# INVESTIGATION: The "Equalizer" Bomb — How Ukraine Built Its Precision Weapon in 17 Months

> What strikes me about this announcement is less the bomb itself than what it reveals about Ukraine's industrial adaptability. In 17 months, under constant bombardment, with limited resources, a Ukrain

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-la-bombe-equaliseur-comment-l-ukraine-a-construit-son-arme-de-precision

## Key takeaways

- The bomb, made by DG Industry, was declared combat-ready on May 18, 2026, has a 250-kilogram warhead, and was presented at Eurosatory-2026 in Paris.
- Brave1 has enabled more than 3,500 defense innovations; of eight manufacturers working in parallel, two had reached front-line deployment by July 1, 2026.
- The Vyrivniuvach carries no usage restrictions from a supplier country, unlike the American JDAM-ER.
- According to EuroMaidan Press, it costs roughly one-third of a JDAM-ER, which the author says would triple the munitions per equivalent budget.
- The author notes that Russia uses glide bombs by the thousands monthly, and that scaling production remains the main challenge, with volumes and results undisclosed.

## Introduction: A production line that breaks a dependency

### The announcement that changes the equation

On **July 1, 2026**, at the **Brave1 Advantage** event in Kyiv, Ukrainian Defense Minister **Mykhailo Fedorov** delivered the line many had been waiting months to hear: **Ukraine is already deploying its first domestically manufactured guided aerial bombs** against Russian forces on the front line. The program — born out of urgency, developed in **17 months**, tested under the pressure of war — has just crossed the operational threshold. This is not merely a technological victory. It is a strategic turning point that reshapes the balance of aerial warfare in Ukraine.

The bomb is called **Vyrivniuvach** — **"the Equalizer"** in English. The name is no accident. **Russia** has for months been deploying glide bombs at the rate of **thousands per month**, giving its air force a standoff strike advantage that Ukrainian forces have struggled to match with the limited Western equivalents received since 2023. The **Vyrivniuvach** is Ukraine's answer to that asymmetry. An answer built not with the help of a supplying country, but in Ukrainian factories and laboratories.

## The Brave1 Program: A wartime innovation platform

### Birth of an emergency infrastructure

The **Vyrivniuvach** did not emerge from a vacuum. It is the product of the **Brave1** platform, a government-backed defense innovation program launched to accelerate the development of domestic military technologies in response to the battlefield's urgent demands. According to data available as of **July 2, 2026**, **Brave1** has enabled the development of **more than 3,500** defense innovations since its launch. The program has structured an ecosystem of startups, engineers, and defense industry companies that did not exist in this form before the large-scale invasion of 2022.

The approach is deliberately **modular**: **eight Ukrainian manufacturers** worked in parallel on different weight categories, different technical characteristics, and different guidance principles. The goal is not to produce a single standard munition, but a versatile munition ecosystem adaptable to different tactical missions. As of **July 1, 2026**, two of those eight manufacturers had reached front-line deployment status — the other six continue development and testing.

### The "80/20" model: standard budget and innovation budget

The program's funding follows an original model: **80%** of the relevant budget goes to established procurement, and **20%** is reserved for innovative capabilities tested on dedicated ranges. This deliberate split ensures that innovation funding does not come at the expense of immediate operational procurement. Munitions go through accelerated testing on specialized ranges before transfer to combat units — a compressed procedure that nonetheless maintains a minimum of validation standards.

According to **Fedorov**, the accuracy statistics and effectiveness of domestic bombs during testing phases are **"pleasantly impressive."** He cautioned, however, that **"the path to maximum effectiveness in real combat conditions is long and complex"** — a measured formulation that honestly acknowledges the challenges still ahead in scaling from testing to large-scale deployment.

## The Vyrivniuvach: A bomb built from the ground up

### An original architecture — not a copy-paste

The **Vyrivniuvach** bomb, developed by **DG Industry**, is distinguished from a standard guidance kit adaptation: it was **designed from scratch around its own airframe**. Its warhead weighs **250 kilograms**, suited for the destruction of fortifications, command posts, and other significant military targets. It was declared **combat-ready** on **May 18, 2026** by its manufacturer, after **17 months** of development through the **Brave1** platform. In **June 2026**, it was presented internationally at the **Eurosatory-2026 defense show in Paris**, signaling that Ukraine also intends to develop its export defense industry.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense purchased an **initial experimental batch** of the bomb before its front-line deployment. This step, which may seem routine, is actually significant: it confirms that the military procurement and qualification procedure was respected, even in the context of total war where pressures to bypass procedures are immense. The Ukrainian Air Force had received this first experimental batch in **May 2026**.

### No usage restrictions — a decisive tactical advantage

One of the least visible but most strategically significant advantages of the **Vyrivniuvach** is that it **carries no usage restrictions imposed by a supplying country**. **Ukraine** can deploy it wherever it deems necessary, without requiring prior diplomatic authorization from a partner country. Unlike Western munitions such as the American **JDAM-ER**, whose use against targets on Russian territory was long subject to political restrictions, the **Vyrivniuvach** is sovereign in its employment.

This operational freedom has real strategic value in a war where every hour spent negotiating diplomatic authorizations is an hour lost in tactical opportunities. The fact that **Ukraine** chose to highlight this advantage in its public communications — notably during the presentation at **Eurosatory** — shows that **Kyiv** fully understands the political dimension of usage restrictions on supplied weapons.

## The cost: one-third of the American JDAM-ER

### The economic equation of the drone and munitions war

The war in Ukraine is also a war of industrial economics. Every missile, every drone, every bomb represents a production cost that must be kept within sustainable limits for the countries financing the conflict. The American **JDAM-ER** — the precision guidance kit on which **Ukraine** had depended since **2023** — carries a significant production cost. The Ukrainian **Vyrivniuvach**, according to data published at the time of its deployment, costs **roughly one-third the price of a JDAM-ER**.

This cost difference is not a footnote. It means that for every equivalent dollar invested, **Ukraine** can now produce three times as many precision-guided munitions. In a war of attrition where both sides are grinding each other down, this multiplication of strike capacity at the same budget is a potentially decisive structural advantage in the medium term. It also reduces dependence on American deliveries — always subject to the vagaries of political support and congressional budget cycles.

### The comparison with Russian glide bombs

**Russia** has maintained a decisive advantage in the aerial war through its glide bombs — relatively cheap munitions fitted with guidance kits that it has used at the rate of **thousands per month** throughout the conflict. These glide bombs have caused massive destruction in Ukrainian cities, infrastructure, and defensive positions, using the standoff range conferred by their initial propulsion to strike from outside the reach of short-range air defenses.

The **Vyrivniuvach** alone does not fully resolve this asymmetry. Ukraine will need to continue scaling up production to rival the thousands of Russian munitions. But it represents a first sovereign, economically viable answer that gradually narrows the gap. Combined with the parallel development of other munitions by the six manufacturers still in testing, Ukraine's industrial trajectory is pointed in the right direction.

## Eurosatory 2026: Ukraine as a defense exporter

### A symbolic presence charged with meaning

The presentation of the **Vyrivniuvach** at the **Eurosatory-2026 show in Paris** in **June 2026** is a strong political signal. **Eurosatory** is the world's largest land and air armaments show — appearing there with an operational precision munition means asserting that **Ukraine** is not merely a customer in the global arms market, but a player and a future supplier. This identity repositioning is deliberate: **Kyiv** wants to build an export defense industry that will allow it to partly self-finance its long-term military needs.

The strategy is consistent with the Ukrainian government's decision to approve its first transparent mechanism for exporting weapons and defense technologies to partner countries. This mechanism authorizes the transfer of advanced military systems and establishes a **30-day** review procedure for manufacturer applications. Around **20 countries** have already expressed serious interest in establishing this type of technological cooperation — a figure that speaks to the global interest generated by Ukrainian military innovation tested under real conditions.

### BlueBird Tech and the rest: the rising ecosystem

Beyond **DG Industry** and the **Vyrivniuvach**, Ukraine's military innovation ecosystem has grown to include many players. **BlueBird Tech**, in particular, has developed a partnership with a Ukrainian scientific and design bureau to develop and mass-produce its own guided aerial bombs. The six manufacturers not yet deployed to the front line as of **July 1, 2026** represent as many additional potential capabilities that could reach operational status in the coming months.

This diversification of sources is itself a strategic advantage: if one manufacturer faces production difficulties or a Russian strike on its facilities, the others can compensate. It is an architecture of industrial resilience built out of necessity, but one that now stands as a model other countries could draw on to strengthen their own defense sovereignty.

## The race for volume: the real challenge of the next phase

### From experimental batch to industrial production

The initial deployment of the **Vyrivniuvach** rests on an **experimental batch**. For this bomb to genuinely shift the conflict's balance, the step from validated prototype to industrial-scale production must be taken. **Russia** produces and uses its glide bombs by the **thousands every month**. To truly equalize that advantage, **Ukraine** will need to multiply its production volumes at a sustained pace. That is where the real industrial battle of the coming months will be fought.

The **Ukrainian Ministry of Defense** introduced an **"80/20"** procurement model precisely to ensure that innovation does not come at the expense of volume. But as the **Vyrivniuvach** and its future equivalents ramp up, pressure on the supply chain — materials, electronic components, machining capacity, skilled human resources — will intensify. **Russia** is watching this development and will continue striking Ukrainian industrial infrastructure to slow the scale-up.

### International support for production

One lever that could accelerate the industrial ramp-up is support from international partners. **Around 20 countries** have already expressed serious interest in establishing technological cooperation with **Ukraine** through the **Drone Deal** framework — a structure that includes not only arms deliveries but also technology transfers, joint defense research, and financial support. If this framework is extended to guided bombs, it could allow foreign manufacturers to contribute capital, equipment, or components that accelerate Ukrainian production.

The logic is that of a defense industrial partnership rather than simple traditional military aid. Countries that invest in Ukrainian production capacity are not merely providing short-term weapons — they are helping build a durable defense industry that will benefit European and global security well beyond the end of the current conflict. That is a framework the **NATO Ankara summit** of **July 7-8, 2026** should integrate into its deliberations.

## The strategic implications for the conflict ahead

### What changes on the ground

The deployment of the **Vyrivniuvach** concretely changes the options available to Ukrainian aviation. With precision-guided munitions at sustainable cost and without usage restrictions, Ukrainian pilots can plan strikes on Russian military targets with greater autonomy. This does not resolve the question of air superiority — **Russia** maintains a larger combat aircraft fleet and significant air defense systems. But it increases **Ukraine's** ability to precisely target military infrastructure, ammunition depots, command posts, and supply lines.

In the medium term, if production volumes allow the **Vyrivniuvach** to be used at operational scale — rather than merely at the scale of an experimental batch — the impact on combat dynamics could be significant. **Ukraine's** ability to strike precisely behind Russian lines has been one of the factors most concerning to the Russian military command since the start of the conflict. Multiplying that capability through economically viable domestic production represents a structural shift in the balance of forces.

### The challenges that remain

The **July 1, 2026** announcement is encouraging, but we must resist the temptation of premature optimism. **Fedorov** himself warned that the path to maximum effectiveness is long. Concrete challenges include scaling industrial production in a country under constant bombardment, training maintenance teams and pilots, protecting manufacturing sites from targeted Russian strikes — **Russia** systematically targets Ukrainian defense industrial capabilities — and operationally integrating new munitions into existing tactical procedures.

It should also be noted that precise details on volumes produced, units equipped, and concrete operational results were not disclosed publicly — for obvious reasons of operational security. What we know is that the threshold has been crossed. What we don't know is how quickly the scale-up will proceed. The recent history of Ukrainian military innovation invites cautious optimism: this country has regularly surprised both its allies and its adversaries.

## The six manufacturers in waiting: a pipeline of capabilities ahead

### A diversified industrial ecosystem in maturation

Of the **eight Ukrainian manufacturers** engaged in the guided bomb program, two had reached front-line deployment status by **July 1, 2026**. The other six are at various stages of development and testing. This industrial pipeline represents considerable future capacity: if each manufacturer successfully completes its development, **Ukraine** could have multiple types of domestic guided bombs adapted to different missions, calibers, and cost levels. The diversification of munitions is itself a tactical advantage, as it complicates adversary countermeasure planning.

The **Brave1** platform explicitly encourages this diversity: its **modular** approach means different teams work on different weight categories, different guidance principles, and different mission profiles. This is not the logic of a traditional armament program where the state chooses a single design and mass-produces it. It is the logic of a startup ecosystem applied to the defense industry — an approach that would have puzzled traditional defense ministries, but which is producing concrete results under wartime conditions.

### The risks of the industrial deadline

The ramp-up of these six other manufacturers depends on factors not all within their control. Russian strikes on Ukrainian industrial and energy infrastructure represent a permanent threat to production. A workshop producing critical components, a power source for test systems, an engineering team concentrated on a single site — all are potential targets for Russian military intelligence closely monitoring the development of Ukrainian capabilities. **Russia** has already targeted Ukrainian military production sites and will continue to do so.

Despite these risks, the distributed **Brave1** model offers structural resilience: with eight independent manufacturers spread across different sites, destroying one site does not destroy the entire program. It is an architecture of industrial resilience built by wartime necessity, but one that stands as a model other arms-producing nations could study as hybrid conflicts increasingly threaten the industrial infrastructure of democracies.

## Conclusion: Industrial autonomy as a strategic weapon

### A lesson for all democracies

The **Vyrivniuvach** program teaches all democracies watching the war in Ukraine something essential: **industrial sovereignty in defense** is not a luxury — it is an existential necessity. **Ukraine** discovered, at great cost, how far dependency on external deliveries could go — subject to political vagaries, usage restrictions, logistical delays, and supply shortfalls. By developing the **Vyrivniuvach** in **17 months**, it has begun to structurally correct that vulnerability.

For **NATO** members and **Ukraine's** partners who fund its war effort, this trajectory should prompt reflection on how they can support not only short-term weapons deliveries, but the construction of an autonomous, export-capable Ukrainian defense industry over the long term. That is an investment both in **Ukraine's** immediate security and in European security architecture for the decades ahead.

### The Equalizer is doing its job

In **Pyongyang**, **Beijing**, and **Moscow**, observers are watching. The authoritarian axis supporting Russia's war has every interest in keeping **Ukraine** technologically dependent and industrially fragile. The deployment of the **Vyrivniuvach** sends the opposite signal: **Ukraine** is building. It is manufacturing. It is innovating under pressure. And it is exporting. This is not the end of the war. But it is a moment when the scales of military industrial history tilt — slightly, but genuinely — toward the democracy fighting for its survival.

The name "Equalizer" may not be as ambitious as it first appears. It does not promise total victory. It promises a progressive equalization of means. And in a conflict this asymmetric, beginning to equalize the means is already a profound change in the terms of the fight.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [EuroMaidan Press — Ukraine deploys its first domestically made guided bombs, July 2, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/07/02/ukraine-deploys-its-first-domestically-made-guided-bombs-to-battlefield-narrowing-russias-advantages/)

- [Militarnyi — Fedorov confirms use of domestic guided bombs, July 1, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukraine-already-using-domestic-guided-bombs/)

- [EuroMaidan Press — Russia's layered air defense, Ukrainian drones peeling them back, June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/russia-built-its-air-defense-in-layers-a-ukrainian-commander-says-the-drones-are-peeling-them-off-one-by-one/)

### Secondary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Latest news from the war in Ukraine, July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-141/)

- [United24 Media — Ukraine defense news, July 2026](https://united24media.com/latest-news)

- Militarnyi — Coverage of Ukrainian defense and military technologies, 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-la-bombe-equaliseur-comment-l-ukraine-a-construit-son-arme-de-precision