# INVESTIGATION: NATO fractures before Ankara — €70 billion at stake, Italy, and the time running out

> On July 7 and 8, 2026, the heads of state and government of NATO member countries will gather in Ankara, Turkey. On

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-07-01
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-l-otan-fracturee-avant-ankara-70-milliards-en-jeu-l-italie-et-le-temps-q

## Introduction: A summit under pressure, an Alliance under strain

### July 2026: the moment of reckoning in Ankara

On **July 7 and 8, 2026**, the heads of state and government of **NATO** member countries will gather in **Ankara**, **Turkey**. On the table: a commitment of **€70 billion** in military aid to **Ukraine** for 2026, and the question of whether that amount will be renewed for 2027. Behind the façade of unity the Alliance works to project, the fractures are real, documented, and significant. **Italy** is formally opposed to any dated commitment for 2027. Several other allies are wavering. **Russia** is watching.

This summit arrives in a particular context: it is the first major **NATO** gathering since the United States signaled a reduction in its direct engagement in Ukrainian military funding. The **2026 €70 billion** package is a European construction — **€30 billion** in loans from the **European Union** and **€40 billion** in bilateral commitments inherited from the **2024 Washington summit**. If the Alliance divides publicly at **Ankara** over what comes next, it sends **Moscow** a signal worth a thousand declarations.

### Turkey's role as host country

The choice of **Ankara** as the host city is not incidental. **Recep Tayyip Erdoğan**'s **Turkey** is itself a complex ally within **NATO** — maintaining relations with **Russia** through gas flows and exports, while supplying **Bayraktar** drones to **Ukraine**. Hosting the summit in Ankara signals that the **Alliance** is working to keep **Turkey** within its diplomatic perimeter, at a time when **Erdoğan** has occasionally positioned himself as a mediator in Russia-Ukraine negotiations.

Turkey's role as host also gives **Ankara** the diplomatic visibility it knows how to use. **Turkey** could leverage the summit to advance its own files — the **Sweden and Finland** accession question already resolved, but also arms delivery questions and its relations with the **United States**. Western chancelleries are aware of this dual agenda. They nonetheless choose to use **Ankara** as a symbol of the **Alliance**'s internal cohesion.

*NATO has survived deeper crises than this one — but rarely with an active war on its immediate borders. What is at stake in Ankara is not a budget debate. It is an existential cohesion test.*

## The 2026 €70 billion: anatomy of a commitment without Washington

### How this figure was built

The **€70 billion** in military aid to **Ukraine** for 2026 is the result of a complex financial architecture assembled without direct American participation. The first pillar is a **€30 billion European Union loan**, approved by European institutions after lengthy internal negotiations. This loan is backed by the interest generated on Russian assets frozen by the **West** since 2022 — an innovative legal construction that remains contested by **Moscow** but validated by the principal Western jurisdictions.

The second pillar consists of **€40 billion in bilateral commitments**, distributed among **NATO** member countries on the basis of pledges made at the **2024 Washington summit**. These commitments include deliveries of military equipment, training programs, ammunition transfers, and in some cases direct financial components. Together, these two pillars form the **baseline of support for Ukraine in 2026** — a solid foundation, but one whose renewal is not automatic.

### The legal architecture of frozen assets

The use of **interest from frozen Russian assets** as the basis of the **€30 billion** European loan constitutes a legal innovation without precedent at this scale. These assets — estimated at more than **€300 billion**, held primarily by the **Euroclear** platform in **Belgium** — were frozen in response to the 2022 invasion. Using their interest income to fund Ukrainian defense is a decision validated by European institutions and **G7** governments.

This architecture is contested by **Moscow**, which calls it "theft" — an accusation Western legal scholars unanimously reject, noting that it concerns the **interest** on frozen assets, not the assets themselves, and that the freeze is a measure of applicable international law in response to an act of aggression. The legal solidity of this mechanism matters: if it holds over time, it provides a funding base that does not depend on annual political votes in national parliaments.

*€70 billion without the United States. Two years ago, that number would have seemed impossible. Today, it defines the new reality of NATO: an Alliance learning to stand without its traditional pillar. That is uncomfortable. It is also necessary.*

## Italy blocks: why Rome says no to 2027

### The Italian position and its deeper motivations

The government in **Rome** has made clear, in the consultations preceding the **Ankara** summit, its opposition to any formal, quantified commitment for **2027**. **Italy** is not opposed to supporting **Ukraine** in principle — it participated in the 2024 and 2026 commitments. What it refuses is the setting of a specific date and amount before the military and diplomatic situation of 2027 is even known. Officially, this is a position of budgetary prudence and strategic flexibility.

Behind this stated principle, however, analysts identify several factors. **Domestic pressure** on the **Meloni** government regarding Italian public spending — in a context where **public debt** is among the highest in the eurozone — limits its political room to maneuver. Part of the governing coalition's **electoral base** is skeptical of prolonged military engagement abroad. And if the **2027 commitment is confirmed at €70 billion**, the total would reach **€140 billion over two years** — a figure several European capitals are scrutinizing with caution.

*Italy has the right to ask for flexibility. What it does not have the right to do is use that prudence as an instrument to weaken the Alliance's collective position before a Russia that reads every crack. Budgetary good faith does not justify geopolitical bad timing.*

## The €140 billion question: the stakes of the 2027 renewal

### If 2027 is confirmed: a double wager

Renewing the **€70 billion commitment for 2027** would bring the two-year total to **€140 billion** in European military aid to **Ukraine**, excluding any American contribution. That figure, if confirmed at **Ankara**, would send a clear strategic signal: **Europe** is capable of funding long-term military support for **Ukraine** without depending on the goodwill of **Washington**. It is a declaration of strategic autonomy as much as a budget line.

Proponents of confirming the 2027 commitment — notably the **Baltic states, Poland, Scandinavian countries**, and several **Central European** nations — argue that budgetary uncertainty is more costly than a firm pledge. **Ukraine** must be able to plan its acquisitions, its training cycles, its infrastructure repairs on the basis of predictable commitments. Strategic ambiguity benefits **Moscow** and complicates Ukrainian military planning at a moment when every month counts.

### The budget calculation behind Rome's refusal

**Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio** exceeds **140 percent** — among the highest in the eurozone after **Greece**. In this context, committing to an additional **€70 billion in 2027** represents a budgetary constraint the **Meloni** government must weigh against other domestic priorities. That is not an excuse — it is a context. Managing massive public debt creates real pressure on political room to maneuver, even for governments that genuinely wish to contribute to collective security.

However, defense economists argue that the cost of **not supporting Ukraine** — in terms of regional instability, national defense spending that would need to surge if **Russia** prevails, and commercial damage from European insecurity — far exceeds the cost of current commitments. That is the argument allies with the strongest commitment are bringing to **Rome** in the corridors of **NATO** headquarters. It has not yet convinced the **Meloni** government to shift its position on fixing a date for 2027.

*€140 billion — that is the price of European collective security in its most direct form. This is not charity. It is life insurance. And Italy, like any policyholder, has a stake in keeping the system solvent.*

## Hungary in the background: the second obstacle

### Budapest and its complex relationship with the Alliance

**Hungary** represents the second friction point within **NATO** on the Ukrainian file. The **Orbán** government has accumulated divergent positions since 2022: refusal to allow arms deliveries to **Ukraine** through its territory, maintenance of economic relations with **Russia**, repeated opposition to additional sanctions within the **EU**, and sustained contacts with **Moscow** that its allies consider problematic. **Budapest** does not formally block **NATO** decisions — which operate by consensus — but its capacity to slow and complicate processes is well documented.

Hungary's position ahead of **Ankara** is not clearly articulated when it comes to 2027 funding. But several diplomatic sources cited by Ukrainian media indicate that **Budapest** shares Italy's reluctance about dated commitments, for partially different reasons. **Hungary** maintains a line of communication with **Moscow** that it presents as "neutrality" but that its allies read as a troubling asymmetry of loyalty within the Alliance.

*Orbán inside NATO is the structural anomaly the Alliance refuses to name clearly. There is no formal mechanism to exclude a recalcitrant member. There is only peer pressure — and that has limits when dealing with a government that has decided national sovereignty outranks collective cohesion.*

## Rutte and the defense contracts: Ankara's other agenda

### Billions announced in the wings of industry

**NATO** Secretary General **Mark Rutte** announced on **June 25, 2026** that the **Ankara** summit would see the unveiling of **several billion euros in new defense contracts**. These contracts do not directly concern aid to **Ukraine** — they are aimed at reinforcing the industrial defense capabilities of **NATO** member countries, several of which must significantly increase their production to meet the **2 percent of GDP** defense spending target, or exceed it.

This industrial agenda is presented by proponents of Ukraine support as complementary to direct funding: increasing munitions and equipment production in **Europe** reduces dependence on an American industry whose priorities can shift. For critics, it is also a way to navigate political roadblocks on direct funding by investing in capacity rather than in checks. The strategy is less politically visible — and perhaps more durable.

*Rutte is playing two boards at Ankara simultaneously: aid to Ukraine on one side, NATO industrial autonomy on the other. That is high-stakes diplomacy — with live ammunition as the wager. I wish him well.*

## The EU in reinforcement: the €45 billion loan in waiting

### A backup mechanism if the war continues

Alongside the discussions at **NATO**, the **European Union** is preparing a new financing mechanism that could reach **€45 billion in additional funding** if the conflict extends beyond **2027**. This mechanism, reported by several media outlets including **Fakti** on **June 25, 2026**, has not yet been formally approved — it is being developed within Brussels' institutional structures. It would aim to guarantee continuity of financial support even in a scenario where internal **NATO** divisions prevent a collective agreement.

This dual system — **NATO financing + EU financing** — is emblematic of the post-American architecture being built piece by piece since 2025. It is less coherent and more complex than direct American engagement, but it is more politically resilient. No single member country can block all mechanisms on its own. It is an architecture of resilience built precisely to withstand internal political obstruction — such as that exercised by **Rome** and **Budapest**.

*Brussels is constructing a financing architecture that routes around national political roadblocks. It is a pragmatic answer to an uncomfortable reality: you cannot always count on unanimity when lives are on the line. I prefer that to paralysis.*

## What Ukraine expects from Ankara

### Kyiv between expectations and caution

**Volodymyr Zelensky** and his diplomatic team expect the **Ankara** summit to deliver concrete commitments on several fronts. First, confirmation of the continuity of military funding — ideally with an announcement on 2027, at minimum with a strong statement of intent. Second, progress on the delivery of specific weapons systems that Ukrainian forces need to hold current defensive lines. Third, a diplomatic signal to **Moscow**: **NATO** holds, and its members are prepared to sustain support for as long as necessary.

Ukrainian diplomatic sources cited by **News Ukraine RBC** stress that budgetary clarity has direct military value. If **Ukraine** knows it will have **€70 billion more in 2027**, it can plan medium-term acquisitions, train additional battalions, and negotiate weapons contracts on more advantageous multi-year terms. Uncertainty, by contrast, forces costly emergency purchases and short-term planning that undermines strategic coherence at the very moment when every month matters.

*Zelensky expects from Ankara not speeches but numbers. He learned over two years that vague promises do not hold against real missiles. Allies who understand that will send clear signals. The others will send press releases.*

## The Baltic states and Poland: the engine of cohesion

### Those who know what a border with Russia means

While **Italy** and **Hungary** represent the internal resistance points, the **Baltic states** — **Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania** — and **Poland** are the engine of pro-Ukrainian cohesion within **NATO**. These countries share a direct border with **Russia** or with **Belarus**, Moscow's ally. They are not doing abstract geopolitics — they are managing an immediately proximate threat. Their positions on supporting **Ukraine**, measured as a share of their GDP, frequently exceed those of far wealthier countries.

These governments are pushing for a firm commitment at **Ankara**. They argue that **every euro invested in Ukraine's defense** is one euro that avoids spending ten times more on their own defense facing a victorious **Russia**. That argument — economically rational and geopolitically sound — does not convince all of their allies. But it structures the internal **NATO** debate in a way that cannot be ignored.

### Baltic contributions: beyond symbolism

**Estonia** devotes more than **3 percent of its GDP** to defense — a record among **NATO** members. **Latvia** and **Lithuania** both exceed the **2 percent** threshold. These figures are not symbolic: they translate into equipment deliveries, training of Ukrainian soldiers, and active diplomatic support in international forums. These countries, small in size but resolute from historical experience, embody the most direct form of Western solidarity.

The message Baltic states are carrying to **Ankara** is simple and documented by their public positions: **ambiguity kills**. Every month of uncertainty about 2027 commitments slows Ukrainian planning. They are pushing for a firm declaration — and they are prepared to increase their own proportional contributions further if necessary. This exemplary posture is both moral and strategic: it removes any justification from allies who might invoke their own constraints to rationalize weaker commitments.

*Poland and the Baltic states do geopolitics in their bones — because their survival depends on it. While Italy debates budgetary flexibility, Estonia is thinking about its borders. This asymmetry of risk exposure explains everything.*

## The scenario of a minimal agreement: risks and signals

### If Ankara delivers next to nothing

A minimal agreement at **Ankara** — confirming the 2026 €70 billion without a clear commitment on 2027, accompanied by vague language about "long-term support" — would technically be an agreement, but diplomatically a weak signal. **Moscow** knows how to read post-summit communiqués. An ambiguous formulation on 2027 would be interpreted as a crack in Western cohesion — because it is one. **Russia** has always bet on Western exhaustion. A summit that validates doubts about the durability of support reinforces that wager.

There is also a market risk: weapons contracts, industrial planning cycles, and sovereign fund commitments that indirectly back Ukraine's defense effort are all indexed to the predictability of political pledges. An ambiguous signal at **Ankara** could introduce an uncertainty premium into those financial calculations — with practical downstream effects on the Ukrainian military supply chain in the months that follow.

*A failed summit does not detonate a bomb. It slows a supply chain, weakens a contract, delays a delivery. The damage is invisible in the short term — and devastating in the medium term. That is exactly the kind of harm Moscow is hoping for.*

## NATO's future without the US as standard-bearer

### An Alliance reinventing itself under pressure

The **Ankara** summit is also, at a deeper level, a test of **NATO**'s capacity to function without the **United States** as its uncontested leader. The **Trump** administration has signaled consistently since 2025 that **Europe** must assume a greater share of its own security and that of **Ukraine**. This shift in American posture has forced a reorganization of responsibilities within the **Alliance**.

This reorganization is painful — it exposes budgetary vulnerabilities, political disagreements, and differences in risk perception. But it also creates an opportunity to build a more robust European cohesion. The **2026 €70 billion without Washington** would have been unthinkable in 2022. It became reality. If **Ankara** confirms 2027, **Europe** will have proven it can assume a major strategic responsibility on its own. This is a historical test — and its results will be readable for decades to come.

*Europe learning to hold without Washington — that is the deep story of this summit. It is not comfortable. It was not planned. But it may be the only worthwhile lesson of the Trump era: forcing Europe to grow up. The outcome is uncertain. The need is real.*

## Ankara as a credibility test: what the world is watching

### Third parties observing closely

The world is watching **Ankara** carefully — and not only the directly involved parties. **China** is analyzing **NATO**'s capacity to maintain cohesion against a prolonged conflict. **Beijing**, calculating its own margins in the **South China Sea** and regarding **Taiwan**, draws operational conclusions from the fractures or the solidity of the **Atlantic Alliance**. A **NATO** that divides at **Ankara** sends a signal to **Xi Jinping** as much as to **Putin**.

**Iran**, which maintains its de facto alliance with **Moscow** through **Shahed** drone supplies, is watching too. **North Korea**, whose soldiers are dying in **Russia** for technological and diplomatic gains, follows the evolving balance of forces in **Europe**. These actors are not passive — they adjust their positions based on what they read in Western signals. **Ankara** is an international communication, not merely a budget meeting.

### The negotiating margins before July 7

The days between the writing of this article and the **Ankara** summit are days of intensive diplomacy. Sherpas — senior officials who draft the final declarations — are working on formulations that would allow **Italy** to save face while preserving the substance of the commitment. Phrases such as "commitment to maintaining a comparable level of support in 2027 subject to a mid-year review" could satisfy **Rome** without emptying the declaration of its meaning for **Kyiv**.

These linguistic compromises are the real engine of multilateral diplomacy. **NATO** has long experience with formulations that allow countries with divergent positions to sign the same document. The question is whether that experience will be sufficient to produce a final declaration that is both acceptable to **Rome** and readable as a strong commitment by **Kyiv** and **Moscow**. That is the sherpas' challenge in the days ahead.

*Xi Jinping reads NATO communiqués the way an investor reads a quarterly report: he is looking for signals of structural weakness. Every fracture at Ankara is strategic information for Beijing. Alliance members would do well to remember that.*

## What Ankara negotiations could produce

### The possible scenarios before July 8

Three scenarios are taking shape ahead of the **July 7–8, 2026** summit. The optimistic scenario: an agreement on the **2026 €70 billion** accompanied by a firm statement of intent on 2027, with a mid-year review mechanism that addresses Italian reservations. This scenario preserves Alliance cohesion and sends a strong signal to **Moscow**. It is technically achievable if **Rome** secures the terminological flexibility it is asking for without compromising the substance of the commitment.

The intermediate scenario: confirmation of 2026 only, with vague language on 2027 referring to a year-end review meeting. This scenario maintains the appearance of cohesion but introduces six additional months of uncertainty — a period during which **Ukraine** will have to plan without a clear budgetary safety net. The pessimistic scenario: an open deadlock, with a final declaration so watered down it constitutes a measurable diplomatic setback. This scenario is unlikely — **NATO** diplomats have deep experience with surface-level compromise — but it is not excluded if positions remain polarized until the last moment.

*I am not in the Ankara negotiating rooms. I read public signals. And those signals tell me that cohesion is fragile but not broken — that compromise is still possible — but that time works against anyone hoping the fractures will close on their own.*

## European defense industry: Ankara's subtext

### Ammunition production as industrial emergency

Behind the financial commitment figures, the **Ankara** summit will also confront the industrial question: can **Europe** produce sufficient ammunition, armored vehicles, and air defense systems to support **Ukraine** sustainably? The answer, in July 2026, is still partially no. Production lines in several member countries have been accelerated since 2022, but they have not yet reached the output levels of **World War II** that some military analysts judge necessary for a conflict of this intensity and duration.

The **contracts Rutte announced** before the summit target precisely this deficit. By funding new industrial capabilities — new **155 mm shell** production lines, new drone assembly plants, new maintenance contracts for Ukrainian equipment — **NATO** is investing in long-term support capacity that does not depend on an annual political vote. It is a way to work around recurring political debates over figures by creating industrial facts that are difficult to unwind.

### The countries that produce versus those counting their euros

**Poland** has committed massive investments in its national defense industry since 2022 — it is today one of the largest producers of military equipment in **Europe**, with direct effects on its capacity to support **Ukraine**. The **Baltic states**, despite their size, have proportionally expanded their capabilities far beyond what their **GDP** would suggest. By contrast, some **Western European** countries — including **Italy** — have developed defense sectors but face political constraints on deploying them in service of the Ukrainian effort.

This asymmetry between producers and payers creates internal tensions within the **Alliance**. Countries investing in industrial capacity — at the political and budgetary cost that entails — watch with growing frustration as countries that pay in rhetoric resist concrete commitments. The **Ankara** summit must, one way or another, reconcile these two categories — or confirm that tensions continue to escalate.

*Defense industry is foreign policy made physical. When Poland builds an ammunition plant, it is not voting a resolution — it is staking out a position. That may be the most honest form of solidarity that exists in an Alliance where words cost less than shells.*

## Conclusion: NATO searching for itself, Ukraine waiting

### What the summit will reveal about the state of the West

The **Ankara** summit of **July 7 and 8, 2026** will be more than a budget meeting. It will be a barometer of the collective will of the **West** — without the **United States** as standard-bearer, with all its internal tensions on full display — to support **Ukraine** for the long term. The **2026 €70 billion** proved that **Europe** could act without **Washington**. The question is whether it can sustain that action against the budgetary, political, and electoral pressures accumulating in member capitals.

**Zelensky**'s **Ukraine** is waiting for numbers, not words. The soldiers holding the front in the **Donbas** and in the **Izyum** and **Kharkiv** regions depend on decisions made in air-conditioned rooms in **Ankara**. That is the reality of this war: allied policy has measurable effects on the ground, in ammunition, in air defense systems, in the capacity to resist. **NATO** has a responsibility — and Ankara is the opportunity to confirm it or to evade it.

### The message to Moscow the Alliance must send

At its core, what the **Ankara** summit must produce is a clear message to **Moscow**: time does not belong to you. **Putin** built his strategy on the conviction that the **West** will tire before he does. Every confirmation of a long-term financial commitment is a direct refutation of that calculation. Every internal Alliance fracture, every ambiguity on 2027, every roadblock from **Rome** or **Budapest** reinforces the Russian thesis instead. **NATO** has a choice about the message it sends. It has a few days left to decide.

*This Ankara summit may be the moment Europe decides whether it is a strategic power or a group of countries sharing a flag. I hold no certainty about the outcome. But I hold complete certainty that Ukraine deserves better than ambiguity — and that history will judge those who chose the comfort of vague language at the moment when clarity was necessary.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [News Ukraine RBC — NATO divided over €70 billion military aid — June 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/nato-divided-over-70-billion-military-aid-1782852983.html)

- [Censor.net — Italy blocks NATO's allocation of €70 billion to Ukraine for 2027 — June 2026](https://censor.net/en/news/4011167/italy-blocks-nato_s_allocation_of_70_billion_euros_to_ukraine_for_2027)

- [Reuters — NATO Secretary General Rutte announces billions in new defense contracts at summit — June 25, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/natos-rutte-says-billions-new-defense-contracts-will-be-announced-summit-2026-06-25/)

### Secondary sources

- [News Ukraine RBC — Ukraine could gain 6 months advantage if commitments are confirmed — June 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-could-gain-6-months-advantage-if-1782893678.html)

- [Fakti — EU prepares new loan of up to €45 billion for Ukraine if conflict continues beyond 2027 — June 2026](https://fakti.bg/en/world/1064141-eu-prepares-new-loan-of-up-to-45-billion-for-ukraine-if-conflict-continues-beyond-2027)

- [Kyiv Independent — Ongoing coverage of the NATO Ankara summit and military support for Ukraine — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-l-otan-fracturee-avant-ankara-70-milliards-en-jeu-l-italie-et-le-temps-q