# EDITORIAL: Merz, €90 Billion and the Phantom Status — Europe Patches Together Ukraine's Future

> There is in European policy toward Ukraine a painful paradox that few leaders dare name clearly: we are ready to lend €90 billion to a country at war, to supply it with weapons, to welcome millions of its refugees — but we still hesitate to give it a date for accession to the European Union, and we even propose, as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz did on May 21, 2026, a status

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-merz-90-milliards-et-le-statut-fantome-l-europe-bricole-l-avenir-de-l

## Introduction: Europe's Grand Bargaining Around Ukraine

### A historic loan and a controversial proposal

There is in European policy toward **Ukraine** a painful paradox that few leaders dare name clearly: we are ready to lend **€90 billion** to a country at war, to supply it with weapons, to welcome millions of its refugees — but we still hesitate to give it a date for accession to the **European Union**, and we even propose, as German Chancellor **Friedrich Merz** did on **May 21, 2026**, a status of "**associate member**" — a category that does not exist in the treaties, has never been defined, and resembles a great deal of promises and very few real rights. **Ukraine** has been fighting for Europe for more than four years. And Europe offers it a seat at the table without the right to vote.

The reaction of **Volodymyr Zelensky** was not long in coming. As early as **May 23, 2026**, he rejected the proposal with a clarity that surprised some chancelleries: **"Ukraine has defended Europe with full measures, not half measures — and must have the right to vote in the EU."** That is a dignified and clear-sighted response. A country dying for European values cannot accept in exchange a half-member status, a fold-out chair in an institution it is helping to defend with its blood.

### The context of the €90 billion loan

To understand this debate, one must first understand the loan. On **December 19, 2025**, **European Union** leaders approved a **zero-interest €90 billion loan** to **Ukraine**. This loan, backed by the proceeds from **frozen Russian assets** in **Europe** — approximately **€300 billion** — is presented as a long-term financing mechanism for Ukrainian reconstruction. It is distinct from military aid. It is intended to rebuild infrastructure, maintain public services, and stabilize the Ukrainian economy during and after the war.

Of the **27 EU members**, **24** approved the loan. Three notable absentees: **Orbán**'s **Hungary**, **Fico**'s **Slovakia**, and the **Czech Republic** — three countries whose governments maintain ambiguous relationships with **Moscow** and have systematically resisted the most ambitious measures of support for **Ukraine**. On **June 26, 2026**, the first tranche of **€3 billion** was actually disbursed — a concrete signal that the mechanism works.

*Ninety billion euros. That is the figure that should dominate all analysis on Ukraine right now. This is not symbolic. It is real, it is considerable, and it is the demonstration that Europe, when it truly decides, can mobilize resources equal to the stakes. The question nobody asks often enough: if we can mobilize €90 billion, why do we still hesitate on membership?*

## The €90 Billion: What the Number Says and Does Not Say

### A loan, not a grant — the crucial distinction

The first thing to understand about the **€90 billion** loan: it is a **loan**, not a grant. **Ukraine** will have to repay it — with frozen Russian asset proceeds as a safety net, but the repayment principle remains. In a country at war, with a significant portion of its industrial infrastructure destroyed or damaged, with a GDP that contracted considerably since **2022**, and where the best years for repaying this debt will depend entirely on the post-war trajectory, this loan creates a financial obligation that future generations of Ukrainians will carry.

This is not a criticism of the loan — it is necessary contextualization. The alternatives were worse: no financing means the collapse of Ukrainian public services, mass exodus of the working population, the impossibility of maintaining a functioning state during the war. The loan is indispensable. It is also imperfect. And intellectual honesty requires saying so — especially if we demand that **Ukraine** be transparent about its own institutions as a condition of its European path.

### Frozen Russian assets: a legally fragile mechanism

The guarantee mechanism on **frozen Russian assets** is technically ingenious — and legally contested. By using revenues generated by the approximately **€300 billion** in Russian assets frozen in **Europe** as collateral for the loan to **Ukraine**, the **EU** created a mechanism that makes the country causing the destruction pay for Ukrainian reconstruction. That is morally satisfying. It is also legally complex.

**Russia** has challenged the freeze of these assets before several international jurisdictions. Third-party governments — notably some **Gulf** and **Asian** countries — have expressed concerns about the precedent this sets for the security of foreign sovereign assets held in Western financial institutions. These concerns are not without foundation. If Western states can freeze and use foreign sovereign assets without a definitive ruling from an international jurisdiction, the legal security of all states' assets in those institutions is affected. This is an international law debate that will last for years — and whose consequences reach far beyond the Ukrainian case.

*Using Russian assets to fund Ukraine's reconstruction is right in principle — the aggressor pays. But the legal mechanism must be solid, not merely morally justified. A poorly established precedent can backfire against Western interests in other future contexts. Justice and legal rigor are not opposites — they are complementary.*

## Merz and the Proposal for Associate Membership: A Decoding

### What is an EU "associate member"?

The proposal by **Friedrich Merz** on **May 21, 2026** deserves precise analysis. He proposed that **Ukraine** obtain a status of **"associate member"** of the **European Union** — allowing it to participate in European summits and meetings, to be consulted on decisions affecting it, but without holding the **right to vote**. This status does not exist in the current **EU** treaties. Creating a new category of institutional relationship would require a treaty revision — a process that involves ratification by all **27 member states**, some of them by referendum. This is not a simple or fast undertaking.

In substance, **Merz**'s idea addressed a real concern: **Ukraine** cannot join the **EU** as a full member while it is at war — the accession rules require it, the necessary institutional and economic reforms take time, and several member states have legitimate concerns about absorbing an economy as large and as damaged into the European space. While waiting for full membership, how can we ensure that **Ukraine** is integrated into the European decision-making process, informed of discussions concerning it, and treated as a privileged partner?

### Why Zelensky said no

**Zelensky**'s response is clear in principle: a status without voting rights is a second-tier status. **Ukraine** is dying for the **EU**'s values — for democracy, the rule of law, freedom. To offer it a seat at the table without a voice is to say that its sacrifice merits recognition but not equality. Symbolically, it is the same logic as inviting someone to dinner but asking them to remain in the hallway while others eat.

Moreover, **Zelensky** and his advisers see a strategic risk in the Merz proposal: if **Ukraine** accepts associate member status, it could find itself indefinitely in that intermediate category — neither formally in the **EU**, nor clearly on the path to full membership. Associate status could become a comfortable exit for member countries that do not want to accelerate Ukrainian accession — a compromise that relieves the hesitant without resolving anything for **Kyiv**. **Zelensky** refuses to be the adjustment variable for European ambivalences.

*Zelensky was right to say no. Not because an intermediate status is without value — it could have some — but because accepting a status without voting rights as a substitute for membership is allowing Europe to congratulate itself without doing the hard work of truly integrating Ukraine. Cheap self-congratulation is the greatest enemy of real progress.*

## Merz After the Rejection: He Held His Position

### Unusual firmness

What is remarkable about **Merz**'s reaction to **Zelensky**'s rejection is that he did not back down. After the **Brussels** European Council summit of **June 19, 2026**, asked about the Ukrainian response to his proposal, **Merz** maintained that **Ukraine** could not become a full **EU** member while it was at war — and that his idea of associate status remained an option on the table. This firmness is unusual in the European political landscape, where leaders tend to quickly withdraw proposals that create friction.

It also says something about **Merz**'s position on substance: he is not opposed to Ukrainian accession. He is convinced that this accession cannot be rushed — that the institutional, economic, and security conditions necessary for a successful integration are not yet in place and will not be before the end of the war. His associate status proposal is therefore sincere in its intention — to create a bridge between now and the moment when full membership will be possible. The problem is that **Zelensky** sees no reason why accession should be conditional on the end of the war.

### The argument for wartime accession

The substantive debate over Ukrainian accession to the **EU** during the war is real and complex. The European treaties do not explicitly prohibit it. But joining the **EU** also triggers a series of solidarity obligations between members — notably within the framework of the common foreign and security policy. A **EU** member state at war would implicate the entire Union in a conflict that would change the very nature of the institution. Countries such as **Hungary**, **Slovakia**, and even some more cautious members would block a wartime accession by invoking precisely these implications.

There is therefore a real lock. But it is not insurmountable if the political will were there. The truth few leaders state clearly is that the main obstacle to Ukrainian accession is not legal or institutional — it is political. Some member states simply do not want it, for reasons ranging from fears about migration flows to concerns about agricultural subsidies, by way of economic relationships with **Russia** that some never truly wanted to sever.

*The lock on Ukrainian accession is not in the treaties — it is in the capitals that prefer ambiguity to a clear choice. Europe has often used institutional complexity to avoid making difficult political decisions. On Ukraine, this avoidance mechanism has reached its limit. A choice must be made: the Europe we want to be, or the Europe we have been.*

## The Total: €200 Billion Given, €90 Billion Loaned

### The full scale of European support since 2022

To understand the scope of European commitment, the numbers are necessary. Since **February 24, 2022**, the **European Union** and its member states have provided **Ukraine** with total assistance estimated at more than **€200 billion** — encompassing military aid (weapons, ammunition, training), humanitarian aid (food, medicine, shelter), macro-financial aid (support for the Ukrainian state budget), and the reception of refugees (which represents a real economic cost for host countries). The **€90 billion** loan is on top of this already-provided assistance.

This is an unprecedented financial and human commitment in the history of European integration. By comparison, the American **Marshall Plan** that financed the reconstruction of **Europe** after the **Second World War** represented approximately **$13 billion** of the time, equivalent to roughly **€150 billion** in today's value. **Europe** has therefore already devoted to **Ukraine** the equivalent of a **Marshall Plan** — and has committed to doing as much again in the next two years with the new loan.

### The paradox of generosity without belonging

This paradox deserves to be stated clearly: **Europe** already treats **Ukraine** as a beneficiary of community solidarity — with amounts that exceed what some members receive from structural funds. It has opened its borders to Ukrainian refugees with unprecedented generosity. It has supplied weapons, trainers, and strategic advice. It has imposed massive sanctions on **Russia** partly to protect **Ukraine**. And at the same time, it hesitates to give this same **Ukraine** the institutional status that would make these commitments permanent and structural — rather than voluntary and revisable.

This is a logically incoherent position that reflects the deep ambivalence of certain member states. We want the benefits of solidarity (stabilization of the eastern border, the demonstration of **EU** robustness, the strategic advantages of a pro-European Ukraine) without the costs of full membership (agricultural subsidies, cohesion funds, freedom of movement for labor, security risk). This ambivalence is politically understandable. It is morally unacceptable.

*Europe pays €200 billion to Ukraine and refuses to call it a member. It is like financing someone's education for four years and refusing to hand them their diploma on the grounds that the graduation ceremony has not yet been organized. The diploma is membership. And it is owed.*

## European Security: Why Ukraine in the EU Is a Strategic Necessity

### Ukraine as a pillar of continental security

Beyond moral considerations, there is a purely strategic argument in favor of Ukrainian accession to the **EU** — an argument that realists should hear even if they do not like the language of values. A **Ukraine** integrated into the **EU** is a stable, democratic, economically dynamic **Ukraine** aligned with Western institutional structures. It constitutes a permanent and solid barrier to any future expansion of Russian influence toward **central and western Europe**. It protects **NATO**'s flanks. It reinforces the geopolitical coherence of the continent.

A **Ukraine** left unintegrated, maintained in a grey zone between the **EU** and **Russia**, is structurally vulnerable. It is subject to economic pressures, attempts at political destabilization, and Russian interference in its institutional processes. It remains a theater of competition between **Moscow** and **Brussels** — exactly the situation that preceded the **2022** invasion. The lesson of that invasion should be read by all European governments: leaving a country in a grey zone does not protect it. It makes it a target.

### NATO and the EU: the two legs of security integration

One must distinguish between **NATO** accession — on which **Ukraine** is deadlocked for as long as the war continues — and **EU** accession, which falls within a different framework and does not entail the same automatic mutual assistance clauses. **EU** accession would be a demonstration of European commitment that would not automatically trigger **NATO**'s **Article 5**. It would, however, reinforce the European security architecture through other channels: coordination of foreign policies, integration into European defense industries, participation in the **EU**'s common security programs.

Chancellor **Merz** said that **Ukraine** cannot become an **EU** member during the war. That is a defensible position. But what he did not say — and what **Europe** has not yet clearly affirmed — is that membership is guaranteed after the war, with a clear and respected timeline and conditions. Without this explicit guarantee, the associate status proposal looks like a maneuver to avoid a commitment **Europe** is not yet ready to make.

*What Ukraine asks is not immediate membership — it understands that is not possible during the war. It asks for a credible guarantee that membership will come. A clear political commitment, with transparent criteria and a realistic timeline. That is not unreasonable. It is what any accession candidate deserves to hear.*

## The Three Absentees: Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic

### Orbán and the permanent veto

**Viktor Orbán**'s **Hungary** is the most emblematic case. Since the start of the Russian invasion in **2022**, **Orbán** has systematically resisted every measure of support for **Ukraine** — blocking aid packages, refusing sanctions, maintaining economic ties with **Russia**, calling for negotiations that would resemble Ukrainian capitulation. He also received **Vladimir Putin** in **Budapest** outside any official **EU** framework — a violation of European solidarity that his partners have tolerated with few formal consequences.

**Orbán**'s decision not to participate in the **€90 billion** loan is unsurprising. It is consistent with a political strategy that uses Ukrainian foreign policy as a pressure tool internally and as a demonstration of its difference from the Brussels line. The presence of **Hungary** in the **EU** while indirectly financing **Putin**'s war through its gas purchases and institutional blockades is the sharpest contradiction of the current European project.

### Fico and Slovak ambivalences

**Robert Fico**'s **Slovakia** presents a similar profile, though more nuanced. **Fico** has pro-Russian rhetoric in European forums and maintains significant commercial ties with **Moscow**. But **Slovakia** is a smaller country, more vulnerable to pressure from its partners, and whose civil society is deeply pro-Ukrainian — creating a tension between the government's political line and the expectations of the population. Non-participation in the **€90 billion** loan is a decision by the **Fico** government, not a national consensus.

As for the **Czech Republic**, its absence is more surprising — the government of **Petr Fiala** has been generally pro-Ukrainian, going so far as to organize an ammunition supply program with other partners to circumvent blockades by certain **NATO** members. Its failure to join the **€90 billion** loan is more likely linked to internal budget or coalition political constraints than to a fundamental disagreement over support for **Ukraine**.

*Orbán's Hungary in the EU is a contradiction Brussels has tolerated for too long. A member state that receives European solidarity funds while indirectly financing the aggression ravaging a country that is a candidate for accession — this is a moral and institutional incoherence that the treaties permit but that policy should correct. Europe needs an exclusion clause for states that deliberately violate its fundamental solidarity.*

## The First €3 Billion Disbursement: A Strong Signal

### The machinery coming into motion

On **June 26, 2026**, the **European Commission** made the first disbursement of the loan: **€3 billion** sent to **Kyiv**. That is only **3.3%** of the total approved amount, but its symbolic and practical importance is considerable. It demonstrates that the mechanism works — that the agreement of **December 19, 2025** was not merely a political announcement, but a decision whose implementation follows. It demonstrates that the **24 participating members** honored their commitments of contribution to the fund guaranteed by Russian assets. And it injects concrete liquidity into a Ukrainian economy that needs it immediately.

For **Kyiv**, these **€3 billion** make it possible to finance part of the salaries of civil servants, pensions, and health and education services that the Ukrainian state cannot finance alone in wartime. They also signal to international markets and private partners that **Europe** honors its commitments — which facilitates other flows of private financing toward **Ukraine**.

### The pace of future disbursements

The **€90 billion** loan will be disbursed progressively over several years — the exact calendar depends on conditionalities tied to Ukrainian reforms and identified needs. The **European Commission** applies to **Ukraine** the same conditionality framework as for its other financing beneficiaries: milestones for institutional reform, governance, anti-corruption efforts, alignment with European standards. These conditions are legitimate — and **Ukraine** has generally met them better than its detractors predicted.

But the pace of disbursements raises a practical question: will the **€3 billion** of the first tranche be quickly followed by subsequent ones, or will the conditionality machinery create delays that deprive **Ukraine** of resources it needs during the most critical months? The history of **EU** relationships with its financing beneficiaries — notably in the Balkans, but also in **Greece** and **Portugal** after the **2010** crisis — shows that administrative delays can be very significant. This is a real risk that the **Commission** must manage with urgency proportional to the gravity of the situation.

*Conditions tied to reforms are not a problem in themselves — Ukraine must build the institutions of a European state worthy of the name. But applying the same delays and administrative processes to a country at war as to a country at peace is absurd. The urgency of the Ukrainian situation must be reflected in the speed of execution, not just in the amounts announced.*

## The European Security Architecture in Transformation

### Europe's rearmament: a revolution underway

The debate over Ukrainian accession and the **€90 billion** loan is part of a broader transformation of the European security architecture that has been underway since **2022**. **Germany**, under **Merz**, has massively increased its defense budget — finally exceeding the **2% of GDP** required by **NATO**, with a **Sondervermögen** (special fund) of **€100 billion** dedicated to modernizing the **Bundeswehr**. **France** has advanced its military programming law. **Poland** is devoting **4% of its GDP** to defense — a **NATO** record. The **Baltic states** are rearming at full speed.

This transformation is irreversible. The war in **Ukraine** has definitively buried the European illusion that an aggressive power could be appeased by trade and diplomacy. It has forced a generation of European leaders to look reality in the face: security has a cost, and that cost cannot be indefinitely subcontracted to the **United States**. **Ukraine** is the catalyst for this transformation. It deserves to be its institutional beneficiary as well.

### Ukraine in the future European defense architecture

The question of integrating **Ukraine** into the future European defense architecture is distinct from the question of **EU** or **NATO** accession, but linked to it. The Ukrainian defense industry — which has proven its capacity for innovation and adaptation under extraordinarily difficult conditions — is a strategic asset for **Europe**. **Ukrainian drones**, electronic warfare systems, and long-range missiles developed under the pressure of war are technologies that **Europe** has an interest in integrating into its own defense systems.

Defense industry partnerships between European and Ukrainian companies are already underway. But their scope is still limited by regulatory obstacles, questions of technology transfers, and uncertainties about **Ukraine**'s final status in the European institutional architecture. Clarifying that status — including through the accession path — would resolve these obstacles and allow a far deeper and more mutually beneficial defense industrial integration.

*The Ukrainian defense industry is one of the most innovative in the world right now — forged in the fire of war, forced to find creative solutions in the face of well-equipped adversaries. Integrating it into the European defense ecosystem would not be charity — it would be strategic intelligence. Europe needs that expertise as much as Ukraine needs Europe.*

## Zelensky's Role: Between Diplomacy and Resolve

### A leader who refuses the fold-out chair

**Zelensky**'s response to the Merz proposal reveals something important about his leadership. After more than four years of war, after surviving assassination attempts, after maintaining the political cohesion of his country under extraordinary conditions, **Zelensky** is not in a position of weakness. He negotiates from the posture of someone who knows what his country has achieved, what it has sacrificed, and what it deserves in return. Refusing a half-member status is not arrogance. It is dignity.

This firmness is also a strategy. By rejecting associate status, **Zelensky** forces **Europe** to remain in the discomfort of its own ambivalence — unable to off-load the question of accession onto an intermediate category that would allow it to temporize indefinitely. He keeps the pressure on for a clear answer. That is adult diplomacy — and it is exactly what the moment demands.

### Kyiv's credibility on reforms

It is important to note that **Zelensky**'s rejection of associate status does not mean rejecting reforms or alignment with European standards. On the contrary, **Ukraine** has made remarkable progress on institutional reforms since **2022**: judicial reform, anti-corruption efforts (with progress documented by **Transparency International**), legislative alignment with the EU's acquis communautaire, strengthening of the independence of institutions. These reforms in the context of total war are extraordinary — they testify to a genuine political will to join the **EU**, not as an economic opportunity but as a civilizational choice.

**Zelensky** can therefore maintain a coherent dual message: "We are reforming and meeting the conditions for accession. And precisely because we are reforming, we refuse a second-tier status. Give us membership, not the fold-out chair." That is a solid, defensible position — one that deserves the support of European partners who sincerely defend the values they preach.

*I am struck by the moral coherence of the Ukrainian position. Zelensky does not say "give us membership without conditions." He says "we are meeting the conditions — so give us membership, not a consolation prize." That is the voice of a sovereign state that has earned its entry ticket to the room. Refusing to open the door would be a betrayal of what the EU claims to be.*

## The German Position: Merz Between Generosity and Prudence

### Germany as the pivot of European policy on Ukraine

**Merz**'s **Germany** occupies a central position in this debate. Europe's largest economy, the main contributor to the **€90 billion** loan, the main provider of military and financial support in Europe — its role in **Ukraine**'s destiny is decisive. The transformation of German policy toward **Ukraine** since **2022** is remarkable: from a hesitant **Germany** bound to **Russia** by **Nordstream** and decades of illusions about **Wandel durch Handel** (change through trade), it has become one of the pillars of Western support for **Kyiv**.

But this transformation has its limits. **Merz** is a pragmatist — not an idealist. His support for **Ukraine** is real, but it is framed by internal political calculations (a German public opinion monitoring the costs of the war) and external ones (managing relations with more hesitant member states). His associate status proposal fits within this pragmatism: finding something that satisfies **Kyiv** sufficiently without forcing a consensus on full membership that some members will not accept.

### The Merz–Zelensky dialogue as a microcosm

The exchange between **Merz** and **Zelensky** over associate status is a microcosm of the fundamental tension in the Europe–Ukraine relationship. On one side, a **Europe** that wants to support **Ukraine** but is not ready for all the implications of that commitment. On the other, a **Ukraine** that wants to enter **Europe** fully but does not want half of Europe. This tension is not soluble in the short term — it will persist until the end of the war, and probably beyond.

What can change is the quality of the dialogue. Instead of a **Europe** that proposes institutional solutions it did not consult **Kyiv** about, a sincere dialogue is needed where **Ukraine** is involved in designing the solutions that concern it. **Zelensky** did not reject the principle of progressive integration — he rejected a specific proposal that seemed inferior to what **Ukraine** deserves. The door is not closed. It is poorly framed.

*Merz and Zelensky are both right — and that is why it is difficult. Merz is right that accession during the war is institutionally complex. Zelensky is right that associate status without voting rights is insufficient. The solution lies somewhere between the two — but it requires an institutional creativity that the EU has not yet fully mobilized.*

## The Balkans as Model and Warning

### Twenty years of waiting in the Balkans

There is a nearby model of what the Merz proposal could produce if adopted: the **Western Balkans**. **Montenegro**, **Serbia**, **Albania**, **North Macedonia**, **Bosnia-Herzegovina**, **Kosovo** — all have been accession candidates for years, some for more than **twenty years**. The accession process in the **Balkans** has been so slow, so fragmented, so conditional that some experts speak of **"enlargement fatigue"** — on both the candidates' side and the **EU**'s.

The result of this slowness has been an opening for other powers. **Russia**, **China**, and **Turkey** have all strengthened their influence in the **Balkans** while **Europe** prevaricated on accession. **Serbia** in particular plays several tables at once — maintaining close ties with **Moscow** and **Beijing** while formally continuing its **EU** accession process. European indecision has created exactly the kind of grey zone it sought to avoid. **Ukraine** must not reproduce this model.

### The urgency of clarity

**Europe** has a historic window to integrate **Ukraine** in a way that will positively and durably transform the architecture of the continent. This window is not unlimited. If the Ukrainian accession process becomes as slow and fragmented as the Balkan one, post-war **Ukraine** will find itself in an unstable grey zone — neither fully in the **EU**, nor at lasting peace with **Russia**. That scenario is the worst possible: it would create a chronically destabilized **Ukraine** on Europe's doorstep, a permanent terrain of geopolitical competition between great powers.

Clarity — a date, explicit and reasonable conditions, a clear political commitment from the most important European capitals — is the only way to prevent this scenario. It is not only good for **Ukraine**. It is indispensable for the long-term security and coherence of the **European Union** itself.

*The Balkans are the mirror in which Europe should look before repeating its mistakes with Ukraine. Twenty years of unfinished accession process, advancing Russian and Chinese influence, publics that tire of waiting — that is the result of institutional ambiguity. Ukraine deserves better. And Europe has the means to do better, if it has the will.*

## What the Editorial Demands: A Clear Position

### The position this editorial defends

This editorial has a position. It is as follows: the **€90 billion** loan is a courageous and necessary decision that **Europe** must honor fully and rapidly. The associate status proposed by **Merz** is an understandable but insufficient idea if it replaces the accession commitment — it is only acceptable if it comes with a clear date and precise calendar for full post-war membership. **Zelensky**'s rejection of associate status without voting rights is legitimate and deserves the respect of his European allies.

**Europe** must choose. Not between supporting **Ukraine** and not supporting it — that choice is already made. But between structural support that integrates **Ukraine** durably into its institutions, and conditional and reversible support that leaves **Ukraine** in perpetual ambiguity. The first option is more costly in the short term. The second is catastrophic in the long term. This is not difficult to choose — if one looks at the numbers, history, and values with the same honesty.

### The call to European leaders

To the European leaders who still hesitate on Ukrainian accession: look at the numbers. **€200 billion** already given. **€90 billion** more loaned. Millions of refugees welcomed. Ukrainian soldiers trained on European soil. If **Europe** was ready for all those commitments, it can be ready for accession. It already is in practice. What it lacks is only the courage to say it clearly, with a timeline, transparent conditions, and the political will to respect them.

History will judge this generation of European leaders on this moment. Not on the generosity of their announcements — the announcements have been numerous and impressive. But on the coherence between their words and their institutional acts. **Giving money and refusing belonging is funding without committing.** And funding without committing is exactly what democracies do when they lack conviction.

*I am an editorialist, not a European official. I do not have to manage political compromises, fragile coalitions, or anxious public opinions. But I have the right to say what logic and values demand: Ukraine has earned Europe. Europe must now earn Ukraine. That is not a rhetorical formula. It is a test of character.*

## Conclusion: Europe at the Threshold of a Historic Decision

### The moment when words no longer suffice

The **€90 billion** loan, the associate status proposal, **Zelensky**'s refusal, the first **€3 billion** disbursement — all of this says one simple thing: **Europe** is at the threshold of a decision it can no longer defer indefinitely. The war in **Ukraine** is not an external event affecting **Europe** from the outside. It is taking place in **Europe**, it involves **Europe**, it concerns the future of **Europe**. To pretend one can fund this war without drawing its institutional consequences is to deceive oneself.

European integration has never been linear. It has always been driven by successive crises — each crisis forcing an advance that ordinary deliberations would not have produced. The Ukrainian crisis is the greatest European security crisis since **1945**. It can — if **Europe** chooses to make it so — be the greatest advance in European integration since the creation of the euro. The history of institutions is made in these moments. And this moment is now.

### What Ukraine awaits and what Europe must offer

**Ukraine** does not expect **Europe** to solve all its problems or take over its future. It expects **Europe** to honor the implicit commitment made since **2014** — when **Ukraine** chose **Europe** over **Russia**, at the cost of the **Maidan**, at the cost of **Crimea**, at the cost of war. That commitment cannot be reduced to checks, however large. It must translate into belonging — real, full, with all the rights and all the responsibilities that implies.

The Merz associate status proposal is an imperfect attempt to answer that expectation. The Zelensky rejection is the legitimate response of a people who will not settle for imperfect. This dialogue, uncomfortable but necessary, is the signal **Europe** must hear and answer with ambition. Not with creative institutional formulas. With a clear political decision: **Ukraine** is European, it will become a member, and we work now to make that accession possible as soon as possible after the war.

*I end this editorial with a simple conviction: the €90 billion matters. Associate status is insufficient. Membership is necessary. And the path between the two is not a question of treaties or procedures — it is a question of political will. When Europe truly wants it, it will find the way. The question is whether it will want it before or after history has rendered its verdict on this generation of leaders.*

## Final Look: The Next Two Years Will Be Decisive

### The tightening calendar

The next two years — **2026–2027** — will likely be decisive for **Ukraine**'s institutional future. The **€90 billion** loan was approved through **2027**. The next electoral cycle in several key **EU** member states could shift political balances. The trajectory of the war itself — toward an armistice, escalation, or stagnation — will determine the conditions under which **Ukraine** approaches accession negotiations. And the rotating **EU** presidencies in **2026** and **2027** will offer windows to advance the dossier if the political will is there.

These two years cannot be lost in debates over intermediate institutional categories. They must be used to lay the foundations of an accession that, when it comes, will be solid, legitimate, and beneficial to both parties. That demands preparation, transparency, and coherence — and above all, abandonment of the comfortable ambiguity that has for too long served as European policy toward **Ukraine**.

### The verdict of history

History is sometimes unjust. It forgets sacrifices, magnifies gestures, erases nuances. But on the great institutional decisions of crisis periods, it is generally clear-eyed. It will remember who funded **Ukraine** when it was necessary. It will also remember who delayed its integration when it was possible. These two memories will coexist. And it is in their balance that the judgment on this generation of European leaders will be rendered.

The **€90 billion** loan is to **Europe**'s credit. The proposal for associate status without voting rights is to its debit. The truth of this moment lies in this tension — and its resolution depends on decisions that can still be made differently. That is why editorials exist: not to record what has happened, but to influence what can still happen. **Europe** has a choice. It must make it with the full awareness of what that choice represents.

*Four years of war. Two hundred billion euros. Millions of refugees. Tens of thousands of dead. And at the end, a debate over an "associate status" without voting rights. If that is not the definition of institutional ambivalence, I do not know what is. Ukraine deserves better. Europe can do better. It just has to decide.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Euronews — Merz proposes associate EU membership for Ukraine with mutual assistance — May 21, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/05/21/merz-proposes-associate-eu-membership-for-ukraine-with-mutual-assistance)

- [Deutsche Welle — Merz proposes associate EU membership for Ukraine — May 21, 2026](https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-eu-associate-membership-merz-european-union/a-77236052)

- [Euronews — Zelensky rebuffs Merz proposal, says Ukraine deserves full EU membership — May 23, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/05/23/zelenskyy-rebuffs-merz-proposal-says-ukraine-deserves-full-eu-membership)

- [Euromaidan Press — Zelensky responds to Merz: Ukraine has been defending Europe fully and has to have right to vote in EU — May 24, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/05/24/zelenskyy-responds-to-merz-ukraine-has-been-defending-europe-fully-not-with-half-measures-and-has-to-have-right-to-vote-in-eu/)

### Secondary sources

- [NBC News — EU leaders agree 90 billion euro loan for Ukraine — December 19, 2025](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/eu-leaders-agree-90-billion-euro-loan-ukraine-rcna250016)

- [deutschland.de — EU secures Ukraine funding until 2027 — December 19, 2025](https://www.deutschland.de/en/news/eu-secures-ukraine-funding-until-2027)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine will not become full EU member during the war — June 19, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-will-not-become-full-member-of-eu-1781896352.html)

- ABC News — EU releases 3 billion euro loan package for Ukraine — June 26, 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-merz-90-milliards-et-le-statut-fantome-l-europe-bricole-l-avenir-de-l