# INVESTIGATION: Hunting the Msta-S — how Ukrainian drones neutralize Russian artillery

> A 65 percent increase in one year in the destruction of Russian artillery: that figure deserves a pause. This is not luck. It is method. Ukraine has built a machine for hunting enemy artillery — and t

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-la-chasse-aux-msta-s-comment-les-drones-ukrainiens-neutralisent-l-artill

## Key takeaways

- A June 30, 2026 video from the Northern Eagle battalion of the 151st Brigade shows the destruction of a concealed Russian 2S19 Msta-S howitzer.
- Defence Express reported 2,053 Russian artillery systems destroyed in June 2026, against 1,243 in June 2025, a rise of 65 percent.
- The three-step doctrine is detect, fix and strike, with FPV drones delivering the final blow.
- A similar late-May operation by the 72nd Brigade's Bulava battalion hit equipment inside Bryansk Region, Russia.
- Border guard units, mechanized brigades and other units share the hunting role, and Ukraine's drone production has reached industrial scale.

## Introduction: June 30, a hunt on film

### One video, one howitzer, one lesson in war

On **June 30, 2026**, drone operators from the **Northern Eagle** unmanned systems battalion of the **151st Separate Mechanized Brigade** published a video showing the detection and destruction of a **Russian 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer**, carefully concealed in a camouflaged firing position. The footage is not spectacular in its visuals. It is spectacular in what it reveals: an army that has developed a method, a system, a doctrine for hunting and neutralizing heavy enemy artillery with growing efficiency and reduced human cost.

That same day, **Defence Express** reported that Ukrainian forces had destroyed **2,053 Russian artillery systems in June 2026**, compared with **1,243 in June 2025** — a rise of **65 percent**. Behind that cold statistic lies a transformed tactical reality: **Ukraine** is winning the artillery war, not by mass but by precision, technology, and a "hunter" doctrine that is rewriting the rules of ground combat.

## The Msta-S: portrait of the target

### Russia's reference self-propelled howitzer

The **2S19 Msta-S** is one of the most widely deployed self-propelled artillery systems in the **Russian armed forces**. Armed with a **152mm gun**, it can fire shells up to **24 kilometers**, or up to **36 kilometers** with rocket-assisted munitions. Its tracked mobility allows it to move quickly after a salvo to evade counter-battery fire. Its rate of fire can reach **8 rounds per minute** over a short burst. In Ukraine, it is one of the instruments used to bombard cities, defensive positions, and Ukrainian troop concentrations.

Its unit value is estimated at **several million dollars**. Its destruction therefore represents not only an immediate tactical gain — removing a lethal artillery piece from the sector — but also a real economic loss for **Russia**, which must replace or repair each system destroyed. At **2,053 artillery systems destroyed in June**, we are talking about figures that weigh heavily even for a major army.

### Camouflage as Russia's last line of defense

The June 30 video shows a **Msta-S** "in a camouflaged firing position." That detail is critical: Russian forces have long understood that their artillery systems have become priority targets for Ukrainian drones. In response, they have developed more sophisticated camouflage and dispersal practices — camouflage nets, prepared positions in woods, nighttime movement, frequent position changes.

These adaptations have slowed the pace of destruction but have not stopped it. **Ukrainian reconnaissance drones** have refined their low-altitude detection capabilities, image resolution, and capacity to operate at night. The race between concealment and detection is permanent — and for now, according to the **June 2026** figures, detection is winning.

## The method: reconnaissance, fix, strike

### The three-step doctrine

The **151st Brigade's** account reveals a three-step doctrine: first, Ukrainian **aerial reconnaissance teams** locate the target; then the target is "fixed" — kept under continuous surveillance to prevent it from moving before the strike; finally, **tactical strike drones** deliver precision impacts. This sequence — detect, fix, strike — has become the operational signature of Ukrainian drone warfare.

This doctrine is far more sophisticated than it appears. The "fix" phase is particularly critical: if the **Msta-S** moves between detection and strike, the entire sequence must restart. Ukrainian operators must maintain continuous aerial coverage of the target while preparing and launching the strike — an operation requiring coordination, aircraft availability, and favorable weather conditions.

### The role of FPV drones in the final destruction

**FPV drones** (First Person View) — strike drones guided in real time by an operator wearing virtual-reality goggles — have revolutionized the destruction of artillery targets in **Ukraine**. Less costly than anti-tank missiles, more precise than an artillery shell, they can reach targets in protected positions that conventional strikes would miss. Their production cost, increasingly mastered by Ukrainian industry, allows large-scale deployment.

The combination of reconnaissance drones plus FPV drones plus, at times, guided anti-tank missiles constitutes a lethal chain that Russian artillery systems struggle to evade indefinitely. Every adaptation attempt — changing position more often, using smoke screens, operating at night — carries its own operational costs that reduce the effectiveness of Russian artillery even when it survives the hunt.

## Context: June 2026, a record month of destruction

### The overall figures and their meaning

In **June 2026**, according to data compiled by **Defence Express** and other specialized sources, Ukrainian forces destroyed **2,053 Russian artillery systems** — across all categories: self-propelled howitzers like the **Msta-S**, towed howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, and heavy mortars. This monthly figure exceeds all previous records since the start of the full-scale war. It reflects an acceleration of Ukraine's operational tempo that is not incidental but structural.

The acceleration reflects several simultaneous improvements: better intelligence capabilities, more reconnaissance drones available, a refined doctrine, more experienced operators, and improved coordination between the various units hunting enemy artillery. These cumulative improvements produced a significant quantitative leap between **June 2025** and **June 2026**.

### The similar late-May operation: the 72nd Brigade inside Russia

To contextualize the June 30 operation, **United24 Media** also reported a similar operation conducted in late **May 2026** by the **Bulava Unmanned Systems Battalion** of the **72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade** in **Bryansk Region, Russia**. Drone operators had destroyed a concentration of heavy equipment including several **2S19 Msta-S**, **2S1 Gvozdika**, a **2S4 Tyulpan**, towed **D-30** howitzers, and mortar positions. These operations on Russian territory show that the hunt does not stop at the international border — it follows artillery systems to their assembly and maintenance areas.

This extension of operations deep into **Russia** marks a significant strategic shift. **Ukraine** is no longer content to defend its territory: it is carrying the war into the Russian interior, targeting artillery reserves before they reach the front. This is a direct application of the extended counter-battery doctrine that Western allies have encouraged.

## Border guards and the diversity of hunting units

### A distributed effort, not a centralized one

Hunting Russian artillery systems is not the preserve of a special unit. It is distributed across the entire Ukrainian army. **Defence Express** documented on **June 25, 2026** how **Ukrainian border guard units** destroyed a **Msta-S**, a **Msta-B**, and a **D-30** in coordinated drone strikes. These units, originally designed for border surveillance, have been converted into active combat units using drones — a remarkable institutional transformation under the pressure of war.

This distribution of strike capability across multiple types of units — mechanized brigades, border guards, unmanned systems battalions, military intelligence units — makes Ukraine's campaign against Russian artillery extremely difficult to counter. There is no single "center of gravity" the Russians could neutralize to stop the campaign. It is everywhere, conducted by dozens of units simultaneously.

### The industrialization of Ukrainian drone production

Behind this distributed capability lies an industrial revolution in progress: **Ukraine** is now producing drones at industrial scale. According to data published by the **Ukrainian Ministry of Defense**, hundreds of thousands of drones have been produced inside **Ukraine** since the start of the full-scale war. This domestic production has reduced dependence on Western deliveries for this category of equipment and has allowed every combat unit to be equipped with strike capabilities.

Ukraine's drone industry has benefited from international support, notably through the **Ukraine Defense Contact Group**, which provided components and training. But the core of the innovation came from within — from young Ukrainian engineers, often from the civilian technology sector, who applied agile software-development methods to weapons design. This fusion of tech culture and military urgency is one of the most remarkable characteristics of **Ukraine** at war.

## Tactical implications: counter-battery transformed

### From traditional counter-battery to drone hunting

**Counter-battery** — the art of destroying enemy artillery — is a military discipline as old as artillery itself. Traditionally, it relied on acoustic or electronic detection radar, observation drones or reconnaissance aircraft, and return artillery fire. This system had delays — between detecting an enemy firing position and responding, the opposing weapon had time to move.

Ukraine's doctrine from **June 30** — continuous reconnaissance, fixing, drone strike — compresses these delays to the minimum. Detection and strike can follow each other in under an hour when conditions are right. This compression of the "observe-orient-decide-act" cycle (**OODA**) is precisely what makes Ukrainian hunting so effective: the **Msta-S** does not have time to move between detection and strike.

### Russian adaptation and its limits

Russian forces have sought to counter this doctrine. They have increased the mobility of their artillery systems — fire and move quickly (**shoot and scoot**). They have dispersed more, reducing concentrations that facilitated multiple strikes. They have deployed electronic warfare systems to disrupt Ukrainian drones. And they have begun using their own FPV drones to counter Ukrainian reconnaissance drones.

These adaptations have had partial effects — some Ukrainian strikes have been jammed or neutralized. But the underlying trend remains unfavorable to Russian artillery: **2,053 systems destroyed in June** far exceeds Russia's monthly production capacity for such systems, even accounting for shell imports supplied by **Iran** and **North Korea**. The pressure exceeds the absorption capacity. And that is precisely the definition of winning attrition.

## Military lessons: what this war teaches the world

### A counter-artillery manual for 21st-century armies

Ukraine's doctrine of hunting artillery systems with drones is becoming a reference manual for armies worldwide. **NATO** observers, military attachés from allied countries, strategic think tanks — all are studying closely how **Ukraine** managed to destroy **2,053 systems in a month** with resources limited compared to those of a major conventional power.

The lessons include: the importance of persistent aerial surveillance (drones that stay airborne for hours, not aircraft making a single pass); the value of cheap FPV drones combined with higher-quality reconnaissance drones; the necessity of rapid coordination between observation and strike; and the benefit of distributing this capability across the entire army rather than concentrating it in a few specialized units.

### Western equipment as a force multiplier

The hunt for **Msta-S systems** benefits indirectly from equipment provided by **Ukraine's** Western partners. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems — partly shared by allies — allow Ukrainian commanders to identify artillery concentration areas and focus drone resources accordingly. Without this intelligence support, Ukraine's hunting doctrine would be less effective, even with excellent drones.

The symbiosis between Western intelligence and Ukrainian operational capabilities is one of the least visible but most important aspects of support for **Ukraine**. It allows **Kyiv** to fight a numerically superior Russian army with qualitative advantages — precision, decision-cycle speed, terrain knowledge — that partially compensate for the mass differential.

## Conclusion: The hunt continues

### 2,053 in June — and July beginning

**2,053 artillery systems destroyed in June 2026**. That figure will likely be exceeded in **July** if the trend holds. The hunt continues, unit by unit, sector by sector, drone by drone. The **Msta-S** filmed on **June 30** is not an isolated trophy: it is an illustration of an industrialized process of degrading Russian artillery that is shifting the balance of forces at the front.

For **Ukraine**, sustaining this pace of destruction requires a continuous supply of drones, rising industrial production, well-trained operators, and a doctrine constantly refined against Russian adaptations. These conditions are in place — fragile perhaps, but in place. And as long as they are, the count climbs: fewer Russian artillery systems, fewer bombardments on Ukrainian cities, fewer deaths. That is a simple equation. And its simplicity is its strength.

### The message sent to every Russian artillery commander

Every video published by Ukrainian units — every **Msta-S** turned into wreckage filmed from the sky — sends a message to Russian artillery commanders: your position is not safe. Your camouflage can be pierced. Your mobility can be outmaneuvered. Ukrainian drones are everywhere, patient, persistent, precise. This psychological message is also a weapon. It forces Russian commanders to spend more energy protecting themselves, to move their guns more often, to reduce their rate of fire. An artillery system in permanent flight is a less effective system — even when it survives.

## Final conclusion: The doctrine that is changing war

### Precision against mass

The war in **Ukraine** is often presented as a mass war of attrition — millions of shells, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, front lines that shift by a few kilometers after months of combat. That is true. But behind this visible reality hides another war: the war of precision. And in that war, **Ukraine** — with its FPV drones, its unmanned systems battalions, its hunting doctrine — is demonstrating that precision can surpass mass when applied with coherence and intelligence.

A **Msta-S** destroyed on **June 30, 2026** by operators from **Northern Eagle** is the proof of this doctrine. It is not an isolated heroic feat — it is an ordinary fact in the extraordinary war that **Ukraine** is waging. A war in which hunting enemy guns has become a professional routine, carried out with the same discipline a technician brings to solving an engineering problem. Systematically. Effectively. Victoriously.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [United24 Media — Ukrainian drone operators hunt down and destroy camouflaged Russian 2S19 Msta-S artillery — June 30, 2026](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukrainian-drone-operators-hunt-down-and-destroy-camouflaged-russian-2s19-msta-s-artillery-20294)

- [Defence Express — Russian artillery destruction data — June-July 2026](https://en.defence-ua.com/news/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Ukrainian military operations — July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/)

### Secondary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Latest military news — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/)

- [RBC Ukraine — Ukrainian drone operations — 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news)

- Army Inform — Official Ukrainian armed forces communiqués — 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-la-chasse-aux-msta-s-comment-les-drones-ukrainiens-neutralisent-l-artill