# INVESTIGATION: 88 F-35s OR SWEDISH GRIPENS? THE FIGHTER FILE PARALYZING OTTAWA

> In January 2023, Canada signed a contract worth 19 billion Canadian dollars with Lockheed Martin for the acquisition of 88 F-35A Lightning II fighters, intended to replace the aging fleet of CF-18 Hornets. An agreement that put an end to years of political dithering and seemed to

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-06-24
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-88-f-35-ou-des-gripen-suedois-le-dossier-chasseur-qui-paralyse-ottawa

## Introduction: The contract of the century trapped in political limbo

### A $19-billion contract in limbo since March 2025

In **January 2023**, **Canada** signed a contract worth **19 billion Canadian dollars** with **Lockheed Martin** for the acquisition of **88 F-35**A Lightning II fighters, intended to replace the aging fleet of **CF-18** Hornets. An agreement that put an end to years of political dithering and seemed to finally settle the question of renewing Canada's fighter fleet. First delivery scheduled for **2026**. Full operational capability by the early 2030s. Everything seemed settled.

Then came spring **2025**. Newly elected as prime minister, **Mark Carney** ordered a formal review of the **F-35** program — not because the aircraft had underperformed, but because the **Canada**-**United States** relationship had deteriorated sharply under the **Trump** administration, and **Ottawa** no longer wanted to depend so heavily on an American supplier for its air force's most critical weapons system. In **April 2026**, before the Senate defence committee, Minister **David McGuinty** confirmed the review was ongoing with no conclusion timeline. In **June 2026**, the **Straits Times** reported that Carney had launched the review "**shortly after taking office**." More than a year later, the file is still open. And in the meantime, Canada keeps paying for F-35 components it may not yet have decided to fully deploy.

### 16 F-35s confirmed, 72 in limbo

Here is the current state of the file, as documented by multiple sources in **2026**: **Canada** has **financially committed to the first 16 F-35**s and has begun making payments for long-lead components on **14 additional F-35s** — for a total of **30 aircraft** on which **Ottawa** has real financial commitments. The **remaining 58 F-35s** (or 72, depending on various estimates of the review's final scope) remain in limbo. The review has been underway since March 2025. It has no known end date. And in the meantime, the **CF-18** fleet ages, F-35 delivery timelines lengthen, and **Saab** makes an aggressive, if improbable, pitch to Ottawa with its **Gripen** E fighter.

*A $19-billion contract under review for more than a year, with no conclusion date. In the private sector, an executive managing a major acquisition this slowly would be summoned before the board. In Canadian defence policy, it's the norm. I say this not with cynicism — I say it because while Ottawa deliberates, the CF-18s age and the threat evolves. The cost of lost time doesn't appear in budget ledgers. It appears in the fleet's operational readiness.*

## The F-35: what the evaluation numbers say

### 95% vs 33% — a technical gap that cannot be ignored

In **November 2025**, Radio-**Canada** obtained classified data from the evaluation of the **Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP)** conducted by the Defence Department in 2021. The results were devastating for the **Gripen**: the **F-35**A scored **57.1 points out of 60 possible (95%)** across all evaluation categories. The **Gripen E** scored **19.8 points out of 60 (33%)**. The gap was particularly brutal in the mission performance and upgrade potential categories — two metrics directly linked to pilot survival and long-term platform relevance.

The **20 nations** that have chosen the **F-35** worldwide were not wrong. It is the only **5th-generation fighter** — with stealth, sensor fusion, advanced **electronic warfare** systems — in production in the Western world. The **Gripen** E is a solid **4th-generation-plus** aircraft, modern and capable for its segment. But in a sophisticated air-threat environment — advanced surface-to-air **missiles**, 5th-generation Russian Su-57 or Chinese J-20 **fighters** — the difference between a stealth platform and a non-stealth platform can be the difference between a successful mission and a downed pilot. These data don't disappear because **Ottawa** has commercial tensions with **Washington**.

### What the evaluation didn't measure

However, the 2021 evaluation had blind spots. It compared both aircraft on raw military capability — which is what it was designed to do. It did not adequately weight political and economic factors that became central in 2025: dependence on **United States**-controlled software updates for the **F-35**, the impact on mission-data sovereignty, comparative industrial spinoffs, the ability to operate independently should the **Washington**-**Ottawa** relationship deteriorate. These factors are not in the scoring rubric — but they are at the heart of the review **Carney** ordered. That is where the technical evaluation and political reality diverge, and that is the gap in which the file has been stuck since March 2025.

The **F-35** requires, for each sortie, software updates and authorizations that flow through **Lockheed Martin** and the **US Department of Defense**. If one day **Ottawa** decided to send its F-35s on a mission **Washington** disapproved of — which may seem unlikely but is not impossible in a **Trump** world — that software dependency becomes a real operational constraint. **Saab**, which offers access to the **source code of the Gripen's mission systems** — allowing **Canada** to integrate its own sensors and weapons without US approval — has a **sovereignty** argument that carries weight in the context of 2026.

*57.1 against 19.8 out of 60 points. F-35 against Gripen in the 2021 Canadian evaluation. These numbers are real. And yet Ottawa is seriously considering buying Gripens. That's not madness — it's politics. But it's a politics that carries an operational cost that Canadian fighter pilots will pay in any conflict against a top-tier adversary. That cost must be named honestly in the public debate. And it isn't.*

## The Saab offer: 72 Gripens, a data centre in Montreal, 12,000 jobs

### The Swedish proposal in detail

**Saab** has proposed to **Canada** a substantial package to replace the **72 remaining F-35**s: **72 Gripen** EF fighters, six **GlobalEye** surveillance aircraft (based on the **Bombardier** Global 6000 business jet), a **sovereign data centre in Montreal** to keep mission data on Canadian territory, and a potential assembly line in Canada with a commitment to **more than 12,000 Canadian jobs**. Saab CEO Micael Johansson stated in **March 2026** that the first Gripens could be delivered to Canada within **5 years**, potentially as quickly as **3 years** under optimal production arrangements.

For a **Canada** eager to reduce its dependence on the **United States**, to create high-quality defence jobs, and to ensure the **sovereignty** of its mission data — this package is highly attractive. It responds precisely to **Carney**'s anxieties about American dependence. And it offers a solution that, according to its proponents, "doesn't need to be the best military platform to be the best choice for Canada" — a defence-policy argument that makes sense in certain doctrines, but which is contestable in an environment of sophisticated threats.

### What an EKOS poll says about Canadians' preferences

An **EKOS** poll published during the debate showed that a **plurality of Canadians** favoured acquiring the **Gripen** over the **F-35**, with nearly half of respondents supporting the **Swedish fighter**. This result reveals something important about public perception of the file: for many Canadians, this debate is not about comparative military capability. It is about national independence from the **United States**. And in that light, the Gripen — a Swedish plane, non-American, with sovereign data — wins hands down.

This political dynamic creates pressure on **Carney** that goes beyond techno-military rationality. He must deliver a decision that is defensible to Canadian public opinion, to the **Canadian Armed Forces** and their operational needs, to **NATO** and **NORAD**, and financially viable over a 50-year lifecycle. These four imperatives do not point to the same aircraft. That is why the file has been in limbo since March 2025.

*Nearly half of Canadians prefer the Gripen. Not because they evaluated its combat capabilities. Because they want less dependence on the United States. That's a legitimate and understandable political impulse. But it's a dangerous reason to choose a combat fighter. Fighter jets are not national symbols — they are weapons systems. And when they are in operation ten years from now, the pilots on board will want the best aircraft available, not the most symbolically sovereign one.*

## The mixed fleet: the road to compromise?

### 30 F-35s + 60 Gripens — the middle ground

Faced with the impasse between the military imperative (**F-35**) and the political imperative (**Gripen**/**sovereignty**), the solution that has emerged in official discussions is a **mixed fleet**. According to sources reported by **La Presse** and confirmed by multiple analyses, the preferred option in **Ottawa**'s corridors would be approximately **30 F-35s + 60 Gripens** — or, in a more ambitious scenario reported by **CBC** in June 2026, an expanded fleet of **140 aircraft in total** combining 72 to **88 F-35s** and up to **72 Gripens**. The review itself, according to **MigFlug.com** in its **June 2026** analysis, "has no decision expected before the American mid-term elections at the end of 2026."

The logic of a mixed fleet is politically understandable: keep the **F-35** for the most demanding missions (penetration into contested territory, enemy air defence suppression, high-intensity **NORAD** missions) and supplement with less expensive-to-operate **Gripens** for less demanding missions (Arctic patrols, training exercises, surveillance). This simultaneously satisfies the industrialists who want the F-35, the sovereigntists who want the Gripen, and the budget managers seeking operational savings.

### The problems a mixed fleet creates

Unfortunately, the mixed fleet has a serious problem its proponents tend to minimize: **operational and logistical complexity**. Training pilots on two different platforms multiplies training costs. Maintaining two aircraft types in hangars multiplies parts inventories, specialized tools, and technician skill sets. Integrating two different communications and data systems into joint operations creates compatibility risks. **Senior officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)** argued internally, according to sources reported in autumn 2025, that **Canada** should proceed with the full purchase of **88 F-35**s. And a letter signed by **a dozen retired RCAF officers** warned that a fleet centred on 16 F-35s supplemented by **Gripens** would be "**virtually unusable**" for high-intensity missions.

The operating costs over the **Gripen**'s lifetime are certainly substantially lower than those of the **F-35** — some estimates place them at **40 to 60% cheaper** per flight hour depending on mission profile. But these operational savings must be weighed against the additional costs of mixed fleet complexity — and the reduced operational capabilities in the most demanding scenarios.

*The mixed fleet — that's the solution of someone who can't make a decision but has to appear to be making one. I understand the political constraint. But militarily, operating two different types of fighters with two logistics chains, two training pipelines, two data systems is a complexity with a real cost — measured not in press releases but in operational readiness on D-Day. If Ottawa opts for the mixed fleet, let's at least be honest about what we're sacrificing.*

## The real cost of the F-35 program: $73.9 billion over its lifetime

### $19 billion for acquisition, $73.9 billion over 50 years

The initial contract worth **19 billion Canadian dollars** covers only the acquisition of the 88 **fighters**. The total cost over the **program's lifecycle** — including spare engines, munitions, infrastructure (hardened shelters at Cold Lake and Bagotville), software updates, training and in-service support over 50 years — is estimated by the Canadian government itself at **73.9 billion** Canadian dollars, according to a June 2026 analysis. This figure, which is not a cost overrun but the official lifecycle estimate, places Canada's real commitment in an entirely different dimension than the acquisition contract.

The **Gripen**'s cost over the same lifetime is substantially lower — per-flight-hour operating costs are markedly cheaper. But one must also factor in the costs of the transition (shutting down the already-underway **F-35** training pipeline, setting up the Gripen training pipeline), the costs of the mixed fleet if that is the chosen path, and the costs of reduced operational capability in high-intensity scenarios. The overall arithmetic is complex. What can be said with certainty: the F-35 at **73.9 billion** over 50 years is a colossal financial commitment that will weigh on Canadian defence budgets for decades, reducing the capacity to invest in other capabilities.

### The quiet payments for 14 additional F-35s

In **mid-February 2026**, **Carney** confirmed that his government had begun payments for long-lead components on **14 additional F-35**s — bringing the total commitment to **30 aircraft**. The prime minister stated these payments were aimed at "maintaining options" during the review. That is politically astute: by keeping its place in **Lockheed Martin**'s production queue, **Canada** preserves the ability to return to the full purchase without losing additional years of delay. But it is also a way of paying for an aircraft that has not yet been fully decided upon — which has fuelled criticism of an incoherent acquisition policy.

These payments for 14 additional aircraft, made while the review is officially ongoing, reveal the pragmatic reality behind the political rhetoric. **Ottawa** knows the **F-35** is probably its best military choice. It maintains its options to return to the full purchase while preserving political space to announce a final decision that will include elements of industrial **sovereignty** (the **Gripen** or production in **Canada**). This is complex management of a file with multiple constraints. It may also be procrastination dressed up as strategic prudence.

*Carney is paying for 14 additional F-35s while he reviews the F-35 contract. He says it's to "maintain options." Another word for that is playing both sides. I don't blame him entirely — in his position, with the contradictory pressures he faces, it may be the only viable posture. But let's not be told this is a coherent strategy. It's improvised crisis management on a file that should never have been put on hold.*

## NORAD interoperability: the constraint Saab cannot erase

### NORAD and continental defence

The **NORAD** — North American Aerospace Defense Command — is a Canada-US binational command that provides surveillance and defence of North American airspace. It is the framework within which the **Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)** operates daily alongside its American counterparts. And within that framework, systems **interoperability** is absolutely critical — radars, communications, friend-or-foe identification systems, data links must all function seamlessly between Canadian and American aircraft.

The **F-35** is designed to operate natively in this environment. It shares communication systems, data links and protocols with American F-35s and US Air Force command systems. The **Gripen** E, while compatible with **NATO** standards, does not offer the same level of native integration into the **NORAD** architecture. Gripen proponents argue this integration can be improved. Sceptics — including US Air Force officials — dispute that the Gripen can achieve the same level of NORAD integration as the F-35.

### What Washington has said and what it implies

The **United States** has been clear, in its official communications, that the **Gripen** would not be **NORAD**-compatible at the same level as the **F-35**. This American position is not necessarily disinterested — **Washington** has commercial and strategic reasons to prefer that **Canada** remain in the F-35 program. But it also reflects a real technical reality: in a NORAD crisis, Canadian and American aircraft must be able to share data in real time, coordinate their manoeuvres and communicate securely without friction. Every degree of systemic incompatibility introduces a delay, an ambiguity or a risk in situations where decisions are made in seconds.

This is not a theoretical concern. The defence of North American airspace faces growing threats — **Russian hypersonic ballistic missiles**, **strategic bombers**, **surveillance drones**. In this context, the full compatibility of the Canadian **fighter** with the American air defence system is not an ideological luxury. It is an operational condition that **NORAD** pilots and commanders consider non-negotiable.

*NORAD interoperability — there is the real argument in favour of the F-35 that nobody wants to say too loudly in Ottawa because it amounts to saying "we need the United States to defend ourselves." That's an uncomfortable truth in the Trump era. But it is a truth. Canada cannot defend its northern airspace alone against Russian and Chinese threats. This geographical and military reality should weigh very heavily in the final decision on fighters.*

## The Gripen and industrial sovereignty: what Saab really offers

### The sovereign data centre in Montreal

**Saab**'s most compelling argument for the Canadian market is its offer of a **sovereign data centre in Montreal**. Concretely, this means that mission data from Canadian **Gripens** — flight routes, sensor data, collected intelligence, weapons configurations — would remain on Canadian soil, in facilities controlled by **Ottawa**, without passing through American servers. This is a direct response to **Carney**'s concern about dependence on the **United States** for **F-35** software updates and mission data.

This argument has real value in a context where confidence in the American bilateral relationship has been eroded by **Trump**. But it also needs to be put in perspective: within a **NORAD** framework, Canadian aircraft share data in real time with their American counterparts regardless. The idea that fully sovereign mission data is compatible with full NORAD integration is somewhat contradictory. The sovereign data centre is a **sovereignty** argument that is symbolic and commercial — it carries political value. Its military value within the context of **continental defence** is more nuanced.

### Bombardier + Saab: the Canadian connection

What distinguishes the **Gripen** offer from a simple import sale is the involvement of **Bombardier**. The **GlobalEye** — which **Canada** is also seeking to acquire — is based on the **Bombardier Global 6000**. **Saab** has proposed assembling Canadian Gripens in Canada, potentially at **Mirabel, Quebec**, with significant technology transfer. This Canadian industrial component is what makes the Gripen offer politically viable in **Ottawa**. It allows **Carney** to present the decision not as a military retreat but as an industrial victory.

If **Bombardier** secures a role assembling the **Gripen** in **Canada**, that represents a direct and tangible economic spinoff for Quebec — a province whose political support is crucial for any Liberal government. This political calculation carries weight. And it is not entirely illegitimate: if we are going to spend **73.9 billion** over 50 years on a **fighter** fleet, we might as well keep the maximum possible in Canada. The question is whether the industrial spinoffs justify the capability trade-offs of a Gripen fleet.

*Bombardier at Mirabel assembling Swedish Gripens for the RCAF — there is something interesting in that image. Not because it's the best possible military decision. Because it's the way a smart middle power manages its trade-offs between military capability and industrial sovereignty. The trade-offs are real. But denying them doesn't advance the debate. Naming them honestly at least allows an informed decision.*

## The GCAP option: the wildcard from the future

### McGuinty and the Global Combat Air Programme

There is a third actor in this file that few have mentioned: the **Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP**). This **6th-generation fighter** project brings together the **United Kingdom**, **Japan** and Italy to develop, by **2035**, a successor to the European Typhoon and Japan's F-2. During his visit to **Tokyo** in **June 2026**, **McGuinty** expressed explicit interest in GCAP, stating that **Canada** was "seeking more information" and that the program was "a perfect illustration" of how countries can pool their resources.

The **GCAP** option is not a short-term prospect — a **fighter** expected in 2035 cannot replace the **CF-18** fleet that must be renewed now. But it opens a longer-term perspective: **Canada** could buy enough **F-35s** to cover the transitional period (the 30 already committed, possibly a few more), then join the GCAP program for its next-generation aircraft in the 2030s. This is a strategic option that would allow the F-35/**Gripen** dilemma to be partially resolved by pushing part of it into the future.

### The conditions for joining GCAP

Joining **GCAP** is not, however, trivial. The program is already well advanced among its three founding members — UK, **Japan**, Italy. Canadian entry would require complex negotiations on governance, industrial contributions, intellectual property sharing and specific **NORAD** requirements. Moreover, GCAP has already experienced delays in its own ambitions — the question of assembly in Japan and technology-sharing requirements with **Tokyo** has created tensions within the existing consortium. Adding a fourth member is not a simple decision for countries already involved.

Despite these obstacles, the **GCAP** dimension in **McGuinty**'s thinking reveals something important: **Ottawa** is already thinking about the fleet for the 2035-2050 decade, not just the one replacing the **CF-18s** in the near term. That is a strategic maturity **Canada** had not demonstrated in its handling of the **fighter** file over the past two decades — where every decision was made in reactive urgency rather than proactive planning.

*McGuinty looking toward GCAP from Tokyo — there is someone trying to see ten years out rather than to the next election campaign. That's rare enough to be noted. The GCAP option is not a short-term solution. But it's a way of saying: our decision on the 72 remaining F-35s doesn't bind us for 50 years. We can buy the minimum necessary now and build the rest of the fleet in a more favourable technological context. That may be the real way out of the fighter crisis.*

## The CF-18s: the urgency of the transition

### A fleet that can wait no longer

While **Ottawa** deliberates, the **CF-18** Hornets age. These **fighters**, which entered service in **1982**, are approaching their structural limits. Life-extension programs have kept them flying into the 2020s, but these extensions have limits — physical and economic. Each additional year of CF-18 operations costs more in maintenance, reduces operational availability and diminishes their capabilities against adversaries whose weapons systems have evolved since the 1980s.

The first Canadian **F-35s** — the initial 16 — are expected to begin delivery in **2026**. Their operationalization — pilot training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, infrastructure setup at Cold Lake and Bagotville — will take several more years. Initial operational capability for the 16-aircraft F-35 fleet is expected in the early 2030s. During this period, the **CF-18s** continue flying with their growing limitations. This is a real window of vulnerability, into which every additional hesitation about purchasing the remaining 72 aircraft drives the knife deeper.

### The time pressure on the decision

A decision delayed is not a deferred decision — it is a decision that costs. Every additional month of review is a month when the **CF-18s** suffer additional wear, when pilots are trained on aircraft that will no longer be in service in ten years, when defence industry partners — whether **Lockheed Martin** or **Saab** — adjust their projections. The cost of indecision does not appear in **Ottawa**'s budget ledgers. It is measured in fleet operational readiness, capability currency and credibility in the eyes of allies who have watched for years as **Canada** fails to close its **fighter** file.

McGuinty said in April 2026 that the review would "**take as long as it takes**." That is the response of a politician managing contradictory pressures. It is not the response of a strategist who understands that time is a limited resource in military acquisitions. The final decision on the remaining 72 **F-35s** — or their replacement with **Gripens** — will need to come before the end of 2026 if **Ottawa** wants any chance of meeting its operational capability commitments for the early 2030s.

*The CF-18 still flying in 2026. An aircraft designed in the 1970s, entering service in 1982. While McGuinty talks about AI, quantum computing and GCAP in Tokyo, Canadian pilots take off daily on airframes that are 40 years old. There is something emblematic in this image. The modernity of strategic vision is worth nothing if the platforms that bring it to life date from the Reagan era.*

## What the fighter file reveals about Canada

### A country that struggles to make big defence decisions

The Canadian **fighter** file is a brutal mirror of **Canada**'s difficulty making major defence decisions. The acquisition of **CF-18** replacements was launched in 2010, cancelled, relaunched, abandoned under Trudeau after the initial **F-35** selection controversy, restarted through a competitive tender process, concluded in 2023 with a return to the F-35 — and now questioned again by **Carney**. This fifteen-year cycle is not a catastrophe — in the end, Canada will probably have new **fighters** at a reasonable date. It is above all a revelation of a political culture that struggles to maintain a strategic defence vision across electoral cycles.

Every government has wanted to re-examine its predecessor's decisions, inject its own political and economic priorities, and leave its mark on this symbolic file. The result is a fifteen-year process to replace a fleet that had been identified as needing renewal since the early 2000s. The cost of this slowness is measured in billions of CF-18 maintenance for the aging fleet and in degraded operational capabilities during the transition period.

### The coming decision

According to MigFlug.com's analysis in **June 2026**, **Ottawa** is not expected to make a final decision before the **American mid-term elections** at year's end — which suggests the American electoral result could influence the Canadian choice. This may be the most revealing signal of all: **Canada** is waiting to see how American policy evolves before deciding which aircraft to buy. That is **strategic sovereignty** with an asterisk — national decisions conditioned on the electoral results of a foreign country. Precisely the dependency **Carney** says he wants to reduce.

Final irony, and a bitter one. The real decision on Canadian **fighters** might be made not in **Ottawa** but in American polling stations in November 2026. If Democrats retake **Congress** and moderate **Trump**'s posture, Ottawa could return to the full **F-35** purchase. If Trump consolidates his hold, Ottawa could accelerate the pivot toward **Saab**. Either way, the decision will be reactive. That is not strategy — it is political survival. And **Canada** deserves better than that for its next fighter.

*Ottawa waiting for American mid-term results to decide which fighter to buy. If that's true — and all signs point that way — it's the ultimate proof that Canada has not yet fully internalized what genuine strategic sovereignty means. We talk about reducing dependence on Washington. Meanwhile, we defer our most structurally important defence decision to the American electoral weather forecast. That's a contradiction that deserves to be said loudly.*

## The precision-guided munitions file: the void that undermines everything

### A fighter without munitions: the strategic gap nobody names

Beyond the **F-35** vs **Gripen** debate, there is a question Canadian defence analysts are raising in hushed tones: what good is the best **fighter** in the world if **Canada** doesn't have precision-guided munitions to equip it in sufficient quantity? The Ukrainian experience has brutally demonstrated that stocks of sophisticated munitions are exhausted in weeks during a high-intensity conflict — not years. **Canada**, in 2026, has no domestic production capability for long-range **air-to-air missiles**, **precision-guided bombs**, or **cruise missiles**. These munitions are all imported — primarily from the **United States** and the **United Kingdom**.

This munitions dependency may be the most underestimated strategic risk in the **CF-18 replacement program**. A Canadian **F-35** without sufficient stocks of **AMRAAM**, **JDAM** or **JSM** is a **73.9-billion-dollar** investment at reduced capacity. The decision on the **fighter** type must be accompanied by a parallel decision on munitions — their acquisition, their stockpiling and, ideally, partial production on Canadian territory. Without this dimension, the **CF-18** replacement will be a symbolic victory with limited operational impact.

*Munitions. That's the word missing from most debates about Canadian fighters. We talk about aircraft, costs, jobs, interoperability. We say little about what these aircraft fire. And without munitions in sufficient quantity, the world's best aircraft is a symbol with wings. That's a gap the next government will need to close, regardless of which aircraft is chosen.*

## The international comparison: what our allies do and what we should learn from it

### Australia, Belgium, Denmark: decisions Canada is watching

**Canada** is not the only country to have recently chosen the **F-35** — and these precedents offer valuable lessons. **Australia** ordered **72 F-35As** with a **delivery schedule** extending through 2023, and integration into the **RAAF** revealed training delays and costs higher than initial projections. **Belgium**, which chose the **F-35A** to replace its **F-16s**, encountered difficult discussions with **Lockheed Martin** over industrial offsets — a file directly relevant to **Canada**, which insists on Canadian industrial content in any major defence contract. **Denmark** received its first **F-35s** in 2023 and reports a demanding but manageable operational learning curve.

These allied experiences suggest that the final decision on Canadian **fighters** must factor in not only acquisition cost but also long-term maintenance costs, actual delivery timelines, and the quality of industrial support on Canadian territory. The Canadian evaluation score of **57.1/100** for the **F-35** against **19.8/100** for the **Gripen** captures part of this reality — but our allies' experiences suggest initial projections are often optimistic. Caution in timeline and cost planning is a lesson **Canada** can absorb without having to repeat its partners' mistakes.

*Australia. Belgium. Denmark. These countries chose before us. Their experiences are data, not opinions. And that data says one clear thing: a fighter program is always longer, costlier, and more complicated than expected. That's not a reason not to choose. It's a reason to plan honestly rather than announce timelines that won't be met.*

## The domestic politics: how the fighter file became a partisan issue

### When national defence becomes a partisan playground

The **CF-18** replacement file has a long history of politicization in **Canada**. The **Harper** government announced in 2010 the purchase of **65 F-35s** without a competitive tender — a decision that triggered a political storm and contributed to the Conservative defeat in 2015. The **Trudeau** government then launched a competitive process that dragged on for years. The **Carney** government inherits this political saga with a decision that was taken but whose execution remains fragile — the **57.1/100** F-35 evaluation score gives the government a legal basis for the choice, but it does not end the debate over the value of that purchase.

Both the Conservative opposition and the **New Democratic Party** have positions on **fighters** — the former favouring the **F-35** for **interoperability** with the **United States**, the latter sceptical of the total costs of **73.9 billion dollars**. This partisan dynamic creates uncertainty about the program's continuity beyond the current mandate. The long-term political viability of the **F-35** choice depends in part on the **Carney** government's ability to build a consensus that crosses party lines — or to embed it deeply enough in contracts and industrial obligations that it becomes difficult for a future government to undo.

*The politicization of defence decisions. It may be the deepest pathology in the Canadian system. The F-35, the frigates, the submarines — all these decisions become hostages to short electoral cycles in a country with thirty-year defence planning horizons. This contradiction is not resolved by a score of 57.1/100. It is simply placed, once again, on the table.*

## NORAD interoperability and the future of North American continental defence

### The modernization of NORAD and the technical requirements it imposes

One of the strongest arguments for the **F-35** in the Canadian evaluation is its integration into the surveillance and combat architecture of **modernized NORAD**. The **North American continental defence** modernization program — announced by **Canada** in 2022 with an investment of **38.6 billion dollars** over twenty years — rests on an architecture of sensors, command systems and strike vectors that must be fully interoperable with American systems. The **F-35**, with its **APG-81** sensor, its data-fusion system and its **stealth-mode** communications capability, integrates natively into this architecture. The **Gripen**, as capable as it may be on other criteria, does not have the same level of native integration into the **NORAD** systems.

The question of **interoperability** is not only technical — it is political. In a context where the **United States** under **Trump** has questioned the automatic security guarantees toward its allies, Canada's ability to contribute substantially to **continental defence** is a weighty factor in bilateral relations. A **Canada** flying aging **CF-18s** or transitioning to a less capable **fighter** contributes less to collective defence — and that reality reinforces political pressure in favour of the **F-35**, independent of its cost. That may be the most decisive argument in the evaluation: not the technical score, but the geopolitical logic of the **alliance**.

*NORAD. That's the word that closes every debate in Canada when it comes to defence. The moment you invoke continental defence, cooperation with Washington, the shared security architecture — the Gripen recedes and the F-35 advances. That's not a bad reason to choose the F-35. But it's a reason that deserves to be stated clearly, rather than hidden behind evaluation scores that don't fully capture it.*

## Conclusion: an investigation without a verdict, an urgency without an answer

### What this investigation has not resolved

This investigation does not deliver a definitive answer on what **Canada** should choose. Not because the answer is unknown — militarily, the **F-35** is the best aircraft available for the most demanding missions, and the 2021 evaluation data demonstrate this clearly. But because the "right" decision also depends on political, industrial, economic and symbolic factors that each actor weighs differently. What can be stated without ambiguity is this: the status quo — continuing the review indefinitely — is the worst option. It combines the costs of indecision (**CF-18s** aging, allies questioning, industry waiting) without the benefits of any option.

The final decision on Canadian **fighters** is probably the most structurally significant that **Carney** will make in the defence domain. It will commit tens of billions over 50 years, shape **Canada**'s military capabilities for a generation, and send a clear signal about what Canada chooses to be in the security architecture of the **West** — a fully integrated partner in **NATO** capabilities, or a country that adjusts its military choices to its domestic political calculations. These two paths are not incompatible. But they must be chosen with eyes wide open.

### The stone in the shoe

**Canada** has **CF-18s** whose age warranted retirement long ago. It has a contract to replace them with **F-35s**. It has a political review suspending that contract. It has a Swedish rival offering militarily inferior but industrially more sovereign aircraft. It has allies watching with growing impatience. And it has a prime minister who says he wants to reduce American dependence while continuing to pay for F-35 components "to maintain options."

In this tangle, the only certainty is this: the decision can wait no longer. It has already waited too long. And every additional month of indecision is one more month in which Canadian pilots fly aircraft whose age should have forced their retirement long ago. That is unacceptable. And no political calculation, however sophisticated, changes this reality of metal, fuel and responsibility toward the women and men in uniform.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*An investigation without a verdict. That is the truth of this file in June 2026. The F-35 won the evaluation. The contracts are unsigned. The aircraft are undelivered. The CF-18s age. And somewhere in the Canadian sky, a pilot is flying a fighter that is forty years old. That reality, no strategic document can erase.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Straits Times — Canada to send warships to Indo-Pacific, defence minister says (including McGuinty's statements on GCAP) — June 24, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/canada-to-send-warships-to-indo-pacific-defence-minister-says)

- [AeroTime — Canada's F-35 review drags on with no decision timeline — April 28, 2026](https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/canada-f-35-review-no-end-date)

- [Canada.ca — Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar (NORAD modernization) — official page](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/allies-partners/norad/aothr.html)

### Secondary sources

- [MigFlug — Canada Weighs a Split F-35 and Gripen Fleet — June 20, 2026](https://migflug.com/jetflights/canada-mixed-fighter-fleet-f-35-gripen-2026/)

- [19Fortyfive — Canada's 88 F-35s Are Under Review — January 18, 2026](https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/01/canadas-f-35-fighter-debate-is-now-in-overtime-and-the-jas-39-gripen-could-win/)

- [CityNews Toronto — Ottawa won't say if it penalized Gripen jets in 2021 analysis — March 1, 2026](https://toronto.citynews.ca/2026/03/01/ottawa-wont-say-if-it-penalized-gripen-jets-in-2021-analysis/)

- [19Fortyfive — Canada Could Buy Stealth F-35 AND JAS 39 Gripen Fighters — February 20, 2026](https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/02/what-debate-canada-could-buy-stealth-f-35-and-jas-39-gripen-fighters/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/enquete-88-f-35-ou-des-gripen-suedois-le-dossier-chasseur-qui-paralyse-ottawa