# INVESTIGATION: At the OSCE, the EU denounces Russia's hybrid threats — and Moscow's isolation

> On June 24, 2026, in Vienna, at the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (session N°1140), the European Union and its member states took the floor to strongly condemn the Russian escalation in Ukraine. This official statement, published on June 26, follows the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference of June 17-18, during which Russia's position had been condemned by a "large majo

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-a-l-osce-l-ue-dresse-le-bilan-des-menaces-hybrides-russes-et-l-isolement

## Introduction: Vienna, June 24 — Europe speaks with one voice against Moscow

### One forum, one platform, one collective condemnation

On **June 24, 2026**, in **Vienna**, at the **OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation** (session N°**1140**), the European Union and its member states took the floor to strongly condemn the Russian escalation in **Ukraine**. This official statement, published on **June 26**, follows the **OSCE Annual Security Review Conference** of **June 17-18**, during which Russia's position had been condemned by a "large majority" of participating states.

These institutional moments can seem abstract, far from the bombs and trenches. They are not. The **OSCE** — Organization for Security and Co-operation in **Europe** — is the only pan-European organization that includes both **NATO** member countries, neutral states, and **Russia** itself. When a "large majority" of its members condemns **Russia** within this organization and describes it as "the greatest threat to security in the OSCE area," that is a diplomatic signal of considerable significance.

### Ukraine at the center of all European concerns

The European declaration at the **OSCE Forum** arrives in a context of strong Russian military pressure on **Ukraine**. In **May 2026**, the latest **United Nations** report on civilian casualties in **Ukraine** recorded **274 civilians killed** and **1,763 wounded** in a single month — with long-range weapons (missiles and drones) as the primary cause of civilian mortality. This context of daily violence gives full force to the condemnations issued in **Vienna**.

The **EU** did not confine itself to general diplomatic formulas. Its statement listed with precision the facts being condemned: mass missile and drone strikes against civilians, attacks on the **Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra** (a site on the **UNESCO World Heritage List**), threats against European diplomatic missions in **Ukraine**, repeated violations of **EU** member state territory, and military support from **North Korea**, **Iran**, and **Belarus** for Russia's war machine.

*There is a form of intellectual discipline in the EU's official statements at the OSCE that I respect. Naming facts precisely — the UNESCO strikes, the threats against diplomats, the deployment of North Koreans — is refusing the vague rhetoric that allows Russia to deny. Every named fact is a brick in the case for international accountability.*

## Russia's hybrid threats: a documented strategy

### The EU's definition of hybrid threats

The concept of "hybrid threats" is central to the European declaration at the **OSCE**. By this expression, the **EU** designates a combination of destabilization methods that blend conventional military actions, cyberattacks, disinformation, infrastructure sabotage, instrumentalization of migration, and influence operations targeting the democratic processes of targeted states. This Russian doctrinal approach, sometimes called "non-linear warfare" by its theorists, aims to weaken adversaries while staying below the threshold that would trigger a direct military response.

The **EU** has documented numerous incidents fitting this hybrid strategy since **2022**: sabotage of railway and port infrastructure in member states, suspicious fires in logistics depots linked to aid for **Ukraine**, coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting European public opinion, pressure on Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states. Condemning these practices at the **OSCE** aims to document them within a recognized multilateral framework.

### Russia's "aggressive, irresponsible, and reckless" behavior

The wording of the European declaration is intentionally strong: the **EU** condemns **Russia**'s "increasingly aggressive, irresponsible and reckless" behavior toward **EU** member states. This diplomatic language, normally measured, reflects growing frustration in the face of provocations that keep intensifying — flights by Russian aircraft over Baltic airspace, maritime incidents in the **Baltic Sea**, intimidation attempts against diplomatic personnel.

The reference to "repeated violations of **EU** member state territory" is a grave formulation. It points to documented incidents in **Poland**, **Estonia**, and other border countries — missile or drone debris landing on their territory, potentially following Russian strikes against **Ukraine**. These incidents directly raise the question of the application of **Article 5** of the North Atlantic Treaty.

*The difficulty with hybrid threats is that they are precisely designed to avoid the thresholds for conventional military response. How do you respond to a suspicious fire in a logistics warehouse? To a drone that drifts over allied territory? NATO and the EU are still searching for appropriate response doctrines to aggressions designed never to cross the red line. Meanwhile, Moscow keeps testing its limits.*

## Russia's isolation at the OSCE: a measurable reality

### An isolation confirmed at the Annual Security Review Conference

The **OSCE Annual Security Review Conference**, held on **June 17-18, 2026** in **Vienna**, provided a precise barometer of Russia's level of isolation within this organization. According to the European declaration of **June 24**, "last week also showed how the Russian Federation continues to be isolated in its position," with participating states having "overwhelmingly condemned its war of aggression against Ukraine" and largely considered this war "the greatest threat to security in the OSCE area."

This is an important diplomatic indicator. The **OSCE** includes states that are neither in the **EU** nor in **NATO** — Central Asian countries, Caucasus nations, Balkans states, countries that maintain significant economic relations with **Russia**. When even these states join in the condemnation, it means that Russian isolation extends beyond the Western perimeter alone.

### The OSCE architecture facing Russian paralysis

The **OSCE** operates on consensus — meaning that **Russia**, as a member, can theoretically block any formal decision. In practice, **Russia** has used this veto numerous times to prevent the adoption of resolutions condemning its actions. This institutional paralysis has led to a debate within the **OSCE** on reforming its decision-making mechanisms, or on the possibility of acting outside formal consensus.

The **EU**'s declaration at the **June 24 Forum** is itself a partial workaround of this paralysis: rather than a formal resolution that **Russia** would block, it is a collective statement of the **EU** member states, recorded in the **Forum**'s minutes, and publicly documenting each party's positions. **Russia** can block votes — it cannot prevent public statements.

*The OSCE is an organization designed for cooperation between states that share at minimum a minimum of common values. With a Russia waging a war of aggression against another member state, the organization is fundamentally broken. But keeping Russia in the organization has a utility: it creates a space where its positions can be confronted directly and publicly with those of the majority.*

## Strikes on UNESCO sites: a symbol of Russian barbarism

### The attack on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra

The specific mention in the European declaration of "strikes against the UNESCO World Heritage Site of the **Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra**" (in Ukrainian: **Kyivo-Pecherskaya Lavra**) deserves particular attention. The **Lavra** is one of the oldest and most venerated monasteries in **Slavic Orthodoxy** — founded in the **11th century**, it is listed as a **UNESCO World Heritage Site** and carries fundamental cultural and religious importance not only for **Ukraine**, but for the entire Christian Orthodox world.

Striking this place — whether deliberately or negligently — constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law, which specifically protects cultural and religious sites. The **1954 Hague Convention** for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its additional protocols are explicit on this point. **Ukraine** has asked **UNESCO** to document and condemn these strikes.

### Russia's strategy of cultural erasure

Strikes on Ukrainian cultural sites fit within a broader strategy of **erasing Ukrainian national identity** — a strategy that historians and jurists are beginning to qualify as **culturicide**. By destroying Ukrainian monuments, archives, religious sites, and cultural institutions, **Russia** seeks to erase the traces of a distinct Ukrainian civilization — thereby denying the very existence of the Ukrainian people as a separate historical and cultural entity.

This strategy is documented by **UNESCO**, by heritage preservation organizations, and by specialized jurists. It adds to conventional war crimes — killings of civilians, deportations, torture — as an additional dimension of a crime of aggression of a scope and brutality without equivalent in **Europe** since **1945**.

*I am not particularly religious. But it seems to me that striking an 11th-century monastery, heritage of all humanity, goes beyond simple military strategy. It is an act of civilizational vandalism. And the fact that Putin, who presents himself as the defender of Orthodox Christian civilization, orders strikes on its own monuments says more about the nature of his regime than any speech.*

## Threats against European diplomatic missions

### An unprecedented provocation in international law

The **EU**'s condemnation of "threats against European diplomatic presence in **Ukraine**" refers to serious incidents documented in **2025** and **2026**. Russian missiles struck in the immediate vicinity of diplomatic buildings in **Kyiv**. Direct threats against **EU** country embassies were conveyed through official or semi-official channels. These acts constitute direct violations of the **Vienna Convention** on Diplomatic Relations, which protects diplomatic premises and personnel with the greatest firmness.

The inviolability of diplomatic missions is one of the most fundamental principles of international law. It ensures that even states in a state of war can maintain communication channels and on-site observers. **Russia**, by threatening diplomatic missions in **Ukraine**, seeks to terrorize states maintaining their diplomatic presence in **Kyiv** despite the war — and thus to further isolate **Ukraine** from its international partners.

### Diplomatic resilience as an act of resistance

Despite these threats, the vast majority of **EU** member state embassies have remained open in **Kyiv** since **2022** — some after a brief initial closure in **February 2022**. This continuous diplomatic presence is an act of political and symbolic resistance of the first order: it means that the international community refuses to regard the Ukrainian government as besieged or illegitimate, and continues to treat **Ukraine** as a sovereign and respected interlocutor.

The **EU** declaration at the **OSCE**, in explicitly defending its diplomatic presence in **Ukraine**, sends a clear signal: Russian threats will not work. **Europe** will not close its embassies in **Kyiv** under the pressure of missiles or diplomatic threats.

*Keeping an embassy open in Kyiv in 2026 is an act of institutional courage that the diplomats who do it do not always receive the recognition they deserve. They are not soldiers on the front line — but they are there, under air raid sirens, maintaining the link between Ukraine and the world. That counts.*

## North Korea, Iran, and Belarus: Russia's support network

### Allies of isolation in service of the war

The explicit condemnation by the **EU** of the military support provided to **Russia** by **North Korea**, **Iran**, and **Belarus** is an important political statement. It acknowledges that Russia's war against **Ukraine** is no longer a bilateral war — it is a confrontation between the **West** and an authoritarian axis that includes **Moscow**, **Pyongyang**, **Tehran**, and **Minsk**.

**North Korea** has supplied artillery ammunition in massive quantities and sent troops to fight alongside the Russians. **Iran** has supplied **Shahed** drones that daily terrorize Ukrainian cities. **Belarus** under **Lukashenko** serves as a rear logistics base and has been building military infrastructure at the Ukrainian border. These supports extend Russia's war-making capacity and are therefore legitimate targets of sanctions and Western diplomatic pressure.

### Implications for Western deterrence strategy

The formation of this authoritarian axis poses considerable challenges to Western deterrence strategy. How do you deter **Russia** when its allies compensate for losses in equipment and ammunition? How do you economically isolate a country that markets its oil through a global network of non-Western partners? The **West** has responded by broadening its sanctions to third-party entities that facilitate circumvention — notably Chinese, Emirati, and Turkish companies.

But this response has structural limits: the **West** cannot sanction all of global trade, and countries like **China** and **India** refuse to accept a sanctions regime they view as an expression of Western economic dominance. The war in **Ukraine** has thus become the revealing lens of a global fracture between liberal democracies and a broader set of powers that refuse their leadership.

*The list of Putin's allies — North Korea, Iran, Belarus, with China in quiet economic support — sketches the map of a world where autocracies close ranks against democracies. This is a geopolitical reality the West has not yet fully integrated into its strategy. Ukraine's victory is not only a victory for Ukrainians — it is a victory for the thesis that democracies can hold their ground against autocracies.*

## Criminal accountability: a reaffirmed commitment

### The ICC and international justice mechanisms

One of the most important points of the European declaration at the **OSCE** is the reaffirmation of the **EU**'s commitment to "full accountability for war crimes and other most serious crimes committed in the context of **Russia**'s war of aggression against **Ukraine**." This formulation encompasses both the crimes prosecuted by the **ICC** — war crimes, crimes against humanity — and the crime of aggression itself, for which a special tribunal is being created.

The **EU** has actively supported the **ICC**'s work in **Ukraine** since **2022**: funding investigative teams, sharing evidence gathered by its members' intelligence services, training Ukrainian lawyers in international judicial documentation standards. Thousands of pieces of evidence documenting Russian war crimes have been collected and archived.

### The special tribunal for the crime of aggression

Alongside the **ICC**, Ukraine's allied nations have been working since **2022** toward creating a special tribunal charged with judging the crime of aggression against **Ukraine**. This crime — deliberately launching an illegal war against another state — falls outside the direct jurisdiction of the **ICC**, whose competence for the crime of aggression is limited to states parties. The special tribunal would aim to fill this legal gap.

The creation of this tribunal is the subject of complex international negotiations. Questions of jurisdiction, funding, composition, and location remain to be resolved. But the political commitment of many states — including all **EU** members — is clearly expressed. This tribunal is one of the most structurally significant dimensions of the post-war international legal framework the **West** is seeking to build.

*I believe that international justice, even imperfect and slow, is necessary. Not because it prevents wars in the short term — it does not have that capacity — but because it creates a historical accountability that changes long-term calculations. Leaders who know they may one day be judged may modify their behaviors. Perhaps.*

## EU enlargement: a structural response to Russian threats

### Opening the first cluster of negotiations with Ukraine

The **European Council** of **June 18-19, 2026** brought concrete news of considerable strategic importance: the **EU** "warmly welcomed" the opening of the **first cluster of accession negotiations** with **Ukraine** and **Moldova**. This is the first time all **27 member states** have adopted common conclusions on **Ukraine** since **March 2025** — a unity restored that is itself a powerful political message.

Ukraine's accession to the **European Union** is both a long-term prospect and an immediate strategic response to Russian ambitions. By integrating **Ukraine** into European institutions, the **EU** definitively removes it from the sphere of influence that **Russia** claims. This is precisely why this accession is so fiercely opposed by **Moscow**.

### The momentum on enlargement: a strategic signal at continental scale

Beyond **Ukraine** and **Moldova**, the **June 2026 European Council** registered "a sense of new momentum on enlargement, also for the Western Balkans countries." This general movement toward enlargement is an indirect response to Russia's destabilization strategy: by integrating countries on Europe's periphery into the **EU**, **Europe** reduces the zones of instability that **Moscow** seeks to exploit.

This is a long-term strategy, taking years to produce its effects. But it is also the most durable response to the structural insecurity of **Eastern Europe**: not only defending borders by military means, but integrating vulnerable countries into political, economic, and institutional structures that make their destabilization far more difficult.

*EU enlargement is the most effective foreign policy Europe has ever invented. Every country that has gone through it has seen its level of democracy, prosperity, and security increase. Offering it to Ukraine is offering Ukrainians a future perspective that justifies all the sacrifices they are making today.*

## Mass strikes on civilians: the documented reality

### 274 civilians killed in a single month — the UN report

The citation in the European declaration of the latest UN report records **274 civilians killed** and **1,763 wounded** in **Ukraine** for the month of **May 2026** alone. These figures, collected by the **UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine** (**HRMMU**), represent confirmed civilian casualties — the reality is probably higher, as not all victims are documented in active conflict zones.

Identifying long-range weapons — missiles and drones — as the primary cause of these casualties is a direct confirmation of Russia's aerial terror strategy. Unlike ground combat that can be militarily justified even when it causes civilian losses, missile and drone strikes on cities behind the front are deliberate acts against civilian populations. These are documented war crimes.

### Russia's strategy of civilian exhaustion

Russia's aerial terror campaign against Ukrainian cities follows a clear strategic logic: break civilian morale, destroy energy infrastructure to make daily life unbearable, force massive population displacements that destabilize rear cities, and compel the government to devote an increasing share of its resources to civil defense at the expense of the military effort.

This strategy is failing in **Ukraine** — the morale of the Ukrainian population is remarkably resilient, as regularly attested by surveys by the **Kyiv International Institute of Sociology**. But it fails at the cost of considerable human suffering, and it creates permanent pressure on the Ukrainian government, armed forces, and civil society that has lasted more than four years.

*These figures — 274 civilian deaths in May 2026 — risk seeming abstract. But these are 274 ordinary people: elderly, children, parents. Every month, for more than four years. The world has grown accustomed to these numbers, and this is precisely what Putin is counting on: that the normalization of Ukrainian civilian deaths erodes Western willingness to maintain support.*

## The 21st sanctions package: toward a reinforced sanctions wall

### The June European Council: a hardening of the European position

At the **European Council** of **June 18-19, 2026**, EU heads of state and government adopted a symbolically important decision: renewing economic sanctions against **Russia** for **12 months** instead of the previous **6 months**. This apparently technical modification is in reality a strong political signal: **Europe** is committing for the long term, not seeking a quick exit from sanctions, and signaling to **Moscow** that the restrictive measures will not disappear at the first sign of superficial de-escalation.

This annual renewal had been sought by several countries on the **EU**'s eastern flank — **Poland**, the **Baltic states**, **Finland** — who wanted to show that the European position would no longer depend on the threat of a veto from countries like **Hungary**, which can theoretically block a six-monthly renewal but finds itself more politically isolated if it blocks an annual renewal voted unanimously.

### The coherence of sanctions as a credibility factor

The credibility of a sanctions policy rests on its consistency over time. If actors seeking to circumvent sanctions think they might be lifted in six months, they take calculated risks. If sanctions are renewed for a year and strong political signals indicate they could last even longer, the calculation changes. The **June 2026 European Council** decision aims precisely to anchor this credibility over time.

It is in this context that the **EU**'s declaration at the **OSCE** on **June 24** gains its full coherence: it is inscribed in a moment of collective reinforcement of the European position — more sanctions, for longer, with more precise and more thoroughly documented condemnations. This is the portrait of a **Europe** that has chosen to hold, even if the effort is long and costly.

*Shifting from six-monthly to annual renewal of sanctions may seem like a technical detail. It is not. It is a signal that Europe is no longer looking for a quick exit strategy. That the end of sanctions is not conditioned on a simple ceasefire but on a just peace that respects Ukrainian sovereignty. This is exactly the message that needs to be sent to Moscow.*

## Ukraine's resilience against hybrid threats

### A society that has adapted to every form of aggression

**Ukraine** is today probably the society most resilient to hybrid threats in the entire world. Since **2014** — and at a dramatically accelerated pace since **2022** — it has developed responses to every dimension of Russia's hybrid strategy: early detection of cyberattacks, resistance to disinformation, maintaining critical infrastructure under bombs, continuation of democratic processes in wartime. These experiences are of inestimable value for allies.

Countries like **Estonia**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, and **Poland** have developed close cooperation with **Ukraine** on these questions for years. These countries, who know the Russian threat intimately, have been among the most active in transferring resources, expertise, and equipment to **Ukraine** since **2022**. This is not altruism — it is intelligent collective security.

### The Ukrainian model as a reference for democratic defense

Ukraine's experience facing Russian hybrid threats should inspire a thorough revision of Western democracies' defense doctrines. Not only at the military level — air defense, cyber defense — but also at the societal level: how does a democracy maintain its citizens' trust, the functionality of its institutions, and the cohesion of its social fabric under a prolonged hybrid aggression?

**Ukraine** has answers to these questions — answers acquired at the cost of blood and suffering. The **West** would be gravely irresponsible not to take hold of them. The **EU**'s declaration at the **OSCE** of **June 24, 2026** is not only a diplomatic document — it is also a collective profession of faith on the necessity of maintaining this collective resistance, whatever the cost.

*I am struck, in every European diplomatic document on Ukraine, by the same tension: on one side, strong and documented condemnations; on the other, a caution that always avoids crossing certain lines — explicitly naming Ukrainian victory as a strategic objective, for example. This strategic ambiguity seems to me increasingly untenable facing a Russia that practices no ambiguity whatsoever in its objectives.*

## Long-term implications for European security architecture

### A structural turning point in continental security relations

The developments described in this article fit within a broader transformation of European security architecture. The **European Union**, long perceived as an essentially normative and economic power, is acquiring a real and substantial military dimension. The instruments created since 2022 — SAFE, APF, reinforced PESCO, bilateral industrial cooperation — constitute together an **institutional foundation** for a European defense that did not exist five years ago.

This structural change is irreversible to the extent that it responds to real, documented, and growing security needs. As long as **Putin**'s Russia maintains an aggressive posture and the democracies of Europe's eastern periphery are threatened, the movement toward a **more robust European defense** will continue. Debates over national sovereignty, cost-sharing, and national priorities will remain — but they will not reverse the underlying trend. Collective security requires collective structures. And Europe is building them.

### What this evolution means for Ukraine

For **Ukraine**, these developments are directly linked to its immediate security and long-term future. In the short term, every billion invested in European defense, every military capability developed, every contract signed with Ukrainian producers strengthens its capacity to resist. In the longer term, a **solid European defense** is the best guarantee that Western support for Ukraine will not evaporate with the next change of government in the United States or elsewhere.

Ukraine is not only a beneficiary of these developments — it is also an **essential driver** of them. Its combat experience, its growing industries, its technological innovations in drones and electronic warfare systems directly feed the investment choices and operational doctrines of allies. **Europe learns from Ukraine** as much as it brings to Ukraine. And this mutual learning partnership is one of the most durable legacies this war will leave to the continent's collective security.

*What strikes me in this EU-OSCE dynamic is the gap between the quality of diagnosis and the slowness of response. The statements name Russia's crimes precisely. The sanctions are tightened. The accession door has opened. And yet Ukraine still waits for more ammunition, more air defense systems, more long-range strike authorization. The institutional courage of Europe's words has not yet fully matched the military courage it demands of Ukrainians.*

## The international response and the support of the Atlantic community

### Allies facing the evolution of the situation

**Western partners** of Ukraine have followed the latest developments closely. European chancelleries, NATO general staffs, and allied intelligence services have integrated this information into their analyses and planning. The decisions described in this article are not made in a strategic vacuum — they fit within a **permanent dialogue** between Kyiv and its partners, a technical, political, and military dialogue conducted through dozens of formal and informal channels.

This dialogue has produced concrete results visible in arms deliveries, soldier training, intelligence sharing, and coordinated diplomatic decisions. The **institutional framework** of this support — NATO, EU, bilateral coalitions — has grown considerably since 2022 and today functions with an effectiveness no one would have predicted at the start of the conflict. Ukraine is no longer alone. And this reality fundamentally changes the strategic equation facing Russia.

### Future commitments: sustainability and depth

The sustainability of Western support is a legitimate question Ukraine raises regularly. **Political changes** in allied democracies — elections, changes of government, public budget pressures — can cause fluctuations in commitment levels. This is why Ukraine seeks to **institutionalize support** in bilateral treaties, multi-year industrial contracts, and financing mechanisms with long-term commitments that transcend electoral cycles.

*The investment in Ukraine's defense industry, the Gripen pilot training, the 45-year SAFE financing guarantees — all these decisions aim at exactly this objective: creating irreversible commitments that can only be undone by a deliberately costly political decision. This is conscious institutional strategy. And it reflects the maturity that Ukrainian decision-makers and their partners have acquired since the start of the conflict.*

The investment in Ukraine's defense industry, the training of pilots on Gripen aircraft, the 45-year SAFE financing guarantees — all these decisions aim at exactly this objective: creating **irreversible commitments** that can only be undone by a deliberately costly political decision. This is conscious institutional strategy. And it reflects the maturity that Ukrainian decision-makers and their partners have acquired since the beginning of the conflict.

## The regional geopolitical context and its ramifications

### Regional instability with multiple dimensions

The Ukrainian conflict cannot be understood in isolation. It is part of a broader **regional geopolitical context** that includes tensions between Russia and its immediate neighbors, the internal dynamics of Atlantic democracies, and the calculations of emerging powers seeking to profit from Western instability. **China**, Iran, North Korea — all these actors are watching closely what happens in Ukraine and drawing lessons for their own strategies toward the West.

Ukrainian resistance is therefore not only important for Ukraine or for Europe. It is a global signal addressed to all those who might consider challenging the rules-based international order. If Russia obtains durable gains in Ukraine through aggression, it sends a devastating message: violating international law is profitable. If Ukraine resists successfully, the message is the opposite: **democracies defend their values**, and aggressors pay the price.

*China, North Korea, Iran — all watching the Ukrainian laboratory to determine whether democracies have the endurance to defend their values over time. The answer the West provides in Ukraine will resonate far beyond Eastern Europe. This is the most important geopolitical test of the 21st century, and it is being played out bridge by bridge, sanction by sanction, vote by vote.*

### Sanctions as a tool of systemic pressure

The **economic sanctions** maintained by the European Union and its partners against Russia remain one of the most important pressure instruments available. They do not end the war in the short term, but they constrain the resources available to finance Russia's war effort, they raise the economic costs of aggression for the Russian population, and they maintain international pressure on Moscow. The renewal of sanctions for **12 additional months** until July 2027 testifies to allies' determination to maintain this pressure over time.

The effectiveness of sanctions is debated — Russia has partially adapted its economy to this reality. But adaptation has a cost. **Import substitution**, the turn toward less reliable and less technologically advanced partners, the reorientation of energy exports toward less lucrative markets — all of this represents a real deterioration of Russia's economic position. This deterioration will not trigger the collapse of Putin's regime in the short term. It contributes nonetheless, over time, to the **strategic exhaustion** of Russia's war machine.

## Conclusion: The OSCE as a mirror of the world and its choices

### The European Union chose its side — without ambiguity

The **EU** declaration at the **OSCE** of **June 24, 2026** is a document of political clarity: **Europe** condemns **Russia** without ambiguity, names its crimes precisely, supports **Ukraine** without reservation, and stakes its credibility in the construction of a framework of international accountability. This is a position that would have seemed unimaginable ten years ago, when European diplomacy sought to accommodate **Moscow** at any cost.

The war in **Ukraine** has achieved what years of diplomacy had failed to do: clarify Europe's fundamental values and interests. It has forced a unity that, while fragile at the margins, is real at its core. And it has demonstrated that democracies can choose to defend their values when sufficiently compelled to do so — even if the price is high.

### The long road to a just peace

Russia's growing isolation at the **OSCE**, sanctions renewed for a year, sustained support for **Ukraine**'s **EU** membership, and renewed commitment to criminal accountability constitute together a message to **Moscow**: no return to normalcy is possible without a just peace. No reintegration into international institutions, no lifting of sanctions, no economic normalization — until **Ukraine** has recovered its sovereignty and war crimes have been judged.

This message is more credible today than two years ago, precisely because **Europe** has demonstrated its capacity to sustain pressure despite economic and political costs. But it is not sufficient. Diplomatic and economic pressure must be accompanied by continued military support for **Ukraine** — because **Putin** ultimately understands only the balance of force.

*This war has no easy or quick ending. It will end when one of the parties has exhausted its will to fight or its capacity to do so. For Ukraine, the will is intact. Capacity depends on Western support. For Russia, Putin's will is strong, but industrial and economic capacity slowly erodes under the combination of sanctions, Ukrainian strikes, and the human cost of war. Continuing to document, analyze, and understand this evolution — that is also, in its own way, contributing to the victory of truth.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [EEAS — EU Statement on Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, OSCE Forum N°1140 Vienna — June 26, 2026](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/eu-statement-russia%E2%80%99s-war-aggression-against-ukraine_en)

- [European Parliament / EPRS — Outcome of the European Council meeting, 18-19 June 2026 — June 25, 2026](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2026)788145)

- [French Ministry of Foreign Affairs — European leaders commit to Euro-Atlantic security and the transatlantic bond — June 26, 2026](https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/european-leaders-commit-euro-atlantic-security-and-transatlantic-bond)

### Secondary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Kallas calls the Lavra attack a war crime and announces new EU sanctions — June 15, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/15/kallas-calls-the-lavra-attack-a-war-crime-and-announces-new-eu-sanctions/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Trade, banks, energy, crypto — the EU keeps its full Russia economic sanctions wall standing to 2027 — June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/trade-banks-energy-crypto-the-eu-keeps-its-full-russia-economic-sanctions-wall-standing-to-2027/)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Russia planning new provocations against NATO, intelligence warns — June 26, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-planning-new-provocations-against-1782480814.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-a-l-osce-l-ue-dresse-le-bilan-des-menaces-hybrides-russes-et-l-isolement