# EDITORIAL: The Ukrainian Nuremberg Tribunal — history knocks on the door of justice

> In May 2026, 36 states and the European Union formally created the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (STCA). This tribunal is the first of its kind since Nuremberg and Tokyo — the founding trials of the post-war international legal order. In June 2026, the states parties convened to establish the governing body, elect judges, and approve the budget. T

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-le-tribunal-de-nuremberg-ukrainien-l-histoire-frappe-a-la-porte-de-la-

## Introduction: May–June 2026, a tribunal without precedent since 1946 takes shape

### 36 states and the EU make history

In **May 2026**, **36 states** and the **European Union** formally created the **Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine** (**STCA**). This tribunal is the **first of its kind since Nuremberg and Tokyo** — the founding trials of the post-war international legal order. In **June 2026**, the states parties convened to establish the governing body, elect judges, and approve the budget. The **European Council of June 18–19** welcomed progress toward its operationalization. The wheel of international justice is finally turning — slowly, but it is turning.

This creation is not symbolic. It responds to a specific gap in existing international law: the **International Criminal Court** can try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in **Ukraine**, but it cannot try the **crime of aggression** itself against nationals of states that are not members of the **Rome Statute**. **Russia** is not a member of the **ICC**. The **STCA** was created precisely to fill this gap — to ensure that the crime of having started this war does not go unpunished.

### The crime of aggression: what exactly is it?

The **crime of aggression** is defined in the **Kampala** amendments to the **Rome Statute** as the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state, in manifest violation of the **UN Charter**. It is the supreme crime in the hierarchy of international law — the one from which all others derive. Russia's invasion of **Ukraine** on **February 24, 2022** is the very definition of this crime.

The potential defendants are not the soldiers on the ground — the war crimes they commit fall under the **ICC**. The defendants of the **STCA** are the leaders who **planned, prepared, initiated, and executed** the aggression: **Vladimir Putin**, members of the **Russian Security Council**, and top military commanders who gave the orders. These are the decision-making heads, not the executors.

*Creating a tribunal to try the crime of aggression means saying that ordering an invasion war is a personal crime for those who give the order. This principle was established at Nuremberg. It was forgotten for decades. Ukraine is putting it back on the agenda with a force no one had anticipated. That is one of this war's great contributions to the civilization of law.*

## The Nuremberg precedent: why it matters now

### 1946 and 2026: two founding moments

The **Nuremberg** trial, concluded in **1946**, established for the first time that individuals — not just states — could be held criminally responsible for crimes against peace (the equivalent of the crime of aggression), war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This revolutionary principle founded the architecture of modern international criminal law.

For decades, the Nuremberg principle existed without a permanent institution to apply it. The **ICC**, created in **2002**, partially filled this gap for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But the crime of aggression remained in a legal blind spot — recognized in texts, impossible to apply in practice against nuclear great powers. The **STCA** attempts to close this blind spot.

### Obstacles to overcome: jurisdiction and arrest

Two major obstacles stand before the **STCA**. The first is the question of **jurisdiction**: will the tribunal have universal jurisdiction, or will it be limited to states parties? If jurisdiction is too narrow, the main defendants — Russian citizens — could argue the tribunal does not concern them. This legal debate is real and not yet settled.

The second obstacle is practical: how to **arrest the defendants**? **Putin** will not voluntarily travel to a state that would arrest him. International justice functions on the voluntary cooperation of states — and **Russia** will not cooperate. The tribunal can issue arrest warrants, try defendants in absentia, and build a legal record for the future. But the concrete execution of sentences depends on a regime change in **Russia** or currently unforeseeable political circumstances.

*Skeptics will say the STCA can never catch Putin as long as he remains in power in Russia. They are right — and that should not be a reason not to create the tribunal. The ICC arrest warrant against Putin did not lead to his arrest. It restricts his travel to 124 countries. It documents the crime. It changes the long-term political context. International justice is slow — it is real.*

## The International Claims Commission: justice and reconstruction

### The indispensable complement to the STCA

In parallel with the **STCA**, the **International Claims Commission for Ukraine** is being operationalized. Its role is different but complementary: to assess and process compensation claims for damages caused to **Ukraine** and its citizens by Russian aggression. Together, the **STCA** and the Commission form a two-level system of justice and accountability — criminal and civil.

The **European Council of June 18–19, 2026** explicitly welcomed progress toward the operationalization of both mechanisms in its conclusions. This explicit mention in Council conclusions is not trivial: it means the issue is important enough to appear in the most formal political document of the **EU**. It is a political signal about the durability of European commitment to justice for **Ukraine**.

### Frozen Russian assets: the financial link between accountability and reconstruction

The **International Claims Commission** will need to mobilize resources to compensate victims. The **frozen Russian assets** — approximately **$300 billion** in Western financial institutions — are the most obvious and most justified funding source. It would be the most complete poetic justice: the money of the Russian kleptocracy, accumulated through decades of corruption and exploitation, used to rebuild what the Russian war machine destroyed.

This mechanism is not yet fully operational — complex legal questions about confiscating a sovereign state's assets still need to be resolved. But the direction is clear: the **EU**, the **G7**, and their partners are progressively moving toward an architecture in which **Russia** will ultimately fund its own punishment. It is slow — it is the right direction.

*Frozen Russian assets funding Ukrainian reconstruction — this scenario seems to me both just and necessary. Just because victims of aggression deserve to be compensated by the aggressor. Necessary because Western taxpayers cannot alone finance a reconstruction estimated in the hundreds of billions. International law can here serve economic justice.*

## The 36 founding states: a coalition of principle

### Who are these 36 states and why they matter

The **36 founding states** of the **STCA** represent a trans-regional coalition that goes beyond **Ukraine**'s traditional allies. Beyond **EU** member states and **NATO** partners, countries from various world regions have joined this initiative. This trans-regional support is significant: it says that the defense of territorial integrity and the prohibition of aggression is not an exclusively Western concern — it is a universal principle.

That said, the absence of certain major actors — notably the **United States**, which is not a signatory to the **ICC**'s **Rome Statute** and has adopted a cautious position toward the **STCA** — is a real limitation. A tribunal without American support will be weaker than one with it. This limitation does not invalidate the initiative — it requires the tribunal to prove its value through its actions.

### The tribunal's legitimacy: building credibility through rigor

An international tribunal's credibility is built over time, through the rigor of its procedures, the quality of its judges, and the solidity of its decisions. The **STCA** must, from its earliest years, demonstrate that it is founded on rigorous legal principles and not on politics — that its decisions will withstand scrutiny from the most demanding jurists.

To this end, the election of judges — a process underway in **June 2026** — is crucial. Independent judges, internationally recognized, drawn from diverse legal traditions, will give the tribunal the legitimacy it needs for its decisions to carry global weight. Judges perceived as politically selected would do the opposite — and would be exploited by **Russia** to discredit the institution.

*The STCA's legal credibility is its first battle. Before issuing its first indictment, it must convince the international community that it is not a Western political instrument dressed up in judicial robes. That is difficult — the history of ad hoc tribunals is littered with legitimate criticisms about their impartiality. The STCA must do better.*

## The Ukrainian Rada and national participation

### Ukraine as a stakeholder, not just a victim

The **Rada** — the Ukrainian Parliament — actively participated in discussions on the creation of the **STCA**. This national participation is important: it guarantees that the tribunal is not perceived in **Ukraine** as an external institution imposed by allies, but as a co-constructed mechanism to which the Ukrainian nation fully adheres.

The psychological dimension is real. Ukrainian victims of the aggression — civilians, soldiers, displaced families — need to see that justice for their suffering is being pursued in an institutional and durable manner. The **STCA** is a response to this need. It says: your suffering will not be forgotten; those who caused it will answer for their actions.

### Justice as a dimension of Ukrainian resistance

**Ukrainian resistance** to Russian aggression is not only military — it is also legal, diplomatic, and moral. The creation of the **STCA**, which **Ukraine** actively supported and whose diplomats helped shape, is a dimension of this resistance. It says: we are fighting not only for our territory, we are fighting for the principle that launching a war of aggression is a punishable crime.

This legal dimension of Ukrainian resistance has implications that extend beyond **Ukraine**. It reminds all international actors — **China**, **Iran**, **North Korea**, any state tempted by territorial aggression — that international law is not a dead letter, that attempts to violate it have consequences that materialize in courtrooms.

*Ukraine's legal resistance is as much a contribution to humanity as its military resistance. It defends not only its own sovereignty, but the universal principle that aggression is a crime. This is exactly the principle that China threatens in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan. The STCA's credibility therefore carries implications far beyond Ukraine.*

## Practical challenges: funding, timelines, and politics

### Building a tribunal is a long-term undertaking

The approval of the **STCA**'s budget in **June 2026** is a necessary but still modest step. An international tribunal — with its registries, investigation units, legal services, interpretation facilities, and security measures — costs hundreds of millions of euros over time. States parties will need to sustain financial support for years, perhaps decades.

This is one of the real risks: financial fatigue among states parties. When governments change and political priorities shift, contributions to international institutions are often among the first to be cut. The **STCA** will need to regularly demonstrate its added value to maintain the commitment of its funders.

### International justice timelines: patience and consistency required

International criminal procedures are lengthy. The **Nuremberg** tribunal itself lasted only one year — but that was a justice of military occupation, not a procedure respecting current fair trial standards. Trials before the **International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia** lasted decades. The **ICC** is known for its extremely slow procedures.

The **STCA** will need to find a balance between procedural rigor and temporal efficiency. Overly slow procedures would lose public and political attention. Overly rapid procedures would sacrifice the defense rights that any fair justice — even when defendants are presumed tyrants — must respect. That is the difficult balance the judges will need to maintain.

*I think of Slobodan Milošević who died in prison in 2006 before being convicted by the ICTY — after ten years of procedures. I think of Radovan Karadžić, convicted in 2019 for crimes committed in the 1990s. International justice is slow. It sometimes eventually arrives. That is not enough for victims who cannot wait. But it is something.*

## The ICC and the STCA: two complementary institutions

### What the ICC does that the STCA cannot, and vice versa

The **International Criminal Court** (**ICC**) has already issued an **arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin** in March **2023** — for the deportation of Ukrainian children, a specific war crime. That warrant, while unenforceable as long as **Putin** remains in power in **Russia**, has had concrete effects: it has restricted his international travel and created a legal precedent. But the **ICC** cannot try the **crime of aggression** itself in this case — that is the gap the **STCA** fills.

The complementarity between the two institutions is therefore structural and deliberate. The **ICC** handles crimes committed in the conduct of the war — torture, deportations, deliberate strikes on civilians. The **STCA** will handle the political and military decision to have launched this war. Together, they cover the full spectrum of international criminality — from the supreme political crime down to crimes committed in the field.

### Russia and the international legal architecture it rejects

**Russia** left the **Rome Statute** in **2016**, formally withdrawing its signature. It rejects the **ICC**'s jurisdiction and will contest that of the **STCA**. This stance of rejecting international law is consistent with its doctrine that great powers are not subject to the same rules as ordinary states. It is precisely this doctrine that the **STCA** seeks to overturn.

That **Russia** rejects the **STCA** is not a surprise — and must not be a reason not to create it. The **Nuremberg** war criminals also rejected the tribunal's jurisdiction. That did not prevent the convictions, and those convictions founded the modern international legal order. The legitimacy of a tribunal is measured by the quality of its procedures and decisions — not by the consent of the accused.

*Russia rejects the STCA. Of course. Criminals always reject the jurisdiction of the tribunals judging them. But the legitimacy of a judicial institution does not depend on the consent of those it judges — it depends on the solidity of its legal foundations and the support of the international community. On both dimensions, the STCA has serious arguments.*

## The long-term deterrent impact: changing the calculus for future aggressors

### Beyond Ukraine: the message to regional actors

The **STCA**'s most important impact may not be in the convictions it will hand down — but in their deterrent effect on potential future aggressors. If the **STCA** succeeds in credibly establishing that leaders who decide to launch wars of aggression can be criminally prosecuted, it creates an additional cost in the calculus of any future aggressor.

This message is directly addressed to **China** regarding **Taiwan**, to **Iran** regarding its regional ambitions, to **North Korea**, and to any other actor tempted by military aggression. It is not a guarantee — tyrants are not always rational in the face of legal risk. But adding the threat of personal criminal prosecution to the risk tableau of aggression changes the parameters of the decision.

### Lasting peace passes through justice

Historical experience shows that lasting peaces are those founded on justice — not merely on force or power balances. The **Versailles Treaty** of **1919**, which humiliated **Germany** without holding it accountable for its crimes, sowed the seeds of the **Second World War**. The **Nuremberg** trials, which combined military victory with legal accountability, contributed to founding a more lasting peace in **Europe**.

Peace in **Ukraine** will be lasting if it is founded on justice — recognition that aggression was a crime, compensation of victims, and a mechanism to prevent recurrence. The **STCA** is an essential component of this durable peace architecture. That is why its creation deserves to be celebrated — modestly, with all the caution required of an institution that has not yet proven itself.

*Lasting peace passes through justice — that is the principle the STCA embodies. I believe in this principle. I also believe that its implementation will be difficult, slow, and imperfect. But difficult-to-implement principles are worth more than easy principles that change nothing. That is why the STCA deserves our support.*

## Conclusion: Justice as a complement to resistance

### What the STCA changes in the conflict's dynamic

The creation of the **STCA** changes something in the dynamic of the Ukrainian conflict: it says this war is not only a military and political question, but also a legal and moral one. It creates an institutional mechanism that will survive the conflict, document the crimes, and serve as a legal reference point for decades to come.

For **Putin** and his co-conspirators, the **STCA** is a signal: even if your regime survives, even if the war ends through a political agreement, the criminal question of the crime of aggression you committed will not be buried. It will be investigated. It will produce verdicts. And those verdicts will carry the force of international law — not merely moral condemnation.

### The legacy for international law

*I will close this editorial with a simple conviction: a world in which heads of state can launch wars of aggression without being held accountable before justice is a more dangerous world. The STCA is an imperfect answer to this problem. But it is an answer. And in 2026, after everything we have witnessed, any honest answer deserves to be supported.*

The **STCA**'s most important legacy could be to confirm and reinforce the **Nuremberg** principle: that leaders who decide to launch wars of aggression are personally held to account before the law. This principle, weakened by decades of great-power impunity, could regain new vitality through this tribunal. That is the hope. And in **Ukraine**'s case, hope has often taken the form of action.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [ICDS Estonia — The Special Tribunal for Ukraine, turning the wheels of international justice — 2026](https://icds.ee/en/the-special-tribunal-for-ukraine-turning-the-wheels-of-international-justice/)

- [European Council — Conclusions on Ukraine — June 2026](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/european-council-conclusions-ukraine_en)

- [Le Monde — The Special Tribunal on Ukraine's aggression, a major step toward protecting post-WWII international law — June 25, 2026](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/06/25/the-special-tribunal-on-ukraine-s-aggression-could-be-a-major-step-toward-protecting-the-legal-architecture-built-after-world-war-ii_6754844_4.html)

### Secondary sources

- [JusticeInfo — News on justice for Ukraine — 2026](https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/regions/ukraine)

- [Ukrainian Rada — Committee news on the special tribunal — 2026](https://www.rada.gov.ua/en/news/News/committee_news/273755.html)

- [Opinio Juris — Symposium on reparations for victims of the war in Ukraine — June 1, 2026](http://opiniojuris.org/2026/06/01/symposium-on-advancing-effective-and-comprehensive-reparation-for-victims-of-the-war-in-ukraine-no-uncharted-territory-the-iccs-and-tfvs-role-in-the-ecosystem-of-justice-for-victims-in-u/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-le-tribunal-de-nuremberg-ukrainien-l-histoire-frappe-a-la-porte-de-la-