# EDITORIAL: Twenty-first package: Europe must stop bargaining

> Since February 24, 2022, the European Union has stacked twenty sanctions packages against Russia. Twenty packages, twenty rounds of negotiations, twenty repetitions of the same bargaining scenes between capitals. And now the 21st package is on the table, officially proposed on June 27, 2026. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin is increasing war spending by an additional four to five tril

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-vingt-et-unieme-paquet-l-europe-doit-cesser-de-marchander

## Introduction: The European Union facing the mirror of its own cowardice

### Four years of war — how many more packages?

Since **February 24, 2022**, the **European Union** has stacked twenty sanctions packages against **Russia**. Twenty packages, twenty rounds of negotiations, twenty repetitions of the same bargaining scenes between capitals. And now the **21st package** is on the table, officially proposed on **June 27, 2026**. Meanwhile, **Vladimir Putin** is increasing war spending by an additional **four to five trillion rubles** in **2026**, according to **Bloomberg**. The equation is simple, brutal — and **Europe** pretends not to see it.

Russia's **budget deficit** has admittedly surpassed **80 billion dollars**, according to **United24 Media**. **Russian government bonds** have collapsed, with yields approaching **15%**. But **Putin** keeps financing his war machine. Why? Because **Europe** still leaves taps open, still hesitates over a **total oil embargo**, and grants delays that **Moscow** converts into oxygen.

### The 21st package: promise or alibi?

This new package arrives in a context where the **Baltic states** — **Estonia**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania** — have been pressing **Brussels** for months to accelerate the **Russian oil embargo**. The **Kyiv Post** reports that these three nations are pushing for a faster, more comprehensive ban. The **EU** itself has only just extended its existing sanctions by one year instead of six months — on **June 19, 2026** — as though such a gesture deserved applause. **Euromaidan Press** confirms: the wall of economic sanctions holds until **2027**, but gaps remain.

I will say what many are thinking quietly: this **21st package** risks being, like its predecessors, a catalogue of overly timid measures negotiated downward to satisfy the most hesitant members. Can **Europe** still look **Ukraine** in the eye and claim it is doing the maximum?

*What I feel watching this new round of European economic diplomacy is a weariness mixed with a deep, slow-burning anger. We are bargaining with the executioner. We are negotiating the terms of our own security. And meanwhile, Ukrainian soldiers are dying. Every additional week of negotiation is a week gifted to Putin.*

## The Russian war economy: wounded but not on its knees

### The figures of Russia's paradox

The **Kiel Institute** speaks of «**structural exhaustion**» of the Russian economy. Russia's **GDP** contracted by **0.2%** in the first quarter of **2026**, and the **IMF** has revised its forecast downward to **0.8%** annual growth. **The Economist** ran the headline on **June 22, 2026** that Russia's war economy has problems but is not about to crash — and that is precisely where the danger lies. A wounded but functioning economy remains a war economy.

Zelensky's sanctions adviser declared on **June 26, 2026** that the Russian economy has reached a dead end, according to **RBC-Ukraine**. But a dead end is not a collapse. **Putin** can hold for years in a dead end if the **West** does not push harder. Russia's **regions**, meanwhile, are drowning in debt because of the war, confirms the portal **dn.gov.ua**. The social cost is real. But the regime absorbs the blows by redistributing the pain onto the periphery.

### War rubles and their limits

Increasing military spending by **four to five trillion rubles** when the currency is under pressure and bond yields are spiking to **15%** is playing with fire. Independent Russian economists — those who can still speak — raise the specter of monetary overheating. **Inflation** is gnawing at the purchasing power of ordinary Russians. The **Russian Central Bank** keeps punishingly high benchmark rates to contain the spiral.

And yet **Putin** holds on. He holds on because oil and gas revenues, though reduced, continue to flow. He holds on because countries like **China**, **India**, and **Turkey** absorb Russian oil at cut-rate prices, cheerfully circumventing **Western** sanctions. That is where **Europe** must look. That is where the **21st package** must strike.

*The Russian economy is like a boxer who has been absorbing punches for rounds — bleeding, staggering, but still standing, because its opponent refuses to put its full weight behind the blows. Europe can win this economic fight. But it needs to stop boxing with velvet gloves.*

## The Baltics out front: a lesson in courage for Brussels

### Three small states that see further than the large ones

**Estonia**, **Latvia**, and **Lithuania** do not need anyone to explain to them what **imperial Russia** means. They lived it — in their bones, under their feet. These three nations have been pushing for a **total oil embargo** for a long time, well before the major European capitals deigned to give it serious thought. Their position is clear, without ambiguity: you cannot claim to sanction **Moscow** while continuing to buy its energy in disguised forms.

The **Kyiv Post** of **June 27, 2026** documents their pressure on **Brussels**: the **Baltics** want an accelerated embargo, without the usual delays that allow **Russia** to adapt. Their argument is airtight: every delay is a strategic gift to **Putin**. The **EU** must listen to those who understand the enemy, not to those who still hope to do business with it tomorrow.

### Geography as a moral compass

There is something profoundly revealing in the fact that the states closest to **Russia** are the most determined to sanction it. **Poland**, the **Baltic states**, **Finland** — all understand that the current **EU** softness is not only morally indecent but strategically suicidal. When the **states most exposed** to the Russian threat demand more firmness, and the most sheltered states dig in their heels, there is a fundamental problem of perception.

**France**, **Germany**, **Hungary** — for very different reasons — have too often played the moderators. **France** out of diplomatic ambition, **Germany** out of historical dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, **Hungary** out of open complicity under **Orbán**. The result: twenty diluted packages instead of unrelenting maximum pressure.

*Geography does not lie. The Baltics, who live a few kilometers from Russian military bases, have understood what certain Brussels bureaucrats appear to ignore: Putin is not a difficult partner — he is an active enemy. Treating your economic partners as enemies is a courageous decision. Refusing its consequences is weakness.*

## The 21st package under the microscope: what we know, what we fear

### The June 27 proposal: progress or repetition?

According to **Daily Finland** of **June 27, 2026**, the **EU** has officially proposed its **21st package** of sanctions against **Russia**. The precise details are still under negotiation, as always. But the outlines are taking shape: new restrictions on imports, expansion of blacklists of individuals and entities, measures against circumvention of sanctions via third countries. On paper, it looks serious. In practice, everything depends on the ambition of the measures ultimately adopted.

Because the history of previous packages is eloquent: at every announcement, the rhetoric is strong. Then come the negotiations, the exemptions, the transition periods. The final package is always less biting than the initial draft. It is a well-oiled mechanism that **Moscow** has learned to anticipate. Russian strategists know the European rhythm better than some Members of the European Parliament.

### The two countries opposing entry bans for Russians

**Pravda Ukraine** of **June 25, 2026** reveals that two **EU** member states still oppose the entry ban for Russian nationals. The fact that these countries refuse to submit to this symbolic measure illustrates how sharply interests diverge within the **Union**. This is not a question of considerable economic sacrifice — merely a firm stance on the free movement of citizens of a state waging a war of aggression.

This type of internal resistance undermines the European unity that **Moscow** is precisely trying to erode. Every exception, every postponement, every derogation is a victory for Russian propaganda proclaiming that the **West** is divided and weak. And, to be honest, that propaganda is not entirely wrong when one observes certain European behaviors.

*Two EU countries opposing entry bans for Russians in 2026, four years after the full-scale invasion — it is beyond comprehension. This is not a question of diplomatic nuance. It is a question of where you stand morally in this conflict. And some are still struggling to choose a side.*

## Russia's war machine and its financing: the gaps that need closing

### Russian oil still circulating

Despite the sanctions, Russian oil continues to move. The **shadow fleet** — those vessels transporting Russian crude by circumventing controls — has become an industry in its own right. Hundreds of old tankers, operating under flags of convenience, channel **Putin's** oil to Asian refineries that in turn resell refined products into **Europe** and the **West**. The circuit is known. The tools to block it exist. The political will is insufficient.

The **21st package** should, according to early reports, include additional measures against this shadow fleet. But "include measures" is a formulation that can cover a great deal. Symbolic sanctions against a handful of vessels, or a genuine offensive against the entire network? The difference is considerable, and **Moscow** monitors every detail with the attention the **EU** should impose on itself.

### Russian military spending: a signal that must not be ignored

When **Putin** announces an increase in military spending of **four to five trillion rubles**, he sends a clear message: he is not looking for an exit. He is accelerating. This decision, in the context of a budget deficit already exceeding **80 billion dollars**, is not that of a leader who senses defeat. It is that of a man betting that the **West** will tire before he does.

This bet is not irrational. **Europe** has demonstrated in the past a remarkable capacity to grow weary, to seek compromises, to want to "de-escalate." **Putin** is counting on that. The answer must be to show him that this calculation is wrong — and that requires a **21st package** that truly strikes, not a catalogue of good intentions.

*Putin increases military spending despite a colossal deficit. That is the most important signal Europeans seem unwilling to read. This man is not looking for a way out. He is preparing the next round. And Europe — Europe is preparing its next working session.*

## What the 21st package must contain to be credible

### The oil embargo: the decisive measure

Economists, strategists, and geopolitical analysts broadly agree: a **total oil embargo** on Russian oil is the most effective available measure. Oil revenues still represent a substantial share of the Russian federal budget. Cutting them — or drastically reducing them — directly strikes **Putin's** ability to finance his war. The **Baltic states** have understood this. It is time the rest of **Europe** joined them.

The argument that a total embargo would be too painful for European economies has lost its substance. **Europe** has diversified its energy sources since **2022**. American and Qatari liquefied natural gas has partially replaced Russian flows. The transition, though costly, has been accomplished. There is no longer any valid economic excuse for failing to go all the way.

### Secondary sanctions: hitting those who help Russia

A **21st package** worthy of the name must also include robust **secondary sanctions** against entities enabling **Russia** to circumvent existing restrictions. Companies in **Turkey**, **China**, the **United Arab Emirates**, **Kazakhstan**, and elsewhere serve as conduits for the Russian war economy. Secondary sanctions allow them to be targeted directly — at the risk of creating diplomatic tensions, certainly, but that is the price of coherence.

The **European Union** has too long feared applying this type of sanctions for fear of antagonizing commercial partners. But the question is no longer about preserving trade relations with countries that help **Putin** finance his war against **Ukraine**. The question is whether **Europe** is serious about its commitment to defending its values.

*Secondary sanctions are the real red line. Hitting Chinese, Turkish, or Emirati companies that help Russia circumvent sanctions means accepting a real diplomatic cost for a real strategic result. That is precisely the kind of courage Europe has been lacking for far too long. And that is precisely what the 21st package should embody.*

## Ukraine waits — Europe deliberates

### The slow tempo of bureaucracies versus the rapid pace of war

The rhythm of European negotiations is fundamentally incompatible with the rhythm of a war. **Ukraine** loses men every day. The front lines shift every week. Russian military capacity — financed by revenues that **Europe** still contributes indirectly to generating — strikes civilian infrastructure continuously. Meanwhile, **Brussels** organizes expert meetings, sends diplomatic notes, and waits for consensus.

This temporal disconnect is a form of passive complicity. Not from malicious intent — I do not attribute sinister ulterior motives to our European diplomats. But from an institutional incapacity to match the urgency. European treaties were designed to manage trade disputes, not to respond to wars of aggression. And this structural inadequacy is costing **Ukraine** dearly.

### Aid fatigue: a trap that must be refused

A narrative is beginning to circulate in certain European capitals: "aid fatigue" for **Ukraine**. Too much money, too many weapons, for too long. This narrative is dangerous, and it must be named for what it is: a rationalization of abandonment. **Ukraine** is not asking for a favor. It is fighting for values that **Europe** claims to defend — sovereignty, international law, democracy.

Abandoning **Ukraine** midway would not only be a moral betrayal. It would be a first-order strategic error. A victorious **Russia** would not stop at **Ukraine**. The **Baltics**, **Poland**, the **Scandinavian countries** — all understand that the current boundary of the conflict is their own line of defense. The **21st package** is not merely an economic tool: it is a declaration of intent on what **Europe** is willing to defend.

*Aid fatigue for Ukraine is a moral luxury Europe cannot afford. When I hear political leaders talking about "finding an exit" or "not humiliating Russia," I wonder whether they have looked at what this war has done to Mariupol, to Bucha, to Kharkiv. Fatigue, here, would be capitulation dressed as pragmatism.*

## Russia adapts: anticipating circumvention of the 21st package

### Moscow has learned to read sanctions before they are even adopted

**Russia** has since **2022** developed a formidable expertise in anticipating and circumventing sanctions. Its economic teams monitor European negotiations, identify probable exemptions, and set up alternative circuits even before measures come into force. By the time a package is adopted, the workarounds are already in place. That is why the speed of adoption is as important as the content of the measures.

The **21st package** must be designed with this reality in mind. The drafters of the sanctions texts must work from sufficiently broad legal bases to cover foreseeable circumventions. Designation lists must be updated quickly and regularly. And enforcement mechanisms must be given adequate resources — something the **EU** has often neglected, resulting in well-drafted but poorly enforced sanctions.

### Closing the gaps before they are exploited

One of the lessons from previous packages is that gaps identified at the time of adoption — negotiated exemptions, transition periods, sectoral derogations — are systematically exploited to the maximum by **Russia** and its partners. A six-month transition window becomes a six-month preparation window for sanctions-busters. A limited sectoral exemption becomes an entry point for much larger flows.

The **European Commission** and the member states must therefore adopt a radically different approach for the **21st package**: minimize exemptions from the design stage, provide enhanced monitoring mechanisms for residual gaps, and include automatic adjustment clauses if data shows circumvention occurring. This is a more ambitious standard than previous packages. It is precisely what the situation demands.

*Russia anticipating European sanctions even before they are adopted — that is the result of four years of learning. Europe has been predictable, methodical, sometimes naive about the ingenuity of those who evade. The 21st package should be designed not as a political statement, but as a precise economic weapon — with circumvention engineers sitting across the table in the drafting room.*

## Conclusion: Time for action, not symbolic packages

### Twenty packages were not enough: the twenty-first must be different

The **European Union** has demonstrated since **2022** that it can act with a unity and speed that was previously unknown. The first twenty sanctions packages, imperfect as they are, represent an unprecedented effort in the history of multilateral economic sanctions. But the adversary has adapted. Circumvention networks have organized. The Russian economy has absorbed the shocks — at the cost of massive distortions, to be sure, but it has held.

The **21st package** must be of a different nature. Not a catalogue of symbolic measures designed to show that **Europe** is "active." A coordinated economic offensive, with teeth, with secondary sanctions, with a muscular oil embargo, and with the political will to enforce it even against internal resistance and the protests of third-party partners. **Europe** has the tools. It must find the will.

### Zelensky deserves better than renewed promises

**Volodymyr Zelensky** has transformed **Ukraine** into a symbol of resistance. His country absorbs daily strikes on its infrastructure, its cities, its civilians. He holds on, with a dignity and determination that few leaders would have shown. What **Europe** owes him in return is not a twenty-first package accompanied by a press conference. It is a real, quantified, binding commitment to economically suffocate the war machine that terrorizes his people.

Stopping the bargaining over sanctions means stopping the bargaining with our own values. **Europe** cannot define itself as a community of values while continuing to leave taps open that feed a war of aggression. The moment has come. The **21st package** must be the turning point, not the twenty-first episode of an endless series.

*Twenty-one sanctions packages — twenty-one times Europe had the chance to do better. This is not the twenty-first opportunity to replay the same timid scenario. It may be the last chance to act before the strategic window closes. I say this with all the solemnity the situation demands: the time is now.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Daily Finland — EU proposes 21st package of sanctions against Russia — June 27, 2026](https://www.dailyfinland.fi/europe/49757/EU-proposes-21st-package-of-sanctions-against-Russia)

- [United24 Media — Russia's budget deficit tops 80 billion dollars — June 23, 2026](https://united24media.com/world/russias-budget-deficit-tops-80-billion-despite-kremlin-stability-claims-20083)

- [Kyiv Post — Baltics press EU to accelerate Russian oil embargo — June 27, 2026](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/79112)

- [Euromaidan Press — EU maintains its Russia economic sanctions wall to 2027 — June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/trade-banks-energy-crypto-the-eu-keeps-its-full-russia-economic-sanctions-wall-standing-to-2027/)

### Secondary sources

- [Bloomberg via Ground News — Russia to increase war spending by an additional 4–5 trillion rubles in 2026 — June 23, 2026](https://ground.news/article/bloomberg-russia-to-increase-war-spending-by-an-additional-45-trillion-rubles-in-2026)

- [The Economist — Russia's war economy has problems but is not about to crash — June 22, 2026](https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/06/22/russias-war-economy-has-problems-but-is-not-about-to-crash)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Russia's economy has reached a dead end, says Zelensky's adviser — June 26, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-s-economy-has-reached-dead-end-zelenskyy-1782474737.html)

- [Pravda Ukraine — Two EU countries oppose entry ban for Russians — June 25, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/25/8041130/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-vingt-et-unieme-paquet-l-europe-doit-cesser-de-marchander