# INVESTIGATION: AI Defense Center A1 — Ukraine Places Artificial Intelligence Inside the Kill Chain

> What the A1 Center does is the military equivalent of a Silicon Valley startup: short cycles, rapid iteration, obsession with the real problem of the end user. Except the end user is a soldier in a Do

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-centre-de-defense-ia-a1-l-ukraine-place-l-intelligence-artificielle-dans

## Introduction: Tomorrow's war is being built today in a Kyiv office

### An AI defense center created in March 2026, already operational in combat

In **March 2026**, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense created something unprecedented in the history of armies at war: the **A1 AI Defense Center**. Not a theoretical research laboratory. Not an inter-ministerial working group. An operational center whose mission is to integrate **artificial intelligence directly into the kill chain** — and to do so right now, on an active front.

Its director, **Danylo Tsvok**, stated it plainly in an interview given to **Euromaidan Press** on **June 25, 2026**: "**AI can automate parts of the kill chain.**" That declaration is short, but it reshapes the rules of the game. The kill chain — the sequence running from target detection to strike and damage assessment — is the **central process** of **modern warfare**. Integrating AI into it is not a technological curiosity. It is a **military revolution** in motion.

### A direct response to the "pain points" of front-line units

The way the **A1 Center** operates is both ambitious and pragmatic. It works directly with front-line units, collects their "**concrete pain points**" — the real operational problems encountered in daily combat — and converts them into **combat-tested technological tools**. No ivory-tower development that fails on first contact with reality. Agile, iterative development, centered on the needs of the soldiers who use these tools under fire.

This "**bottom-up**" approach is a deliberate and revolutionary choice. Traditional armies develop technologies in laboratories far removed from the front, then try to impose them on operational units. The **A1 Center** inverts that process: soldiers identify problems, engineers build solutions, soldiers test them in combat, engineers refine. This rapid iteration cycle is one of the reasons why **Ukraine** has managed to become a world leader in certain military-technology niches despite its limited resources.

## Computer vision in the final seconds: the AI that guides drones where GPS cannot reach

### The problem: electronic jamming that cuts data links

One of the hardest realities of modern drone warfare is the intensive electronic warfare both sides wage. **Russian jammers** have reached a level of sophistication capable of cutting Ukrainian drone communication links — GPS, video feed, radio commands — in the critical final seconds before impact on target. It is precisely in those seconds that drones most often miss.

The **A1 Center** has developed a solution to this problem rooted in computer vision applied to **"last-mile" navigation**. Visual recognition algorithms allow a drone to continue guiding its trajectory toward the target using only its own camera feed — with no GPS, no radio link, no external connection whatsoever. The target is "**locked**" visually, and the AI completes the guidance autonomously.

### Performance maintained even under intensive electronic jamming

**Tsvok** confirmed that this last-mile guidance system "**works even under electronic warfare that cuts most data links**." That is a significant operational breakthrough. The same vision algorithms — trained on real combat data — also operate in Ukrainian intercept drones that seek to shoot down the Iranian **Shahed** drones used by **Russia**. These intercept drones "**lock on and shoot down**" incoming drones in a semi-autonomous manner.

This is not science fiction. These systems are already deployed and used in real combat on the Ukrainian front. Field data allows continuous refinement of the algorithms — creating a machine-learning cycle accelerated by real war conditions that no peacetime laboratory could reproduce. **Ukraine** is building a combat AI dataset that armies around the world are watching with intense attention.

## Armed remote turrets and ground robots: AI beyond the air

### Remote-operated armed turrets keeping soldiers out of exposed positions

The **A1 Center**'s computer vision does not apply only to aerial drones. It also equips **remote-operated armed turrets** installed in defensive positions. These turrets are controlled remotely by a human operator — **the decision to fire always remains human** — but their target acquisition, tracking, and stabilization are AI-assisted.

The operational advantage is direct: the most exposed combat positions can be defended without soldiers physically present there. Human life is preserved. The position remains defensible. And the operator, under cover, can control several turrets simultaneously. **Tsvok** confirmed that these systems "**are already operational**" and allow "**keeping soldiers out of exposed positions**."

### Ground robots in the logistics and combat chain

The **A1 Center** is also developing AI-equipped **ground robots** for various tasks — logistics under fire, reconnaissance, combat support. These robots are not autonomous lethal terminals — Ukrainian doctrine keeps the human in the final decision loop — but they are capable of operating in dangerous environments without exposing soldiers.

Ground robots for logistics are particularly important in zones of intense contact. Delivering ammunition, food, and medical supplies to forward positions is one of the most lethal operations for Ukrainian soldiers. A ground robot capable of making those deliveries in direct-fire zones potentially saves a human life with every mission.

## Drone swarms: coordination at the fleet level

### From individual drones to a coordinated unit

One of the **A1 Center**'s most advanced ambitions concerns **piloted drone swarms**. Current technology connects individual drones operating separately. The center's goal is to link multiple drones into "**a single coordinated unit**" — a swarm that can share data in real time, coordinate attack trajectories, and collectively adapt to enemy countermeasures.

This swarm technology offers a major tactical advantage: it multiplies the difficulty for enemy defenses. Shooting down one drone means engaging one target. Shooting down a coordinated swarm of **20 drones** that share data and mutually adapt in real time is a radically more complex problem. And if some swarm members serve as decoys while others reach the target, the challenge grows further still.

### Swarm pilots already being tested in combat conditions

**Tsvok** confirmed that **drone swarm pilots** are "**already being tested in combat conditions**," linking multiple drones into a single unit. These are preliminary technical trials, not yet large-scale operational deployments — but their existence on an active front places **Ukraine** at the global cutting edge of this technology.

Context matters: both sides are developing swarms. **Russia** uses waves of **Shahed** drones and decoy drones to saturate Ukrainian defenses. The difference is that **Ukraine** is developing active coordination between swarm elements — a distributed intelligence — while current Russian swarms are primarily uncoordinated waves. This technological distinction could prove decisive.

## The battlefield "digital twin": AI as operational planner

### A battlefield map that thinks and proposes options

Beyond immediate tactical applications, **Tsvok** described a broader strategic ambition: a "**digital twin**" of the front. This system would "**read the entire battlefield at once, draw conclusions, and propose options**" — in real time, to help commanders make operational decisions.

In practice, this digital twin would ingest data from hundreds of sensors — reconnaissance drones, electronic surveillance systems, ground-unit reports, satellite imagery — and synthesize it into a coherent operational picture with action recommendations. The commander would remain the final decision-maker, but AI would provide analysis that human teams would take hours to produce manually.

### Decision speed as a competitive advantage

In modern high-intensity warfare, **decision speed is a critical competitive advantage**. The army that can identify a target, plan a strike, coordinate available vectors, and execute the action in less time than the adversary wins structurally. AI can reduce this decision cycle dramatically — turning processes that take hours into processes that take minutes.

This is precisely the goal of the **A1 Center**'s second line of work: "**AI to accelerate decisions by processing battlefield data faster than the enemy**." If **Ukraine** can make tactical and operational decisions faster than **Russia** — despite the asymmetry in human and material resources — it can offset part of that gap through decision-making superiority.

## The fundamental rule: humans retain the final trigger

### An assumed doctrine of controlled autonomy

**Tsvok** insisted on a fundamental point that the international defense community is watching closely: "**Ukraine is not building fully autonomous weapons. A human retains the final decision.**" That declaration is not only ethical — it is also strategic and diplomatic. It positions the **A1 Center** on the side of nations developing "**responsible**" military AI rather than fully autonomous lethal systems.

This distinction — maintained human control versus total autonomy — is at the heart of the emerging international debate on "**lethal autonomous weapons systems**" (LAWS). Many nations and international NGOs are pushing for an international ban on LAWS. By explicitly maintaining human control, **Ukraine** protects itself against criticism that could erode its Western political support.

### The practical limits and open ethical questions

Maintaining human control in a context where operations unfold at high speed creates practical tensions. An intercept drone that must shoot down an enemy drone in milliseconds cannot wait for confirmation from a human operator — the speed of events exceeds human reaction capacity. In such cases, operational autonomy is de facto total, even if doctrine says otherwise.

These questions remain unresolved, and **Tsvok** does not pretend otherwise. **Ukraine** is navigating uncharted ethical and legal waters. It does so under the constraint of absolute military necessity — its national existence is at stake — which grants it a latitude that peacetime nations would not have. But the practices developed here will become the norms that armies around the world will strive to adopt or avoid. That responsibility is real.

## The race toward battlefield autonomy: both sides accelerating

### Russia in the same race, with different approaches

**Tsvok** acknowledged it explicitly in his interview with **Euromaidan Press**: "**Both sides are accelerating toward battlefield autonomy.**" **Russia** is developing its own military AI systems — though its approach is different, often less agile and less field-feedback-driven. Modified Iranian **Shahed** drones, Russian **Lancet** drones, anti-drone defense systems — all incorporate increasing degrees of automation.

The qualitative difference is that **Ukraine** tests its systems under real high-intensity conditions, with a rapid feedback loop between the front and developers. **Russia**, for its part, operates more through massive industrial approaches — quantity over quality, saturation over precision. These two philosophies are confronting each other in real time on the Ukrainian front, and the results are informing armies around the world.

### What NATO allies are observing and what they are learning

**NATO** member armies are watching Ukrainian technological developments with very close attention. Liaison officers, observation teams, data-sharing contracts — the lessons from the war in **Ukraine** are being systematically collected and integrated into the **Alliance**'s military doctrines. The **A1 Center** is under particularly close scrutiny.

The main lesson allies are drawing from Ukrainian experience in drone and AI warfare is this: the speed of innovation and adaptation matters more than the initial sophistication of systems. An army that can test, learn, modify, and redeploy in weeks beats an army that takes years to develop perfect but static systems. That is a doctrinal revolution as much as a technological one.

## Funding and international partnerships for the A1 Center

### Partnerships with Western tech companies

The **A1 AI Defense Center** does not operate in isolation. It benefits from partnerships with Western technology companies, university research laboratories, and allied defense organizations. These partnerships give it access to algorithms, training models, and computing infrastructure that would be impossible to develop alone in wartime.

The international tech community — particularly in the **United States**, **Estonia** (Europe's cybersecurity hub), the **United Kingdom**, and **Poland** — has developed remarkable solidarity with **Ukraine** since **2022**. Tech volunteers, open-source contributions, preferential access to cloud computing tools — this civilian mobilization in the tech domain is a dimension of Western support for **Ukraine** that is often underestimated.

### The question of sustainable funding after the war

The **A1 Center** exists within the context of a severely constrained Ukrainian war economy. Its funding depends partly on national defense budget allocations and partly on international support. The question of sustaining these resources after the end of the conflict — in the context of massive national reconstruction — is real.

But there is a strong economic argument for maintaining this center even after the war: the technologies it develops have considerable commercial and national security applications. Post-war **Ukraine** could become an exporter of cutting-edge AI defense technologies — a strategic economic position that justifies continued investment even in peacetime.

## Implications for international law and future wars

### Legal rules that do not yet exist for these technologies

The accelerated development of military AI on the Ukrainian front is unfolding in an almost complete international legal vacuum. The conventions of international humanitarian law — the **Geneva Conventions**, the **Additional Protocols** — were designed for weapons and conflicts that did not include semi-autonomous systems capable of making operational decisions at the speed of light.

International discussions on regulating lethal autonomous weapons systems have not produced a binding treaty. The **A1 Center** therefore operates in a space where the only constraints are internal military doctrines and individual ethical decisions — such as the human control that **Tsvok** defends. This self-regulation is commendable but insufficient in the long run.

### What this war will change in global military doctrines

The war in **Ukraine** will have lasting consequences for global military doctrines in the AI domain. When military historians write about this conflict in twenty years, they will likely identify the period **2024–2026** as the moment when AI definitively moved from theory to practice in high-intensity warfare. The **A1 Center** will be cited as one of the pioneer institutions of that transition.

For armies that have not had the benefit of this direct experience, the Ukrainian lesson is both a warning and an invitation: invest now in military AI development, create rapid-innovation structures capable of testing and deploying technologies in weeks rather than years, and develop ethical doctrines of use that maintain human accountability in lethal decisions.

## Concrete operational victories: what AI has already changed at the front

### Measurable results in combat operations

Beyond theoretical ambitions, **Tsvok** confirmed concrete operational results. Intercept drones equipped with computer vision have improved the interception rate of incoming **Shahed** drones in certain front sectors. Remote-operated armed turrets have made it possible to hold defensive positions that would have required continuous and exposed human presence.

These gains — still partial and localized — are significant because they prove that military AI can function in real high-intensity conditions, not just in simulations or controlled exercises. It is this validation through real-world use that gives the **A1 Center** its international credibility and attracts the attention of allied armies.

### Current limitations and the challenges of scaling

The **A1 Center**'s systems have their own limitations. Computer vision can be fooled by **visual countermeasures** — smoke screens, camouflage nets, thermal decoys. Coordinated swarms require communication links between drones that are themselves subject to jamming. The digital twin requires a continuous flow of sensor data that can be interrupted.

These limitations do not call into question the direction of innovation — they define the next challenges to be solved. That is the very nature of iterative technological development: each solution creates new problems, which generate new solutions. The **A1 Center** is in this spiral of continuous improvement, driven by the relentless pressure of an adversary that also never stops innovating.

## The broader context: Ukraine as a defense-tech nation

### An unprecedented wartime military innovation ecosystem

The **A1 Center** is not an isolated phenomenon. It is part of a Ukrainian military innovation ecosystem that has emerged since the start of the full-scale war. Dozens of Ukrainian tech companies, drone startups, volunteer developer groups — this entire ecosystem converges toward a common goal: giving **Ukraine** a technological edge that compensates for its numerical disadvantage against **Russia**.

Ukraine's FPV drone program has become one of the most prolific in the world. Ukrainian maritime drones have sunk or damaged dozens of Russian vessels in the **Black Sea**. Targeting and reconnaissance software solutions developed by Ukrainian civilian teams are used daily by the armed forces. This total technological mobilization is one of the most remarkable features of the Ukrainian resistance.

### Toward a doctrine of an AI-augmented army

The ultimate ambition of **Tsvok** and the **A1 Center** — "**a fully AI-driven army**," as he put it — is a long-term vision, not an immediate reality. The goal is not to replace soldiers with machines, but to **augment each soldier's capabilities** with AI tools that allow them to decide faster, target more precisely, and execute more effectively.

This doctrine of the augmented army is likely the dominant warfare configuration of coming decades. And **Ukraine**, by force of circumstance, is developing it with a speed and depth of practical experience that no other country could acquire without paying the terrible price it is paying. That is a reality that is at once extraordinary and profoundly tragic.

## Ukraine's international responsibility toward these technologies

### Sharing data, building norms

**Ukraine** bears a particular responsibility in the international debate on military AI precisely because it is a pioneer in this field. Its combat data, algorithms, and doctrines of use will shape de facto international standards, even without a formal treaty. That is why **Tsvok**'s transparency in his public statements matters: it contributes to an international conversation on the ethical limits of military AI.

**Ukraine** should go further and engage actively in international forums on the regulation of autonomous weapons systems — bringing its concrete field experience rather than remaining in theoretical abstraction. Its voice, that of a nation that has lived and still lives these technologies under real war conditions, is an irreplaceable contribution to that debate.

### International law must adapt — before the next war forces it to

The war in **Ukraine** has shown that the international law of war lags behind technological reality. The rules governing bombardments, civilian protections, belligerent obligations — all were designed for weapons with a clearly identifiable human operator. Military AI blurs that accountability in a fundamental way.

The international community — the **UN**, the **ICRC**, signatory states of the Geneva Conventions — must seize these questions now, while the technologies are emerging, rather than waiting for a catastrophe to force an emergency revision. The **A1 Center** and its counterparts around the world are posing questions that international lawyers can no longer defer.

## What this means for tomorrow's war — and for peace

### AI in the kill chain: toward a more precise war or one more distant from the human

Integrating AI into the kill chain raises one final fundamental question: will it make war more precise and less deadly for civilians — the official vision of "**surgical warfare**" — or will it simply make it more distant for those who wage it, erasing the psychological friction created by physical proximity to the act of killing?

**Ukraine** uses AI primarily for defensive goals and the protection of its soldiers — which is morally sound. But the same technologies, applied by less scrupulous regimes against civilian populations, could have terrifying consequences. That is the dual-use challenge of all advanced military technologies, amplified by the power and scalability of AI systems.

### Peace through technology: a genuine aspiration of the A1 Center

The vision of **Tsvok** and the **A1 Center** is ultimately oriented toward peace: using AI to "**save Ukrainian lives and make front-line work more effective**." In this context of total war, military effectiveness serves national survival and, ultimately, peace. A militarily stronger **Ukraine** is an **Ukraine** better positioned for lasting peace.

**Ukraine** did not choose this war. It did not choose to become the world pioneer in military AI technologies. It chose to survive, and to survive, it innovates at a pace that absolute necessity imposes. The **A1 Center** is the technological expression of that resistance — a resistance that deserves not only the West's military and financial support, but also its intellectual recognition.

## Conclusion: The A1 Center, proof that Ukraine is fighting to win

### A wartime innovation that will define tomorrow's warfare

The **A1 AI Defense Center**, created in **March 2026**, led by **Danylo Tsvok**, is one of the most concrete and original responses **Ukraine** has made to the war **Russia** is imposing on it. Computer-vision drone guidance under jamming, remote-operated turrets, semi-autonomous intercept drones, coordinated swarms, a battlefield digital twin — these are real operational capabilities, already combat-tested, incrementally changing the terms of the war.

What the **A1 Center** is building is not only a military response to **Russia**. It is a vision of **Ukraine** as a technologically advanced nation, capable of innovating under the most extreme pressure, and having something to offer the world beyond its own defense. That vision deserves the full support of the **West** — in resources, partnerships, and public recognition.

### Ukraine is not asking the West to fight in its place

The existence of the **A1 Center** is itself an argument against those who claim that aid to **Ukraine** is aid to a passive, dependent state. **Ukraine** innovates, fights, learns, and builds the tools of its own defense with remarkable creativity. It asks the **West** for resources — weapons, funding, technologies — but it does the work of using them to maximum effect itself. That is a partnership, not a dependency. And it is the kind of partnership that deserves to be supported without hesitation.

## Conclusion: AI at the service of Ukrainian resistance — an innovation that demands our support

### National survival tools that have become global references

In less than six months of existence, the **A1 AI Defense Center** has demonstrated that a team of talented engineers, guided by real field needs, can produce operational advances that transform the reality of combat. This is not a promise. It is a fact, confirmed by front-line unit reports and by **Tsvok**'s own public declaration.

The **West** has the unique opportunity to support this institution — financially, technologically, and diplomatically — and to ensure that the innovations developed here benefit democracies rather than authoritarian regimes. The alternative — leaving **Ukraine** alone to face the AI war that **Russia** and **China** are also developing — is not a strategically defensible option.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Ukraine wants an AI-driven army. Its new defense center is already putting AI inside the kill chain — June 25, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/25/ukraine-wants-an-ai-driven-army-its-new-defense-center-is-already-putting-ai-inside-kill-chain-steering-drones-onto-target-in-final-seconds/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Russo-Ukrainian War Day 1583: Russia bombs Ukraine's grain ports ahead of harvest — June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/russo-ukrainian-war-day-1583-russia-bombs-ukraines-grain-ports-ahead-of-harvest/)

- [United24 Media — Ukrainian drones: innovations and operations — 2026](https://united24media.com/tags/ukrainian-drones)

### Secondary sources

- Militarnyi — Ukrainian military news and defense technologies — July 2026

- [Euromaidan Press — Russian aggression: article category — July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/category/russian-aggression/)

- [Kyiv Independent — Videos and reports on Ukrainian drones and defense — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/video/)

- [Foreign Policy — Trump, weapons, Ukraine, NATO, defense technologies — June 25, 2026](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/25/trump-weapons-iran-lockheed-ukraine-nato-rutte/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-centre-de-defense-ia-a1-l-ukraine-place-l-intelligence-artificielle-dans