# INVESTIGATION: Kaliningrad, Forward Base: What Russia's Baltic Strike Rehearsals Reveal

> On June 21, 2026, NATO surveillance radars once again registered the familiar and unsettling activity coming out of Kaliningrad's skies. Su-24M tactical bombers of the Russian military took off in formation from the Russian enclave and flew profiles that, according to Army Recognition analysts, replicate attack trajectories toward targets in the Baltic region. They were escorte

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-kaliningrad-base-avancee-ce-que-revelent-les-repetitions-de-frappe-russe

## Introduction: An Airfield Rehearsing for War

### June 21, 2026, over the Baltic

On **June 21, 2026**, **NATO** surveillance radars once again registered the familiar and unsettling activity coming out of **Kaliningrad**'s skies. **Su-24M** tactical bombers of the Russian military took off in formation from the Russian enclave and flew profiles that, according to **Army Recognition** analysts, replicate attack trajectories toward targets in the Baltic region. They were escorted by **Su-30SM2** multirole fighters, whose presence clearly signals rehearsal of an offensive scenario involving the suppression of adversary air defenses.

This was not the first time. These rehearsals have been multiplying for several months, with growing frequency and sophistication. They constitute one of the most tangible and best-documented signals of Russian military preparation in the Baltic region — and one of the most preoccupying subjects for **NATO** planners as the **Ankara summit of July 7–8, 2026** approaches.

### What this investigation seeks to untangle

What exactly do these rehearsals mean? Are they preparation for an imminent act of aggression, a capability demonstration designed to maintain psychological pressure on allies, or simply exercises to maintain operational proficiency in a high-tension context? This question cannot receive a definitive answer from outside intelligence circles — but systematic analysis of the available facts allows us to draw a picture that deserves serious attention.

This investigation draws exclusively on available open sources — military expert reports, declassified intelligence analyses, official statements from Baltic governments and **NATO** — in an attempt to answer a simple question: what do the Russian strike rehearsals from **Kaliningrad** really tell us?

*I am neither a military analyst nor an intelligence officer. I am a columnist, and my role is to read the available sources with the best possible attention and draw the conclusions they compel. On Kaliningrad, the conclusions are serious. Serious enough to go beyond the comfort of reassuring neutrality.*

## Kaliningrad: Anatomy of a Forward Base

### The history of an enclave that should not exist

**Kaliningrad** is a geographic anomaly born of war. The city was called **Königsberg** before **1945**: the capital of **East Prussia**, a cultural jewel of northern Germany, birthplace of philosopher **Immanuel Kant**. In **1945**, the **Red Army** conquered the city in extremely brutal fighting, and the **Potsdam Conference** awarded the territory to the **Soviet Union**. The German population was expelled, a new Russian population settled, and the city became **Kaliningrad**.

With the collapse of the **USSR** in **1991**, the **Kaliningrad** enclave found itself geographically separated from **Russia** by the newly independent republics of **Lithuania** and **Belarus**, and then further isolated when these countries joined **NATO** and the **EU**. Today, **Kaliningrad** is surrounded on all sides by **NATO** members — a unique situation in the European security architecture, and a permanent source of strategic tension.

### The enclave's military arsenal

Despite its limited area of roughly **15,000 km²**, **Kaliningrad** concentrates disproportionate military power relative to its size. The enclave houses elements of the **Russian Baltic Fleet**, with surface ships and submarines; Russian air force units equipped with **Su-24M**, **Su-30SM2**, and other types; **S-400** and **S-300** surface-to-air missile systems; **Iskander-M** ballistic missiles with dual conventional and nuclear capability; and advanced electronic warfare capabilities, notably the **Krasukha-4** system capable of disrupting adversary radars and communications.

This concentration of capabilities in such a small space makes **Kaliningrad** an "A2/AD bubble" — an anti-access/area denial zone — that significantly complicates **NATO**'s air and naval operations in the Baltic region. Any Alliance aircraft or vessel operating in the zone must account for the permanent threat that the Kaliningrad arsenal represents.

*Kaliningrad is often presented as a strategic "burden" for Russia — an enclave difficult to supply and defend. That is a superficial reading. Kaliningrad is above all a permanent threat at the heart of NATO territory, a dagger that Russia has never stopped using as a lever of pressure.*

## The Su-24M Fencer: Understanding the Weapon of Choice

### Portrait of a Cold War bomber that remains formidable

The **Sukhoi Su-24 Fencer** entered service with the Soviet military in **1974**. It is a twin-engine, variable-geometry wing jet bomber, with a swing-wing design that adapts its flight characteristics to different mission phases. It can fly at very low altitude at supersonic speeds — a capability specifically designed to penetrate under the radar ceiling of enemy defenses and evade surface-to-air missiles.

Despite its age, the **Su-24M** — the modernized version still in use at **Kaliningrad** — remains a formidable platform for tactical strike missions. It can carry a variety of payloads: unguided bombs, anti-radiation missiles to destroy enemy radars, short-range cruise missiles, and laser- or TV-guided bombs. Its low-altitude penetration capability makes it a difficult threat to intercept for missile defenses optimized against high-altitude threats.

### The flight profiles observed on June 21

The details of the **June 21, 2026** exercises documented by **Army Recognition** indicate that the **Su-24Ms** flew low-altitude approaches simulating attacks on coastal targets and military installations in the Baltic region. These flight profiles are not those of generic training exercises — they replicate specific trajectories corresponding to identifiable targets in neighboring countries.

The escort role of the **Su-30SM2s** in these missions is analytically important. The **Su-30s** are dual-role fighters: they can escort the **Su-24s** by protecting the attack package against enemy fighters, and they can themselves conduct air-to-ground strikes with precision weapons. Their simultaneous presence alongside **Su-24s** in a coherent mission profile suggests training for combined offensive air operation scenarios — not air defense exercises.

*When a strike aircraft flies trajectories that correspond to real targets in neighboring NATO member countries, calling it a "routine exercise" betrays either breathtaking naivety or a deliberate will to minimize reality in order to avoid having to respond to it.*

## The Russian Baltic Fleet: A Degraded but Present Force

### The losses sustained since 2022

The **Russian Baltic Fleet**, based at **Kaliningrad** and **Baltiysk**, has undergone significant changes since **2022**. Some of its most capable units have been redeployed, and the fleet has had to adapt to a maritime environment profoundly altered by the accession of **Finland** and **Sweden** to **NATO**. The **Baltic Sea** is now almost entirely surrounded by Alliance members, which considerably complicates Russian naval operations in those waters.

Ukrainian operations against the **Black Sea Fleet** have also had an indirect effect on Russian naval psychology, demonstrating that even modern surface ships are vulnerable to drone and missile attacks. Although the **Baltic Sea** situation differs from the **Black Sea**, these vulnerability demonstrations have modified Russian operational calculations.

### The role of submarines in the Kaliningrad strategy

**Submarines** based at **Kaliningrad** constitute a discreet but significant strategic component. In a conflict scenario, they could conduct mining operations in the maritime approaches to Baltic ports, attack **NATO**'s maritime communications lines, or launch missile strikes against land targets. Their detection and neutralization in the **Baltic Sea** — shallow water favorable to anti-submarine warfare — is easier than in open ocean, but it remains an operational challenge for the Alliance's navies.

The construction of new submarine infrastructure at **Kaliningrad**, documented by commercial satellite imagery, suggests that **Russia** is investing in maintaining and developing its submarine capabilities in the enclave. This is not the behavior of a military force that has lost interest in the Baltic region.

*The Baltic Sea is shallow, narrow, nearly enclosed. It is a naval theater that favors anti-submarine defense. But "easier" does not mean "solved." Russian submarines at Kaliningrad remain a real threat to NATO's maritime communications in the region.*

## The Iskander Systems: Nuclear Threat Within Reach

### A dual-capable missile in a sensitive enclave

The **Iskander-M** missiles deployed at **Kaliningrad** are perhaps the most strategically significant component of the Kaliningrad arsenal. With a range of **500 kilometers** and metric precision, these missiles can strike targets throughout the **Baltic States**, **Poland**, **Finland**, and even **Berlin**. Their capacity to carry tactical nuclear warheads — even if their current configuration at **Kaliningrad** is not publicly known — is what makes them strategically different from purely conventional missiles.

The Russian doctrine of "**nuclear de-escalation**" — the idea that a limited tactical nuclear strike could force an adversary to negotiate rather than escalate — is a permanent concern for **NATO** planners. The **Iskanders** of **Kaliningrad** are the potential instrument of this doctrine in the Baltic context. Their mere existence forces Alliance planners to integrate the nuclear dimension into their crisis scenarios, even for incidents that begin as conventional.

### Missile exercises as political signals

**Russia** has regularly organized missile exercises at **Kaliningrad**, often in response to **NATO** actions or Western political declarations. These exercises are political signals as much as military training: they remind the Alliance and its members that **Russia** retains a permanent strike capability at the heart of the European security architecture.

The timing of these exercises — often coinciding with **NATO** summits, weapons deliveries to **Ukraine**, or ally declarations about strengthening their defenses — is not accidental. It is a form of strategic communication that European capitals read carefully and sometimes with undisguised concern.

*The Iskanders at Kaliningrad are the physical manifestation of what I call the "nuclear tyranny of proximity." Putin cannot use his intercontinental ballistic missiles without provoking a certain nuclear response. But the Iskanders, with their tactical ambiguity, offer him a lever between the two. That is precisely what makes them dangerous.*

## Electronic Warfare: A Domain of Russian Excellence

### GPS jamming documented for years

One of the best-documented aspects of the Kaliningrad threat is electronic warfare, and specifically **GPS jamming**. For several years, civilian pilots operating over the Baltic countries, **Poland**, **Finland**, and **Sweden** have regularly reported **GPS signal** disruptions that complicate navigation. The **Finnish Civil Aviation Authority** has documented these incidents and attributed them to Russian sources.

These disruptions affect not only civilian aircraft, but also the navigation systems of vessels in the **Baltic Sea** and potentially the weapons systems of **NATO** forces that depend on **GPS** for precision. Western military forces' excessive dependence on **GPS** is a recognized vulnerability that **Russia** has identified and deliberately exploits. The deployment of the **Krasukha-4** system at **Kaliningrad** — an advanced electronic warfare system — illustrates Russia's investment in this capability.

### Military communications as a priority target

Beyond **GPS** jamming, Russian electronic warfare targets military communications systems. Disrupting communications between headquarters, combat units, and weapons systems is a priority in Russian doctrine during the initial phase of any military operation. **Kaliningrad**, with its sophisticated electronic warfare systems, can exert significant influence on communications within a radius of several hundred kilometers — covering all of the **Baltic States** and portions of **Poland** and **Finland**.

**NATO** has invested in electronic warfare-resistant communication systems — satellite communications, advanced encryption systems, degraded-mode communication protocols. But no system is perfectly immune, and the advantage of the attacker who chooses the timing and method of disruption remains significant in the first hours of a crisis.

*Electronic warfare is invisible to most citizens, but it conditions everything. An army whose communications are jammed is a blind and deaf army. Russia's investment in this domain — with the Krasukha and other systems — is one of the most concerning aspects of Kaliningrad's military capabilities.*

## The Intelligence Services' Interpretation

### What the Latvian alerts say

The alerts issued by Latvian intelligence services in **June 2026**, reported notably by **Fox News** on **June 22**, represent a significant source of information on the threat assessment by national services with privileged access to signals of Russian activity in the region. **Latvia**, by virtue of its geographic position and history, has developed particularly advanced expertise in monitoring and analyzing Russian military activities near its borders.

The fact that these services judged it useful to make public their alerts about Russian preparations for hybrid provocations is itself a signal. Intelligence services do not make public statements lightly — especially in a context where incorrect information could be exploited by **Moscow** for its own narratives. These alerts were therefore carefully weighed before being communicated, which gives them particular weight.

### The convergence of Western assessments

The information reported by the **Guardian** on **June 26, 2026** about Russian provocation preparations, and by the **Telegraph** on **June 27** about Western officials' suspicions of a possible attack on a Baltic state, are not isolated assessments. They reflect a convergence of evaluations within several allied intelligence services.

This convergence matters: when several independent services, using different methods and sources, arrive at similar conclusions, the probability that the assessment is correct increases significantly. Intelligence divergences — situations where different services reach contradictory conclusions — are frequent and warrant caution. Convergence, by contrast, deserves serious attention.

*I am not inside the intelligence agencies. But the convergence of Latvian service alerts, Guardian and Telegraph reports citing Western official sources, within the same few-day window, is not coincidence. These are coordinated signals designed to prepare public opinion for a possible deterioration of the situation.*

## Allied Exercises in Response

### The reinforced NATO presence as a message

Faced with the Russian strike rehearsals and alerts about planned provocations, **NATO** responded by intensifying its own exercises in the region. Allied fighter rotations based in the Baltic countries were reinforced, naval patrols in the **Baltic Sea** increased, and integrated air defense exercises multiplied. These responses aim to send a clear message: the Baltic air and maritime space is under permanent surveillance.

**Poland** simultaneously reinforced its radar surveillance capabilities over the **Suwalki Corridor** and deployed additional missile batteries in its northeastern region. These deployments are direct responses to **Kaliningrad** activities, and their visibility — unlike the usually discreet tactical measures — is deliberate. The goal is to make obvious to **Moscow** that **NATO**'s defensive preparation is active and responsive to its own signals.

### Early identification as deterrence

One of the most effective responses to Russian strike rehearsals is demonstrating that every movement is **identified, tracked, and analyzed**. When **NATO** intelligence services make public — even partially — the Russian military activities at **Kaliningrad**, they signal to **Moscow** that surveillance is permanent and effective. This targeted transparency is a deterrence tool: if **Putin** knows that every preparation is visible, the element of surprise — precious in any military operation — is reduced.

**NATO** has developed a surveillance and early warning architecture considerably strengthened since **2022**. **E-3 AWACS** surveillance aircraft, **GlobalHawk** drones, commercial and military satellites, ground sensors in member countries — all contribute to a real-time operational picture that would limit the possibility of a surprise strike from **Kaliningrad**.

*Permanent surveillance may be the most underestimated form of deterrence. Making visible what the adversary is doing — even without preventing it — changes the strategic calculus. Putin loses the element of surprise, which is often decisive in the first hours of a military operation.*

## The Strategic Objectives of the Rehearsals: Multiple Possible Readings

### Hypothesis 1: preparation for a real act of aggression

The first reading of the Russian strike rehearsals from **Kaliningrad** is the most alarming: they constitute operational preparation for a real act of aggression against the **Baltic States** or **Poland**. In this hypothesis, the exercises serve to refine attack procedures, train crews on specific trajectories corresponding to real targets, and test **NATO**'s reaction times.

This hypothesis is consistent with other concerning signals: the intensification of Russian hybrid activities in the region, the alerts from Baltic and Western intelligence services, and the Russian doctrine that calls for pre-emptive strikes against enemy command infrastructure at the opening of a military operation. It cannot be excluded, but it implies that **Putin** is ready to risk a direct war with **NATO** — a decision with potentially catastrophic consequences even for **Russia**.

### Hypothesis 2: capability demonstration for psychological pressure

The second hypothesis is that these rehearsals are primarily tools of **psychological pressure** — capability demonstrations designed to maintain anxiety in Baltic capitals and **NATO** circles, to influence debates on defense spending, and to signal that **Russia** remains a capable military actor in the region despite its difficulties in **Ukraine**.

In this hypothesis, the exercises are costly for **Russia** — in fuel, flight hours, and equipment wear — but their strategic "**return on investment**" is the anxiety they generate in Western military headquarters and chancelleries. This anxiety can influence ally decisions on maintaining American presence in **Europe**, on the timeline and nature of support to **Ukraine**, and on diplomatic options under consideration.

*These two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. The rehearsals can be both real preparation and a capability demonstration. Putin is tactically sophisticated enough to ensure that each exercise simultaneously serves multiple objectives. It is this calculated ambiguity that makes it such an effective tool.*

## Baltic State Resilience Against the Air Threat

### The air defense systems deployed

The **Baltic States** are not defenseless against the air threats posed by the **Su-24M** and **Su-30SM2** aircraft from **Kaliningrad**. Since **2022**, allied **Patriot** missile defense systems have been deployed in the region, **NASAMS** batteries provide medium-altitude coverage, and portable **Stingers** and other short-range systems complete the layered defense. These systems create a layered defense that significantly complicates the mission for Russian bombers.

Allied fighters rotating through the Baltic countries — the Alliance's **Baltic Air Policing** mission is conducted by different **NATO** member nations on a rotation system from bases at **Šiauliai** in Lithuania and **Ämari** in Estonia — constitute the active component of this defense. These aircraft are on permanent alert and could intercept Russian aircraft that penetrated Baltic airspace. Quick reaction alert scramble times, engagement procedures, and rules of engagement are defined and regularly exercised.

### The limits of existing air defense

Despite these capabilities, significant gaps remain. Radar coverage is not uniform across the entire region; certain altitudes and trajectories remain difficult to monitor effectively; and the capacity to simultaneously manage attacks from ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, and drones requires a command integration that will only be fully operational when current investments are fully deployed.

A massive attack scenario simultaneously involving **Iskander** missiles, low-altitude **Su-24M** strikes, cyberattacks against command systems, and intensive electronic warfare would represent a formidable challenge for Baltic integrated air defense. This is why the Baltic countries argue for a permanent, non-rotational presence of allied forces on their territory — with systems already deployed, known, and integrated into national defense.

*Baltic air defense has made remarkable progress since 2022. But if I am honest, it remains insufficient to withstand a large-scale coordinated Russian attack. The Ankara summit should set as its objective closing these gaps — not in five years, now.*

## Ukraine as a Learning Ground for Kaliningrad

### The lessons of Ukrainian strikes for Russian planners

The war in **Ukraine** is a learning ground for all belligerents, including Russian military planners responsible for **Kaliningrad**'s capabilities. They observe how Russian artillery is hit by Ukrainian drones, how air defense systems adapt to different threats, how the precision of missiles and guided bombs affects defensive tactics. These lessons are directly applicable to strike scenarios in the Baltic region.

They also observe how deep Ukrainian drone strikes — such as the strike on **Ufa** documented on **June 25, 2026** at more than **1,300 kilometers** — have shown that strategic depth no longer provides the same protection as before. **Kaliningrad** planners are integrating these lessons into their own capabilities — but also into their defenses against a potential Ukrainian or allied response.

### Drones as a new dimension of the Kaliningrad threat

Long-range drones constitute a new dimension of the threat that **Kaliningrad** can project onto neighboring countries. Reconnaissance and strike drones, deployed from the enclave, could harass Baltic defenses, collect real-time intelligence, and guide artillery or missile strikes with increased precision. The drone employment doctrine developed and refined by **Russia** in **Ukraine** is directly transferable to the Baltic context.

**NATO** is developing counter-drone capabilities — detection systems, jammers, kinetic interceptors — but this is a fast-evolving technological arms race. Today's defensive measures can be overtaken by tomorrow's offensive capabilities, and vice versa. This perpetual offensive-defensive innovation cycle is one of the characteristics of future warfare that **Kaliningrad** illustrates perfectly.

*Drones have transformed warfare since 2022. What was a technological curiosity has become a decisive operational factor. Kaliningrad — with its electronic warfare capabilities to jam enemy drones and its own drone capabilities to strike — represents this new military reality in the Baltic context.*

## Escalation Scenarios: From Provocation to War

### The mechanics of unwanted escalation

One of the major concerns for strategists is the risk of **unintended escalation** — a situation where a series of actions and reactions, each perceived as defensive or proportionate by the initiator, leads to a war that no one truly wanted. History offers many examples of this fatal chain reaction. In the context of current tensions around **Kaliningrad** and the **Baltic States**, this risk is real.

An aerial incident — for example, a **Su-30** fighter that approaches too close to a **NATO** aircraft and causes an accidental collision — could quickly create a crisis situation where political pressure on both sides not to "back down" would lead to successive escalation steps. The "**guardrail**" doctrine — crisis and accident management mechanisms — developed during the **Cold War** has been partially reactivated, but in a context of far more degraded Russia-West relations than at that time.

### The red line Putin must not cross

The essential question is: what is the red line that **Putin** cannot cross without triggering a massive conventional military response from **NATO**? This line must be sufficiently clear to be credible — **Putin** must know the line exists — but not so precise as to serve as a guide for a "**salami slicing**" strategy where **Russia** takes slices just below the Article 5 trigger threshold.

Strategic ambiguity is double-edged: it gives **NATO** flexibility to respond to provocations without automatically triggering nuclear escalation, but it also gives **Putin** the ability to act in gray zones without certainty about the response. Finding the balance between these two imperatives — enough clarity to deter, enough flexibility to manage — is one of the fundamental challenges of Alliance strategy against the Kaliningrad threat.

*The red line in the Baltics must be defined, communicated to Moscow, and — this is where it gets hard — defended even when doing so is politically costly for Western governments. A red line one does not defend is worse than no red line at all: it tells Putin he can bluff indefinitely.*

## What to Do with the Information About Kaliningrad?

### Proportionate and visible responses

The ultimate political question is: what should **NATO** do with the accumulated information on **Kaliningrad**'s military activities? The first answer is a reinforced and visible presence: more fighters rotating through the **Baltic States**, more missile defense systems deployed, more joint exercises documented and communicated. These visible measures serve deterrence by signaling to **Moscow** that **Kaliningrad**'s activities do not purchase surprise — they generate a proportionate defensive response.

The second answer is diplomatic: bring the data on **Kaliningrad** military activities before international bodies — the **UN Security Council**, the **OSCE**, bilateral communications with **Moscow**. This approach will probably not change Russian behavior in the short term, but it creates a documented record that can be important for mobilizing international public opinion and for future legal proceedings or sanctions.

### The pressure to accelerate Ankara's decisions

The third answer — the most directly useful — is to use the anxiety generated by **Kaliningrad**'s activities as an additional argument to accelerate the decisions at the **Ankara summit**. The dozens of billions in defense contracts announced by **Rutte** ahead of the summit must include measures specifically designed to strengthen the air defense and electronic resilience of the **Baltic States**. The **Kaliningrad** threat must translate into concrete investments, not merely declarations of concern.

This concrete test will ultimately allow us to judge the value of the **Ankara summit**: did it produce responses adapted to the documented threat from **Kaliningrad**, or did it produce general declarations about **GDP** percentages? **Zelensky** is waiting for shells; the **Baltic States** are waiting for anti-missile systems. They have, respectively, an urgency and a right to both.

*What I take from this investigation: Kaliningrad is not a theoretical problem for military history books. It is a real, documented, and actively developing threat. The right response is neither panic nor denial. It is preparation, vigilance, and decisive response to provocations. Exactly what the Baltic countries are doing, with the means at their disposal.*

## Baltic Airspace: A First-Order Strategic Issue

### Enhanced air surveillance after the Kaliningrad incidents

The aerial strike rehearsals from **Kaliningrad** have directly led to an intensification of Baltic airspace surveillance by **NATO** allies. The Alliance's **air policing** missions, operated on a rotation by different member nations from the bases at **Šiauliai** in **Lithuania** and **Ämari** in **Estonia**, were reinforced in response to Russian provocations. **F-16**, **Eurofighter**, and **Rafale** fighters take turns maintaining a continuous presence in airspace that **Moscow** considers its natural sphere of influence.

Radar data from **NATO**'s **AWACS** surveillance aircraft — which perform regular rotations over the Baltic region — have allowed precise documentation of the flight patterns of Russian aircraft from **Kaliningrad**. This data is valuable for military planners: it allows them to distinguish routine exercises from preparations for real strikes. The line between the two is not always obvious, and the intelligence services of the Baltic countries spend countless hours analyzing it.

### Missile defense: the priority link in Baltic protection

Facing the ballistic and cruise missile capabilities deployed at **Kaliningrad** — notably the **Iskander-M** systems with their dual conventional and nuclear capability — the **Baltic States** and their allies have considerably strengthened their **missile defense** architecture. The delivery of **Patriot PAC-3** systems to several **Eastern Flank** countries, combined with Franco-Italian **SAMP/T** systems and modernized **Hawk** batteries, creates a multilayered defensive architecture that **NATO** planners still describe as insufficient but which represents a significant improvement over the **2022** situation.

The deployment of a German **Patriot battery** in **Lithuania** — announced in **2022** and then extended — is emblematic of this buildup. **Germany**, despite its hesitations on other issues, has maintained this concrete commitment. The surface-to-air missile batteries are visible, measurable, and send a clear signal to **Kaliningrad** planners: a strike against the **Baltic States** will not be an easy exercise. Conventional deterrence, layer by layer, is being built.

*Every Patriot battery deployed in Lithuania, every fighter on patrol over Baltic airspace is a concrete response to Kaliningrad's rehearsals. It is not enough, but it is real. And in this strategic standoff, reality counts infinitely more than beautiful summit declarations.*

## Conclusion: Kaliningrad as a Thermometer of Russian Intent

### Read the exercises, not the words

**Kaliningrad** is the most reliable thermometer of Russian military intent in the Baltic region. **Putin** can say whatever he likes in diplomatic speeches — present himself as ready to negotiate, propose security agreements, denounce **NATO**'s "provocations." What matters is what the aircraft taking off from **Chkalovsk** airfield at **Kaliningrad** are doing, what the submarines patrolling from **Baltiysk** are preparing, and what the **Iskander** system exercises are targeting.

On **June 21, 2026**, those aircraft were training to strike targets in the **Baltic States**. This fact, documented by **Army Recognition**, is not speculation. It is a military reality that must inform the decisions of the **Ankara summit**. To ignore this signal, to contextualize it away, to file it under "routine exercises," would be a mistake whose consequences could be paid for at a very high price.

### The urgency of collective decision

**NATO** has the instruments to respond to the threat from **Kaliningrad**: surveillance systems, defensive capabilities, operational plans, and determined allies. What it sometimes lacks is rapid and firm collective political decision. The **Ankara summit** is an opportunity to fill that gap — to transform analysis into decision, anxiety into investment, and alerts into concrete responses.

The **Su-24Ms** of **Kaliningrad** are training. The **NATO** soldiers in the **Baltic States** are training too. The question is not which side is better prepared in terms of equipment, but which has the political determination to follow through if the provocation exceeds the acceptable threshold. **Zelensky** answered that question on **February 24, 2022**. The rest of the **Alliance** still needs to provide its own answer.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*What **Kaliningrad** tells us is that deterrence is never a given. It is built, maintained, reinforced — or it erodes. The Russian strike rehearsals are not innocuous: they test our nerves, our detection systems, our political will. The response must be clear, measured, and unambiguous. **Putin** understands firmness. He exploits weakness. We do not have the luxury of leaving him in doubt.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Army Recognition — Russia rehearses Baltic strike operations from Kaliningrad — June 21, 2026](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/russia-rehearses-baltic-strike-operations-from-kaliningrad-with-su-24m-bombers-and-su-30sm2-fighters)

- [The Guardian — Russia preparing possible provocation in Baltic states or Poland — June 26, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/russia-provocation-baltic-states-poland)

- [Fox News — Russia preparing hybrid attacks on NATO's eastern flank — June 22, 2026](https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-preparing-hybrid-attacks-natos-eastern-flank-intelligence-warns)

- [The Telegraph — Western officials suspect possible Russian attack on Baltic NATO state — June 27, 2026](https://www.facebook.com/TELEGRAPH.CO.UK/posts/1465008079007153/)

### Secondary sources

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/)

- [The Guardian — NATO leaders fear they can no longer rely on US — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

- [European Parliament — Briefing on NATO Ankara summit and Eastern Flank security — June 26, 2026](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2026/789355/EPRS_BRI(2026)789355_EN.pdf)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-kaliningrad-base-avancee-ce-que-revelent-les-repetitions-de-frappe-russe