# INVESTIGATION: Occupied Crimea under a state of emergency — the humanitarian crisis Moscow can no longer hide

> On June 26, 2026, Russian occupation authorities in Crimea declared a regional state of emergency — a legal exception regime that gives authorities expanded powers to manage crises. The Russian proxy in Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhayev, justified this decision in cautious terms: "primarily to resolve questions of an economic nature," to ensure "the stable functioning of all sphe

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-crimee-occupee-en-etat-d-urgence-la-crise-humanitaire-que-moscou-ne-peut

## Introduction: the June 26 state of emergency reveals the scale of the crisis

### What the state of emergency declaration really means

On **June 26, 2026**, Russian occupation authorities in **Crimea** declared a **regional state of emergency** — a legal exception regime that gives authorities expanded powers to manage crises. The Russian proxy in **Sevastopol**, **Mikhail Razvozhayev**, justified this decision in cautious terms: **"primarily to resolve questions of an economic nature,"** to ensure **"the stable functioning of all spheres on which people's way of life depends."** Translated plainly: the essential infrastructure of the peninsula is in a state of crisis and normal administrative mechanisms are no longer sufficient to manage it.

This declaration comes after a week of Ukrainian strikes that systematically targeted the energy, oil, and military infrastructure of the peninsula. In the night of **June 25**, **Ukraine** struck the **Tavria thermal power plant in Simferopol**, a **fuel depot in Dzhankoi**, two **gas compressor stations**, two **electrical substations**, and three **coastal radar stations**. These strikes left approximately **half the peninsula without electricity** — affecting **Simferopol, Yalta, Sevastopol, and Yevpatoria**.

### The choice of words: why occupation authorities minimize

The language chosen by **Mikhail Razvozhayev** to justify the state of emergency is revealing: **"primarily to resolve questions of an economic nature."** This neutral terminology — **"economic,"** not **"crisis,"** not **"humanitarian emergency"** — is deliberate. Naming the situation too clearly would amount to admitting that Ukrainian strikes succeeded in destabilizing the daily management of the peninsula. The occupation administration prefers technocratic language that veils the extent of the problem.

But words do not change the realities they describe. A state of emergency is a state of emergency, regardless of the formulations used to announce it. It implies exceptional powers, potential restrictions, administrative mobilization outside normal procedures. These legal instruments are not deployed for ordinary **"economic questions"** — they are deployed when normal administration is no longer sufficient to manage the situation. **Razvozhayev's** attenuated vocabulary is itself a confirmation of the gravity of the crisis.

*When occupation authorities declare a state of emergency, they simultaneously admit two things: that Ukrainian strikes worked, and that their capacity to manage the crisis is insufficient within normal frameworks. It is the official acknowledgment of a fragility they have been denying for weeks.*

## Electricity cut: half of Crimea in the dark

### Crimea's energy sources: a structural dependency

Before the Russian annexation of **2014**, **Crimea** depended on **mainland Ukraine** for more than **80% of its electricity**. After the annexation, **Russia** invested massively in electrical connections from the Russian mainland via the **Kerch Bridge** and submarine cables, and developed local production capacities — including the **Tavria thermal power plant in Simferopol**. This plant, with its industrial turbines, was one of the cornerstones of the peninsula's electrical system.

The Ukrainian strike on the **Tavria plant** therefore struck at the heart of occupied **Crimea's** energy system. Simultaneously, strikes on the **two electrical substations** disrupted distribution. The result: approximately **half the peninsula** was left without electricity in the hours following the **June 25** attack. Affected cities include major urban centers — **Simferopol** (administrative capital, approximately **350,000 inhabitants**), **Yalta**, **Sevastopol**, **Yevpatoria**.

*80% electrical dependency on Ukraine before 2014. Ten years later, Russia rebuilt that infrastructure — and Ukraine is in the process of dismantling it. There is a historical logic in this sequence that is both cold and relentless.*

## The water shortage: when electricity cuts the tap

### The link between power outages and water restrictions in Yevpatoria

The power outage did not only extinguish lights in **Crimea**. It also disrupted water supply in several cities. In **Yevpatoria** — a coastal city in western **Crimea** with a population of approximately **110,000 inhabitants** — occupation authorities introduced **hourly water restrictions** after outages put **well pumps out of service** and reduced the reserves at local pumping stations. When electricity disappears, pumps stop. When pumps stop, taps run dry.

This cascade — strike on electrical infrastructure, failure of pumping systems, water shortage at taps — illustrates the interdependency of modern infrastructure systems. A strike on an electrical node can have immediate consequences for water, sanitation, heating, and communications. This is not a design accident: modern infrastructure is deliberately integrated for efficiency reasons. But this integration also creates cascading vulnerabilities that military strategists on both sides have learned to exploit.

*A population without running water for 24 hours is not in immediate mortal danger. But it is a population in crisis, an administration in difficulty, an occupation regime showing its limits in managing daily life. That is precisely what the Ukrainian strategy aims to render visible.*

## The fuel shortage: Dzhankoi and logistical consequences

### The Dzhankoi depot and its implications for military supply

Among the targets struck in the night of **June 25**, the **Dzhankoi fuel depot** deserves particular attention. **Dzhankoi** is a city in northern **Crimea**, a railway and road hub playing a key role in the peninsula's logistics. A fuel depot in **Dzhankoi** supplies both the local civilian population and, in all likelihood, Russian military units based in the region. Its destruction creates a shortage affecting both types of users.

**Crimea** has already been in a state of chronic fuel shortage since **Ukraine** intensified its strikes on the peninsula's oil terminals. In **June 2026**, queues at gas stations in **Simferopol** were reported by residents on Russian social networks. The destruction of the **Dzhankoi** depot aggravates this situation. For Russian military forces deployed in **Crimea**, a fuel shortage means restrictions on armored vehicle mobility, delays in logistical operations, and an increase in operational costs.

### The North Crimean Canal: a water dependency with precedents

**Crimea** suffers from a water vulnerability that predates the **2026** strikes. After the **2014** annexation, **Ukraine** cut the water supply from the **North Crimean Canal** — a Soviet canal that provided approximately **85% of the peninsula's fresh water**. This decision triggered a major agricultural crisis and shortages in certain regions. **Russia** responded by developing alternative water sources and building pumping infrastructure.

With the Ukrainian reconquest of **Kherson** in **November 2022**, the canal was partially reopened, but distribution infrastructure in **Crimea** was not all restored to its original capacity. Current water shortages in **Yevpatoria** therefore fit within a broader structural vulnerability — a peninsula that has always had water supply problems, aggravated by the occupation and now by the consequences of strikes on electrical pumping systems.

*When you deprive an occupation army of fuel, it can move less. When it moves less, it controls its territory less well. This logic is simple but its implications are profound. Ukraine attacks Russian mobility in Crimea — and it is working.*

## Summer camps closed: the most revealing indicator

### Artek and Crimea's camps: a showcase transformed into a symbol of crisis

The **Artek** camp is one of the most symbolically charged institutions in occupied **Crimea**. Founded in the Soviet era as a pioneer camp for young elites of the communist bloc, it was rehabilitated after the Russian annexation of **2014** as a cultural and ideological showcase of the Kremlin — a place that welcomes Russian and allied-country children in a setting mixing leisure with patriotic indoctrination. Its temporary closure since **June 21, 2026**, followed by the general suspension of all camps until early **September**, is a powerful signal.

Children who had crossed the **Kerch Bridge** to join their camps were sent home. Those who had reached **Kerch** or were en route to **Simferopol** were temporarily housed before being returned to their places of residence. This emergency logistical operation — sending back hundreds or thousands of children who had just started their summer vacation — is the type of decision that occupation regimes make when they can no longer ensure basic safety. It illustrates, better than any official statement, the true extent of the crisis.

*Artek closed is a perfect metaphor for the collapse of Russia's showcase in Crimea. The Kremlin turned this camp into a propaganda tool — and it now becomes the symbol of its inability to maintain basic security in the territories it occupies.*

## Strikes on coastal radars: the direct military dimension

### Three radar stations destroyed: partial blindness in Russian coastal defense

Among the targets struck in the **June 25** attack, the **three coastal radar stations** have a direct military significance that news about civilian shortages risks eclipsing. Coastal radars serve to detect naval and aerial approaches toward **Crimea**. Their destruction creates blind spots in the peninsula's radar coverage — areas where a Ukrainian strike could approach without being detected in time to trigger a defensive response.

This destruction fits the logic of the Ukrainian campaign against **Crimea**: progressively degrade Russian defense and detection capabilities to increase the peninsula's vulnerability to future strikes. Every destroyed radar is an additional window of vulnerability in the Russian defense system. Over time, the cumulative degradation of these systems can enable operations that the presence of these radars would have made impossible. It is a long-term **battlefield preparation** strategy, not an isolated tactical strike.

### The ZU-23-2 destroyed: short-range drone defense

Among the equipment destroyed in Ukrainian strikes on **Crimea** was a **ZU-23-2** — a short-range Soviet double-barrel anti-aircraft gun. This equipment, obsolete for conventional anti-aircraft warfare, has been rehabilitated by **Russia** as a defense system against low-altitude drones. Its lightness and capacity to fire high-rate bursts make it effective against small FPV drones flying low and fast.

The destruction of a **ZU-23-2** in **Crimea** is therefore significant in the context of the drone war. It reduces anti-drone coverage of Russian peninsula installations. Combined with the destruction of coastal radars — reducing early detection — and the **Volna Kupol Garant** jammer, the strikes of the week of **June 23–27** systematically degraded several layers of Russian defense in **Crimea**. This is not coincidence — it is planning.

*Destroying coastal radars is not glamorous. It doesn't generate big announcements. But it is one of the most strategically significant military acts possible: blinding the adversary on the ground it claims to control. Ukraine does this with remarkable regularity and precision.*

## The Tavria thermal plant: a Soviet legacy turned target

### The history of Crimea's energy infrastructure under occupation

The **Tavria thermal power plant**, located in **Simferopol**, is a Soviet-era installation, modernized and expanded after the Russian annexation of **2014** to compensate for the loss of electrical connections with **mainland Ukraine**. Its importance to occupied **Crimea's** energy system is considerable: it provides a significant share of local electricity production. Striking it is therefore one of the most effective actions **Ukraine** could take to rapidly destabilize the energy supply across the entire peninsula.

Repairing such an installation takes time — weeks in the best case, months for major structural damage. During this time, **Crimea** will depend more heavily on electrical connections from the Russian mainland — via the **Kerch Bridge** and submarine cables. These connections have themselves been disrupted by previous strikes. **Crimea** finds itself in a structurally fragile electrical supply situation, where each additional strike worsens an already difficult-to-manage situation.

*Russia invested billions to make Crimea energy self-sufficient after 2014. Ukraine is undoing that investment strike by strike. This is an economic war as much as a military one — and it is a war Ukraine is winning in this specific domain.*

## The Kerch railway bridge struck: confirmed logistical cutoff

### June 23, 2026: the bridge under bombardment once again

On **June 23, 2026**, Ukrainian forces struck a **railway bridge crossing the North Crimean Canal** in the locality of **Razdolne** — an unprecedented strike on this specific structure, which destroyed part of the railway track and caused a bridge span to collapse. The following night, drones struck the remaining sections and repair equipment. This double strike significantly disrupted the railway line connecting **Kerch** to the rest of **Crimea** — an essential route for Russian military logistical supply.

The **Kerch Bridge** itself — the main structure linking **Crimea** to the Russian mainland — has already been struck multiple times since **2022**. Its capacity to function normally has been reduced, forcing **Russia** to increase maritime supply routes and permanently repair damaged sections. The progressive degradation of the logistical network between **Russia** and **Crimea** is an integral part of the Ukrainian strategy of strangling the occupation.

### The R-280 Novorossiya highway and the reduction in military traffic

Alongside aerial strikes, **Ukraine** documented a significant reduction in military traffic on the **R-280 Novorossiya highway** — the land route connecting Russian territory to northern **Crimea**. According to analyses published by the **Kyiv Independent** in June **2026**, military cargo traffic on this route decreased by **71%** over the two weeks preceding the state of emergency. This reduction is the combined result of strikes on logistical axes, disruption of the railway network, and the fear of military convoy drivers of finding themselves on routes exposed to drones.

This reduction in logistical traffic is one of the most concrete indicators of the Ukrainian campaign's effectiveness. Fewer convoys means less ammunition, less fuel, fewer spare parts reaching Russian forces in **Crimea**. This is the strategic objective of the **"stranglehold doctrine"** applied to military logistics — not killing soldiers directly, but progressively reducing their capacity to resupply and maintain their operational presence.

*The Kerch Bridge was Putin's symbol — his bridge, his Crimea. Ukraine is methodically transforming it into a symbol of its vulnerability. Every time a span collapses, a little more Russian imperial arrogance sinks with it.*

## The civilian population under occupation: between Russian propaganda and reality

### What the civilians of Crimea are actually living

The situation of civilians in occupied **Crimea** is complex and painful to analyze honestly. There is a local population — Russian and Ukrainian — living through the power outages, fuel shortages, water restrictions, the closure of summer camps for their children. These people are not combatants. They suffer the consequences of a war they did not necessarily choose, even if some supported or tolerated the **2014** annexation.

It must also be noted that occupied **Crimea** is a territory where **Ukraine** cannot govern — and where **Russia**, as the occupying power under international law, is responsible for the well-being of the population. If this population suffers shortages, it is first because **Russia** maintains a massive military presence that makes it a legitimate target — and because **Russia** lacks the logistical capacity to simultaneously protect both its military and civilian infrastructure. This responsibility belongs to the occupier, not to those resisting the occupation.

*I am uncomfortable with images of children sent back from their summer camps. These children did not choose the war, or the occupation, or Putin. But responsibility for their situation belongs to the regime that invaded, occupied, and maintained this peninsula in a permanent state of war. This does not make the consequences less painful. It fixes the responsibilities.*

## Information under occupation: how news filters through despite censorship

### Russian social networks and unofficial testimonies

Russian occupation authorities in **Crimea** attempt to control information about the real situation — minimizing damages in their official communiqués and limiting independent reporting. But information filters through channels that censorship does not fully control. Residents of **Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yalta** post on Russian social networks — **VKontakte, Telegram** — photos of power outages, videos of gas station queues, testimonies about disruptions in their neighborhoods.

These publications are fragmentary and anecdotal — they do not constitute a complete picture of the situation. But their accumulation, read alongside official communiqués declaring a state of emergency, allows reconstruction of a coherent reality: occupied **Crimea** is in a state of growing infrastructure crisis. Independent Russian journalists in exile, including those from **Meduza** and **iStories**, compile this data and publish it despite restrictions. Their work is essential to understanding what is actually happening in the occupied territories.

### International media coverage: the state of emergency as a revealer

The declaration of a state of emergency in **Crimea** attracted international media attention in a way that individual strikes had not always managed to generate. Media like the **Kyiv Independent, Ukrinform, United24 Media** but also international agencies covered the event. The state of emergency gives Ukrainian strikes an institutional visibility they lacked when reported as isolated tactical events.

This visibility has political value for **Ukraine**. It demonstrates to its allies — who sometimes debate the usefulness of strikes on occupied infrastructure — that these strikes produce measurable effects officially recognized by the occupation administration itself. When **Russia** declares a state of emergency in **Crimea**, it unwittingly provides the best evidence of the effectiveness of the Ukrainian strategy. It is an irony that no one in **Moscow** planned for.

*The truth about Crimea seeps out drop by drop through the cracks of Russian censorship. Blurry photos on Telegram, anonymous testimonies, commercial satellite images. This isn't great journalism — it is informational survival. And it works.*

## Ukraine's strategy in Crimea: a doctrine of cumulative pressure

### The objective: make the occupation unsustainable without direct confrontation

The Ukrainian campaign against occupied **Crimea's** infrastructure obeys a clear doctrine: progressively increase the economic, logistical, and human cost of the occupation for **Russia**, without requiring a direct ground offensive that would be costly in Ukrainian lives. This doctrine is sometimes described as a **"stranglehold strategy"**: progressively sever the logistical and energy arteries of the peninsula until maintaining a Russian military presence becomes more costly than **Russia** is willing to pay.

The effectiveness of this strategy is measured by several indicators: the state of emergency declaration, the closure of summer camps, massive power outages, fuel shortages. These are signs that the pressure is partially achieving its objectives. It has not yet produced a Russian strategic change — **Crimea** remains occupied, Russian forces remain deployed. But it absorbs Russian resources, degrades the peninsula's military capabilities, and makes the experience of occupation progressively harder to live with and sustain.

*The cumulative pressure strategy is not a quick fix. It requires time, consistency, and the capacity to maintain sustained pressure without being distracted by more immediately visible gains. It is the politically hardest strategy — and probably the most effective in the long run.*

## The humanitarian implications under international law

### The rules of war and the protection of civilians in Crimea

The question of humanitarian implications of the Ukrainian campaign against **Crimean** infrastructure deserves to be asked honestly. International humanitarian law — notably the **Geneva Conventions** and their additional protocols — distinguishes between legitimate military targets and protected civilian targets. **Dual-use** infrastructure — such as power plants supplying both civilians and military installations — is subject to a **proportionality** analysis: the expected military damage must be proportionate to anticipated civilian losses.

Legal specialists in the law of armed conflict hold varying positions on this question. What is generally accepted: infrastructure directly serving Russian military operations in **Crimea** — fuel depots, radar stations, logistical hubs — is a legitimate military target. A power plant primarily supplying the civilian population raises more complex proportionality questions. **Ukraine** has a legal and moral obligation to minimize civilian losses in its strikes. Available documentation suggests it makes efforts to this end — targeting military or dual-use installations rather than pure residential areas.

*I am not a jurist and I do not definitively resolve these humanitarian law questions. What I note is the difference in method: Ukraine targets military and logistical infrastructure; Russia bombs apartments and markets. This difference in method has a moral and legal value that cannot be erased by the symmetrical argument.*

## What the state of emergency reveals about Russian management capacity

### The occupation administration facing its limits

The declaration of a state of emergency in **Crimea** also reveals the limits of the Russian occupation's administrative capabilities. Since **2014**, **Russia** has tried to build a functional administration in **Crimea** — with its own officials, its own legal structures, its own public service systems. This administration invested massively in the peninsula's infrastructure. But it had not developed robust contingency plans for a situation where this infrastructure would be systematically targeted by precision strikes.

The state of emergency is, in this context, an admission of unpreparedness. Infrastructure resilience plans — which democratic governments develop in response to natural risks and security threats — were not developed at sufficient scale for occupied **Crimea**. Backup generators are insufficient in number. Emergency stockpiles are limited. The civilian chain of command is not ready for sustained crisis management. This is not a surprise for observers following Russian management of occupied territories — but it is now visible and documented.

### Crimea's growing dependence on mainland imports

As Ukrainian strikes degrade local production capabilities in **Crimea** — thermal power plants, gas compressor stations, fuel depots — the peninsula becomes increasingly dependent on supplies from the Russian mainland. This growing dependency adds to already existing structural dependencies. The logistics of this dependency rests primarily on the **Kerch Bridge** and railway and road connections — which are themselves targets for **Ukraine**.

The vicious cycle is thus: strikes reduce local self-sufficiency, which increases dependence on mainland connections, which makes these connections more critical targets, which justifies more strikes on these connections. For Ukrainian military planners, this dynamic is favorable: every reduction in **Crimea's** autonomy makes **Russia** more vulnerable on the peninsula. The strategy is designed to feed itself — which is precisely the hallmark of a well-constructed doctrine.

*Authoritarian regimes are often impressive in the short term — in their brutality, their speed of action, their willingness to impose themselves. But they are generally mediocre over time — in governance, resilience, and the capacity to manage unforeseen crises. Crimea in 2026 illustrates this structural weakness.*

## Conclusion: the state of emergency as testimony of a working strategy

### What the week of June 23–27, 2026 reveals about the war for Crimea

The week of **June 23–27, 2026** produced a series of facts that, taken together, describe a coherent reality: occupied **Crimea** is in a state of growing infrastructure crisis. A thermal power plant destroyed. A fuel depot in flames. Electrical substations neutralized. Radar stations destroyed. A railway bridge damaged. A **$2 million** electronic warfare jammer destroyed. Half the peninsula without electricity. A state of emergency declared. Children sent back from their summer camps. Water restrictions in **Yevpatoria**.

### The peninsula between two narratives: the occupier's and the strikes'

**Russia** tells a story of **Crimea** as a reclaimed territory, reconciled with its motherland, prosperous and stable. **Ukraine** tells a story of illegally occupied territory, repressed civilian resistance, and occupation infrastructure progressively degraded. In **June 2026**, documented facts — the state of emergency, power outages, summer camps closed — give more credibility to the second story than the first. The reality of **Crimea in 2026** is not that of a successful integration. It is that of an occupation fragile under a war it cannot win locally.

*Crimea under a state of emergency is the moment when the Russian narrative of conquest begins to crack from within. Not yet collapsed — but cracked. And cracks in occupation narratives are the first signs of a different future.*

## What this crisis says about Crimea's future

### Cumulative pressure and the uncertain horizon

The state of emergency in **Crimea** does not prefigure an immediate reconquest. **Ukraine** does not have the capacity to launch a ground offensive on the peninsula under current conditions. The cumulative pressure strategy is a long-term strategy, whose decisive effects — if it succeeds — will be measured in years, not weeks. What the week of **June 23–27, 2026** demonstrates is that this strategy is progressing in accordance with its internal logic: increasing the cost of the occupation, strike by strike, until the economic and military equation changes.

*Crimea will return one day to Ukraine. I don't know when. But I know that each strike on its occupation infrastructure writes one more line in this chapter. The story of Crimea is not finished. It is, in June 2026, in the middle of its most turbulent page.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Crimea faces electricity shortages, summer camp suspensions after Ukrainian strikes — June 27, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/crimea-faces-electricity-shortages-summer-camp-suspensions-after-ukrainian-strikes/)

- [United24 Media — Russia Built a $2 Million Starlink Jammer. Ukraine Destroyed It in Crimea — June 24, 2026](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russia-built-a-2-million-starlink-jammer-ukraine-destroyed-it-in-crimea-20119)

- [Kyiv Independent — How Ukraine's drone blockade of Crimea is pressuring Russia's hold on the peninsula — June 25, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/how-ukraines-drone-blockade-of-crimea-is-pressuring-russias-hold-on-the-peninsula/)

### Secondary sources

- [Militarnyi — NATO Official: Russia's Total Casualties Reach 1.3–1.5 Million — June 23, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/nato-official-russia-casualties-war-ukraine/)

- [Kyiv Independent — General Staff: Russia has lost 1,395,790 troops in Ukraine since Feb. 24, 2022 — June 24, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/general-staff-russia-has-lost-1-395-790-troops-in-ukraine-since-feb-24-2022/)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — EU extends economic sanctions against Russia for another year — June 25, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/25/8041148/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-crimee-occupee-en-etat-d-urgence-la-crise-humanitaire-que-moscou-ne-peut