# EDITORIAL: Taiwan — when Chinese coast guards invent a "jurisdiction" that does not exist

> On June 7, 2026, Chinese vessels launched what they called a "maritime law enforcement operation" in the waters east of Taiwan. That

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-26
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-taiwan-quand-les-garde-cotes-chinois-inventent-une-juridiction-qui-n-e

## Introduction: the sea as the terrain of legal fiction

### June 7, 2026 in the waters east of **Taiwan**

On **June 7, 2026**, Chinese vessels launched what they called a "**maritime law enforcement operation**" in the waters east of **Taiwan**. That vocabulary is precise and deliberate. This is not a "**military** operation" — that would be too openly aggressive. It is not a "patrol" — that would be too mundane. It is a "law enforcement operation," which assumes the exercise of **legitimate jurisdiction** over waters where **China** has none under international law.

That is the heart of this editorial: **China** is constructing a legal fiction of maritime **sovereignty** around **Taiwan**, repeating gray-zone operations until they are considered normal. And the **West**, too often, looks the other way.

### The incident's numbers

The facts are documented. **4 Chinese vessels** were expelled by Taiwan's coast guard. **7 Taiwanese patrol vessels** were deployed. The vessels remained in a **standoff at 33 nautical miles** southeast of the island. For the **first time**, a Chinese surveillance ship and a coast guard vessel operated jointly in the area — something Taiwan's authorities described as "unprecedented coordination designed to provoke **Taiwan**." And all of this occurs against the backdrop of a daily deployment of **40 to 50 Chinese vessels** in the **South China** Sea.

*I read the figures from this incident — 4 vessels expelled, 7 vessels deployed, a standoff at 33 nautical miles — and I see a precisely calibrated military choreography. This is not improvisation. This is a carefully planned response test. **China** is learning by doing, incident by incident, what the limits of Taiwan's and the international community's reactions are. It is a strategy of learning through gradual escalation.*

## The "gray zone" doctrine: what **Beijing** is building

### Definition and mechanics

The **gray-zone strategy** consists of exerting pressure and extending influence through means that remain below the threshold that would trigger a formal military response. Coast guard vessels rather than **warships**. "Law enforcement operations" rather than military maneuvers. Access barriers rather than formal blockades. This strategy is both effective and difficult to counter: it forces the adversary either to respond with disproportionate force that can be presented as aggression, or to let the incident pass, which validates Beijing's sovereignty claim.

**China** refined this strategy in the **South China** Sea — in the Spratly Islands, at Scarborough Reef — with success. It is now applying it east of Taiwan, in even more strategically significant waters.

### The invocation of Japan-Philippines negotiations as a pretext

The **June 7** operation cited **Japan-Philippines negotiations** as its contextual justification. This is pure geopolitical cynicism: using a regional diplomatic dynamic as a pretext for an action that has no direct connection to it. The real objective is to assert that **China** exercises surveillance and jurisdiction over these waters, independently of what is happening elsewhere. The pretext changes — the strategy remains constant.

*Using Japan-Philippines negotiations as a pretext for an operation in the waters east of Taiwan — this is the geopolitics of the absurd elevated to a method. **Beijing** knows nobody believes this connection. That is precisely the point: demonstrating that it can act without even needing a credible justification. It is the most arrogant display of power imaginable.*

## UNCLOS: the rule China chooses to ignore

### A signatory that does not respect the treaty

**China** is a signatory to the **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)**. This convention defines the rights and obligations of states in their exclusive economic zones, their territorial waters and international waters. It precisely fixes the limits of each state's maritime jurisdiction.

And yet, according to an analysis published in the **Taipei Times** on **June 21, 2026**, **China** "does not fully adhere to UNCLOS despite being a signatory." That is legal diplomatic language for: China uses international law when it suits its interests, and ignores or unilaterally reinterprets it when it contradicts its territorial ambitions.

### The 2016 precedent: the Hague Arbitration Court

In **2016**, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at **The Hague** delivered an unambiguous ruling: Chinese claims in the South China Sea based on the "nine-dash line" are incompatible with UNCLOS. **China** simply refused to acknowledge the decision. It declared the tribunal incompetent, denied the validity of the proceedings, and continued its activities in the South China Sea as if the ruling did not exist.

*China refuses a ruling from The Hague Court on maritime law, then invokes principles of "maritime law enforcement" to justify its operations around Taiwan. This is the height of legal hypocrisy. But hypocrisy is not a legal argument, and China knows it. What matters to it is not rules — it is facts on the ground, or rather on the water.*

## The first coast guard + surveillance ship coordination

### A significant tactical novelty

One of the most troubling elements of the **June 7, 2026** incident is the **first documented coordination** between a Chinese surveillance vessel and a coast guard ship during an operation around Taiwan. Coast guard vessels are para-military actors — they carry light weapons, they operate under a law-enforcement rather than naval combat doctrine. Surveillance vessels are intelligence-gathering actors.

Operating together around Taiwan combines the intelligence function (mapping Taiwan's responses, testing procedures) with the presence function (asserting claimed sovereignty). It is also harder to respond to militarily: opening fire on a coast guard vessel would be interpreted very differently than responding to a warship.

### What this signals for the future

This unprecedented coordination is likely the first of many. **China** methodically tests new configurations, observes responses and adjusts its methods. The June 7, 2026 operation is a rehearsal — not necessarily for an imminent conflict, but for sustained and growing pressure that aims to normalize Chinese presence in waters **Beijing** is unilaterally claiming.

*The gray-zone doctrine is a strategy of infinite patience. China is in no hurry. It accumulates precedents, tests responses, normalizes its presence. Faced with this strategic patience, the West must develop its own persistence — not in escalation, but in the constancy and coherence of its responses. Democracy can be patient too. It has been in the past. It must be again, now, around Taiwan.*

## Taiwan's response: firm and controlled

### 7 patrol vessels and the expulsion of intruders

**Taiwan's coast guard** responded rapidly and firmly: deploying **7 patrol vessels** and expelling the **4 Chinese vessels**. This is a proportionate and professional response. Taiwan did not escalate — it simply exercised its sovereign rights in its own waters and expelled intruders.

*The gray-zone doctrine is a strategy of infinite patience. China is in no hurry. It accumulates precedents, tests responses, normalizes its presence. Faced with this strategic patience, the West must develop its own persistence in the constancy and coherence of its responses. Democracy can be patient. It has been in the past. It must be again now around Taiwan.*

But Taiwan also knows that each such incident tests not only its own response capabilities but also the international reaction — and most crucially, the American reaction. The security arrangement between the United States and Taiwan, though ambiguous in its details, remains the fundamental underpinning of Taiwan's security. Has Washington responded? With what firmness? These reactions are watched from Beijing with the closest attention.

### The combat readiness exercises

Taiwan announced **combat exercises** lasting five days in June 2026 — a signal of readiness and determination sent to Beijing. These exercises are a direct response to the accumulated pressure of maritime incidents and Chinese shows of force. They say: we will not be intimidated; we are preparing.

*Taiwan's combat exercises — that is the healthiest response a democracy besieged by an authoritarian neighbor's pressure could give. Preparing one's **defense** is not provocation. It is **deterrence**. And **deterrence**, when credible, is the only language Beijing understands and respects. Weakness invites aggression. Taiwan has understood this.*

## What the West must do

### More frequent Taiwan Strait transits

One of the most effective Western responses to Chinese maneuvers around Taiwan is **freedom of navigation** — regular transits by American, British, French and Canadian warships through the Taiwan Strait and the waters east of the island. These transits send a clear message: the democracies recognize freedom of navigation in these waters and refuse the fictitious jurisdiction Beijing is trying to impose.

France in particular has conducted several Taiwan Strait transits in recent years — a diplomatically courageous position that deserves to be sustained and amplified. The **Taipei Times** editorial of **June 21, 2026** is explicit: allies must counter China at sea. This is not optional — it is a strategic necessity.

### Direct support for Taiwan

Beyond freedom of navigation, the **West** must reinforce its direct support for **Taiwan** — defensive arms sales, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, additional diplomatic recognitions that strengthen Taipei's international legitimacy. Every act of support for Taiwan is a cost to China's gray-zone strategy. And cumulative costs can deter escalation.

*I have no hesitation on this point: Taiwan must be defended. Not because the West has economic interests there — though it does, through TSMC and advanced chips. But because Taiwan is a functioning democracy of 23 million people who deserve to choose their own destiny. The autocrat in Beijing cannot decide the future of a free people. This is a matter of principle, not just strategy.*

## The risk of habituation: when the gray zone becomes the norm

### The normalization spiral

The deepest danger of China's gray-zone strategy is not any single incident — it is **progressive habituation**. When Chinese vessels regularly operate in the waters east of Taiwan, when incidents are reported and then forgotten, when the international response becomes less firm because "this is normal now," Beijing's legal fiction begins to look like reality.

*Taiwan is a democracy of 23 million people who deserve to decide their own future. That is not complicated. That is not ambiguous. It is the simplest and clearest line in this entire geopolitical discussion. Everything else — gray-zone strategies, diplomatic balancing acts, economic interests — is important but secondary to that fundamental principle. The autocrat in Beijing has no right to decide the fate of a free people.*

This is the logic of cumulative facts on the ground. In the South China Sea, China built artificial islands, installed missiles, created military bases — and today these installations are there, permanent, de facto accepted by an international community that chose at each stage not to respond firmly enough. The waters east of Taiwan must not meet the same fate.

### The credibility of deterrence

**Deterrence** only works if it is credible. China constantly tests the credibility of Western deterrence around Taiwan — and each time the response is insufficient, deterrence weakens a little more. This is a dangerous cycle. Restoring it requires firm, consistent and sustained responses over time — not solemn declarations followed by inaction.

## Taiwan's allies: between formal commitment and real presence on the ground

### What freedom of navigation means in practice

**Taiwan Strait transits** by **allied warships** — American, British, French, Canadian — are more than diplomatic symbols. They are concrete demonstrations that the **democracies** refuse to recognize Chinese **sovereignty** claims over these international waters. Every passage through the **Strait**, every naval exercise in the **waters east of Taiwan**, is a practical refutation of the legal fiction that **Beijing** is incrementally trying to impose.

**France** has conducted several transits through these waters in recent years, often with **French Navy** vessels. **Germany** has begun deploying **frigates** in the **Indo-Pacific** region. These gestures carry strategic importance that exceeds their direct military value: they signal that **freedom of navigation** is a **European interest**, not solely an American one. And they complicate China's strategy of **progressive maritime fait accompli**.

### Supporting Taiwan's autonomous **defense** capability

Beyond **arms sales** and **military exercises**, the **West** can support **Taiwan** by strengthening its **autonomous defense industrial capacity**. **Defense technologies**, **anti-ship missile systems**, **surveillance and strike drones**, **conventional submarines** — helping Taiwan produce its own armaments is **strategically more robust** than depending on external deliveries that can be interrupted by a crisis or a naval blockade.

**Defense industrial cooperation** between **democratic allies** and **Taiwan** is one of the most important and most underdeveloped work streams in **Indo-Pacific** security. The **diplomatic constraints** are real, but they cannot be a permanent excuse for inaction in the face of a Chinese threat that does not pause to observe diplomatic niceties.

*Supporting Taiwan industrially rather than merely selling it finished weapons — that is the difference between giving a fish and teaching how to fish. A Taiwan that produces its own missiles, its own drones, its own submarines is infinitely more resilient than a Taiwan dependent on deliveries that Beijing is trying by every means to prevent. This is a long-term security investment that deserves absolute priority.*

## Conclusion: international law, the last bulwark

### What is at stake goes beyond Taiwan

What is happening in the waters east of **Taiwan** in **June 2026** goes far beyond the question of Taiwanese sovereignty. It is a test of the solidity of **international law**, of the credibility of Western deterrence, and of the willingness of democracies to defend the principles they proclaim. If **China** can with impunity construct a legal fiction of maritime jurisdiction around Taiwan, it can do the same anywhere in the Indo-Pacific — and potentially beyond.

### The hour of choice

The **democratic West** must choose: allow the gray zone to become the norm and watch the geopolitical reality gradually redrawn in **Beijing**'s favor, or respond with the firmness and coherence necessary to ensure that international law remains a binding reality rather than a suggestion that authoritarian powers ignore at their convenience. This is a civilizational question, not merely a maritime strategy question. And that response begins now, in the waters 33 nautical miles southeast of **Taiwan**.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ahram Online: Taiwanese coast guard standoff with Chinese vessels — June 24, 2026](https://english.ahram.org.eg/UI/Front/Inner.aspx?NewsContentID=570308)

- [Taipei Times: Expert warning on expanding Chinese hybrid warfare — June 20, 2026](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/06/20/2003859425)

- [Taipei Times editorial: Allies must counter China at sea — June 21, 2026](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2026/06/21/2003859450)

### Secondary sources

- [Geopolitical Daily: PLA exercises and coercion around Taiwan — June 22, 2026](https://buttondown.com/geodaily/archive/geopolitical-daily-june-22-2026/)

- [Semafor: Taiwan announces combat readiness exercises — June 21, 2026](https://www.semafor.com/article/06/21/2026/taiwan-announces-combat-drill)

- [Washington Post: Taiwan begins five-day military exercises — June 22, 2026](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/22/taiwan-hosts-military-drills-readiness-china/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-taiwan-quand-les-garde-cotes-chinois-inventent-une-juridiction-qui-n-e