to real threats, capable of outmanoeuvring systems built by

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-le-drone-hornet-force-la-russie-a-construire-une-defense-a-cinq-couches

## Introduction: A drone that rewrites the rules of electronic warfare

### The Hornet, also known as the Martian-2

On the Ukrainian battlefield, certain weapons systems become markers of an era. The **Hornet** drone — also known as the **Martian-2** — is one of them. This Ukrainian strike drone, operating in some of the most intense electronic jamming conditions ever documented, has forced Russian forces to build an entirely new, complex, **five-layer** countermeasure system. This is not a marginal improvement to Russian air defenses. It is a structural response to a system that, according to Russian sources themselves, remains difficult to neutralise effectively.

On **July 1, 2026**, the specialist outlet **Militarnyi** published a detailed analysis of the Russian countermeasure system developed specifically against the **Hornet**. This analysis, based on the statements of Russian propagandist **Aleksey Smirnov**, reveals a startling reality: **"There is currently no universal and proven system capable of countering the Hornet."** For a Ukrainian drone facing the military machine of a major nuclear power, that is a remarkable admission.

### Why this drone is so hard to shoot down

The **Hornet** operates in an unusually wide frequency band — approximately **160 to 450 MHz** — with **horizontal signal polarization**. These two characteristics make it difficult for conventional Russian electronic warfare systems to detect, since their signature databases did not initially include this drone. The **Ten** detector family, initially deployed to detect Ukrainian drones, was simply unable to automatically identify the **Hornet** — its signal parameters were absent from their databases.

Some variants of the **Hornet** use **Starlink** satellite communications to maintain the data link with the operator, an additional communication layer that conventional radio detection systems are not designed to intercept in this context. This combination of technical characteristics — atypical frequency band, horizontal polarization, satellite option — makes it a particularly complex target for Russian defenses.

## Layer one: hunting the operator through Kalina

### Kill the shooter, not the bullet

The first Russian line of defense against the **Hornet** is not directed at the drone itself — it is a radically different tactic. It targets **the operator**. The Russian radio-intelligence system **Kalina** sits at the core of this approach. Equipped with **directional detectors**, the **Kalina** can identify the characteristic emissions of **Starlink** terminals from several kilometres away, and determine the direction of the source signal.

This approach is strategically shrewd: if you cannot shoot down the drone quickly and reliably, you target the person controlling it. A neutralised operator means a drone that loses its guidance and becomes useless or crashes. For **Hornet** variants that depend on **Starlink**, this vulnerability is real — though Ukrainian engineers are actively working to close it through various alternative navigation solutions.

### Fiber-optic drones and Ukrainian countermeasures

The Kyiv-based company **Himera** illustrates perfectly how **Ukraine** responds to the jamming problem. Documented by **Euromaidan Press** on **June 26, 2026**, the company develops lightweight mesh networks, portable radios weighing around **300 grams** — compared to **one kilogram** for competitors — and repeaters that can be deployed from drones in forward positions. The mesh network continues functioning even if certain nodes are neutralised.

The Ukrainian response to the operator-targeting problem also involves fiber-optic drones for short-range operations, and the development of autonomous navigation systems of the **DSMAC** type — comparing terrain images with stored reference data — that do not depend on an interceptable radio signal. On this technological front, **Ukraine** is developing counter-countermeasures at a pace the Russians are struggling to match.

## Layer two: the reconfigured Groza electronic warfare system

### Groza-07K and Groza-03: adapting to the Hornet's frequencies

The second layer of the Russian defensive system relies on the **Groza-07K** and **Groza-03** electronic warfare systems. These systems, initially designed for other frequency ranges, have been **specifically reconfigured** to match the **Hornet**'s atypical operating frequencies — between **160 and 450 MHz**. Their antennas have also been adapted to operate in **horizontal polarization**, or simultaneously in both polarization planes, to maximise jamming effectiveness.

This reconfiguration is not trivial. It reveals that Russian forces could not simply deploy their existing systems: they had to modify them. That is an indirect acknowledgment of the **Hornet**'s sophistication — and of the human and technical resources devoted to countering it. Every hour of Russian engineering spent reconfiguring the **Groza** systems is an hour not spent on anything else.

### The limits of jamming: range and mobility

The **Groza** systems offer a defined jamming range. They essentially create an electronic inhibition zone around protected positions. But this coverage is neither total nor infallible. Terrain, obstacles, weather conditions, and the mobility of infantry units create blind spots. And Ukrainian engineers, by observing jamming patterns, can theoretically guide their drones through less-covered zones.

The **RAND Corporation** has noted that **"mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum is now essential for digitised armies dependent on sensors, satellites, and networked systems."** This reality applies to both sides of the front. Russian forces seek to blind Ukrainian drones; Ukrainian forces seek to maintain their data links. It is a spectrum war as much as a war of metal.

## Layer three: radar detection with the Ten family

### Signature libraries updated under pressure

The third Russian defensive layer relies on the **Ten detector family** — radio-intelligence systems capable of automatically detecting and identifying drones by their electromagnetic signatures. The initial problem: the **Hornet** simply did not appear in their signature libraries. Its signal parameters — frequency band, polarization — were atypical enough to make automatic identification impossible.

This gap forced Russian forces to urgently update the **Ten** detectors' databases to include the **Hornet**'s signature. It is a process that takes time and requires precise information about the target drone — information that can change if the Ukrainians modify their parameters. In the drone war, signature update cycles are as important as drone production cycles themselves.

### Coverage zones and blind spots

Detection efforts focus primarily on frontline areas where standard **Hornet** variants, using conventional radio links, operate most frequently. Coverage is less complete for variants using **Starlink**, which are handled separately by the **Kalina** system. This segmentation by variant type reveals the growing complexity of the Russian countermeasure taxonomy.

Updating signature libraries is an ongoing process, not a stable state. Each new version of the **Hornet** — or any other Ukrainian drone — can potentially defeat detection calibrated for the previous version. This dynamic creates permanent pressure on Russian engineering teams, who must stay current in a rapidly evolving electronic warfare environment.

## Layer four: mobile close-range fire teams

### Armed pickups against sophisticated drones

The fourth layer of the Russian defensive system is the most rudimentary in appearance — and one of the most effective in practice. **Mobile fire teams** operate from pickups or off-road vehicles, equipped with **Kord heavy machine guns**, **DShKM**, **Utyos**, or **ZU-23-2 twin 23mm anti-aircraft cannons**. These teams coordinate with observation posts and deploy rapidly toward the area where a drone threat has been detected.

This high-rate-of-fire anti-drone system is effective in the close-in defense zone immediately around protected installations. Its strength lies in its mobility: a fixed team is easy to bypass; a mobile team receiving real-time alerts is much harder to avoid. Its weakness: it requires accurate prior detection to deploy at the right place, at the right moment.

### FPV drones as interceptors

Russian forces also deploy **FPV** (First Person View) **drones** in the close defense zone. These interceptors are used to **physically destroy the Hornet**, either by direct collision or by detonating a small explosive charge nearby. This drone-versus-drone tactic has become a standard battlefield practice — a response to a fundamental asymmetry: it is often cheaper to shoot down a drone with a drone than with an anti-aircraft missile.

The tactic has constraints, however: FPV drones themselves need operators, a stable data link, and prior detection to be guided toward their target. In an intense jamming environment — like the Ukrainian front — the coordination chain between detection systems and FPV interceptor drones is fragile and easily disrupted.

## Layer five: the Yolka interceptor, the specialist killer

### A VTOL at 200 km/h with automatic target acquisition

The fifth and final Russian defensive layer against the **Hornet** is the most sophisticated: the specialised interceptor **Yolka**. It is a high-speed **VTOL quadcopter** (vertical take-off and landing), capable of reaching **200 km/h**, equipped with an automatic target acquisition system based on a **neural network**. The **Yolka** can be hand-launched or deployed from a compact launch platform.

What makes the **Yolka** particularly remarkable is its autonomy: its **neural network** system allows it to identify and pursue its target without constant human guidance. It is an artificial intelligence capability applied directly to the anti-drone defense problem. Once launched, it can theoretically operate even in jamming conditions that would render a manually guided drone useless.

### The limits of the last resort

The **Yolka** is described as a **last-resort system** in the Russian defensive architecture — deployed when the other layers have failed to neutralise the threat. Its deployment implies that the enemy drone has already passed through the first four layers and is approaching its target. In that context, the **Yolka**'s engagement speed is critical: at **200 km/h**, it can intercept drones that have outrun slower systems.

But even the **Yolka** has constraints. Its neural network must have been trained on the **Hornet**'s visual characteristics. Its effective range remains limited by its flight endurance and onboard energy. And, like any complex system, it can be defeated by modifications to the target's shape or thermal signature. The technological race between the **Hornet** and the **Yolka** is a micro-version of the broader arms race between the two belligerents.

## The Starlink signal: the variable that changes everything

### A dependency that creates an exploitable vulnerability

Some **Hornet** variants use **Starlink** communications as their primary data link. This option provides extended range and robustness against conventional jamming — **Starlink** terminals operate at frequencies and with protocols very different from traditional radio links. But it also creates an exploitable vulnerability: **Starlink** terminals emit a distinctive signal detectable by the **Kalina** system.

The Ukrainian solution to this dilemma is multifaceted. First, diversify communication systems across drones — some using **Starlink**, others conventional radio links, still others autonomous navigation systems with no active link. This diversification complicates the task of Russian forces, which must deploy different types of countermeasures depending on the variant encountered. Then, develop intermittent communication protocols that minimise the detection exposure window.

### Ukrainian communications architecture as a countermeasure

The Kyiv-based company **Himera**, documented by **Euromaidan Press**, illustrates the Ukrainian systemic approach. Its mesh networks allow units to maintain communications in environments where each individual signal type would be jammed. **Himera**'s **R1** repeater can connect to satellite terminals like **Starlink** while serving as a node in a local mesh network — combining the advantages of both architectures.

The Ukrainian communications doctrine in intense jamming zones — documented by **Mykyta Puz**, technology liaison with the **Azov Corps** — demands systems that are **"truly scalable, robust, designed for battlefield use."** The objective articulated by **Misha Rudominski**, co-founder of **Himera**, is significant: **"It's not about making it impossible. It's about making it very difficult and very complicated and very costly, so that your enemy decides to spend their resources on something else."**

## The world's most jammed battlefield

### A global laboratory of electronic warfare

The Ukrainian front is officially recognised as **the most electronically jammed battlefield in history**. Russian forces deploy an impressive range of electronic warfare systems: the **Murmansk-BN** strategic jammer capable of reaching hundreds of kilometres, the **Krasukha-4** broadband jammer, the **R-330Zh Zhitel** targeting VHF and UHF frequencies, and the **Pole-21** GPS suppressor. The recent trend is toward deploying smaller, less powerful, but more numerous and more dispersed solutions — making mapping and neutralising these systems exponentially more difficult.

In this context, every Ukrainian drone that reaches its target is a technical victory as much as a military one. And the creation of a Russian five-layer defensive system specifically dedicated to the **Hornet** is, paradoxically, the finest proof of its effectiveness. You do not build a complex architecture against something that does not work.

### Exportable lessons from the Ukrainian war

The Spanish **FENIX** programme, documented by **Defence-UA** in June **2026**, incorporates navigation and control technologies tested in **Ukraine** — notably through **Navigation-Grupo Oesía**, whose **DSMAC**-type system is integrated into the **Ruta** cruise missile-drone from Dutch company **Destinus**, supplied to Ukrainian forces. **Shield AI**'s **Hivemind** system has been tested with the **Hornet** strike drone and the **V-BAT** reconnaissance drone. Ukrainian drones had accumulated **more than 3,000 km of flight experience** with the Western navigation module **Osiris**.

These connections illustrate how the war in **Ukraine** has become the primary accelerator of military drone innovation worldwide. Technologies developed and tested under real combat conditions — anti-jamming navigation, autonomous swarms, VTOL interceptors, tactical mesh networks — are migrating to other military programmes at a speed unprecedented in modern defense history.

## The Russian admission: "no universal system"

### When propaganda tells the truth

The most revealing statement in this entire analysis comes from an unexpected source: Russian propagandist **Aleksey Smirnov** himself, describing the countermeasure methods against the **Hornet**. His conclusion: **"There is currently no universal and proven system capable of countering the Hornet."** This sentence, extracted from a pro-Russian source, is the best possible summary of the situation.

Building a five-layer defense is the response to this absence of a universal solution. Each layer compensates for the gaps in the others: operator detection through **Kalina** fails if the operator stays mobile; **Groza** jamming fails if the drone navigates autonomously; mobile fire teams fail if initial detection is late; FPV drones fail if jamming degrades their guidance; and even the **Yolka** can be defeated by target modifications.

### What this reveals about Ukrainian innovation

Analysis of the Russian defensive system reveals in outline the **Hornet**'s qualities: it is fast, operates in a frequency band difficult to jam, can use multiple types of data links, and its operator can remain mobile to avoid targeting. These characteristics are not accidental — they are the result of engineering deliberately designed to circumvent existing defenses. Ukrainian engineers studied Russian countermeasures and built their drone to bypass as many of them as possible.

This is the dialectic of wartime innovation: each advance by one side forces the other to respond, which forces the first to adapt, in a continuous cycle of forced mutual improvement. On the Ukrainian front, this cycle plays out over **weeks**, not years — creating a pace of military technological innovation without precedent in the modern history of warfare.

## Implications for Western defense doctrine

### What the West must retain

The Russian five-layer defensive system against the **Hornet** contains valuable lessons for every Western military planner. First lesson: modern strike drones are asymmetric threats requiring multi-layer responses. No single system can counter them effectively — not radar, not electronic warfare, not interceptors. Defense must be integrated, redundant, and adaptive.

Second lesson: the electronic signature war is as important as the materials war. A drone your detectors cannot recognise is a drone you cannot shoot down, regardless of the sophistication of your weapons systems. Maintaining up-to-date signature libraries, developing detectors capable of identifying atypical signals, integrating machine learning into detection systems — all of this has become an absolute priority of modern defense.

### The systemic cost of a single effective drone

There is an economic dimension to this story worth highlighting. The **Hornet** is a relatively inexpensive drone compared to the countermeasure systems that Russian forces have had to deploy against it: the **Kalina**, the reconfigured **Groza** systems, the **Ten** family updates, the mobile fire teams, the FPV interceptor drones, and the specialised **Yolka**. The sum of these Russian defensive investments probably far exceeds the manufacturing cost of the **Hornets** that made them necessary.

That is precisely the objective of asymmetric deterrence: force the adversary to commit disproportionate resources to defense. If every **Hornet** shot down costs **Russia** ten times its own value in deployed countermeasures, the military mathematics favour **Ukraine**. And this logic applies well beyond the **Hornet** alone.

## The Ruta drone and swarms: the next frontier

### Technologies migrating from the field to the product

Technologies tested in **Ukraine** are already migrating to the next generation of systems. The **Ruta** cruise missile-drone from Dutch company **Destinus**, supplied to **Ukraine**, integrates a **DSMAC**-type navigation system developed by **Navigation-Grupo Oesía** — the same supplier equipping the Spanish **FENIX** drone swarm programme. These connections illustrate how the Ukrainian laboratory is accelerating global military development.

**Shield AI**'s **Hivemind** system, already tested with the **Hornet** and the **V-BAT**, represents the next step: drone swarms coordinated by artificial intelligence, capable of operating autonomously even in GPS-degraded and jamming-intensive environments. Against such a system, the five-layer defense developed against the **Hornet** would face a threat of an order of magnitude higher. A single drone can be intercepted; a swarm of ten, AI-coordinated, is exponentially harder to counter.

### Russia fights back with its own swarms

It should be noted that **Russia** is also developing its own drone swarm capabilities. The Russian trend toward deploying **smaller, less powerful, more numerous, and more dispersed solutions** in electronic warfare reflects the same logic applied to attack systems: saturate defenses through quantity rather than individual sophistication. This saturation doctrine is a natural response to point defense systems that can intercept individual drones but are overwhelmed by a wave.

The evolution of the drone war in **Ukraine** suggests that future major conflicts will be fundamentally different from all that preceded them. Aerial dominance no longer belongs exclusively to conventional air powers. It is contested drone by drone, signal by signal, signature library by signature library, in an electromagnetic space that armed forces are only beginning to fully understand.

## What this says about the war in Ukraine: resistance and ingenuity

### An army that innovates under fire

The sophistication of the **Hornet** and the Russian defensive response it generated say something important about the nature of the war in **Ukraine**. This is not a symmetric conflict between two conscript armies equipped with Soviet-era weapons. It is a technological war of unprecedented intensity and innovation pace, in which Ukrainian forces have developed a remarkable military engineering culture capable of adapting and improving their systems in cycles of weeks.

The company **Himera**, with its **300-gram radios** and drone-deployable mesh networks, illustrates this culture. The doctrine articulated by **Rudominski** — **"Ukraine never asks for the best. Ukraine asks for what is perfectly suited to this task, and then in large quantities"** — is the expression of a pragmatic and effective military philosophy. Not maximum technological perfection, but maximum operational relevance. Not maximum sophistication, but maximum robustness.

### The price of Russian unpreparedness

On the other side, the Russian response to the **Hornet** reveals insufficient initial planning. The absence of the **Hornet**'s signature from the **Ten** detectors' databases; the need to reconfigure the **Groza** systems for frequencies initially not covered; the construction of a complex defensive architecture after the threat emerged rather than in anticipation — all of this suggests that Russian forces had not anticipated the emergence of a drone with these specific characteristics.

Tactical surprise is what forces strategic adaptation. **Ukraine** created that surprise. And while **Russia** adapted its countermeasures, **Hornet** drones continued reaching their targets. That is the fundamental value of technological initiative: it gives you a window of effectiveness during which the adversary cannot yet respond. In that window, missions are accomplished, targets are destroyed, Ukrainian soldiers' lives are saved.

## The complete architecture: synthesis of the five layers

### A system built through accumulation, not planning

In synthesis, the Russian defensive system against the **Hornet** presents itself as an architecture built through reactive accumulation rather than anticipatory planning. The **first layer** — targeting the operator via **Kalina** — is a response to the impossibility of reliably shooting down the drone directly. The **second layer** — reconfigured **Groza** jamming — is an adaptation to the **Hornet**'s atypical frequency band. The **third layer** — updating **Ten** libraries — fills a detection blind spot. The **fourth layer** — mobile fire teams — provides close-in defense. The **fifth layer** — the **Yolka** interceptor — constitutes the high-tech last resort.

This five-layer architecture is not the result of an established doctrine. It is the sum of responses to a problem that **Russia** did not anticipate. And that is precisely what **Ukraine** seeks to do: pose new problems, force costly adaptations, maintain technological initiative. As long as **Ukraine** remains capable of innovating faster than **Russia** can adapt its defenses, this advantage will remain operational.

### What the Hornet prefigures

The **Hornet** is today. **Shield AI**'s **Hivemind** — AI-coordinated drone swarms — is tomorrow. The progression of these technologies, accelerated by the war in **Ukraine**, will redefine combat doctrine for the coming decades. Armies that fail to integrate these lessons — the importance of mesh networks, anti-jamming navigation systems, multi-layer defensive architectures, rapid innovation cycles — will be exposed to surprises similar to what the **Hornet** inflicted on Russian forces.

And for all of **Ukraine**'s allies, the invitation is clear: fund, support, and protect this innovation capacity. Not only because **Ukraine** deserves that support — it does, fully — but because the Ukrainian laboratory produces military knowledge of a strategic value that democracies would take decades to acquire any other way.

## Ukraine over the next two years: maintaining the lead

### The innovation cycle as a strategic weapon

**Ukraine**'s technological advantage in drones is not permanent. It is the result of initiative — a lead won through necessity and ingenuity. Maintaining that advantage in the coming years will require continuous investment, a capacity to rapidly incorporate lessons from the field, and sustained support from Western partners. Every time Russian forces adapt their countermeasures, Ukrainian engineers must be ready to respond with a new generation of systems.

This innovation cycle is not free. It demands qualified human resources, materials subject to supply chains disrupted by war, and research and development investment in the context of a national budget under extreme pressure. Western partners who want **Ukraine** to maintain its technological advantage must integrate support for military innovation — not merely the supply of finished equipment — into their assistance.

### International cooperation: sharing knowledge, multiplying impact

The Spanish **FENIX** programme, the American development of **Hivemind**, the **Ruta** missile from **Destinus** — all benefit directly from Ukrainian experience. This knowledge transfer is bidirectional: **Ukraine** receives improved systems in return. But it requires a more formal, faster cooperation structure, less hampered by standard procurement procedures that measure innovation cycles in years.

The medium-term objective is clear: make **Ukraine** a military innovation hub integrated into the **NATO** defense architecture. Not a peripheral appendage from which technologies are occasionally purchased, but a systemic partner whose real-time combat experience feeds the defense programmes of all allies. That is one of the most concrete forms that durable Western support for **Kyiv** could take.

## Conclusion: the drone war has changed in nature

### From simple object to complex ecosystem

The drone entered military consciousness as a simple weapon — cheap, expendable, remotely guided. The **Hornet** and the defensive system it generated show that era is over. Modern strike drones are complex systems integrating anti-jamming navigation, atypical frequency bands, satellite links, and potentially artificial intelligence. Their defense requires multi-layer architectures, continuous signature updates, and coordination between detection, jamming, and interception systems.

This evolution has direct implications for the security of Western democracies. If a relatively accessible drone like the **Hornet** forces an army the size of Russia's to build a five-layer defense, imagine the implications of a swarm of fifty AI-coordinated drones. Military doctrine, research and development investment, and personnel training must adapt to this reality — and they must adapt now, not after the next conflict.

### Ukraine as a beacon

**Zelensky** and the Ukrainian forces transformed an invasion the world thought would be over in **72 hours** into more than four years of fierce resistance and continuous military innovation. The **Hornet** is one symbol of that resistance. It illustrates that military superiority is not measured only in tonnage of steel or nuclear warheads — it is also measured in ingenuity, adaptability, and the will to keep innovating even under fire.

The Russian five-layer defensive system is the forced response of the aggressor to the creativity of its victim. That, in its own way, is a Ukrainian victory as real as any territorial gain. And it reminds every observer worldwide that in the war of the **21st century**, technological initiative can be as decisive as numerical superiority.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Militarnyi — Hornet Drone Forces Russians to Build Multi-Layered Countermeasure System — July 1, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/hornet-drone-forces-russians-to-build-multi-layered-countermeasure-system/)

- [Defence-UA — Will Another Drone Swarm Feature Technologies Tested in Ukraine? — June 2026](https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/will_another_drone_swarm_feature_technologies_tested_in_ukraine_this_time_from_the_ruta_cruise_missile-18805.html)

- [Euromaidan Press — In the world's most jammed battlefield, a Kyiv company keeps the signal alive — June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/in-the-worlds-most-jammed-battlefield-a-kyiv-company-keeps-the-signal-alive/)

### Secondary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukraine War Latest — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-141/)

- Militarnyi — Defence and military technology coverage Ukraine — July 2026

- [Euromaidan Press — Russian Aggression Coverage — July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/category/russian-aggression/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-le-drone-hornet-force-la-russie-a-construire-une-defense-a-cinq-couches