# The U.S. Air Force bets on AI to keep its edge > Introduction: the war is now fought inside the algorithms - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Editorial - Published: 2026-07-03 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-larmee-de-lair-americaine-mise-sur-lia-pour-garder-une-longueur-davance ## Introduction: the war is now fought inside the algorithms ### An **exercise** that changes in nature Some **military** **exercise**s make headlines for their spectacular images of fighter jets in formation, while others, far quieter, silently redefine how a future war will be fought. The second kind matters infinitely more, and that is exactly what just happened in **Las Vegas**. The **Department of the Air Force** ran the **Multi-Decision Advantage Sprint for Human-Machine Teaming**, nicknamed **MASH**, a two-week **exercise** that for the first time integrated **Guardians** from the **Space Force** alongside **Air Force** personnel. The stated goal is simple to state but colossal to achieve: let American forces make **decision**s faster than any adversary in a contested environment. At a time when **China** and **Russia** are pouring resources into their own AI-assisted command capabilities, every day of American delay can translate into a very real tactical disadvantage on a future battlefield. ### An unprecedented partnership between two services What sets this **exercise** apart from previous ones is the active integration of **Guardians** from the **Space Force**, no longer as observers but literally **"in the seat,"** directly shaping the development of **combat** management tools that span the space domain. Colonel **John Ohlund**, director of the cross-functional team for the advanced battle management system, summed up the stakes: weaving **artificial intelligence** into the **combat** management architecture so operators can process massive volumes of **data** faster than ever before. ## **MASH**, a set of three critical functions ### Sense, match, generate The exercise put six industry software development teams to the test, alongside the **military** **ShOC-N** team, around three foundational **decision**-making functions drawn from the Department of the **Air Force**'s transformational model: identifying possible actions against a target, matching the desired effect with the best available capability, and generating viable **combat** courses of action for commanders. These three functions, technical in appearance, are in reality the very heart of modern **military** **decision**-making. Intelligently automating these steps, without removing final human judgment, could dramatically shrink the time between detecting a threat and mounting the appropriate operational response. ### A proving ground at **Nellis** The experiment took place at a dedicated facility of the **Shadow Operations Center-Nellis**, led by the Department of the **Air Force**'s cross-functional team for the advanced battle management system, in partnership with the **Air Force Research Laboratory**, the **Space Force**, and the **805th Combat Training Squadron**. ## Allies are watching, a powerful **strategic** signal ### Four nations invited to observe Notably, four allied nations observed the exercise, gathering lessons on the American approach to integrated architectures and laying the groundwork for future **interoperability**. This calculated openness sends a clear message: Washington wants its **NATO** and Indo-Pacific partners to advance at the same **technological** pace, rather than fall behind during future joint operations. **Interoperability** is not a bureaucratic footnote. In a high-intensity conflict involving several **Atlantic Alliance** countries against **Russia**, the ability of allied systems to exchange targeting **data** in real time could decide the outcome of an engagement far more than the raw number of platforms deployed. ### A closing **strategic** window **China** is rapidly advancing its own AI-assisted command, control, and communications capabilities, just as **Russia** keeps adapting its electronic warfare systems on the Ukrainian theater. Every delay in Western integration of these technologies narrows the West's **strategic** room to maneuver against adversaries who are not waiting around. ## The accelerated software development cycle ### An operator-developer co-creation model The user-producer co-creation environment lets military operators give immediate feedback to developers, dramatically speeding up the software development cycle for the entire joint force. This model breaks from traditional American defense acquisition processes, often criticized for their excessive slowness in the face of rapidly evolving **technological** threats. In practice, this means fixes and improvements that might have taken months, even years, under a classic acquisition program can now be tested, adjusted, and redeployed within just a few days during these intensive exercises. ### Building on the gains of previous exercises **MASH** builds on the successes of earlier Decision Advantage Sprint for Human-Machine Teaming exercises, single-function experiments that progressively proved the technical feasibility of this approach before scaling up to this integrated, multi-domain version. ## The Chinese threat as backdrop ### **Beijing**, systemic rival number one It would be naive to claim this exercise has no direct link to **China**'s rising military power. **Beijing** has made multi-domain **data** fusion an explicit **strategic** priority for its own armed forces, seeking to shorten its own decision loop ahead of a potential conflict in the western Pacific. **China** remains, according to dominant Western doctrine, the greatest long-term systemic threat to the rules-based international order, even more so than **Russia** in terms of overall economic and technological power. ### A race with no room for delay The space domain, where the **Space Force** now plays a central role, is also where **China** is investing most aggressively, developing anti-satellite and surveillance capabilities that could one day directly threaten the communication and navigation systems on which the entire Western military apparatus depends. ## The growing role of the **Space Force** ### From observers to full-fledged actors The active participation of **Guardians** in this exercise marks an important symbolic milestone for the Space Force, a still-young service seeking to prove its immediate operational relevance rather than simply its future potential. Moving from observer status to direct contributor in the development of **combat** management tools illustrates the rapid maturation of this military branch. This shift reflects a growing recognition, within the **Pentagon** itself, that the space domain can no longer be treated as a mere technical appendix to air operations, but as a full-fledged operational theater, as critical as air, land, or sea. ### Toward complete multi-domain integration The long-term ambition goes far beyond this exercise: building a truly joint command and control architecture, where space, air, cyber, maritime, and land data converge in real time toward decision-makers, regardless of their service of origin. ## Private industry as an indispensable partner ### Six teams in constructive competition The six industry software development teams that took part in the exercise represent a cross-section of the American defense **innovation** ecosystem, a sector that now blends traditional major contractors with young startups specialized in **artificial intelligence** applied to combat. This constructive competition among vendors, rather than an exclusive contract handed to a single player, lets the **Pentagon** directly compare different technical approaches before committing to major long-term investments. ### A model worth replicating elsewhere This intensive sprint model could be reproduced in other critical areas of American defense, from missile defense to electronic warfare, wherever the speed of **innovation** often matters more than immediate technical perfection. ## What this means for future conflicts ### A battle that will be fought before the first shot is fired In a future high-intensity conflict, whether against Russia in Eastern Europe or against **China** in the Pacific, the ability to process information faster than the adversary could well decide the outcome of the conflict before the first shots are even exchanged. That conviction underpins the entire American investment in the tools tested in **Las Vegas**. European **NATO** allies are watching these developments closely, aware they too will need to invest heavily in similar capabilities if they want to remain interoperable with American forces during future joint operations. ## Conclusion: an edge to preserve at all costs ### What this exercise really reveals **MASH** is not just another technological exercise: it is a signal sent to allies and adversaries alike that the United States takes the race for AI-assisted decision-making seriously. In a world where China, Russia, **Iran**, and **North Korea** are all investing, to varying degrees, in disruptive military capabilities, the West can no longer afford technological complacency. ### The real challenge still lies ahead What remains is turning these promising experiments into fully operational, field-deployed capabilities, a path that stays long, costly, and littered with the usual bureaucratic obstacles. But at least the direction taken looks like the right one, and that alone is reassuring in as tense a geopolitical context as 2026. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [U.S. Air Force Warfare Center — Space Force integrates with Air Force in AI sprint — June 25, 2026](https://www.nellis.af.mil/Nellis-News/Article-Display/Article/4526413/space-force-integrates-with-air-force-in-ai-sprint-to-ensure-mission-dominance/) - [Nellis Air Force Base — Space Force Integrates with Air Force in AI Sprint — June 24, 2026](https://www.nellis.af.mil/Units/Wings-of-the-USAFWC/505-CCW/News/Tag/323127/multi-decision-advantage-sprint-for-human-machine-teaming-sprint/) ### Secondary sources - [Space Force — Official service news feed](https://www.spaceforce.mil/news/) - [U.S. Air Force Warfare Center — Photos of the MASH exercise in Las Vegas](https://www.nellis.af.mil/Nellis-News/Photos/igphoto/2003953618/) - [Institute for the Study of War — Context on regional military capabilities, June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/korean-peninsula-update-june-23-2026/) - [Reuters — Broader context on American military modernization, June 25, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-notifies-congress-turkey-engine-sale-2026-06-25/) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-larmee-de-lair-americaine-mise-sur-lia-pour-garder-une-longueur-davance