# EDITORIAL: Putin must make the first move — peace is not a favor

> On June 26, 2026, from Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky repeated what he has been saying for weeks: Ukraine is ready for meetings, but Russia must make the first move. This is not a capitulation, not a supplication — it is a diplomatically mature position from a country fighting for its survival for more than four years. Kyiv wants peace. But it is not begging for i

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-poutine-doit-faire-le-premier-pas-la-paix-n-est-pas-une-faveur

## Key takeaways

- Zelensky said on June 26, 2026 that Ukraine is ready for meetings but Russia must take the first step, and that a negotiation window is open until winter 2026.
- Ukraine released and recovered 160 prisoners of war in a recent exchange, which the author sees as a sign that communication channels exist.
- The author rejects Putin's demand that talks be based on the 2022 Istanbul agreements and on "realities on the ground," calling it a disguised capitulation.
- Ukraine's conditions include Russian withdrawal, recognition of its full territory, security guarantees (the author says NATO membership or equivalent), and reparations.
- The article cites 660 Ukrainian drones launched on June 27 and 28 oil infrastructure strikes in June, framed as "negotiating from strength."

## Introduction: Ukraine extends a hand, Moscow responds with missiles

### Zelensky, hand extended

On **June 26, 2026**, from **Kyiv**, Ukrainian President **Volodymyr Zelensky** repeated what he has been saying for weeks: **Ukraine** is ready for meetings, but Russia must make the first move. This is not a capitulation, not a supplication — it is a diplomatically mature position from a country fighting for its survival for more than four years. **Kyiv** wants peace. But it is not begging for it.

That same week, **Vladimir Putin** responded to these overtures by ordering ballistic strikes on **Kyiv** — two injured, a fire in the Darnytskyi district on **June 25–26** — and by permitting fresh strikes on **Zaporizhzhia**, wounding at least **9 people**. That is Moscow's answer to calls for peace: missiles. This fundamental contradiction tells us everything we need to know about the Kremlin's real intentions.

### The window closing

Zelensky himself spoke of a "negotiation window open until winter 2026." This temporal framing is a signal of urgency. Fighting continues, losses mount, and the military dynamic is far from frozen. If serious negotiations do not begin in the coming months, the conflict risks settling into a new phase of intensification that no one controls. Ukraine is ready. The question is whether Putin is as well — or whether his horizon is simply to wait out Western exhaustion.

*I'll say something unpopular: Zelensky's diplomatic consistency deserves respect. This man is leading a country at war, one that has endured colossal destruction, and he maintains an open dialogue position despite everything. That is not weakness — it is strategic wisdom. He understands that peace must be built, not won by arms alone.*

## The Ukrainian position: clear and documented

### Zelensky and the logic of the Russian first step

Zelensky clarified on **June 26, 2026** why he is asking Russia to make the first move: it is not a question of protocol — it is a question of good faith. For negotiations to mean anything, Moscow must demonstrate a minimal willingness to engage seriously, not simply to dictate unacceptable conditions as a prerequisite for any dialogue. **Putin** has repeatedly stated that he is "ready to negotiate at any time" — according to Foreign Minister **Lavrov** on **June 23, 2026** — but his conditions make any actual negotiation impossible.

Meanwhile, according to **RBC-Ukraine** on **June 26**, a meeting between **Zelensky** and **Putin** is "possible" according to certain sources — and Ukraine has transmitted **official proposals** to its partners and to "Putin's friends." Zelensky approved a **40-day influence operation** aimed at pushing Russia toward negotiations. This is not the behavior of a leader who refuses peace — it is that of a man doing everything in his power to create the conditions for a halt to hostilities.

### 160 prisoners released: deeds, not words

Ukraine recently released and recovered **160 prisoners of war** in a recent exchange with Russia. These exchanges, conducted despite the continuation of combat, show that communication channels exist, that both sides can speak on concrete matters. The question is whether this cooperation on prisoners can extend to broader discussions on a ceasefire and a peace framework.

*Prisoner exchanges seem to me the most honest indicator of willingness to engage. You cannot claim to want peace while refusing to release captured soldiers. The fact that these exchanges continue is a minute positive signal in a context of ongoing violence. That deserves noting.*

## What Putin demands: a disguised capitulation

### The Istanbul conditions: the fiction of a balanced deal

**Putin**'s position has been clear since his statement of **June 23, 2026**: Russia is ready for negotiations, "on the basis of the agreements reached in Istanbul and, let me remind you, initialed by the Ukrainian delegation." This formulation is a **deliberate distortion** of history. What **Putin** calls the "Istanbul agreements" of 2022 were not a balanced deal — they were a text elaborated under Russian military pressure during a partial occupation of Ukraine, containing conditions that Kyiv had begun to explore but never formally accepted.

According to **Ukrainska Pravda**, during the Istanbul meetings of May 2022, Russia's lead negotiator **Vladimir Medinsky** had threatened to "fight forever" and warned that Russia could seize the oblasts of **Sumy** and **Kharkiv**, declaring: "We fought Sweden for 21 years. How long are you prepared to fight?" That is not the language of a party seeking a fair deal.

### The condition of "territory": amputating Ukraine

In addition to the "Istanbul agreements," Putin demands that negotiations reflect "realities on the ground" — meaning the de facto recognition of Russian occupation of parts of **Ukraine**, including illegally annexed **Crimea** since 2014 and the four partially occupied oblasts since 2022. According to Bloomberg, during a closed-door meeting in Istanbul in May 2022, Russian representatives had put as conditions that Ukraine renounce these territories and abandon any right to reparations.

Accepting these conditions means legitimizing territorial aggression — a catastrophic precedent for the entire international order. This is not a basis for peace — it is a basis for capitulation. **Zelensky** is right to reject this framework. **Ukraine** has the right to recover its territorial integrity, recognized by dozens of UN General Assembly resolutions.

*Putin cites Istanbul as if it were a balanced diplomatic victory. It was a negotiating room where the Russian delegation openly threatened to continue conquering Ukrainian territories. Presenting that as a reasonable framework is a historical falsification. And accepting it as a starting point would be a capitulation that Ukraine has no moral or legal obligation to grant.*

## Zelensky's diplomacy: a coherent strategy

### Ukraine proposes, Moscow responds with bombs

Since the start of 2026, **Zelensky** has multiplied diplomatic initiatives. On **June 4, 2026**, he sent an open letter to **Putin** proposing a bilateral meeting to end the war — an offer supported by US President **Donald Trump**. On **June 15**, he proposed a meeting at the G7 summit in France. On **June 25**, Ukrainian missiles were striking a Russian arms factory in **Volgograd**. This is not a contradiction — it is the doctrine of "negotiating from strength."

Zelensky has understood that **Putin** will only accept serious negotiations if the cost of continuing the war becomes unbearable for Russia. Deep strikes on Russian territory — **660 drones** launched according to **WION** on **June 27**, strikes on oil infrastructure (28 in June according to ISW), the strike on **Vtorovo** — are diplomatic tools as much as military ones. The signal is clear: Moscow can come and negotiate, or keep absorbing the blows.

### Europe's role: actor or spectator?

The question of European representation in any eventual negotiations is central. Zelensky was clear on **June 21, 2026** in an interview with **TSN**: "They [the Europeans] will decide the format, and ultimately Ukraine will determine who represents Europe in the negotiations. They will propose several options." This formulation — Ukraine has a veto over its European representative — is an assertion of sovereignty and dignity that some European partners have found difficult to accept.

The reason for this position is simple: if **Russia** imposes its representatives and if **Ukraine** has no say over who represents its allies, the imbalance at the negotiating table will be fatal. Ukraine learned from 2014–2015, from the Minsk agreements — signed under pressure, not applied by Moscow, then used to justify ever greater demands. There will be no acceptable second Minsk.

*I understand the frustration of some European partners at this Ukrainian claim. But I understand even better why Zelensky insists on it. A country that has endured four years of aggression has the right to demand that the representatives of its allies at the table are people it trusts. That is elementary.*

## Lavrov's position: cosmetic peace, permanent war

### "Ready at any time": the phrase that says nothing

Russian Foreign Minister **Sergei Lavrov** declared on **June 23, 2026** that Russia is ready for negotiations "at any time." This formula has become a mantra of Russian diplomacy — it allows appearing willing to engage while maintaining preconditions that make any engagement impossible. When pressed for specifics, the conditions emerge: Istanbul, "realities on the ground," exclusion of American representatives from certain discussions.

This Russian diplomatic strategy has been honed over years. It consists of saying "we are ready" while knowing that the preconditions set are unacceptable to the other party, thereby creating the illusion of Moscow's good faith while attributing the deadlock to Kyiv or the West. It is sophisticated political manipulation that the media and foreign ministries should no longer repeat without context.

### The bluff of "Putin's friends"

Ukraine has transmitted **official proposals** not only to its direct partners, but to "Putin's friends" — countries that maintain relations with Moscow while remaining formally neutral: certain Gulf states, Turkey, India, China. This approach is pragmatic: if Moscow won't listen to Ukraine's Western allies, perhaps those with access to Putin can convey a different message. It is a multi-channel influence diplomacy that testifies to the strategic sophistication of the Zelensky team.

*Lavrov's "ready at any time" formula exasperates me every time it appears. It is not a diplomatic position — it is rhetoric. And we, journalists and analysts, have a responsibility not to relay it as if it were a sincere opening. It is not. It never has been.*

## The conditions of a just peace

### What Kyiv demands: territorial integrity and security guarantees

Ukraine's position on the conditions of a just peace has been consistent since 2022. It rests on several pillars: the **withdrawal of Russian forces** from Ukrainian territories occupied since 2022, **recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty** over its entire internationally recognized territory, solid **security guarantees** preventing further aggression — which in many minds implies membership in **NATO** or equivalent guarantee agreements — and **reparations** for the destruction inflicted on Ukraine.

These conditions are not unreasonable — they reflect international law and **UN** resolutions. What makes them unacceptable to **Moscow** is precisely that they imply Russia's political and symbolic defeat. **Putin** cannot return home having ceded territories he has annexed and presented as "eternal Russian lands." That is the crux of the problem: a just peace for Ukraine is Putin's domestic defeat.

### The gray areas: the difficult compromises

I must be honest on this point: a resolution of the conflict will likely involve painful compromises. The military recovery of **Crimea** would be extremely costly in human lives. Formulas for freezing or neutralizing certain territories could be explored without constituting capitulations. These complex discussions can only take place at a serious negotiating table — not in press conferences where each side seeks to dominate the narrative. What I am defending is that this table open without unacceptable preconditions set by Moscow.

*I cannot pretend to have the solution to the Ukrainian peace puzzle. There are gray areas, painful compromises, questions without easy answers. What I know is that as long as Putin conditions all dialogue on recognition of his right to conquest, there is nothing to negotiate. The first step must be his — and that first step is agreeing to talk without predefined conditions.*

## Ukrainian deep strikes: the language of pressure

### 660 drones and 28 oil infrastructure strikes

While **Zelensky** multiplies diplomatic gestures, **Ukraine** maintains growing military pressure on Russian territory. According to **WION**, on **June 27, 2026**, Ukraine launched an operation involving **660 strike drones** — one of the largest campaigns of this type since the start of the conflict. These drones targeted military and industrial infrastructure inside Russia, leveraging Ukraine's ability to penetrate Russian air defenses.

The **ISW** (Institute for the Study of War) documented **28 strikes on Russian oil infrastructure** in June 2026 alone — refineries, fuel depots, pumping stations. These targets are not chosen at random: oil revenues finance between **30 and 40%** of the Russian military budget. Every successful strike reduces **Moscow**'s resources for funding its operations in Ukraine and, indirectly, its transfers to **North Korea**. This is the "ultimate sanction" in Zelensky's own words — Ukrainian strikes as a tool of direct economic pressure.

### The "negotiate from strength" strategy

The juxtaposition of **Zelensky**'s diplomatic overtures with Ukrainian military deep strikes is not a contradiction — it is a doctrine. Ukraine is seeking to create the conditions where Russia perceives the cost of continuing the war as exceeding the expected benefits of victory. Every drone that strikes a Russian oil refinery strengthens Ukraine's argument at the negotiating table: the war is costing Moscow more than Putin anticipated, and it will cost more still if negotiations yield no results.

Analysts such as those at the **Kyiv Independent** documented in June 2026 that Ukrainian drones are increasingly penetrating Russian air defenses — adapting their trajectories, altitudes, and approaches to exploit gaps in detection systems. This growing capability changes the Russian strategic calculus: the depth of territory is no longer an absolute shield, and critical infrastructure hundreds of kilometers from the Ukrainian border is now within range.

*There is something remarkably coherent in Ukraine's strategy — simultaneous diplomacy and military pressure, every strike reinforcing the diplomatic message. Zelensky has learned what the great powers have long known: you negotiate best when the other party perceives the cost of no agreement. Ukraine imposes that cost on Russia every day.*

## What a just peace concretely entails

### Security guarantees: the key to any lasting deal

Beyond territorial questions, the most fundamental condition for a lasting peace for **Ukraine** is a system of **credible security guarantees** preventing further aggression. The **Budapest Memorandum** of 1994 — in which Ukraine had renounced the Soviet nuclear arsenal it inherited in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom — demonstrated catastrophically that a document without a binding enforcement mechanism is worthless against a determined aggressor. Ukraine draws the logical conclusion: the next guarantees must be fundamentally different.

The only guarantee that **Kyiv** considers credible is membership in **NATO** or an equivalent mechanism. **Article 5** of the North Atlantic Treaty — under which an attack on one member is an attack on all — has proven itself as a deterrent since 1949: no NATO member has been attacked by a foreign state since the Alliance's creation. For Ukraine, which has endured two Russian aggressions in eight years (2014 and 2022), it is the only guarantee that makes sense.

### Reconstruction: the economic dimension of peace

The **World Bank** and Ukraine estimated in 2026 that the cost of rebuilding Ukraine exceeds **500 billion dollars** — a figure that continues to grow with every Russian strike on civilian infrastructure. The question of who will pay for this reconstruction is inseparable from the question of **Russian reparations**. Ukraine demands that Russia contribute to reconstruction — either directly through reparations, or indirectly through the approximately **300 billion dollars** in Russian assets frozen in the West since 2022. This question is a major sticking point in any potential negotiations.

The **European Union** took a first step by using the revenues from frozen Russian assets to fund military aid to Ukraine — a significant legal and political precedent. But using the frozen assets themselves as a reconstruction lever goes much further, and the question of the international legality of this approach remains debated. This legal debate is not trivial: the West's decision on this question will send a message about the capacity of international norms to adapt to unprecedented situations.

*Rebuilding Ukraine is the most strategically sound economic investment the West can make. A rebuilt, stable, EU-integrated Ukraine is the best response to Putin's imperial ambitions — far more effective than sanctions. Those who balk at funding reconstruction are balking at building peace. They are the same people who balked at supporting Ukraine militarily in 2022.*

## Conclusion: Peace will not be begged for

### Ukraine has done its part

**Ukraine** has done its part. It has resisted four years of aggression that no one predicted it could withstand this long. It has lost tens of thousands of soldiers, entire cities reduced to rubble, millions of citizens displaced. And despite all of that, it maintains an open dialogue position — provided that dialogue is between equals, not between an attacked state forced to accept the dictates of its attacker.

### The first step belongs to Moscow

*I want to end this editorial with a simple conviction: peace is possible. It is desirable. It is necessary. But it can only be built on foundations of justice and respect for international law. A peace that rewards aggression is not a peace — it is a pause before the next war. Putin must make the first move. A real first move, not a hollow posture.*

The ball is clearly in **Moscow**'s court. **Zelensky** has proposed meetings, sent letters, transmitted proposals through multiple channels. The Russian response has been missiles on **Kyiv** and meaningless declarations. Until Russia demonstrates minimal good faith — a partial ceasefire, a symbolic withdrawal, a halt to strikes on civilian infrastructure — **Lavrov**'s words about "readiness to negotiate" will remain what they are: a propaganda posture. Peace is not a favor Ukraine must beg for. It is a right.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [UNN — Zelenskyy stated Ukraine is ready for meetings, but Russia must make the first step — June 27, 2026](https://unn.ua/en/news/zelenskyy-stated-ukraine-is-ready-for-meetings-but-russia-must-make-the-first-step)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Putin: Russia ready for talks with Ukraine only if based on Istanbul 2022 agreements — June 23, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/23/8040766/)

- Kyiv Independent — Russia Foreign Minister Lavrov says Russia ready for talks at any time — June 23, 2026

- RBC-Ukraine — Zelenskyy-Putin meeting possible, Ukraine sends proposals to Putin's friends — June 26, 2026

### Secondary sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Zelenskyy: Ukraine will decide who represents EU in talks with Russia — June 21, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/21/8040456/)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/)

- [Kyiv Independent — Zelensky: peace window open until winter 2026 — June 2026](https://www.kyivindependent.com)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-poutine-doit-faire-le-premier-pas-la-paix-n-est-pas-une-faveur