# EDITORIAL: Three hundred billion for Iran: the price of a false victory

> 300 billion dollars. That is the figure that circulated in dispatches of June 23, 2026 concerning the framework of the US-Iran agreement — the famous Islamabad MoU documented by Ground News. Three hundred billion in reconstruction for Iran. Three hundred billion for a regime that has financed Hezbollah, armed the Houthis, supplied drones to Russia to strike Ukrainian cities, an

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-trois-cents-milliards-pour-l-iran-le-prix-d-une-fausse-victoire

## Introduction: when the number becomes the symbol

### A figure that shocks and raises questions

**300 billion dollars**. That is the figure that circulated in dispatches of **June 23, 2026** concerning the framework of the US-Iran agreement — the famous **Islamabad MoU** documented by **Ground News**. Three hundred billion in reconstruction for **Iran**. Three hundred billion for a regime that has financed **Hezbollah**, armed the **Houthis**, supplied drones to **Russia** to strike Ukrainian cities, and whose leaders still chant **"Death to America"** at official rallies. This figure demands an explanation. This editorial attempts to provide one — honest, without complacency.

Let us begin with what this figure **is not**. It is not an American check made out to the Iranian regime. Nor is it a budget approved by Congress. According to available analyses, the **$300 billion** represents an **estimate of potential foreign investment** — oil, infrastructure, industry — that could flow into **Iran** if sanctions were lifted and the economic environment became attractive again. It is a projection, not a wire transfer. The distinction is crucial. But in political communication, projections quickly become realities, and realities become commitments.

### Why this figure hurts regardless

Even if the **$300 billion** is a projection and not a direct financial commitment, it reflects a troubling strategic fact: **lifting sanctions on Iran** means restoring its access to considerable oil revenues and international investment flows that would economically strengthen a regime that has withstood two decades of economic pressure while continuing to finance destabilizing actors. The legitimate question is: **what behavior are we rewarding?** And the honest answer is: behavior that has not fundamentally changed.

**Iran** has reduced — under pressure — certain of its most visible activities. It has moderated its weapons deliveries to the **Houthis** after American and Israeli strikes. It has toned down some of its most explosive declarations. But the foreign policy structure that produces these behaviors — the **Revolutionary Guards**, the revolutionary ideology, the will to challenge the American order in the Middle East — remains intact. And it is this structure that the **$300 billion** in reconstruction would contribute to perpetuating.

*I want to be clear about my position: I am not against diplomacy with Iran. I am against a diplomacy that pays the price of peace without demanding the behavioral change that would justify that price. Offering $300 billion in economic prospects to a regime that continues to threaten its neighbors and support armed groups is a failure to understand the political economy of authoritarian regimes. They interpret concessions not as a good-faith gesture, but as proof that pressure works and that they can obtain even more.*

## Iran and Russia: an armed complicity that complicates everything

### Iranian drones over Ukrainian cities

It is impossible to analyze the US-Iran agreement without mentioning a fact that should weigh heavily on the Western conscience: **Iran supplied Russia with Shahed drones** that struck Ukrainian cities, civilian infrastructure. These drones have killed civilians, destroyed homes, deprived millions of Ukrainians of water and electricity. This complicity in the Russian aggression against **Ukraine** is not an allegation: it is a documented reality, confirmed by debris analyses.

In **June 2026**, while American and Iranian negotiators meet in **Switzerland**, Ukrainian forces continue to face Iranian drones. This simultaneity must be named. It does not mean that negotiations should not take place. But any agreement that does not include an explicit clause on halting weapons deliveries to **Russia** is an incomplete agreement that finances its own victims.

### Behavioral conditionality

Demanding a change in **Iran**'s regional behavior in exchange for economic concessions is described as utopian by certain analysts. These same analysts would be the first to condemn an agreement that **Iran** would use to finance even more destabilizing operations in the region. There is a contradiction in this position: one cannot afford to demand the behavior, but one cannot afford to ignore it either.

The pragmatic answer is an architecture of progressive conditionality: lifting sanctions in stages, each stage conditioned not only on progress on the nuclear issue but on measurable signs of reduced support for armed proxies. This is not perfect — these signs are difficult to measure. But it is incomparably better than sanctions relief without any behavioral conditionality.

*Every Iranian drone that explodes over a Ukrainian city should weigh on the dossier of whoever is negotiating with **Tehran**. It does not weigh enough. I understand the logic of diplomatic silos. But when the same regime to which you offer **$300 billion** in prospects supplies the weapons that kill your allies, you need a clause on halting those deliveries. That is not excessive. It is the minimum of moral coherence.*

## Global dependence on Hormuz: Iran's real leverage

### Twenty percent of the world's oil through 21 kilometers

To understand why the **United States** accepts making significant concessions to **Iran**, one must understand the reality of **Hormuz**. Every day, approximately **21 million barrels of oil** — representing **20% of global consumption** — transit through this strait, only **21 kilometers** wide at its narrowest point. Added to this are the massive volumes of **Qatari LNG**. A temporary closure of **Hormuz** would trigger a price surge capable of triggering a global recession.

This vulnerability is **Iran**'s principal leverage in negotiations. It will not disappear with a nuclear agreement. It will exist as long as global economies depend on hydrocarbons. But the agreement can at least create a mechanism that makes the use of this leverage more costly for **Tehran** — by ensuring that any untimely closure would automatically trigger a return of the heaviest economic sanctions.

### Limited alternative routes

Alternative routes exist — the **Petroline pipeline** in **Saudi Arabia**, the **Habshan-Fujairah pipeline** in the **UAE** — but their combined capacities cover only a fraction of normal **Hormuz** volumes. In the event of a prolonged closure, these alternatives would not be sufficient to prevent a major supply crisis. This reality explains why the **US Fifth Fleet** has been positioned in the region for decades, and why all successive American administrations have given absolute priority to freedom of navigation in the strait.

The direct communication line on **Hormuz** provided for in the road map is therefore more than a diplomatic gesture. It is a risk management mechanism for the global economy. Even declared adversaries have an interest in maintaining communication to prevent tactical incidents from spiraling into an economic crisis that would strike their own economies as well.

*Global dependence on **Hormuz** oil is the vulnerability our societies have not resolved. We have been talking about energy transition for forty years. In **2026**, we are still negotiating with the Mullahs' regime because 21 kilometers of sea control 20% of the world's oil supply. It is a collective lesson in humility about the gap between our transition ambitions and our current dependence.*

## What Europe must demand from the US-Iran agreement

### European interests in the negotiations

**Europe** has direct interests in the outcome of US-Iran negotiations, even if it is not at the table in **Switzerland**. Economically, lifting Iranian sanctions would open markets to European companies — oil, construction, transportation, agri-food. These commercial interests are real and legitimate. From a security standpoint, an **Iran** with advanced nuclear capabilities is a much closer threat to **Europe** than to the **United States**.

These two interests — economic and security — can point in opposite directions. An imperfect nuclear agreement that opens Iranian markets will serve short-term economic interests while weakening long-term security. **Europe** must clearly decide on the order of its priorities and make this position known to **Washington** — not to block an agreement, but to ensure it is robust enough to deserve European support.

### The lessons of the JCPOA for the European position

**Europe** experienced the American withdrawal from the **JCPOA** in **2018** as a betrayal. It had invested politically and economically in that agreement, encouraged its companies to invest in it, and found itself exposed to American counter-sanctions when **Trump** withdrew. This traumatic experience should make Europeans more demanding about the institutional robustness of the new agreement — not less demanding.

The legitimate European demand is therefore for an agreement anchored in a durable multilateral structure — a **Security Council** resolution, a formal treaty with precise obligations, an automatic snapback mechanism. These elements would reduce the agreement's vulnerability to changes in American administrations and would allow **Europe** to associate itself with it in full knowledge of the facts.

***Europe** has learned the hard way what it means to invest in an agreement the other party can tear up unilaterally. The lesson should be: only endorse an agreement if it has sufficient institutional foundations to survive a change of government in **Washington**. This is not distrust of the **United States** — it is elementary diplomatic prudence after the experience of **2018**.*

## Regional actors facing the agreement

### Israel between vigilance and unilateral action

**Israel** is the regional actor most determined to prevent any agreement that would economically strengthen **Iran** without dismantling its advanced nuclear capabilities. The **Netanyahu** government maintains a doctrine that considers an **Iran with nuclear weapons capability** to be an existential threat. This position reflects a real strategic analysis: an **Iran** capable of producing a weapon in a matter of weeks fundamentally changes the regional deterrence balance, even without using it.

**Israel** possesses military capabilities to strike Iranian nuclear sites — and this threat, whatever its degree of operational realism in a given scenario, weighs on the calculations of all actors. An agreement that **Tehran** perceives as humiliating can trigger reprisals that threaten Israeli security. An agreement that is too lenient can push **Israel** to act unilaterally. This Israeli sword of Damocles is a permanent factor that negotiators must manage.

### The Gulf and the potential arms race

**Saudi Arabia**, the **United Arab Emirates** and other **Gulf** monarchies are watching US-Iran negotiations with deep suspicion. These countries see an economically strengthened **Iran** as an even more dangerous regional adversary. And some Saudi officials have suggested that if **Iran** retained advanced nuclear capability, the **kingdom** might seek to develop its own capabilities — triggering a chain proliferation in the world's most unstable region.

This threat of regional proliferation is the strongest argument for demanding a genuinely robust nuclear agreement. An agreement that does not dismantle Iranian advanced centrifuges does not resolve the proliferation problem — it aggravates it by implicitly legitimizing the maintenance of these capabilities, and by giving other regional actors a pretext to develop their own. The robustness of the Iranian nuclear agreement is therefore a matter of security not just bilaterally but regionally and globally.

*The nuclear arms race in the **Middle East** is the scenario nobody wants but everyone is fueling through bad decisions. If **Iran** keeps its advanced centrifuges, **Saudi Arabia** wants its own. If **Saudi Arabia** wants them, others will follow. A nuclear agreement with **Iran** that does not block this dynamic is not just insufficient — it is potentially counterproductive over the very long term.*

## What the $300 billion would actually fund

### The mechanics of financial flows in Iran

To understand why the **$300 billion** are problematic even if they are primarily foreign private investments, one must understand the **economic structure of Iran**. The Iranian state — controlled in large part by the **Revolutionary Guards** and their affiliated companies — captures a considerable proportion of all economic flows in the country. **Pasdaran** companies hold dominant positions in oil, construction, telecommunications, transportation. Foreign investments in these sectors necessarily pass through partnerships with these entities.

In other words, **investing in Iran** — even in civilian infrastructure projects — partly amounts to capitalizing entities controlled by the **IRGC**. This is not a conspiracy theory: it is the documented reality of Iranian political economy. **Western nations** that would push their companies to invest in **Iran** under an agreement would objectively contribute to strengthening the economic power of the **Revolutionary Guards** — the same ones who plan destabilizing operations in the region.

### Iranian oil and global markets

The most directly quantifiable dimension of the **"$300 billion reconstruction"** is the lifting of oil sanctions. **Iran** possesses the **world's fourth largest proven oil reserves** and **second largest natural gas reserves**. Before the maximum sanctions of **2018**, it exported approximately **2.5 million barrels per day**. Today, it exports illegally — primarily to **China** — approximately **1.5 million**. Restoring legal exports of **2.5 million** at **$75-80 per barrel** represents approximately **$70 billion in annual revenues** for the Iranian state — a substantial portion of which will inevitably go toward financing exactly the activities that pose a problem.

The pressure on global **oil markets** from Iran returning to maximum exports is also a factor to consider. In the short term, more supply means lower prices — which benefits Western consumers. But durably low prices weaken allied producer countries — **Saudi Arabia**, the **UAE**, **Iraq** — and reduce their capacity to maintain investment levels in their own defense and stability. Immediate economic benefits carry medium-term strategic costs.

*Free Iranian oil on the markets lowers prices at the pump in Europe and the United States. That is politically attractive. And it is exactly the type of short-term reasoning that produces long-term strategic mistakes. We did the same with Russian gas for twenty years, telling ourselves that economic interdependence would make Putin reasonable. We know how that ended.*

## The temptation of the "deal" and its precedents

### The JCPOA legacy: lessons unlearned

The **2015 JCPOA** is the precedent one cannot ignore in analyzing any new agreement with **Iran**. That agreement had real qualities: it had effectively reduced Iranian enrichment, it had strengthened **IAEA** inspections, and it had produced a stabilization of tensions during its period of implementation. But it also had structural defects that led to its collapse: the **sunset clauses** that allowed **Iran** to resume its activities after a few years, the gaps regarding military sites, and the absence of a sufficiently robust automatic sanctions mechanism.

The American withdrawal from the **JCPOA** in **2018** certainly worsened the situation. But it is dishonest to pretend that the agreement was perfect and that the entire problem stems from the American withdrawal. The **JCPOA** was an imperfect first step. What the new agreement must be is a far more demanding step — on inspections, on advanced centrifuges, on **Iran**'s regional behavior. If the new agreement reproduces the same defects dressed up in **$300 billion**, it will produce the same results, only worse.

### Trump and the art of the deal: victory before substance

One must name this risk specific to the current administration: **Donald Trump** has a particular relationship with diplomatic agreements. For him, an agreement is above all a narrative — something one can announce as a **"historic victory,"** photograph with smiles and handshakes, and present to his electoral base as proof of his superior negotiating skills. The content of the agreement is secondary to its appearance of success.

This logic has produced agreements that held — the **Abraham Accords** are a relatively positive example. It has also produced declarations of victory on very fragile foundations — such as the repeated announcements on **North Korea**, whose nuclear program continued to advance during and after talks with **Kim**. **Iran** is infinitely more sophisticated diplomatically than **North Korea** and will not hesitate to exploit the Trumpian preference for appearance over substance.

*Trump wants an Iranian agreement as a foreign policy trophy. Iran wants the money. These two motivations can produce a signed text. They cannot produce a lasting peace. What we should demand — we, citizens of the democracies who will have to live with the consequences — is an agreement that holds, not an agreement that shines. The difference between the two is measured in verification and sanction mechanisms, not in signing ceremonies.*

## The conditions for a real agreement

### What is non-negotiable

An agreement with **Iran** that merits the name must contain non-negotiable elements. First: the **verified destruction** or **transfer abroad** of the advanced **IR-6** and **IR-8** centrifuges, which reduce the warning time to a matter of weeks. Second: **IAEA inspections without delay** at any designated site, including military ones. Third: an **automatic snapback mechanism** for sanctions in case of violation — with no possible veto — triggered within **30 days** following a non-compliance finding certified by the **IAEA**.

Fourth, and this is the most difficult point: a verifiable Iranian commitment to halt weapons deliveries to non-state armed groups in the region. This commitment must be followed by measurable effects — documented reduction of support for **Hezbollah**, the **Houthis**, militias in **Iraq** and **Syria**. Without this fourth pillar, the first three allow **Iran** to sign on the nuclear issue while continuing to destabilize the region by other means. That is precisely what the **$300 billion** in economic prospects would make possible.

### Europe's role in monitoring the agreement

**Europe** — including **France**, **Germany** and the **United Kingdom** who co-signed the **JCPOA** — must play an active role in constructing the verification mechanism of the new agreement, not simply in blessing it diplomatically. The **E3** have technical expertise on Iranian nuclear issues that the **United States** must use and not merely tolerate. And they have their own interest in the agreement holding: they are geographically closer to a nuclear **Iran** than **Washington**, and the consequences of an agreement's collapse would affect them more directly.

But **Europe** must also be honest about its motivations: its companies want to regain access to the Iranian market — **Total**, **Airbus**, the automotive manufacturers. This economic interest creates a bias toward signing an agreement, even an imperfect one. The role of civil society and European media is to name this conflict of interest and demand that governments place security ahead of short-term commercial profits.

*Europe must choose: does it want to be a normative power that demands robust verification standards, or does it want to be a market impatiently waiting to sell Airbuses to Tehran? These two roles are incompatible in the next 60 days. I hope the first option prevails. The recent history of European policy toward authoritarian regimes invites caution on this point.*

## Conclusion: avoiding the false victory

### Defining victory by durability, not by announcement

A **"false victory"** in nuclear diplomacy is an agreement that allows its signatories to announce a breakthrough, temporarily calming markets and public opinion, but that reproduces the conditions of its own failure. The **JCPOA** was a genuine advance that became a false victory when it collapsed. The agreement taking shape for **2026** can follow the same trajectory if the lessons of **2015** are not integrated.

A real victory would be an agreement that the **IAEA** can actually verify, that the parties can actually maintain, and that measurably reduces the risk of nuclear proliferation. This is not impossible. **Iran** has already shown that it can respect agreements when its economic interests are sufficiently tied to them. The question is not whether **Iran** can honor its commitments. It is whether the agreement creates sufficient incentives for it to do so — and sufficient consequences if it does not.

### The moment of truth in 60 days

In **60 days**, around **August 20, 2026**, we will know whether the **June 2026** road map produced an agreement or a failure. This text will be reread on that date. If an agreement has been signed, the question will be: does it contain the essential elements enumerated above? If yes, it will deserve to be supported despite its inevitable imperfections. If not, it will deserve to be criticized rigorously, whatever political celebration accompanies it. And if negotiations have collapsed, the question will be who refused the necessary compromises — and to say so clearly, without false diplomatic balance.

*This work of documentation, deterrence, preparation — it is the very definition of what democracies do best when they behave as democracies: anticipate threats, name them, and respond to them with actions before the crisis imposes its own logic. It is never perfect, often too slow, sometimes contradictory. But it is incomparably better than the complacent silence that too often preceded the great catastrophes of the last century.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ground News — Islamabad MoU: the 14 points of the US-Iran framework agreement — June 23, 2026](https://ground.news/article/b656df9e-fc5e-46f1-a8e0-3254c5ac107a)

- [WWNO/NPR — The United States and Iran agree on a road map — June 21, 2026](https://www.wwno.org/npr-news/2026-06-21/the-u-s-and-iran-agree-to-a-road-map-for-a-final-deal-mediators-say)

- [Al Jazeera — US-Iran disagreement on Hormuz and nuclear inspections — June 24, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/6/24/iran-war-live-trump-tehran-at-odds-over-nuclear-inspections-hormuz)

- [Al Jazeera — What the US and Iran agreed on during the first day of talks — June 23, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/23/what-the-us-and-iran-agreed-and-disagreed-on-first-day-of-talks)

### Secondary sources

- [Washington Times — Divergent narratives on nuclear inspections — June 23, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/23/us-iran-offer-different-stories-nuclear-inspections-negotiations/)

- [The Guardian — NATO leaders and American reliability — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-trois-cents-milliards-pour-l-iran-le-prix-d-une-fausse-victoire