# EDITORIAL: Three hundred billion for Iran: the exorbitant price of a peace Trump calls victory

> Three hundred billion dollars. That is the figure. That is what the Islamabad memorandum — sketched at the close of the Swiss talks on June 21, 2026 according to Ground News — earmarks for the reconstruction of the Iranian economy in exchange for a nuclear agreement and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Three hundred billion. To put that figure in perspective:

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-trois-cents-milliards-pour-l-iran-le-prix-exorbitant-d-une-paix-que-tr

## Introduction: A figure that shocks, a peace that raises questions

### Three hundred billion: the weight of an unprecedented deal

**Three hundred billion dollars.** That is the figure. That is what the Islamabad memorandum — sketched at the close of the Swiss talks on **June 21, 2026** according to **Ground News** — earmarks for the reconstruction of the Iranian economy in exchange for a nuclear agreement and freedom of navigation through the **Strait of Hormuz**. Three hundred billion. To put that figure in perspective: it exceeds the combined annual defence budgets of **France** and **Germany** over a full decade. It surpasses the total aid the **United States** has provided to **Ukraine** since **2022**. It is the largest ransom in the history of modern diplomacy, dressed up as a reconstruction plan.

And **Donald Trump** calls it a **victory**. I am going to explain why that figure shocks me, why it should shock everyone, and why — at the same time — we must resist the reflex of outright rejection. Because the geopolitical reality of **Hormuz**, Iranian nuclear ambitions, and the balance of the **Middle East** is too complex to be reduced to either a scandal or a triumph. **Three hundred billion dollars deserves more than a knee-jerk reaction — it deserves an honest and unflinching analysis.**

### Trump and Iran: the paradox of the disruptor turned negotiator

Context matters: **Donald Trump** abandoned the **JCPOA** in **2018**, calling it "disastrous" and "the worst deal ever signed." He reimposed sweeping sanctions on **Iran**, ordered the killing of General **Soleimani** in **2020**, and maintained maximum economic pressure on **Tehran** throughout his entire first term. Now, in his second term, this same **Trump** is negotiating a deal worth three hundred billion dollars for the very regime he had vowed to bring to **"zero"** in petroleum exports.

How do we explain this reversal? Several factors. Global economic pressure on oil prices. American strategic fatigue after decades of Middle Eastern confrontation. And above all, **Trump**'s political need to present a tangible "deal" — something concrete, sellable, nameable. A deal with **Iran** would be a spectacular diplomatic exit that even his political opponents would struggle to ignore. **Trump does not practise foreign policy — he does deals. And a $300-billion deal sells itself.**

*I will say what I genuinely think: this negotiation reveals something deeply problematic in Trump's relationship with diplomacy. For him, a deal is first and foremost a performance — a television moment, a newspaper headline, a "great victory" he can boast about at his rallies. The substance of the deal — is it truly effective on the nuclear file? is it genuinely credible on inspections? — is secondary to the rhetoric of victory. That is dangerous when nuclear weapons are on the table.*

## What the $300 billion actually buys

### A sanctioned economy thirsting for reconstruction

To understand the logic of the **$300 billion**, one must understand the state of the Iranian economy after decades of sanctions. The **Iranian rial** has lost more than **90% of its value** compared with pre-sanctions levels. Structural inflation has gutted the purchasing power of middle classes that had grown through the 2000s. Petroleum infrastructure — the state's main revenue source — is deteriorating for lack of spare parts and foreign investment. Hospitals are short of medicines. Universities are losing their best researchers to emigration.

In this context, **$300 billion** represents a promise of economic renaissance that carries deep resonance for the Iranian population — and for the moderate factions within the regime that need to deliver tangible improvements to maintain their political base. That is why this deal could be placed on the table: there is internal demand in **Iran** for a way out of economic crisis, and the **$300 billion** responds to that demand. **The economic pressure of sanctions worked — not to topple the regime, but to bring it to the negotiating table.**

### What the $300 billion cannot buy

But the **$300 billion** cannot purchase the transformation of the Iranian regime. The history of petroleum-rich **Middle Eastern** countries is filled with examples where massive inflows of economic resources have reinforced authoritarian structures rather than reforming them. Additional resources without meaningful institutional reforms — without rule-of-law reform, without press freedom, without respect for minority and women's rights — do not transform a regime. They give it additional means to stay in power.

An **Iran** enriched by **$300 billion** that maintains its regional proxy activities — funding **Hezbollah**, backing the **Houthis**, exerting influence in **Iraq** — will be a more resourceful regional destabiliser. Economic normalisation without strategic behavioural change does not produce the hoped-for regional stability. It produces a better-funded regional actor with the same intentions. **Money does not transform regimes — it amplifies their existing characteristics.**

*The $300 billion for Iran reminds me of a conversation I would have with someone who has just posted considerable bail for a prisoner convicted of violent behaviour — hoping the money will change the behaviour. Sometimes it works. Often it does not. The difference between hope and reality depends on the quality of the conditions attached to the release. On that point — the nuclear and regional behavioural conditions — the roadmap leaves too many questions unanswered.*

## The geopolitics of the $300 billion: who pays?

### The question nobody wants to ask publicly

The Islamabad memorandum earmarks **$300 billion** for Iranian reconstruction. But it does not specify who pays those **$300 billion**. Are these American public funds? **European Union** contributions? Private investment attracted by normalisation? Sovereign wealth funds from Gulf states? The answer to that question fundamentally changes the nature of the deal. If they are American or European public funds, Western taxpayers are directly financing the Iranian regime. If they are private investments and Gulf funds, the question is whether those actors will trust the deal's stability enough to commit at that scale.

The probable answer is a mix: unfreezing of frozen Iranian assets (some of the **$300 billion** comes from funds that already belonged to **Iran**), private investment from international oil companies attracted by Iranian resources, and perhaps contributions from regional development funds. But the exact mechanics of these **$300 billion** have not been made public — and that is a major transparency problem for any deal claiming to be a political victory. **A $300-billion deal without a transparent financing line is a political promise, not a financial commitment.**

### The $12 billion in frozen assets: the visible tip of the iceberg

**Al Jazeera** mentioned on **June 23, 2026** the question of **$12 billion in frozen Iranian assets** held in foreign banks — a friction point in the negotiations, with **Iran** demanding their prior release and the **United States** wanting to condition it on nuclear progress. These **$12 billion** are the visible and immediately available portion of the financial puzzle. They represent legitimately Iranian funds that were frozen under sanctions — and their partial unfreezing, under conditions, is a reasonable concession in an architecture of mutual confidence.

The problem is that the **$12 billion** represent only a tiny fraction of the memorandum's **$300 billion**. The remaining **$288 billion** would need to come from new investments, long-term reconstruction projects, and financial mechanisms that depend on the deal's stability and the confidence of international investors. That confidence cannot be decreed — it is earned over years of commitment-compliant behaviour. **The promised $300 billion are not $300 billion guaranteed — they are $300 billion conditional on Iranian behaviour that nobody can predict with certainty.**

*I am wary of large diplomatic figures. $300 billion is an impressive number. But it is also a number that can conceal a vague or conditionally achievable financial architecture. The Marshall Plan was $13 billion in 1948 — roughly $170 billion in today's dollars. And it transformed Europe. But the Marshall Plan had a precise institutional architecture, clear governance mechanisms, and beneficiaries who had been defeated and were asking for help. Iran in 2026 is an entirely different situation.*

## Trump, victory, and the art of narrative

### Why Trump needs this deal as a "victory"

To understand why **Trump** presents this deal as a victory, one must understand his political machinery. In the Trumpian narrative, everything **Trump** negotiates is "the greatest deal ever struck." Everything his predecessors did is "disastrous." The value of a deal is measured first by its ability to feed that narrative, not by its technical or strategic merits. With **Iran**, **Trump** can construct a particularly powerful narrative: **"Obama signed a disastrous deal. I have concluded a far better one."**

This narrative has an ironclad political logic for his audience. But it is intellectually problematic. Is the deal genuinely better than the **JCPOA**? That depends on its terms around inspections — which are contested. On the duration of its nuclear limitations — unknown. On the snapback mechanisms — unspecified. On these technical and strategic questions, the narrative of "Trumpian **victory**" provides no answers. It provides a political emotion. **And political emotions, however powerful, do not dismantle Iranian centrifuges.**

### The political cost of a failed deal

But there is also considerable political risk for **Trump** in this deal. If he signs an agreement presented as a major victory, and it proves as flawed as the **JCPOA** — or worse, if **Iran** uses it to buy time and resources while continuing its nuclear programme — the result will be a personal political defeat of considerable magnitude. His political opponents, the pro-**Israel** members of **Congress**, Republican hawks — all will return to this deal with merciless ferocity if it fails.

This political risk of failure should, in theory, push **Trump** to insist on a genuinely robust deal rather than a cosmetic one. That is one of the arguments in favour of a deal possible within **60 days**: the political pressure not to "own" an Iranian failure. But this calculation can also lead to the opposite scenario: a deal sufficiently ambiguous never to be clearly identifiable as a failure, maintaining a political grey zone indefinitely. **Ambiguity can be the political exit strategy as much as the underlying problem.**

*What interests me in analysing Trump on this file is the question of consistency. He left the JCPOA in 2018 for a "far better deal." Six years later, he is seeking to close that "far better deal" in a nuclear situation considerably more dangerous than the one he inherited. If the 2026 deal resembles the 2015 JCPOA on the fundamental questions — and that is a real risk — it would be the demonstration that his 2018 departure was a monumental strategic error that cost six years of Iranian nuclear progress. I doubt he will ever acknowledge that.*

## Iran and the $300 billion: who really benefits?

### The Revolutionary Guards as the primary potential beneficiaries

Let us assume the deal is concluded and the **$300 billion** begin flowing into the Iranian economy. The vital question is: who profits from that money? Some will certainly reach ordinary Iranians, through improvements in medicine imports, medical equipment, and reduced inflation. But another portion — its scale depending on the governance of reconstruction — could go directly to the economic entities controlled by the **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)**.

The **Revolutionary Guards** control between **30 and 40% of the Iranian economy**, according to estimates from various think tanks. They have their own industrial and commercial empire, including construction companies, import-export firms, and investments in every major sector. Any meaningful Iranian economic recovery mechanically translates into increased resources flowing through their structures. **To enrich Iran without precisely targeting the beneficiaries of that enrichment is to enrich the Revolutionary Guards.**

### The financing of regional proxies: a well-founded concern

**Iran**'s proxy activities in the region — backing the Lebanese **Hezbollah**, the Yemeni **Houthis**, Iraqi militias, the Palestinian **Hamas** — cost money. According to estimates cited by regional security experts, these outlays run to several billion dollars annually. Economic sanctions put these funds under pressure — not to the point of stopping them, but to the point of constraining them. An Iranian economic normalisation would mechanically increase the resources available for these activities.

Unless the final agreement includes specific clauses conditioning the lifting of sectoral sanctions on the dismantling of these proxy networks — which would be extraordinarily difficult to negotiate and verify — the **$300 billion** in reconstruction will increase Iran's capacity to destabilise its neighbours. That is why **Israel** and the Gulf allies are watching these negotiations with deep suspicion. **Peace for Hormuz cannot come at the cost of increased destabilisation throughout the rest of the Middle East.**

*Iran's funding of Hezbollah is the element that makes this deal hardest for me to accept morally. People are dying in Lebanon, Israel, Yemen, and Iraq because of these Tehran-funded proxies. Signing a deal that could increase that funding — even indirectly, even unintentionally — demands regional behavioural guarantees I have not seen in the reported terms of the roadmap. The deal cannot be only nuclear and Hormuz. It must address Iranian regional behaviour — otherwise it is a variable-geometry peace that lets people die elsewhere.*

## The alternatives to the $300 billion: what they are worth

### Maintaining sanctions: does it still make sense?

The alternative position to the roadmap is the maintenance or tightening of existing sanctions. This option has its defenders among American hawks and regional allies. Their argument: sanctions work — they put enough pressure on the Iranian economy to force **Tehran** to negotiate, and maintaining that pressure is the only path to substantive Iranian nuclear concessions.

But this argument is undermined by a stubborn fact: **sanctions have been at maximum levels for several years without preventing Iran from enriching uranium to levels increasingly close to the weapons threshold**. If maximum pressure did not stop the enrichment — and the **IAEA** documented its steady progression despite sanctions — there is no reason to believe that maintaining sanctions at their current level would produce different results in the years ahead. Economic pressure brought **Iran** to the table — but not to unconditional surrender. And unilateral capitulation was never a realistic objective. **Sanctions were a pressure tool, not a transformation tool.**

### The military option: an unbearable cost

The other alternative to the **$300 billion** is the military option — strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. **Israel** has maintained this option as credible, and the Israeli-Iranian strike exchanges of **2024** demonstrated that both parties can conduct direct military operations. But the calculus on strikes against the Iranian nuclear programme is grim: even successful strikes would not definitively dismantle a programme as dispersed and deeply buried as Iran's. At best, they would set it back by a few years.

And the costs would be considerable: a probable Iranian response on **Hormuz**, strikes against American regional allies, a spike in oil prices, a potentially uncontrollable regional escalation. The military option is real — it is not abstract. But its cost-benefit ratio is catastrophic compared with a nuclear deal, even an imperfect one. **That is precisely why the deal — despite its obvious flaws — deserves serious consideration rather than out-of-hand rejection.**

*I am compelled to admit something my anti-deal rhetoric in this editorial tends to obscure: the alternative to the $300 billion may be worse. A war with Iran, with all that implies for Hormuz, for Israel, for Gulf allies, for oil prices, and for global stability, would be catastrophic. If the deal — even imperfect — prevents that escalation while partially limiting Iranian nuclear activity, it may be worth its exorbitant price. The question is always the same: on what conditions? And that is where I remain demanding.*

## What Hormuz peace is genuinely worth

### The economic value of stability in the strait

The stability of **Hormuz** has a measurable economic value. Twenty percent of the world's oil transits through this strait. Even a temporary closure — a few days or weeks — would trigger a spike in oil prices with cascading effects across the entire global economy. Estimates suggest that a prolonged disruption of **Hormuz** would cost the global economy hundreds of billions of dollars within weeks — far more than the memorandum's **$300 billion**.

Seen through that lens, the **$300 billion** can look like a reasonable investment in the stability of a critical economic artery. If the deal genuinely guarantees freedom of navigation through the strait for the coming decades, its overall cost to the global economy — compared with the alternative cost of disruptions and conflicts — is potentially positive. This blunt economic calculation is one of the strongest arguments in favour of the roadmap. **Paying $300 billion to avoid Hormuz disruptions that would cost the global economy even more may be rational — provided the deal is real and durable.**

### The peace that may not be peace

But precision is required: the roadmap does not guarantee "peace" in the **Middle East**. It claims to guarantee freedom of navigation through **Hormuz** and a limitation of the Iranian nuclear programme. These two objectives are important but limited. They do not resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in **Yemen**, Israeli-Lebanese tensions, or the presence of Iranian militias in **Iraq**. A deal on **Hormuz** and the nuclear file can coexist with continued Iranian destabilisation throughout the rest of the region.

**Trump** calls it a victory. I would call it a sectoral agreement — potentially useful in its precise domain, but insufficient to transform the nature of the Iranian regime or its regional posture. Presenting a sectoral agreement as "peace" is a rhetorical overreach that sets the stage for future disappointment. **Deals must be sold for what they are, not for what they are not.**

*I am tired of Middle Eastern "historic peace deals" that fail to deliver on their promises. Every American administration has wanted its Oslo moment, its Camp David agreement, its treaty that was going to change everything. The reality of the Middle East is more resistant to diplomatic ambition than any roadmap. That does not mean one should stop trying — but it means one must be honest about the limits of what a deal can produce. $300 billion for Hormuz and the nuclear file is not peace in the Middle East. It is perhaps a useful sectoral improvement.*

## The allies who pay without a seat at the table

### Israel: the absent party that determines everything

The **Netanyahu** government is watching these negotiations with deep suspicion. Its position is simple: no deal that allows **Iran** to maintain an enrichment capability close to the weapons threshold is acceptable. The **$300 billion** that could indirectly fund the activities of **Hezbollah** and other Iranian proxies are unacceptable from the perspective of Israeli security. **Jerusalem** has its own channels of influence in **Washington** — in **Congress**, in conservative circles, in evangelical networks — and will use them if the deal does not meet its minimum requirements.

The question that remains is this: if the final deal is judged insufficient by **Israel**, what will it do? The most extreme response — strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities while negotiations are ongoing — would immediately torpedo the deal and trigger a major regional crisis. The more likely response is intense pressure on the **US Congress** to block ratification or impose additional conditions. **Israel is absent from the negotiating table but present in all its political constraints.**

### Gulf allies: between relief and suspicion

The **Persian Gulf** monarchies — **Saudi Arabia**, the **United Arab Emirates**, **Kuwait** — have an ambivalent relationship with the prospect of an American-Iranian deal. On one hand, the stability of **Hormuz** is directly in their interest — their own oil exports transit through the strait. The reduction of regional tensions — Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure, tensions in the **Gulf** — would benefit them economically and security-wise. On the other, an **Iran** revitalised by **$300 billion** in reconstruction is a more powerful regional rival that could increase its influence in **Yemen**, **Iraq**, and **Lebanon**.

The **Saudi-Iranian rapprochement** of **2023**, facilitated by **China**, had temporarily eased those tensions. But the structural divisions between **Riyadh** and **Tehran** — Sunni versus Shia, monarchy versus Islamic revolution, Arab versus Persian — remain intact. An American-Iranian deal that strengthens **Iran** without demanding changes in regional behaviour will be received with suspicion in Gulf capitals. **Hormuz peace cannot be built on the backs of regional allies who have no seat at the negotiating table.**

*The list of those who bear the consequences without a seat at the table is long: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, Lebanon suffering under Hezbollah, Yemen under the Houthis. The American-Iranian deal is bilateral in form, but its effects will be regional in scope. This asymmetry between those who negotiate and those who live with the consequences is one of the structural injustices of great-power diplomacy. I name it because it is real and because it generates resentments that can destabilise the deal after its signing.*

## The price of peace versus the price of war

### A cold but necessary calculation

Let us run the cold calculation that political emotions on both sides tend to obscure. An imperfect deal that holds and produces a real — even insufficient — limitation of the Iranian nuclear programme for several years, how does it compare with the alternatives? A military strike that would cost thousands of lives, trigger a regional escalation, provoke an oil price spike, and only delay the Iranian nuclear programme by a few years at best, how much is that worth? An absence of a deal that leaves **Iran** approaching the nuclear weapons threshold within **12 to 18 months**, how much is that worth?

This brutal cost-benefit calculation — the one American strategists conduct in their conference rooms — argues for a deal, even an imperfect one. Not for any deal. Not for a deal that abandons genuine nuclear inspections. But for a deal that even partially and temporarily limits the Iranian nuclear programme, that even imperfectly guarantees freedom of navigation through **Hormuz**, and that opens a dynamic toward the normalisation of regional behaviour. **An imperfect peace is not a victory — but it can be better than a perfectly waged war.**

### The conditions that would make the $300 billion acceptable

I will close this chapter with what I would demand were I a strategic adviser: the **$300 billion** would become acceptable if, and only if, they are conditioned on: unconditional **IAEA** inspections at all Iranian nuclear sites; an enrichment ceiling at maximum **5%** and dismantlement of existing stocks beyond that threshold; an automatic snapback mechanism for sanctions in case of violation; and regional behavioural clauses linking at least a portion of the financing to the reduction of Iranian proxy activities in third countries.

Without these minimum conditions, the **$300 billion** are a blank cheque to the Iranian regime with no guarantee of results. **The peace Trump calls victory deserves that name only if it is as real on paper as it is in the speeches.**

*My final position on the $300 billion is nuanced and uncomfortable: I do not reject them a priori — I demand them conditional. Conditional on real inspections. Conditional on verifiable nuclear limitations. Conditional on regional behavioural mechanisms. A deal that meets these conditions deserves to be supported, even at this price. A deal that does not meet them, whatever sum is announced, does not deserve to be called a victory. The distinction between these two positions is precisely what the American public debate on Iran struggles most to grasp.*

## European companies facing the $300 billion: the rush toward Iran

### A market of 90 million consumers opening after years of closure

Behind the geopolitical analyses and the debates over nuclear verification, there is a concrete economic reality that the European business community has clearly identified: a normalised **Iran** represents a market of **90 million inhabitants**, a potential economy worth **$500 billion**, and petroleum and gas resources among the largest in the world. French, German, Italian, and British companies that had massively pulled out of **Iran** after the American withdrawal from the JCPOA in **2018** — under pain of American secondary sanctions — are now watching with appetite the prospect of returning.

**TotalEnergies** had to abandon a multi-billion-euro gas contract in **2018**. **Airbus** had cancelled the delivery of **100 aircraft** ordered by Iranian airlines. **Peugeot** and **Renault** had to withdraw from their Iranian joint ventures. The amounts lost run to tens of billions of euros. The potential return to that market, if the deal holds and American sanctions are stably lifted, is a prospect that European boardrooms are already considering with enthusiasm. **In business, the memory of lost markets is a powerful driving force.**

### The risk of American secondary sanctions and Europe's dollar dependency

The return of European companies to **Iran** will not be without risk. The main constraint remains the **"extraterritoriality"** of American sanctions: even if the **European Union** lifts its own sanctions and allows its companies to trade with **Iran**, transactions denominated in **US dollars** remain potentially subject to American jurisdiction. Yet virtually all petroleum transactions and large-scale infrastructure financing are denominated in dollars. A European company that resumes Iranian operations on a dollarised basis exposes itself to American prosecution if the deal deteriorates and sanctions are reimposed.

This reality creates a structural brake on European engagement in **Iran** that the announced **$300 billion** cannot erase with a wave of a diplomatic wand. Large European companies will demand solid legal guarantees — probably an American law rather than a mere executive agreement — before recommitting billions to a market whose access was already brutally cut once by a change of administration. **Markets have long memories of sanctions, and caution is not timidity — it is risk management.**

*The predictable rush of European companies toward the Iranian market worries me for a precise reason: it will create economic interests that will resist future sanctions even if Iran violates its commitments. That is exactly what happened with German dependency on Russian gas — economic interests built over years made the necessary break politically costly. If the $300 billion create the same type of European economic dependencies toward Iran, the leverage on Tehran will weaken precisely when it may be most needed.*

## The West's moral debt to Iranian citizens

### Sanctions impoverished a population without changing a regime

The **$300 billion** at the heart of the **Washington — Tehran** debate also represent an occasion to reflect on what decades of sanctions have accomplished — and failed to accomplish. The Iranian population has paid a considerable economic price: chronic inflation, high unemployment, difficult access to medicines and technologies, massive devaluation of its savings, and the forced emigration of its educated youth. These genuine sufferings have not, for the most part, changed the nuclear or regional behaviour of the **Revolutionary Guards**' regime.

There is an **implicit moral debt** in this reality: the West imposed sanctions knowing they would strike ordinary citizens first, in the hope — often disappointed — that an impoverished people would overthrow its government. That calculation has proven false in many historical cases. Authoritarian regimes insulate themselves from the economic consequences of their choices by attributing them to a foreign enemy. **A people under sanctions does not necessarily topple its government — they often make that government more legitimate in the eyes of those who prefer national unity in the face of foreign hostility.**

### Economic normalisation and its potential effects on Iranian civil society

The strongest argument in favour of economic normalisation is its potential impact on **Iranian civil society**. An economy that opens to the world creates cultural exchanges, professional connections, flows of information and human capital that strengthen modernising forces inside the country. The **"Woman, Life, Freedom"** movement of **2022** demonstrated the vitality of Iranian civil society and its aspiration for a different Iran. Economic normalisation could give these forces resources and connections they currently lack.

This argument is not a certainty — **Saudi Arabia** is economically open without being democratic, and **China** has developed a prosperous market economy without abandoning its authoritarian political system. But Iranian society is fundamentally different from both those cases: more educated, more urbanised, more culturally exposed to the West, with a rich intellectual and political tradition. The prospects for internal change toward a more pluralist Iran are real — even if they are not guaranteed. **Betting on Iranian civil society may be the smartest long-term wager.**

*I have a personal difficulty with sanctions as a foreign-policy tool — not because they never work, but because they often punish the wrong people. In Iran, decades of sanctions have impoverished students, professors, engineers, and artists who have nothing to do with the decisions of the Revolutionary Guards. If the $300 billion benefit these people rather than the regime's structures, then even an imperfect deal is better than the continuation of sanctions with perverse effects. The difficulty is designing one that distinguishes the beneficiaries.*

## Political communication around the $300 billion: selling the deal to public opinion

### Trump and the rhetoric of financial victory

The **Trump** administration has chosen to present the **Washington — Tehran** deal primarily in financial terms: **$300 billion**, presented as a combination of investments and unfrozen assets benefiting the American economy. This rhetoric responds to a precise political logic: it translates a complex diplomatic agreement into a simple, comprehensible figure, allowing the president to boast of an economic "victory" before an electoral base sceptical of complex foreign policy.

But this presentation can be misleading about the actual beneficiaries. The **$300 billion** do not flow directly into American coffers — they largely consist of unfrozen Iranian assets and potential foreign investments in Iran. The portion directly beneficial to the American economy is far more limited than the astronomical figure suggests. This rhetorical exaggeration creates expectations that could backfire against the deal if the concrete economic benefits for American citizens are slow to materialise. **Selling a diplomatic deal as a financial coup risks having people demand their dividend when it fails to arrive.**

### How Tehran sells the deal to its own population

On the other side, the Iranian regime must sell the deal to a population deeply suspicious of the **United States**, traumatised by past experiences with the JCPOA, and aware that any agreement signed can be unilaterally repudiated by the next American administration. The Iranian official rhetoric presents the deal as a **victory of resistance** — proof that firmness in the face of Western pressure ultimately pays. This narrative is politically useful for the regime, but it obscures the real concessions that **Tehran** had to make to reach a deal.

These contradictory narratives — American victory on one side, Iranian victory on the other — are in reality complementary in their functioning. Each party needs to present the deal as a success to its own domestic audiences in order to obtain the political buy-in necessary for implementation. This is not lying — it is the cultural translation of a necessarily ambiguous deal. **A good diplomatic agreement leaves each party believing it obtained the essentials — even if the reality always lies in the details of the verification mechanisms.**

*The $300-billion rhetoric irritates me somewhat, I must admit. Not because the figure is entirely invented, but because it transforms a global nuclear security issue into a financial transaction. The Iran deal should not be sold as a business move — it should be presented for what it is: a difficult compromise on an existential security question, with real benefits and real risks. Americans deserve that honesty. And so do Iranians.*

## The critical voices worth hearing

### Arguments from sceptics who are not all unreasoning hawks

Critics of the **Washington — Tehran** deal do not all reduce to militaristic hawks who prefer confrontation to negotiation. Several serious and well-informed observers raise substantive objections that deserve to be taken seriously rather than dismissed as political obstruction. The sceptics include former JCPOA negotiators who know Iranian delaying tactics intimately, non-proliferation experts who have analysed the technical limits of the proposed verification mechanisms, and representatives of countries neighbouring **Iran** that will live directly with the deal's consequences.

Their central argument is this: a deal with **Iran** that does not fundamentally resolve the question of the **nuclear threshold** — Iran's capability to produce a bomb within weeks if it decides to — does not durably reduce the risk, it merely defers it. If the deal allows **Iran** to maintain enrichment capabilities at moderate levels while continuing to develop its ballistic missiles and support its regional proxies, then in ten years a economically strengthened but politically unchanged Iran may be more dangerous than today. **Sceptics are not opposed to diplomacy — they are opposed to a diplomacy that misses its objectives while settling for an apparent victory.**

### The necessary synthesis of optimism and vigilance

The answer to these critiques is not to reject the deal, but to impose on it the verification conditions and consequences that would allow it to be validated in the course of implementation. A deal with **"automatic corrective measures"** — sanctions instantly reinstated upon any violation confirmed by the **IAEA**, without any possibility of Russian or Chinese veto in the **Security Council** — would be infinitely more robust than the JCPOA's 2015 mechanisms.

The synthesis between optimism and vigilance requires not treating sceptics as enemies of peace, but as indispensable checks on the quality of the agreement. The **60 days** of finalisation should incorporate their objections into the final texts — not ignore them in the euphoria of signing. **A deal concluded in diplomatic euphoria without having answered substantive objections is a deal that carries within it the seeds of its own collapse.**

*I genuinely believe that ignoring serious sceptics would be an error. Not because their pessimism is always justified, but because their precise objections on verification mechanisms, suspect military sites, and consequences for regional proxies are questions that must find answers in the final text of the deal. A deal that non-proliferation experts judge robust is worth infinitely more than a deal that communicators find politically sellable. And for now, we have yet to see the demonstration that the coming 60 days will produce the former rather than the latter.*

## The future of the Strait of Hormuz under the deal: navigation freedoms and concrete guarantees

### Rubio's declaration on Hormuz: beyond the words

Secretary of State **Rubio**'s declaration that there could be no **"tolls in the Strait of Hormuz"** is one of the most direct and important formulations of the deal — and one of the least spelled out in its guarantee mechanisms. The **Strait of Hormuz** is the passage through which approximately **20% of the world's oil** and **one-third of liquefied natural gas** transported by sea flow. **Iran** controls one shore of the strait and has threatened on several occasions, during moments of maximum tension, to close this strategic passage.

**Rubio**'s declaration sets a political condition — but what are the concrete guarantees? If **Iran** attempts to mine the strait or block vessels under the pretext of **"customs inspections"** two years from now, what would the American response be? Does the **Islamabad** memorandum include an explicit Iranian commitment never to restrict freedom of navigation through the strait, with predefined consequences in case of violation? If not, **Rubio**'s declaration, however firm, is merely a political statement — not a legal guarantee. **A promise without a defined consequence is not a guarantee — it is a pious wish dressed up as foreign policy.**

### The economic value of a guaranteed Hormuz

Quantifying the economic value of a guaranteed open **Strait of Hormuz** is difficult, but the orders of magnitude are staggering. A prolonged closure of the strait would immediately cause global oil and gas prices to explode — some estimates suggest a **50% to 100%** rise in the price of a barrel within the first weeks of such a crisis. Developed economies, which have reduced but not eliminated their hydrocarbon vulnerability, would be struck by an inflation and recession with systemic effects. Developing economies, less resilient, could be potentially devastated.

That is why **Rubio**'s statement on **Hormuz** goes beyond mere diplomatic rhetoric — it touches on a global economic interest of the first importance. If the **Washington — Tehran** deal includes a credible guarantee of freedom of navigation through the strait, that single provision justifies a large portion of the concessions made to obtain it. The question remains whether the guarantee is strong enough to hold through a future crisis — and it is precisely the quality of the verification and response mechanisms that will make the difference. **A free and guaranteed Hormuz is worth infinitely more than the announced $300 billion — it is the real strategic dividend of this deal.**

*Rubio's declaration on Hormuz is, in my view, the most important sentence in this entire file. Not because it is new — the United States has always said it would defend freedom of navigation in the Gulf. But because it was made in the context of a deal that gives Iran additional resources. If those resources strengthen Iran's capacity to threaten the strait, Rubio's declaration will need to be backed up with real firepower, not just words. And at that point, America and its allies will need to decide whether Hormuz peace is worth the price of a confrontation with a strengthened Iran.*

## Conclusion: Trump's victory or a world pinching itself

### Calling things by their name

Three hundred billion dollars to normalise a regime that funds armed groups throughout the **Middle East**, that has enriched uranium to levels close to the weapons threshold, and that offered within the **first 48 hours** a contradictory narrative of what it accepted on nuclear inspections — that is a risky bet that **Donald Trump** calls a victory. I say it plainly: it is not a victory as long as the fundamental conditions — real inspections, verifiable nuclear limitations — are not fulfilled in the final text.

But it may be the best bet available in a situation that offers no good options. Diplomacy is often the choice of the least bad. And if the **60-day** roadmap produces a deal that keeps its promises on the nuclear file and on **Hormuz**, I will be the first to acknowledge that **Trump** accomplished something significant. **But $300 billion deserves real guarantees, not contradictory narratives and diplomatic ambiguities dressed up as triumph.**

### What history will remember

History will remember this deal for what it actually produces, not for what **Trump** says about it in his speeches. If the **Iran** of **2031** is a military nuclear power that used the **$300 billion** to fund its arsenal and regional proxies, the **2026** deal will be the canonical example of diplomatic capitulation dressed up as victory. If the **Iran** of **2031** has verifiably limited its nuclear programme, reduced its regional destabilisation activities, and maintained freedom of navigation through **Hormuz**, then the **$300 billion** will have been an investment in regional peace. **History's verdict will be delivered in 2031** — not in **2026**, in the victory speeches.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*Three hundred billion for Iran — that Trump calls victory and others call a risk — is the formulation of a wager on the economic rationality of a regime that has not always been rational. If the bet succeeds, if a normalised Iran chooses prosperity over adventurism, then one can say Trump was right. If the bet fails, if the freed billions feed proxies, missiles, and nuclear ambition, then the world will have paid a very high price for the triumphalism of a signing photo. The coming 60 days will tell us whether the guarantees are solid enough that we do not have to play heads or tails with global security.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ground News — Islamabad Memorandum: 14 points, $300 billion, Iranian reconstruction — June 23, 2026](https://ground.news/article/b656df9e-fc5e-46f1-a8e0-3254c5ac107a)

- [Al Jazeera — What the US and Iran agreed and disagreed on on the first day of talks — June 23, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/23/what-the-us-and-iran-agreed-and-disagreed-on-first-day-of-talks)

- [Al Jazeera — Trump and Tehran at odds over nuclear inspections and Hormuz — June 24, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/6/24/iran-war-live-trump-tehran-at-odds-over-nuclear-inspections-hormuz)

- [WWNO/NPR — US-Iran roadmap announcement — June 21, 2026](https://www.wwno.org/npr-news/2026-06-21/the-u-s-and-iran-agree-to-a-road-map-for-a-final-deal-mediators-say)

### Secondary sources

- [Washington Times — Divergent US-Iran narratives on inspections — June 23, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/23/us-iran-offer-different-stories-nuclear-inspections-negotiations/)

- [The Guardian — Context of American foreign policy — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-trois-cents-milliards-pour-l-iran-le-prix-exorbitant-d-une-paix-que-tr