# INVESTIGATION: France and Italy block entry ban for former Russian soldiers

> On June 25, 2026, as the Council of the European Union had just adopted the decision to extend economic sanctions against Russia from 6 to 12 months for the first time since 2022, discussions on the 21st sanctions package were hitting an unexpected obstacle. The package's flagship proposal would ban former Russian combatants who participated in the war against Ukraine from ente

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-france-et-italie-bloquent-l-interdiction-d-entree-pour-les-anciens-solda

## Key takeaways

- France and Italy issued about 180,000 and 160,000 visas to Russians in 2025, and more than 470,000 tourist visas were issued across the EU that year.
- Paris and Rome reportedly object that the ban should fall under visa policy rather than sanctions, and that verifying combatant status without Russian military records is difficult.
- Their stated fear is that the ban would pave the way to a total ban on Russian nationals, which the article presents as a rationalization of economic interests.
- Bulgaria is separately blocking parts of the 21st package over sanctions on Patriarch Kirill and Vagit Alekperov.
- The Commission promised visa restrictions, but tied them to a Visa Code revision expected in early 2027, so they would not apply in summer 2026.

## Introduction: Two countries playing the pragmatism card

### The 21st EU sanctions package and its Lebanese knot

On **June 25, 2026**, as the **Council of the European Union** had just adopted the decision to extend economic sanctions against **Russia** from **6** to **12 months** for the first time since **2022**, discussions on the **21st sanctions package** were hitting an unexpected obstacle. The package's flagship proposal would ban former Russian combatants who participated in the war against **Ukraine** from entering **EU** territory. The logic is airtight: men who participated in a war of aggression against a European state should not be free to walk the streets of **Paris**, **Rome**, or **Athens**. The idea commands consensus in Northern and Eastern **Europe**. But two countries oppose it: **France** and **Italy**.

According to **Bloomberg** and **Euronews**, citing multiple diplomatic sources, **Paris** and **Rome** are expressing "legal and technical reservations" about the entry ban proposal. But behind that diplomatically polished language lie economic and political realities far less noble than concern for legal consistency. These two countries alone receive the largest number of Russian tourists in **Europe** — and they have no immediate interest in seeing that revenue stream cut off further.

### Russian tourism figures: an economic interest hard to ignore

In **2025**, **France** issued nearly **180,000 visas** to Russian nationals, and **Italy** approximately **160,000**. **Spain** and **Greece** round out the list of countries most generous with Russian visas. By comparison, **Poland** and the Baltic states have been issuing almost none since **2022**. This massive disparity creates what Eastern and Northern European countries call "visa shopping": Russian nationals obtain their visas in the most accommodating countries and then travel freely throughout the **Schengen** zone, which has no internal border controls.

In total, more than **470,000 tourist visas** were issued to Russian citizens in **2025**, despite years of war, sanctions, and efforts to restrict entries. While Russian missiles continued to strike Ukrainian civilians, Russian tourists were sunbathing on French and Italian beaches. This contradiction is what eleven European countries — **Sweden**, **Poland**, the Baltic states, **Finland**, **Denmark**, the **Netherlands**, the **Czech Republic**, **Iceland**, and **Norway** — denounced in a letter sent to the European Commission in early June **2026**.

*There is a moral obscenity in this type of tourism. Not in tourism itself — many ordinary Russians do not support this war. But in France's and Italy's refusal to distinguish between Russian civilians fleeing the regime and former soldiers who fought in Ukraine. These two categories deserve different treatment.*

## The official arguments of Paris and Rome

### Legal objections: real but contested

The official position of **France** and **Italy** is not to reject the idea of a ban on former Russian combatants. It concerns the proposed mechanism. According to diplomatic sources cited by **Ukrainska Pravda** and **RBC-Ukraine**, **Paris** and **Rome** argue that the ban should fall under visa policy — a power shared between the **EU** and member states — rather than under sanctions, which are a more coercive foreign policy instrument and harder to target precisely. The argument is technically defensible.

A second argument concerns practicability: the proposal would require each member state to determine for itself who participated in the hostilities and who did not. **France** and **Italy** contend that this verification is extremely complex without access to Russian military records, which are naturally unavailable. How does one distinguish a former combatant from an ordinary civilian in a visa application? This is an argument that even some supporters of the ban acknowledge as non-trivial.

### What the technical objections conceal

But the technical objections tell only part of the story. According to **Euronews**, citing three separate diplomatic sources, **Paris** and **Rome** fear that the ban on former combatants would "pave the way" to a total ban on all Russian nationals — something they oppose. This concern reveals the true underlying logic: these two countries believe that maintaining contacts between Europeans and ordinary Russian citizens has intrinsic value, that exposing Russians to European life can influence Russian public opinion over the long term. This is an argument with a certain logic — but it applies poorly to former soldiers.

There is also an economic dimension that diplomats do not openly acknowledge. **France** and **Italy** are the two **EU** countries processing the largest number of Russian visa applications. A restrictive policy would strengthen the competitiveness of countries that already refuse Russian visas — like **Denmark**, the Baltic states, or **Finland** — freeing them of an administrative burden with no costs. For **Paris** and **Rome**, giving up Russian tourism without the other countries doing the same represents a competitive disadvantage. That is the naked truth.

*The "influence through contact" argument is intellectually honest in peacetime. In a context of war of aggression, it looks more like a rationalization of economic interests. You do not influence an authoritarian system by selling croissants to its tourists.*

## Bulgaria: the unexpected disruptor of the 21st package

### Kirill, Alekperov, and the Bulgarian veto

**France** and **Italy** are not the only obstacles to the **21st sanctions package**. **Bulgaria**, under its new less-Atlanticist government, is blocking part of the package for very different reasons. **Sofia** opposes the inclusion of **Patriarch Kirill**, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, on the list of sanctioned individuals. It also opposes sanctions against **Vagit Alekperov**, the billionaire founder of **Lukoil** — a company that owns a major refinery in **Bulgaria** and represents a significant share of Bulgarian fuel supplies.

Bulgarian President **Rumen Radev** stated unambiguously: **"We will not allow the sanctions package to pass in this form. We have a vote, and we will use it."** This is a position that echoes Hungary's tactic under **Viktor Orbán** — using veto power to protect particular economic interests tied to **Russia**. It is worth noting that **Kirill** had already been targeted by a sanctions attempt in **2022**, blocked at the time by **Hungary**. Four years later, it is **Bulgaria** picking up the torch of Russian ecclesiastical protection within the **EU**.

### The unanimity principle: the Achilles' heel of European sanctions

Adopting European sanctions against **Russia** requires unanimity among **27 member states**. This rule, designed to protect the sovereignty of smaller members, has become the main leverage point that pro-Russian states — or those with Russian economic interests — use to dilute or block sanctions packages. **Hungary** under **Orbán** used this mechanism systematically since **2022**. **Slovakia** under **Fico** followed. **Bulgaria** now appears ready to join this club.

There are discussions within the **EU** about the possibility of modifying the unanimity rule for sanctions — allowing qualified majorities rather than full unanimity. But this change would itself require unanimity or treaty revision, which is even harder to achieve. The paradox is total: to reform the rule that allows blockages, you need the agreement of those who have an interest in keeping it.

*The unanimity principle for sanctions is a structural vulnerability that Russia actively exploits by cultivating allies within member states. This is not an accident — it is a strategy. The EU needs to reform this mechanism, but to do so, it must first confront the uncomfortable reality that some of its members have interests more aligned with Moscow than with Kyiv.*

## The North-South-East fracture within the European Union

### The Russian visa frontline: a map that speaks

The map of **Europe** viewed through the lens of Russian visas tells a story of two Europes. To the **East** and **North** — **Poland**, Baltic states, **Finland**, **Sweden**, **Denmark** — Russian tourist visas have barely been issued since the start of the large-scale invasion in **2022**. These countries bear the direct costs of geographical proximity to **Russia** — reinforced border surveillance, Russian espionage, infrastructure sabotage, instrumentalized migrant flows — and reject the schizophrenia of a policy that sanctions **Russia** on one side while welcoming its tourists on the other.

To the **West** and **South** — **France**, **Italy**, **Spain**, **Greece** — the economic logic of tourism still prevails. These countries have no border with **Russia**. They do not face the same direct threats. And they have tourist industries that partly depend on wealthy Russian visitors. The letter from eleven European countries in early June **2026** explicitly named this disparity: frontier countries "bear all the costs and all the risks, while others profit from Russian tourism."

### The European Commission: between promises and delays

The **European Commission** responded to the demands of the eleven signatory countries on **June 5, 2026** with a promise of "targeted restrictive measures" on visas. But spokesperson **Markus Lammert** clarified that these measures would come as part of the revision of the **Visa Code** — scheduled for **early 2027** — and would therefore not apply for the summer season of **2026**. In other words: a promise for next year, while French and Italian beaches remain accessible to Russian tourists this summer.

The **Commission**'s logic is understandable: any change to European visa law requires a rigorous legislative process and time. But for Eastern European countries that carry a disproportionate share of the confrontation with **Russia**, this slowness is experienced as a betrayal. The cohesion of the **EU** is being tested not only by external Russian pressure, but by the internal fragmentation of its economic interests.

*The Commission proposes a 2027 reform while Russian tourists visit European beaches in the summer of 2026. I understand the institutional constraints — laws do not change overnight. But there is something deeply cynical about that timeline, viewed from Kyiv or Tallinn.*

## Former Russian combatants: a real security threat

### The tangible security risk

Beyond the economic and political arguments, supporters of the ban raise a concrete security argument. Former Russian combatants on **European** soil represent a real and documented security risk. European intelligence services have recorded an increase in sabotage acts attributed to Russian networks on European soil — warehouse fires, attempted attacks on public figures, disinformation operations. Individuals with a Russian military background are potential recruits for these networks.

**Estonia**, a pioneer in this area, is pushing other member states to establish blacklists of Russian veterans and ban their entry into the **Schengen** zone. The proposal in the **21st sanctions package** — which delegates to each member state the responsibility of determining who participated in the hostilities — may be imperfect. But the argument that implementation difficulty justifies complete inaction is equally indefensible. Imperfect technical solutions are better than no solution at all when facing a documented threat.

### A precedent that matters

The question of the entry of Russian nationals into the **Schengen** zone has a symbolic dimension that goes beyond the practical question of tourism. If the **EU** cannot ban entry to men who bore arms against a European partner state, it sends a message of weakness that **Moscow** will not fail to exploit. The right to free movement in the **Schengen** zone is a European value — but this value cannot apply to individuals who actively contributed to the destruction of **Ukraine**. The moral coherence of the **Union** is at stake.

The final adoption of the **21st sanctions package** — possibly in amended form — is playing out in the coming weeks. Negotiations between the ambassadors of the **27** member states will continue to seek a compromise. But that compromise risks resembling all previous European compromises on the Russian visa question: hollow enough to satisfy **Paris** and **Rome**, not strong enough to satisfy **Warsaw** and **Tallinn**.

*The Europe of collective defense is the one of Poland and the Baltics. The Europe of economic pragmatism with Moscow is the one of France and Italy. These two Europes can coexist on ordinary issues. On Russia and Ukraine, they create a fracture that weakens the Union's coherence against its most dangerous adversary.*

## The 21st sanctions package: content, ambitions, and compromises

### What the 21st package actually contains

The European Union's **21st sanctions package** against **Russia**, adopted in June **2026**, is the most extensive since the start of the war. It includes new restrictions on exports of dual-use goods — technologies that could have military applications — targeting in particular companies in third countries that serve as platforms for circumventing controls on electronic components. The list of sanctioned entities has grown considerably, including Chinese, Emirati, and Turkish companies involved in documented circumvention networks.

The package also integrates measures on **former Russian combatants** and establishes a framework for **funding Ukraine's reconstruction** from the revenues of frozen Russian assets. This last point is particularly significant: it transforms Russian assets blocked in **Europe** — estimated at approximately **€300 billion** for the Russian central bank's reserves alone — into a funding source for Ukrainian needs, without formally confiscating these assets.

### Behind-the-scenes negotiations: compromises and concessions

The adoption of the **21st package** required several weeks of intense negotiations among the **27 member states**. The unanimity rule on **EU** foreign policy gives each country a potential veto. **Bulgaria** obtained exemptions on certain trade restrictions with **Russia** by invoking transitional economic constraints. **France** and **Italy** softened restrictions on certain consumer goods, preserving commercial interests in their luxury and agri-food sectors.

These compromises are frustrating for proponents of maximum sanctions — primarily the **Baltic** states, **Poland**, and other Central and Eastern European member states with Russia on their doorstep. But they are politically inevitable in a decision-making system requiring unanimity. The real question is whether these exemptions create exploitable loopholes that significantly reduce the package's impact — and that assessment can only be made in practice.

*I look at the sanctions package negotiations and think of the metaphor of a net that lets fish through. Every national exemption, every compromise on this or that category of goods, creates a wider mesh in the net. **Russia** is very effective at finding and exploiting these meshes. The consistency of sanctions requires a European political discipline that national interests constantly put to the test.*

## Sanctions circumvention: a global industry and Western responses

### Circumvention networks: mapping a systemic problem

The circumvention of Russian sanctions has become an organized global industry. Shell companies registered in dozens of countries — **UAE**, **Turkey**, **Kazakhstan**, **Armenia**, **Georgia**, **China** — serve as intermediaries to channel toward **Russia** electronic components, CNC machines, integrated circuits, and other dual-use goods. These sanctions-circumventing supply chains have been documented by organizations like the **CSIS**, **Kyiv School of Economics**, and investigative journalists.

Circumvention effectiveness varies by product category. For **high-end semiconductors** and advanced manufacturing equipment, American and European export controls are relatively effective — global manufacturers depend on Western markets and cannot afford to ignore sanctions. For more standard components — less advanced chips, mechanical equipment, vehicles — non-Western alternatives are more numerous and control is harder.

### Enforcement tools: secondary sanctions and pressure on third parties

The Western response to the circumvention problem increasingly relies on **secondary sanctions** — penalizing entities in third countries that help **Russia** circumvent primary sanctions. The **United States** has the most developed tradition in this area: the threat of cutting foreign entities from the American financial system is a considerable lever. The **European Union** is less advanced in this domain, but the **21st package** marks a step in that direction by explicitly targeting non-European entities.

Diplomatic pressure on facilitating states is the other tool. Direct conversations with **Ankara**, **Abu Dhabi**, and **Astana** have produced partial results — these governments have no interest in being officially designated as sanctions facilitators. But they also have real economic interests in trade with **Russia** and are not prepared to sacrifice those interests entirely. The result is partial and selective compliance that reduces but does not eliminate circumvention.

*Sanctions circumvention reminds me of a fundamental principle: every rule creates incentives to circumvent it. The real measure of a sanctions regime's effectiveness is not the absence of circumvention — impossible to guarantee — but the cost imposed on circumvention. If circumvention is easy, low-risk, and low-cost, sanctions are ineffective. If it is difficult, risky, and costly, they serve their purpose. The ongoing work of sanctions enforcement is precisely about raising those costs.*

## European unity against Russia: four years of sanctions — a balance sheet

### The achievements: unprecedented cohesion despite tensions

Four years after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion, the balance sheet of European cohesion on sanctions is more positive than many would have predicted in February **2022**. Twenty-one packages adopted, progressively tightened export control regimes, collective funding of the Ukrainian war effort through the **European Peace Facility** and confiscated funds — all of this represents a collective effort without precedent in the history of European foreign policy.

This cohesion has survived considerable pressures: energy crises, recessions, the rise of pro-Russian parties in several member states, government changes in **Hungary**, **Slovakia**, and other countries. The fact that the **EU** maintains a collective position in the face of these pressures testifies to the robustness — imperfect, negotiated, contested, but real — of European governance in foreign policy.

### The flaws: Hungary, internal division, and the risk of fatigue

The picture is not entirely positive. **Hungary** under **Orbán** has been the most consistent point of resistance, using its veto to negotiate exemptions and delay the adoption of certain packages. **Slovakia** under **Fico** has taken positions increasingly aligned with **Budapest**. Divisions persist between the ardor of Baltic and Polish countries and the caution of some major Western member states.

Over the longer term, the risk of "sanctions fatigue" is real. The economic costs of the sanctions regime — even if far less significant than initially anticipated — accumulate. Political parties campaigning for "normalization" of relations with **Russia** are gaining ground in several countries. If the war continues without prospect of resolution over the next two or three years, pressure for sanctions easing will intensify. Maintaining European cohesion is a permanent political effort, not an acquired asset.

*Four years after **February 24, 2022**, I remain struck by what **Europe** has collectively managed to accomplish in response to **Russia**. It is not perfect. There are shameful compromises, unacceptable exemptions, countries playing both sides. But compared to what pessimists predicted — a divided, paralyzed **Europe** incapable of acting — the reality is far more encouraging. **Europe** has learned to behave as a geopolitical actor. Whether that lesson becomes embedded in its institutions is the challenge of the next cycle.*

*European cohesion on sanctions reminds me that the **European Union** can act as a geopolitical actor when fundamental interests are at stake. It is slow, compromised, imperfect — but it holds. Four years after **February 24, 2022**, that is more than many predicted. This is not a victory — it is a resistance. And in contemporary geopolitics, resistance that endures eventually becomes strength.*

## Conclusion: The EU in the mirror of its own contradictions

### An investigation that reveals more than a visa question

Behind the seemingly technical question of an entry ban for former Russian combatants, this investigation reveals the deep tensions running through the **European Union** vis-à-vis **Russia**. This is not simply a difference of opinion on a diplomatic instrument. It involves divergent economic interests, different perceptions of the Russian threat, and a chronic inability to translate declaratory solidarity into consistent concrete policies.

The **12-month** extension of sanctions is progress. Bulgaria's threat to block the **21st package** is a step backward. **France** and **Italy**'s opposition to the ban on former combatants is a moral disgrace dressed in legal argument. The **European Union** can be strong and coherent in its response to **Russia** — it has demonstrated this since **2022** on many fronts. But this investigation also reveals the cracks that **Moscow** is actively exploiting and that **Brussels** cannot indefinitely mask with compromises.

### What Eastern European countries expect from their partners

The countries that share a border with **Russia** or directly bear the cost of this war — **Poland**, **Estonia**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, **Finland** — expect something simple from their European partners: consistency. Not solidarity speeches followed by policies that contradict that solidarity. Not sanctions ceremonies followed by tourist seasons in which Russian visas continue to be issued in mass. Not declarations on collective security followed by blockages on entry bans for soldiers who fought against a European state. The **EU**'s credibility against its own stated values depends on that consistency.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Euronews — EU ban on Russian combatants faces resistance from France and Italy — June 26, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/26/eu-ban-on-russian-combatants-faces-resistance-from-france-and-italy)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Two EU countries oppose entry ban on Russians who fought against Ukraine — June 25, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/two-eu-countries-oppose-entry-ban-on-russians-1782413097.html)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Two EU countries resist entry ban for Russians who fought against Ukraine — June 25, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/25/8041130/)

### Secondary sources

- [RFE/RL — EU States Push For Tougher Rules To Deny Russians Tourist Visas — June 4, 2026](https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-tougher-rules-russians-tourist-visas/33772574.html)

- [Euronews — EU vows targeted restrictions on Schengen visas for Russians — June 5, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/05/eu-vows-targeted-restrictions-on-schengen-visas-for-russians-amid-backlash)

- [The Moscow Times — EU Countries Demand Stricter Visa Rules for Russians — June 4, 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/04/eu-countries-demand-stricter-visa-rules-for-russians-a92931)

- [Washington Times — Several European countries want a visa ban for Russian tourists — June 5, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/5/several-european-countries-want-visa-ban-russian-tourists/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-france-et-italie-bloquent-l-interdiction-d-entree-pour-les-anciens-solda