# INVESTIGATION: Kim Jong-un wants to "dominate the world" — the North Korean nuclear race at its peak

> From June 20 to 22, 2026, the plenary session of the Political Bureau of the Korean Workers' Party convened for what may

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-26
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-kim-jong-un-veut-dominer-le-monde-la-course-nucleaire-nord-coreenne-a-so

## Introduction: The plenum that revealed everything

### The **Political Bureau** of June 20–22, **2026**

From **June 20 to 22, 2026**, the **plenary session of the Political Bureau of the Korean Workers' Party** convened for what may prove to be one of the most consequential decisions in **DPRK** history since the proclamation of the nuclear state. Kim Jong-un there reaffirmed with particular solemnity the policy of "**exponential**" nuclear expansion — the word chosen by analysts at the **Guardian** to describe North Korea's trajectory. This reaffirmation, described as "**solemn**" in official records, signals that the **DPRK** is entering a new phase of acceleration in its nuclear programme.

Kim Jong-un was explicit about his objectives: nuclear expansion is the "**most precise and unique method**" for navigating an unstable world. This is not a restatement of existing policy — it is a doctrinal reorientation that positions nuclear weapons no longer as an instrument of defence but as an instrument of **strategic domination**. The phrase "dominate the world" reported by the **Chosun (June 24, 2026)** represents a significant rhetorical escalation.

### Why this plenum, and why now?

The June 20–22, **2026** plenum did not take place in a vacuum. It came in the days following the first reports of USA-Iran talks at **Burgenstock** — and the conclusions Kim drew from them have been explicitly documented: Iran, which negotiated under pressure, is a counter-example. **North Korea**, with a more developed nuclear arsenal, is in a different position. This plenum institutionally formalizes an acceleration that was already under way but which gained urgency in the face of the Iranian precedent.

The formal character of this reaffirmation — a full **Political Bureau** plenary, the highest collective body of the party — indicates that Kim Jong-un is not acting impulsively. He is building institutional consensus around a policy that commits the entire state apparatus, the party, and the military to a common direction. This is a collective commitment, not a personal decree.

*A **Political Bureau** plenary that solemnly reaffirms nuclear policy. Kim is not merely giving orders — he is institutionalizing. That distinction matters: an institutionalized policy is harder to reverse than a personal decree. This is an architecture of irreversibility.*

## Concrete orders: warships and military-grade uranium

### Arming warships with nuclear missiles

Among the concrete decisions to come out of the plenum, Kim Jong-un ordered the **arming of warships with nuclear missiles**. This order, combined with the launch of the **destroyer** **Choe Hyon** on June 23 and the announcement of a programme of ten ships over five years, confirms that naval nuclearization is not a vague future project — it is an immediate operational directive.

The order to nuclearize the navy represents a significant extension of North Korean deterrence doctrine. Until now, the **DPRK** relied primarily on land-based systems — intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, artillery — for its deterrence. Adding a nuclear naval component creates a strategic triad in formation — land-based, airborne (**cruise missiles**) and naval — that makes North Korean deterrence far more robust and resilient.

### Increasing the stock of military-grade uranium

The second major operational directive from the plenum is the order to **increase the stock of military-grade uranium**. This order follows a militarily relentless logic: an "exponential" expansion in the number of nuclear warheads requires a corresponding expansion in fissile material stock. Military-grade enriched uranium (90%) is the critical resource that determines the pace of production of new **nuclear weapons**.

This order indirectly confirms estimates of the North Korean arsenal. Western intelligence agencies currently estimate that the **DPRK** possesses **40 to 60 operational nuclear warheads**. If Kim needs to significantly increase his military uranium stock, it is because he is planning a significantly larger arsenal — perhaps in the range of **100 to 200 warheads** over time. This projection has not been confirmed but is implicit in the directive.

*Increasing military-grade uranium stock. This is not rhetoric — it is an operational decision that puts centrifuges, enrichment sites, and real physical resources in motion. When Kim moves from words to minerals, he is serious. Very serious.*

## The current arsenal: an assessment according to Western intelligence

### 40 to 60 operational nuclear warheads: what that means

The current estimate of **40 to 60 operational nuclear warheads** for the **DPRK**, according to Western intelligence agencies cited in the editorial file, places **North Korea** in a significant category. For comparison: France maintains approximately 290 nuclear warheads, the United Kingdom approximately 225. The **DPRK** falls in the same range as estimated arsenals of **Israel** (not officially confirmed) and **India** (~160 warheads).

But the absolute size of the arsenal is not the only relevant factor: geographical distribution, reliability of delivery vectors, and the capacity to survive a first strike are equally important. On all three criteria, **North Korea** has made significant advances through its missiles on mobile land-based and rail launchers, its underground bunkers, and now its naval capabilities. An arsenal of **40 to 60 warheads** distributed across these multiple platforms constitutes credible deterrence.

### Mobile systems: rail, road, and underground

One of the most strategically significant innovations by the **DPRK** in recent years is the development of **mobile launch systems** on rail and road, complemented by an extensive network of **underground bunkers**. These systems make the **DPRK** resilient against pre-emptive strikes because they do not remain at known fixed positions.

A missile on a mobile road launcher can be moved day and night, making its location uncertain for reconnaissance satellites. A missile deep inside an underground tunnel is protected against all conventional munitions. These two characteristics combined mean that even a massive pre-emptive strike could not guarantee the destruction of the entire North Korean arsenal — and that a residual nuclear counterstrike is therefore probable. This is the definition of a credible second-strike deterrent.

*Missiles on rails, deep tunnels, ships at sea. Kim has distributed his arsenal in the most resilient way possible. Any pre-emptive strike risks leaving dozens of intact nuclear warheads ready to retaliate. This calculation — not Kim's rhetoric — is what makes the DPRK militarily untouchable.*

## The "exponential" expansion: the Guardian as source

### What the Guardian documents about North Korea's trajectory

The **Guardian (June 24, 2026)** uses the word "exponential" to describe the trajectory of North Korea's nuclear expansion — a precise terminological choice that merits attention. In an armament context, "exponential" means growth that progressively accelerates: each new capability financed by the previous ones, each new vector adding to the credibility of the deterrence that justifies further investment.

The **Guardian** also notes that the DPRK possesses systems designed to "**survive a first strike**" — a qualification that defence experts consider the ultimate test of the credibility of a **nuclear deterrent**. A power that cannot survive a first strike can be neutralized by a sufficiently massive pre-emptive attack. A power that can survive — because its systems are dispersed, buried, and mobile — possesses an irreducible deterrent.

### The capacity to "survive a first strike" as a strategic achievement

Achieving a first-strike survival capability is the holy grail of defensive nuclear doctrine. Major nuclear powers achieve this through their nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) which are virtually undetectable. The DPRK achieves it through a combination of dispersed land-based systems, rail-based systems, tunnels, and now nuclearized surface ships.

This reality means concretely that any military approach aimed at "disarming" North Korea by force is today of extremely questionable feasibility. Massive pre-emptive strikes would destroy certain North Korean nuclear assets — but not all. And an indeterminate number of surviving nuclear warheads ready to retaliate against millions of civilians in South Korea, Japan, and potentially the United States constitutes an unacceptable risk. The DPRK knows this. And it is precisely this reality that makes **diplomacy** the only viable path.

*A credible second-strike deterrent makes a preventive war against North Korea suicidal for the attacker. This is a reality the West must accept — not to validate Kim, but to build a realistic strategy. Diplomacy is not a moral preference: it is the only militarily rational option.*

## The Iranian lesson in Kim's strategy

### Iran as the absolute counter-model

Any investigation into North Korea's nuclear expansion cannot sidestep the Iranian factor. **Bloomberg (June 23, 2026)** explicitly documents that Kim Jong-un cites Iran's fate — bombed, blockaded, and forced to negotiate — to justify the acceleration of his nuclear programme. Kim's lesson is simple: Iran did not have a sufficiently developed **nuclear deterrent** to be untouchable. North Korea will not repeat that mistake.

This instrumentalization of the Iranian precedent follows a tragically coherent logic. If the Burgenstock agreement was meant to demonstrate that diplomacy works and that nuclearization is unnecessary, the effect perceived in Pyongyang is precisely the reverse: Iran had to negotiate because it was not sufficiently nuclearized to deter Washington from acting militarily. The **DPRK** will be sufficiently nuclearized that Washington cannot afford to act.

### Kim and the theory of the "most precise method"

The formulation chosen by Kim Jong-un — nuclear weapons as the "**most precise and unique method**" of survival — is a doctrinal statement of almost Cartesian clarity. He does not say "we need **nuclear weapons** to protect ourselves" — the classic defensive formulation. He says that nuclear weapons are the **most precise** method — compared to diplomacy, economics, and alliances — for guaranteeing the regime's survival.

This terminological precision reveals a strategic mind that has eliminated the alternatives: diplomacy has failed to produce security guarantees for the DPRK (the experiences of the 1990s and 2000s with the Agreed Framework and the six-party process); alliances are unreliable (China is a partner imposed by geography, not a security guarantor); the economy is structurally constrained by sanctions. Nuclear weapons remain — in Kim's logic — the only variable that makes the DPRK untouchable.

*"The most precise and unique method." Kim speaks like an engineer solving an engineering problem: he has eliminated the other solutions and identified the one that works. This cold rationality is more alarming than apocalyptic rhetoric. Rational men have reasons for their actions.*

## The **40–60 warheads**: toward what final target?

### Does North Korea want parity with mid-tier powers?

With an estimated **40 to 60 operational nuclear warheads** and a directive to accelerate production, the analytical question is: what is the final target for the North Korean arsenal? Nuclear regimes generally have doctrines defining a target level sufficient for deterrence. The **DPRK** has never officially defined this level — but Kim's statements permit inferences.

If Kim is aiming for **minimum deterrence** — sufficient to survive a first strike and retaliate catastrophically — **40 to 60 warheads** are already within that range. If Kim is aiming for **regional parity** with powers such as France or the United Kingdom (**200–300 warheads**), the directive to increase military uranium stocks suggests a far larger ambition. The rhetoric of "world domination" points toward an even broader goal — though its material realization is extremely difficult for an economy the size of North Korea's.

### The growing submarine fleet as a nuclear vector

Beyond the land-based systems and the new **destroyer**, the **DPRK**'s **growing submarine fleet** is documented as a component of the arsenal in the editorial file. North Korea maintains around sixty submarines of various sizes, some of which have been modified to launch ballistic missiles.

Submarine-launched ballistic missile platforms represent the most formidable naval nuclear component because they are virtually undetectable in operation. The DPRK has long worked to develop this capability, with mixed results to date due to technological limitations imposed by sanctions. But combined with the new **destroyer** **Choe Hyon** and the announced naval construction programme, North Korea's submarine fleet forms the naval component of an emerging strategic triad.

*Submarines, nuclearized destroyers, mobile land-based missiles, underground tunnels. Kim is building a triad. Not yet as robust as those of the USA or Russia. But credible enough to make any pre-emptive strike catastrophically risky. That is sufficient for his deterrence objective.*

## What this expansion demands of the international community

### Has the "maximum pressure" policy failed?

Any investigation into North Korea's nuclear expansion inevitably raises an uncomfortable question: has the "maximum pressure" policy practiced alternately by American administrations for decades produced the intended results? If the objective was to halt or reverse the North Korean nuclear programme, the objective answer is no.

The harshest sanctions have slowed certain aspects of the programme but have not prevented the DPRK from progressing from a handful of primitive **nuclear weapons** in the early 2000s to **40 to 60 operational warheads** with intercontinental missiles, tactical weapons, and now nuclear naval capabilities by 2026. This progression was achieved under the most economically unfavourable conditions. The analytical lesson is that sanctions alone cannot stop a nuclear programme that the regime has made an absolute survival priority.

### Toward risk management rather than elimination?

In the face of this reality, a growing number of security experts are proposing a paradigm shift: rather than pursuing the impossible goal of total DPRK denuclearization, manage risks pragmatically — limit the size of the arsenal through arms control negotiations, reduce proliferation risks toward third-party actors, maintain communication channels to prevent accidental escalation.

The **Straits Times (June 23, 2026)** and the **Washington Post (June 25, 2026)** document Kim's statements on his nuclear ambitions in a context where this pragmatic approach is increasingly discussed in academic and diplomatic circles. The question is no longer "how do we disarm North Korea" — it is "how do we live with a nuclear North Korea in a way that reduces the risk of catastrophic conflict."

*Total DPRK denuclearization: stated objective for 30 years, result achieved in 30 years: zero. At some point, persisting in a strategy that does not work becomes a form of insanity by definition. Perhaps it is time to try something else — even if "something else" is also insufficient.*

## The impossible dialogue and its minimum conditions

### What the DPRK might accept — and will never accept

This investigation, to be complete, must explore what the **DPRK** could theoretically accept within an arms control dialogue. Based on past commitments and the regime's logic, certain elements appear negotiable: a **freeze on arsenal size** at current levels, **confidence-building measures** on military exercises, and perhaps advance notification of long-range missile tests to prevent dangerous misunderstandings.

Certain elements, however, appear non-negotiable within the current political horizon of the **DPRK**: **complete denuclearization** as defined by Washington, the **dismantling of existing nuclear facilities**, and any agreement involving invasive verification of military sites. These limits reflect the Kim regime's deep conviction that nuclearization is the sine qua non of its survival — convictions that the supreme leader's public statements have elevated to the status of **state dogma**.

### The minimum conditions for any resumption of dialogue

For dialogue to even be possible, several minimum conditions must be in place. On the American side: a willingness to engage without imposing **prior denuclearization** as a non-negotiable precondition, recognition of the **DPRK** as a state with which the United States can discuss matters without validating its political system. On the North Korean side: a commitment to a multilateral process that includes **South Korea** and **Japan** as directly concerned parties.

These minimum conditions are already substantial. They imply political concessions from both sides that have been refused on multiple occasions. But the alternative — a total absence of dialogue while the North Korean arsenal continues its "**exponential**" growth — produces an even less satisfactory outcome. The choice is not between a perfect solution and an imperfect one: it is between an imperfect solution and no solution at all in an increasingly dangerous world.

*The minimum conditions for dialogue with the **DPRK** have never been met in three decades. That is the honest observation. And yet those minimum conditions exist, are defined, and are not impossible in theory. The problem is not knowledge of what is needed — it is the political will to accept the concessions required. On both sides.**Engaging with Kim Jong-un without a denuclearization precondition — that is a difficult concession for Washington. But continuing to demand that denuclearization as a precondition while the arsenal grows exponentially guarantees that dialogue will never happen. At some point, one of these two positions must yield to reality.*

## Conclusion: The investigation that cannot conclude

### What the facts establish with certainty

This investigation establishes the following facts with documented certainty: the **Political Bureau** plenary of **June 20–22, 2026** solemnly reaffirmed North Korea's nuclear expansion policy. Kim Jong-un ordered the arming of warships with nuclear missiles and the increase of military-grade uranium stocks. The current arsenal is estimated at **40 to 60 operational warheads** with mobile, underground, and naval systems. The DPRK possesses first-strike survival capabilities. And Kim explicitly cites the Iranian precedent to justify the acceleration of his programme.

These facts combined trace an unambiguous trajectory: the DPRK is accelerating its nuclear programme in a deliberate, institutionalized, and militarily coherent manner. The declared objective of "dominating the world" is rhetoric — but the real objective, an absolutely credible **nuclear deterrent** that renders the DPRK militarily untouchable, is well on its way to being achieved.

### The question this investigation cannot answer

What this investigation cannot answer: how will the West, South Korea, Japan, and China manage, in the years and decades ahead, the reality of a North Korea possessing **100, 200, or more nuclear warheads** with diversified vectors and an active deterrence doctrine? There is no simple answer to this question. There are policies that are more or less risky, trade-offs that are more or less costly, diplomatic engagements that are more or less promising.

What this investigation can state: the time for inaction or the status quo is over. The "exponential" trajectory documented by the **Guardian** and institutionalized by the **June 20–22, 2026** plenum demands a coherent and urgent strategic response from the international community. Any response will be imperfect. But the absence of a response will be catastrophic.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Guardian — Exponential expansion of DPRK nuclear programme, surviving a first strike — June 24, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/24/north-korea-nuclear-program-kim-jong-un)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Kim Jong-un pushes North Korea toward new nuclear level — June 23, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/kim-jong-un-pushes-north-korea-toward-new-1782213707.html)

### Secondary sources

- [Bloomberg — Kim wants more nuclear forces, the Iranian lesson — June 23, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-23/north-korea-s-kim-wants-more-nuclear-forces-after-us-iran-war)

- [Straits Times — Kim: DPRK will exercise its position as a nuclear state — June 23, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/north-koreas-kim-says-country-will-exercise-its-position-as-nuclear-state-kcna-reports)

- [Chosun — Kim dominate the world, nuclear plenum — June 24, 2026](https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2026/06/24/Z6YSHIW7YBGPFJHQOCVT6B36IA/)

- [Washington Post — Kim weapons tests, offensive posture — June 25, 2026](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/25/north-korea-kim-weapons-missiles-south/e03fb72a-70ef-11f1-8730-e7fd0e2a6404_story.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-kim-jong-un-veut-dominer-le-monde-la-course-nucleaire-nord-coreenne-a-so