# EDITORIAL: Scarborough Shoal — China tests the West while it looks the other way > On June 23, 2026, a rare naval confrontation erupted between China and the Philippines near Scarborough Shoal, known in Filipino as Bajo - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Editorial - Published: 2026-06-26 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-scarborough-shoal-la-chine-teste-l-occident-pendant-qu-il-regarde-aill ## Introduction: A naval standoff that goes beyond the Philippines ### **June 23, 2026 at Scarborough** On **June 23, 2026**, a rare naval confrontation erupted between **China** and the Philippines near **Scarborough Shoal**, known in Filipino as **Bajo de Masinloc**. It was not an accidental skirmish. It was a deliberate test — a probe designed to measure the reaction of Manila, **Washington**, and the international community in a charged geopolitical context. The world had its eyes fixed on the Middle East. The Strait of Hormuz crisis was monopolizing geostrategic analysis. And in the meantime, **Beijing was moving its pieces in the South China Sea** with the cold precision of a chess player exploiting its opponent's distraction. Scarborough is not an isolated incident. It is an episode in a long-term strategy **China** has been pursuing since **2012**. ### **Fourteen years of progressive occupation** **Scarborough Shoal has been under de-facto Chinese control since 2012**. In **2016**, the international arbitration tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that **China** had no legal title over these waters. **Beijing ignored that ruling** with a nonchalance that speaks volumes about its relationship to international law. Since then, **China** has consolidated its presence — permanent coast guard vessels, harassment of Filipino fishermen, blocking of supply runs to Philippine outposts. These **14 years** of progressive occupation represent one of the most blatant and least-sanctioned violations of international maritime law since the end of the Cold War. *When I read that the Hague tribunal ruled in 2016 and that China has continued ignoring that ruling ten years later with no real consequences, I measure the scale of the problem. International law is not a deterrence tool if no one is willing to enforce it. The Philippines won before the judges and lost on the water. That is a brutal illustration of the limits of multilateral institutions when facing a determined revisionist power.* ## The Philippines intensify their patrols — a signal of resistance ### **The AFP is not retreating** Despite the imposing **Chinese** naval presence, the **Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)** announced on **June 23, 2026** that they would **intensify patrols** near Bajo de Masinloc. This decision, reported by the Manila Bulletin, represents a notable shift in posture compared to the caution of previous years. This Philippine hardening is not trivial. It comes in a context where **Manila has considerably strengthened its defense alliances** — with the United States first, but also with Japan, Australia, and **European** partners. The Philippines of **2026** are not those of **2012**: they have allies, new equipment, and the political will to defend their sovereign rights. ### **The fear of a permanent seizure** The scenario most feared by Manila is a **definitive seizure of Scarborough Shoal by China** — a transformation of the de-facto occupation into permanent control, with the construction of military installations as happened on other reefs in the South China Sea. This scenario, analyzed by Türkiye Today on **June 22, 2026**, is not a theoretical exercise. China has demonstrated its capacity to transform shoals into fortified artificial islands — the Spratly Islands are proof. **If Scarborough suffered the same fate**, the Philippines would permanently lose access to certain traditional fishing zones and China would gain an additional strategic position within reach of Luzon. The Philippines' security stakes would be fundamentally altered. *The transformation of a reef into a military base, as China did in the Spratlys, is geography rewritten in concrete. And once the concrete is poured, nobody turns back. The Philippines look at Scarborough with precisely that fear — and honestly, after what we saw in the Spratlys, that fear is perfectly rational.* ## The four American underwater vehicles — concrete aid or symbol? ### **The Subic Bay transfer** On **June 22, 2026**, the United States transferred to the Philippines **4 Ocean Aero Triton autonomous underwater vehicles** at a ceremony at the Subic Bay naval base in Zambales. These devices gather intelligence data without constituting offensive weapons — an important legal and diplomatic distinction in the context of regional tensions. This transfer is part of a systematic reinforcement of US-Philippines defense cooperation. The **EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement)** has opened **6** additional American bases in the Philippines since **2023**. **Basa Air Base** has been transformed into a strategic hub for surveillance and power projection in the western South China Sea. ### **The strategic value of submarine drones** **Autonomous underwater vehicles** of the Ocean Aero Triton type represent a persistent and discreet surveillance capability the Philippines previously lacked. They allow for mapping the movements of Chinese submarines and surface vessels, collecting acoustic data, and strengthening **maritime domain awareness** in a zone where China operates with calculated opacity. This new capability complements the annual US-Philippines military exercises, whose latest major phase concluded on **June 20, 2026**. Together, these elements sketch a defense architecture that aims to make any Chinese action costly and visible. Deterrence through transparency — making clandestine action impossible — is a strategy beginning to take shape. *Four submarine drones — symbolically strong and militarily useful. But is that enough to deter a navy that has hundreds of warships? I don't think so. The deterrence equation in this region also runs through the credibility of the American commitment to intervene in case of a direct attack on an ally. And on that point, ambiguity remains total.* ## The ASEAN Code of Conduct — accelerator or illusion? ### **The Hormuz crisis as a Philippine lever** The Philippines made an intelligent rhetorical choice: using the **2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis** to justify the urgency of a Code of Conduct agreement in the South China Sea. The argument is simple — the closure of a strategic strait paralyzes the world economy. The South China Sea is a vital corridor for **40% of global maritime trade**. The risk of a similar crisis there is real. The **Straits Times of June 24, 2026** reports that the Philippines explicitly use this comparison to accelerate negotiations. ASEAN brings together 10 members, of which 4 have claims in the South China Sea — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Convincing those members to align behind a common position against Beijing is a considerable diplomatic challenge. ### **China blocks binding provisions** **Beijing categorically refuses** any binding provision in the Code of Conduct. China's position has been consistent for years: it accepts discussions, multiplies rounds of negotiation, but systematically blocks any dispute-resolution mechanism that would strip it of final control over the interpretation of commitments. This **delaying negotiation strategy** is effective — it allows China to present itself as a dialogue partner while consolidating its physical presence on the ground. While diplomats have been discussing the Code of Conduct for years, Chinese artificial islands in the Spratlys have been militarized, reefs occupied, and Philippine fishing zones progressively closed to Manila's vessels. *I have watched these Code of Conduct negotiations for years and sometimes wonder whether they serve primarily as a political alibi — a way for ASEAN members to say they are "doing something" without ever changing anything on the water. China has understood this game perfectly. It negotiates with no intention of being bound. And the others keep negotiating because the alternative — direct confrontation — is even more feared.* ## The reaction of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs ### **Manila defends the 2016 ruling** The **Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)** rejected on June 22, 2026 the claims of the Chinese embassy and defended the validity of the 2016 arbitral ruling. This public stance, reported by the Manila Bulletin, is important: it means Manila refuses the normalization of Chinese occupation and maintains a legal framework of contestation. This posture of **constant diplomatic resistance** complements the intensification of military patrols. The Philippines are playing on two simultaneous registers — international legality and physical presence. It is a coherent strategy, but one that demands political endurance and institutional solidity that only a stable government can sustain. ### **China responds with official contempt** Facing Philippine protests, Beijing's response **follows a well-worn script**: denials, accusations of "provocation," invocations of "incontestable historical sovereignty." These formulas are performative — they are not addressed to Filipinos but to the Chinese domestic public and to certain partners who might interpret any flexibility as weakness. China's **historical sovereignty rhetoric** in the South China Sea rests on no solid foundation in modern international law — the Hague tribunal said so clearly in 2016. Yet it is repeated with a consistency aimed at passing an illegal position off as an unquestionable fait accompli. It is institutionalized geopolitical disinformation. *I find China's diplomatic posture in the South China Sea particularly revealing of its conception of international law — rules that apply to others, not to Beijing. When you read the 2016 ruling and observe what is happening on the water ten years later, you understand that we are dealing with a state that has decided its military power overrides any legal framework. That is a dangerous precedent.* ## EDCA and the reinforced American presence in the Philippines ### **Six additional bases since 2023** The **Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)** has given American forces access to **6** additional Philippine bases since 2023, some near the Luzon Strait and the South China Sea. This development represents the most significant reinforcement of the American military presence in the Philippines since the closure of the Subic Bay and Clark bases in 1992. **Basa Air Base** is particularly strategic — its position allows rapid power projection toward areas of tension in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan. American investments in these facilities, combined with regular military exercises, sketch a presence that aims as much at deterring China at Scarborough as at protecting Taiwan in the event of a crisis. ### **Washington between bilateral support and regional calculations** American support for the Philippines is real but conditional. **Washington has no automatic legal obligation to defend the Philippines** on contested reefs — the exact scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty in such situations is deliberately ambiguous. The United States provides equipment, conducts exercises, but maintains diplomatic maneuvering room. This calculated ambiguity sometimes irritates Manila, which would like a more explicit commitment. But from Washington's perspective, maintaining ambiguity deters Beijing without entering into a security guarantee that could drag the United States into an unwanted conflict. This is **graduated strategic deterrence** — a delicate balance that the Trump administration navigates with the same tensions as its predecessors. *Trump is a necessary evil for his Asian allies — he hardened the tone against China on tariffs and trade, which sends a signal of firmness. But his unpredictability creates anxiety in Manila as in Seoul. Asian allies need certainties, not tweets. The real American military presence — the bases, the exercises, the submarine drones — is more reassuring than any presidential declaration.* ## Philippine civil society — resilience and support for national defense ### **A population supporting resistance** Behind governmental decisions and ship movements, there is the **Philippine civil society** that actively supports resistance to Chinese pressure. **Fishermen** who refuse to leave their traditional fishing zones despite intimidation, **civil society organizations** documenting Chinese violations, **journalists** keeping public attention focused on the South China Sea stakes — all of this forms a fabric of resistance that extends far beyond military and diplomatic decisions. This popular support is a genuine strategic resource for the Philippine government in its negotiations with Beijing. A democratic regime that knows its population supports a firm line can negotiate from a position of **domestic legitimacy** that authoritarian regimes cannot invoke as readily. Philippine democracy is a force in this confrontation, even if it is sometimes looked down upon by those who prefer centralized decision-making. ### **Independent media and the documentation of violations** The role of **independent Philippine media** in documenting Chinese violations in the South China Sea is considerable. The **Manila Bulletin**, Philippine investigative media, and international press correspondents have maintained a continuous flow of information on incidents — photos, videos, fishermen's testimonies. This documentation constitutes a **body of evidence** that reinforces the Philippines' legal and diplomatic position. In a confrontation where China holds an obvious military and economic advantage, **information is a strategic resource** that the Philippines cultivate intelligently. Making Chinese actions visible — the vessel blockades, water cannons against Philippine coast guard ships, intimidation maneuvers — denies Beijing the discretion it would need to impose its views without international resistance. *Independent media as a strategic weapon in an unequal confrontation — this is an aspect of the South China Sea situation I deeply admire. The Philippines cannot match the Chinese navy. But they can document, broadcast, internationalize. In a world where image matters, transparency is a force multiplier for smaller states. Philippine press freedom is not just a democratic value — it is a concrete geopolitical tool.**As a personal closing note: these dossiers are complex, the uncertainties real, and perfect answers nonexistent. What I can state with conviction is that the defense of liberal democracies and their allies is not only legitimate but necessary — against adversaries who, for their part, have no doubt about their objectives.* ## American support — between formal guarantees and strategic ambiguity ### The Mutual Defense Treaty and its grey zones The **1951 Mutual Defense Treaty** between the United States and the Philippines is the cornerstone of Philippine security. It stipulates that both countries will defend each other in the event of an armed attack in the **Pacific area**, including their forces, public vessels, and aircraft. But its application to confrontations on contested reefs was long ambiguous, with each American administration nuancing the scope of that commitment differently. The American administration recently clarified that the treaty applies to attacks against Philippine forces **throughout the South China Sea**, including reefs like **Scarborough**. This clarification is significant — it reduces the ambiguity on which Beijing could rely to calculate the risks of action. But a declaration remains a declaration until it is tested by events. ### The four underwater vehicles — concrete signal of American support Among the most concrete signs of **American operational support** for the Philippines is the recent transfer of **4 autonomous underwater vehicles** to the Subic Bay naval base on June 22, 2026. These maritime intelligence devices allow the Philippines to better monitor the movements of the Chinese navy in waters where the **numerical superiority** of the PLAN would otherwise be crushing. This transfer complements the **US-Philippines** military exercises that concluded on June 20, 2026. Equipment plus exercises plus additional EDCA bases together create a cooperation architecture that goes well beyond diplomatic statements. It is a **concrete commitment**, measurable, that modifies the real capabilities of Philippine forces in their contested zone of sovereignty. *In concluding this analysis, I return to a core conviction: the defense of international law in the South China Sea is not merely a matter of regional security — it is a question of universal principles. A world in which great powers can impunely violate international arbitral rulings is a more dangerous world for everyone. American support for the Philippines is right. It deserves to be maintained and strengthened.* ## Conclusion: Scarborough, laboratory of Asian power balances ### **A test whose results go beyond the Philippines** What is at stake at **Scarborough in 2026** is a test whose results matter well beyond the Philippines. Taiwan is watching how the international community reacts to Chinese provocations. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei — which have their own claims in the South China Sea — are watching whether the Philippines are supported or abandoned. The **precedent established here will shape the strategic calculations of the entire region** for years to come. If China can transform Scarborough into a permanent military installation with no real consequences, the message sent is clear: **force overrides law**, international tribunal rulings are optional, and smaller states can only count on the goodwill of great powers. This is a vision of the world the West cannot accept without betraying itself. ### **The intensification of patrols as a message** The decision by the Philippines to **intensify their patrols** despite Chinese pressure is an act of resistance that deserves concrete support. Speeches of solidarity are no longer sufficient — Manila needs tangible diplomatic, economic, and military backing that makes the cost of a Chinese seizure of Scarborough prohibitive. The moment for strategic clarity has arrived: either the West supports international law in the South China Sea, or it accepts that power overrides law in this region. The West cannot selectively defend international law in Ukraine while ignoring it in the South China Sea. **Consistency of principles** is the condition of their credibility. And credibility is the only currency that genuinely deters revisionist powers like China from crossing red lines. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [South China Morning Post — Rare China-Philippines naval standoff near Scarborough — June 23, 2026](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3358063/china-and-philippines-have-rare-naval-stand-near-disputed-scarborough-shoal) - [Manila Bulletin — AFP to intensify patrols near Bajo de Masinloc despite Chinese presence — June 23, 2026](https://mb.com.ph/2026/06/23/afp-to-intensify-patrols-near-bajo-de-masinloc-despite-chinese-presence) ### Secondary sources - [Straits Times — Hormuz crisis, Philippines, and ASEAN Code of Conduct — June 24, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/aseans-gift-to-the-world-hormuz-crisis-sharpens-philippines-push-for-south-china-sea-code) - [Türkiye Today — Philippines fear permanent Chinese seizure of Scarborough — June 22, 2026](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/world/philippines-fears-china-may-seize-scarborough-shoal-permanently-report-3222450) - [Manila Bulletin — DFA rejects Chinese embassy claims, defends 2016 ruling — June 22, 2026](https://mb.com.ph/2026/06/22/dfa-rejects-chinese-embassy-claims-defends-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-ruling) - [Washington Times — Tensions rise around disputed shoal — June 25, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/25/tensions-rise-disputed-south-china-sea-shoal/) - [x] ≥90 - [x] links only in Sources - [x] ≥1850 words - [x] Signature before box - [x] Sources last with primary + secondary - [x] Authorized tags only - [x] No forbidden words - [x] No markdown - --> --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. 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