# EDITORIAL: Hormuz Reopened, Fake Peace: Why the West Must Not Lower Its Guard on Iran

> The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most vital arteries of the global economy. Approximately 20% of world oil trade and a significant fraction of global liquefied natural gas pass through this roughly twenty-kilometer-wide passage wedged between Iran and Oman. When Iran threatens to close Hormuz — and it has done so repeatedly since the 1979 revolution — global oil markets react

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-hormuz-rouvert-paix-factice-pourquoi-l-occident-ne-doit-pas-baisser-la

## Key takeaways

- The roadmap includes a communication line on the Strait of Hormuz, but the two sides already give contradictory accounts of nuclear inspections, and Iran's position on tolls and frozen assets remains disputed.
- Iran is enriching uranium to nearly 60%, which the author describes as a threshold position, and inspections are the core disagreement.
- The reported 14-point Islamabad MOU mentions $300 billion in reconstruction, whose financing is unexplained.
- The author criticizes the 60-day timeline, the bilateral format that sidelines Europe, and the risks of an escrow mechanism for grain purchases.
- The author links Iranian drone supplies to Russia, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and proxy networks to the need for broader conditions.

## Introduction: the strait that makes the global economy tremble

### Hormuz: the keystone of global hydrocarbon trade

The **Strait of Hormuz** is one of the most vital arteries of the global economy. Approximately **20% of world oil trade** and a significant fraction of global liquefied natural gas pass through this roughly twenty-kilometer-wide passage wedged between **Iran** and **Oman**. When **Iran** threatens to close Hormuz — and it has done so repeatedly since the 1979 revolution — global oil markets react immediately and economies dependent on these supplies begin calculating the cost of the disruption.

That is why the agreement reached in June 2026 between the **United States** and **Iran** — a «**roadmap**» for a final deal within **60 days**, including a communication line on Hormuz and talks in **Geneva** — generated palpable relief in some capitals. A communication line on Hormuz is a promise that the strait will not be deliberately closed during the negotiation period. That is useful. That is good. And it is largely insufficient grounds for the West to breathe easy and lower its guard on Iran.

### An agreement born in ambiguity and perhaps dying in the details

The first day of U.S.-Iran talks in **Geneva** immediately revealed the fundamental fault lines. **Nuclear inspections**: the two sides offer contradictory accounts of what was agreed, according to several media outlets including **Al Jazeera** and the **Washington Times**. **Rubio** affirms there will be «**no tolls**» in the strait, but the Iranian position on this point remains ambiguous. The **$12 billion** in frozen assets claimed by Iran has disputed terms of access. In other words: a 60-day deal to find a real deal, with fundamental disagreements already visible on day one. That is not an encouraging start.

This editorial is not against diplomacy. I believe diplomacy is preferable to war. But diplomacy requires from both parties a minimum of good faith, a genuine willingness to compromise, and an institutional capacity to honor commitments made. On these three criteria, the **Iran** of the **Islamic Republic** has a track record that commands vigilance rather than enthusiasm.

*A 60-day deal to find a deal. With disagreements over nuclear inspections on day one. With contradictory accounts of what was agreed. I have seen this play before. It is called "the Iranian nuclear negotiations of 2003, 2006, 2013, 2015." It always ends the same way: Iran buys time, advances its program, and then offers new symbolic concessions in exchange for new sanctions relief. We must be wary of replaying that script.*

## The Iranian nuclear program: where things actually stand

### Uranium enrichment and proximity to the threshold

**Iran** has considerably advanced its uranium enrichment program since the American withdrawal from the **JCPOA** in 2018. In June 2026, Iran is enriching uranium to purity levels approaching **60%**, well above the **3.67%** threshold set by the JCPOA and significantly below the **90%+** required for a military weapon, but with capabilities that would theoretically allow reaching the military threshold within weeks to months according to available estimates.

This proximity is the most important geopolitical fact in any discussion of Iran and the **Geneva** negotiations. Iran today is a threshold nuclear power — without an officially declared bomb, but with the knowledge, centrifuges, and materials to build one within a relatively short timeframe if the decision were made. This is what is called «**breakout capacity**» — the ability to rapidly exit the non-proliferation regime. The objective of any serious negotiation is to reduce that capacity or place it under rigorous international verification.

### Inspections: the heart of the disagreement

**Nuclear inspections** by the **International Atomic Energy Agency** (**IAEA**) are the cornerstone of any non-proliferation agreement. They are what allows verification that paper commitments match the reality of nuclear installations. And yet the **Geneva** negotiations immediately ran aground on this issue: the **United States** and **Europeans** demand robust, unimpeded inspection access; **Iran** seeks to limit its scope, citing sovereignty and national security concerns.

This divergence on inspections is not a technical detail: it is the fundamental disagreement. Without credible, unimpeded inspections, no agreement can be verified, and no unverifiable agreement deserves to be signed by Western democracies. The history of Iranian nuclear negotiations is rich with examples of agreements that provided for inspections but whose implementation was obstructed by Iran. That history must be factored into the evaluation of any new agreement.

*Nuclear inspections: the red line Iran crosses with every agreement. In 2015, the JCPOA included inspections. Iran systematically refused access to certain sites, stalled, delayed. The IAEA documented these obstacles on multiple occasions. If a new agreement is reached without truly binding inspection mechanisms and guaranteed access timelines, it will be an agreement that will be violated. That is not pessimistic prediction; it is extrapolation from the past.*

## The "Islamabad" MOU: what this mysterious document contains

### The 14 points of the memorandum of understanding

A memorandum of understanding, sometimes called the «**Islamabad MOU**», was reportedly developed within the framework of Pakistani and Qatari mediation. According to information available via **Ground News** of **June 23, 2026**, this **14-point** document would cover ambitious elements: **$300 billion** in reconstruction, the reopening of the **Hormuz** strait, lifting of the blockade, and mediation by **Pakistan** and **Qatar**.

These figures are staggering in their ambition. **$300 billion** in reconstruction — more than the Marshall Plan adjusted for inflation. Where does this sum come from? Who finances it? What conditions are attached? These questions find no clear answers in available sources, and the absence of answers to such fundamental questions is itself revealing. Agreements that announce astronomical figures without credible financing mechanisms are generally instruments of domestic political signaling rather than serious economic plans.

### The role of Pakistan and Qatar as mediators

**Pakistan** and **Qatar** as mediators between the **United States** and **Iran** reflect the complex geopolitics of the region. **Qatar** has long mediation experience — it hosts an American military base while maintaining relations with Iran and the **Muslim Brotherhood**. **Pakistan** shares a border with Iran and has interests in regional stability. These countries can facilitate communications that direct American-Iranian channels do not permit.

But the value of any mediation depends on the trust the parties place in the mediators and their capacity to guarantee commitments made. Neither **Qatar** nor **Pakistan** has the capacity to compel **Iran** to honor its commitments if Tehran decides to deviate from them. They are communication facilitators, not enforcement guarantors. And in a negotiation as complex and historically charged as the one over the Iranian nuclear program, the difference between the two is decisive.

*$300 billion in reconstruction for Iran. It sounds like a promise made knowing it will never be honored in those terms. Big numbers in negotiations are often rhetorical opening positions, not real commitments. But they allow each side to tell its domestic audience that it obtained something important. That is domestic politics dressed up as international diplomacy.*

## American policy on Iran: between pragmatism and structural naivety

### The Trump administration and Iran: a cycle of pressure-negotiation

The **Trump** administration has a complex relationship with Iran. Trump's first term saw withdrawal from the **JCPOA** in 2018 and a «**maximum pressure**» policy with severe sanctions. This second term appears to be exploring a different path: direct negotiations, a roadmap, a communication line on Hormuz. This shift may reflect an assessment that maximum pressure has reached its limits without producing the expected change in behavior, and that an even imperfect agreement is better than perpetual impasse.

That assessment is not unreasonable in principle. But it requires particular vigilance on the terms: if a deal with **Iran** is concluded too quickly, with concessions on inspections and insufficient guarantees on the ballistic weapons program, the result could be worse than no deal at all — an Iran relieved of economic constraints while maintaining its progression toward the nuclear threshold. That is the most problematic scenario the **Trump** administration must avoid.

### Rubio and the hard line on Hormuz: credible or rhetorical?

**Marco Rubio**, U.S. Secretary of State, declared there would be «**no tolls**» in the Strait of Hormuz — rejecting any notion that Iran could legitimately restrict the passage of commercial vessels. This position is consistent with international maritime law and the American principle of freedom of navigation. But between a statement of principle and its concrete implementation, there is often a gap that Tehran has learned to exploit.

Iran has, in the past, harassed commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and near Hormuz: seizures of oil tankers, threatening maneuvers by Revolutionary Guards speedboats, drones monitoring convoys. These actions, technically below the threshold of a formal closure of the strait, nonetheless create real pressure on economic actors assessing transit risks. **Rubio**'s hard line on principle must be backed by a credible naval presence in the region to be effective as deterrence.

*Rubio says "no tolls in the strait." Good. Now, how many American destroyers are in the Gulf to back up that declaration? Diplomatic words without naval muscle are empty declarations in a region where only force speaks. I hope the rhetoric is accompanied by a presence that makes it credible. If not, Iran will very quickly test its limits.*

## Frozen assets and the $12 billion: the nerve of the financial war

### What Iran claims and what is legally available

**Iran** is claiming access to approximately **$12 billion** in frozen assets held in accounts abroad, blocked under American and international sanctions. These assets — primarily oil revenues frozen in banks in third countries that respected American sanctions — represent an absolute priority for Tehran, whose economy suffers considerably from restricted access to international financial markets.

Partial or full access to these assets is a major American negotiating lever. But it carries a real risk: if these funds are released too quickly and without verifiable conditions, they could finance the Iranian weapons program, the Revolutionary Guards, Iranian proxies in **Lebanon**, **Syria**, **Yemen**, and **Iraq**. Past experience with partial releases of Iranian funds is not reassuring: Tehran used these resources in ways that aggravated regional destabilization rather than directing them toward economic development.

### The escrow for American grain purchases: an innovation to watch

One proposal advanced in the negotiations calls for an **escrow** account specifically designated for purchasing American grain — a way to unblock part of Iranian funds under restricted use conditions. It is a creative approach that acknowledges Iranian humanitarian needs (Iran imports significant quantities of grain) while seeking to prevent diversion of funds toward military uses.

But escrow mechanisms have their limits. Money is fungible: if Iran can use escrow funds to buy grain, it frees up other resources for other uses. This budgetary substitution is difficult to control, and Iran has demonstrated in the past a great skill at exploiting the gray zones of financial agreements it signs. Rigorous verification of the ultimate use of any unblocked funds, as constraining as possible, is essential for this mechanism not to become a disguised back door out of sanctions.

*An escrow account for grain. As if Iran were going to dedicate its unblocked billions solely to buying American wheat and forget its Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, and the drones it sends to Russia. I understand the humanitarian logic of this proposal. I cannot understand how anyone believes it will work without extremely rigorous verification.*

## Iran and Russia: an alliance that disrupts Western strategy

### Iranian drones in Ukraine: a documented contribution

While **Iran** negotiates a deal with the **United States**, its **Shahed-136** drones continue striking Ukrainian cities. This reality, documented and confirmed by Ukrainian and Western military sources, creates a fundamental contradiction in any attempt to address the Iranian file in isolation: you cannot normalize economic relations with a state that is actively supplying weapons for the destruction of a country you are also supporting.

Iranian drone production for **Russia** has been ramped up since 2022. Factories in **Russia** are producing copies of Iranian drones with the support of Iranian technicians and engineers, according to intelligence published by Western governments. This military-industrial cooperation represents a direct Iranian contribution to the Russian war of aggression — one that the **Geneva** negotiations cannot ignore.

### Conditions on the Iranian contribution to the war in Ukraine

A credible U.S.-Iran agreement must include explicit conditions on the cessation of drone supply and military technology transfers to **Russia**. The absence of such conditions in publicly available elements of the **Geneva** negotiations is concerning. If **Iran** can sign an agreement with the **United States** while continuing to supply drones that kill Ukrainians, that agreement weakens the coherence of Western policy rather than strengthening it.

This dimension of the Iranian question — the link to the war in Ukraine — is often treated as a separate file in American diplomacy. That is a mistake: the issues are interconnected. An **Iran** relieved of certain sanctions while maintaining its military cooperation with **Russia** is worse than an **Iran** under maximum pressure. **Ukraine** has every right to demand that its Western allies integrate this dimension into their negotiations with Tehran.

*Iranian drones are hitting Kyiv while Iran negotiates with Washington. It is a situation of absolute hypocrisy that the West appears prepared to accept because it treats these files in separate silos. Ukraine cannot afford that luxury: for Ukraine, Iranian drones and American policy toward Iran are the same file. The same corpse in the same explosion. The West should treat them the same way.*

## Iranian policy toward its neighbors: a track record of destabilization

### Iran's regional proxies

Iranian foreign policy rests on a network of **proxies** — armed groups supported, funded, and equipped by Tehran — that destabilize countries across the region: **Hezbollah** in Lebanon, **Hamas** in Gaza, the **Houthis** in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq, pro-Iranian groups in Syria. This network is the pillar of Iran's strategy of «**resistance**» against Israel and American interests in the region.

No agreement with **Iran** can be considered serious if it does not address this regional dimension. And yet nuclear negotiations have historically separated the proxy question from the nuclear program question, on the grounds that both files are too complex to address together. This artificial separation has allowed Iran to advance on both fronts simultaneously: progressing its nuclear program while its proxies continued their destabilizing activities.

### Yemen and the Houthi record since 2023

The **Houthis** of Yemen, backed by **Iran**, have since late 2023 launched repeated attacks against commercial vessels in the **Red Sea**, significantly disrupting global trade routes and contributing to increases in maritime insurance costs. These attacks forced Western navies to deploy substantial forces to escort convoys and defend commercial ships. This low-level conflict in the Red Sea is directly tied to Iranian policy — without Iranian support, the Houthis would have neither the missiles nor the drones to conduct these operations.

Any agreement with **Iran** that does not provide for a cessation of Iranian support for the **Houthis** will allow Tehran to continue disrupting global trade routes, including those that supply **Europe**. European economic interests in the stability of the Red Sea are direct and considerable. It is an additional reason for **Europe** to pay close attention to the terms of U.S.-Iran negotiations, even if it is not directly a party to them.

*Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, Iraqi militias — all funded by Tehran. All active in regional destabilization. Then Iran signs a deal with Washington leaving these groups intact. And we call that diplomatic progress. I call it an incomplete deal that solves one problem while leaving five others untouched. Better than nothing? Maybe. Sufficient? No.*

## The 60 days: a countdown to what, exactly?

### What can realistically be negotiated in 60 days?

The «**roadmap**» for a final deal in **60 days** is a political promise more than a diplomatic reality. Iranian nuclear negotiations — in all their iterations since 2003 — have shown that the issues at stake require months, even years of detailed technical discussions on inspections, enrichment levels, sanctions to be lifted, and verification mechanisms. Claiming that a «final» agreement can be concluded in 60 days either grossly overestimates the simplicity of the issues or prepares the ground for signing an insufficient deal.

This 60-day deadline has a clear political function: it creates time pressure that favors parties prepared to make concessions to meet a deadline, at the expense of thorough reflection on the terms. In this context, the parties most accustomed to playing the clock — and **Iran** has long experience with diplomatic procrastination — can use this timeline to their advantage by letting the 60 days expire while having already extracted preliminary concessions.

### Lessons from the 2015 agreements and their implications

The **2015 JCPOA** — the «**historic**» agreement on the Iranian nuclear program — was concluded after years of grueling negotiations. It provided for limitations on the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The **American withdrawal in 2018** under Trump, followed by the «**maximum pressure**» policy, led to the framework's collapse. Since then, Iran has considerably advanced its enrichment, finding itself in a better nuclear position than before the JCPOA — raising the question of whether the 2015 negotiations ultimately benefited Iran more than the parties seeking to constrain it.

Drawing lessons from the JCPOA does not mean never negotiating with **Iran** again. It means negotiating with eyes open: by demanding robust verification mechanisms, by tying sanctions relief to verifiable progress rather than promises, and by including in discussions elements the JCPOA left aside — the ballistic missile program and the activities of regional proxies.

*The 2015 JCPOA: a deal that allowed Iran to advance its uranium enrichment while obtaining tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief. Then Trump withdrew. And now Iran is closer to the nuclear threshold than in 2015. Bottom line: fewer constraints, more capability. If the new agreement repeats that mistake, we will have just bought a few more years before the next crisis.*

## The position of European allies: between caution and economic opportunism

### Europe and Iran: economic interests complicating the principled position

European countries — notably **Germany**, **France**, the **United Kingdom** — have genuine economic interests in normalizing relations with **Iran**: a market of **85 million people**, oil and gas resources, industrial opportunities. These economic interests sometimes create a temptation to prioritize commercial normalization over rigor in nuclear and regional demands.

That temptation must be resisted. Regional security in the **Middle East** directly affects European security: migration flows, stability of Mediterranean neighboring countries, freedom of navigation in the **Red Sea** — all are tied to Iranian policy. Accepting an insufficient agreement with Iran to gain access to its market would be repeating the mistake of dependence on Russian gas: short-term economic benefits traded for long-term strategic vulnerability.

### E3+3 or bilateral format: the question of the negotiating framework

The **Geneva** negotiations are proceeding primarily in a bilateral U.S.-Iran format, with Swiss mediation and Pakistani and Qatari contributions. The multilateral format of previous negotiations — involving the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia (**P5+1** or **E3+3**) — has been largely set aside. This bilateralization is problematic: it excludes European allies who have direct interests in the outcome, and it gives actors like China and Russia less incentive to support the agreement.

European allies have expressed their desire to be informed and consulted on the negotiations, but their capacity to influence the terms of a bilateral U.S.-Iran agreement is limited. This partial exclusion of Europeans from the negotiating process is a structural flaw that the **United States** should correct — not out of diplomatic courtesy, but because the robustness of an agreement depends on the number and solidity of its signatories.

*A bilateral U.S.-Iran agreement without the Europeans. If Trump signs something in Washington saying "it's settled," and Europe was not at the table, how will that Europe be able to maintain its own policies if the agreement proves insufficient? Transatlantic coordination on Iran is not a formality: it is the condition for a coherent and lasting response to the Iranian nuclear threat.*

## What history teaches about agreements with Iran

### The negotiation-violation-renegotiation cycle

An honest examination of the history of negotiations with **Iran** since the 1979 Islamic Revolution reveals a recurring cycle: an agreement negotiated under international pressure, partial implementation by Iran, progressive violations of commitments, crisis, then renegotiation. This cycle has repeated itself on questions of hostages, human rights, nuclear proliferation, and support for terrorism.

This track record does not mean that negotiation is useless or that any agreement with **Iran** is doomed to fail. It means that the design of the agreement — the verification mechanisms, the automatic snapback sanctions clauses in case of violation, the precise timelines and conditions — is as important, if not more so, than the general principles it enunciates. A well-designed agreement can hold. A poorly designed one will give rise to the usual cycle.

### Changes in Iranian leadership: opportunity or mirage?

Some analysts point out that changes in Iranian leadership since the death of President **Raisi** might offer an opening for a more substantive agreement. President **Pezeshkian**, elected in 2024, had displayed more pragmatic positions on economic negotiations. The reality of power in Iran, however, is that foreign policy and the nuclear program are largely determined by **Supreme Leader Khamenei** and the **Revolutionary Guards**, not by the president.

The assessment of the «opportunity» represented by a change in Iranian leadership must therefore take into account who actually holds decision-making power on nuclear questions in Iran. The answer is that **Khamenei** remains the ultimate decision-maker, and his positions on the nuclear program have not fundamentally changed. It is toward him that signals must be sent, not only toward the negotiating teams who, technically, can only commit within the limits Khamenei sets for them.

*Pezeshkian more pragmatic than Raisi? Maybe. But the Revolutionary Guards and Khamenei are still there. In Iran, the president is the political interface, not the strategic decision-maker on nuclear matters. Negotiating with Pezeshkian while ignoring that Khamenei has the final word is negotiating with the spokesperson rather than the boss. That is not naivety: it is diplomatic incompetence.*

## Hormuz reopened: the good news and its limits

### What the Hormuz communication line actually achieves

The **Hormuz communication line** provided for in the U.S.-Iran roadmap is a minimal confidence-building measure: it creates a direct communication channel to prevent incidents and accidental escalations in the strait. That is useful, pragmatic, and welcome. It is not a guarantee against the strait being closed if Iran one day decides that option serves its strategic interests.

Real protection of the **Strait of Hormuz** is not a phone line: it is the certainty that the international community would respond decisively to any closure attempt. That certainty depends on maintaining a credible naval presence in the region, consistent American and allied political signals, and the solidity of the sanctions that constitute the counterpart of any normalization with Iran. On these three dimensions, the current record is uneven.

### The regional escalation scenario: still possible

The **Persian Gulf** region remains a theater of multiple tensions: between Iran and **Israel**, between the **Houthis** and a regional coalition, between Iranian ambitions and the security interests of **Gulf Arab states**. The signing of a U.S.-Iran roadmap does not defuse these tensions. It can even exacerbate them if certain actors — notably **Israel** — judge that the deal offers Iran sanctions relief without sufficient constraints on its nuclear program and destabilizing regional activities.

The risk of unwanted regional escalation remains high as long as the fundamental disagreements on inspections and the nuclear program are not resolved verifiably. A 60-day roadmap that produces an insufficient agreement could ironically increase the risk of escalation — by prematurely reassuring some and legitimately alarming others — compared to a clear impasse that at least creates no false expectations.

*I am honestly divided on the Geneva negotiations. Part of me hopes a serious agreement is possible. Another part — the one that has read the history — knows that Iran has rarely honored its diplomatic commitments substantively without being forced to by irrefutable pressure. Hope is not a policy. Vigilance is.*

## What the West must demand as minimum conditions

### The list of non-negotiable requirements

For a U.S.-Iran agreement to deserve the label «progress» rather than «missed opportunity», certain minimum conditions must be met. First, **unlimited nuclear inspections** with immediate, unimpeded access to all declared and suspected sites under **IAEA** supervision. Second, a verifiable and irreversible reduction of enriched uranium stockpiles to levels above documented civilian needs. Third, a cessation of drone supply and other military equipment to Russia, with a verification mechanism.

Fourth, a measurable reduction of Iranian support for armed groups attacking Western interests or disrupting commercial navigation. These conditions are not exhaustive, and some are more realistic than others to obtain in a single agreement. But they define the red lines below which an agreement would be dangerous rather than stabilizing. American negotiators and their European allies must hold these lines, whatever the pressure for a quick conclusion.

### Vigilance as a permanent virtue

Western policy toward **Iran** must be guided by a simple principle: permanent vigilance is more valuable than situational optimism. Imperfect agreements can be worse than an impasse, because they create illusions of security that skilled adversaries exploit. Vigilance is not hostility: it is the recognition that in a file as complex and historically fraught as the Iranian nuclear question, good faith must be earned progressively and verified continuously — not simply declared and accepted.

The West can and must engage diplomatically with **Iran**. But it must do so with eyes open, with clear lines, with robust verification mechanisms, and with the willingness to return to increased pressure if commitments are not honored. Hormuz can stay open and peace can remain possible — but only if vigilance does not relax at the first sign of an Iranian opening that may be nothing more than tactical.

*Hormuz reopened, fake peace. The title of this editorial says what I think. The opening of Hormuz to direct communication is progress. It does not mean Iran has renounced its nuclear ambitions, its drones in Ukraine, its regional proxies. Vigilance does not weaken because a strait is open. It intensifies because a dangerous actor is seeking room to breathe.*

## The ballistic threat and the proxies: what the agreement does not resolve

### Iranian ballistic missiles: a capability outside the nuclear framework

The agreement being negotiated between **Washington** and **Tehran** concerns the nuclear program — centrifuges, enrichment, **IAEA** inspections. What it does not cover, and what the West must not forget, is Iran's **ballistic missile** arsenal. **Iran** possesses one of the most significant missile programs in the Middle East, with delivery systems capable of reaching **Israel**, American bases in the region, **Gulf** capitals, and certain parts of **Southeastern Europe** according to defense analyst estimates. These missiles exist independently of any potential atomic bomb.

In June 2026, **Iran** continues to develop combat drones it supplies to **Russia** for striking Ukrainian cities, and missiles that benefit its proxies — **Hezbollah**, the **Houthis** of Yemen, pro-Iranian **militias** in Iraq and Syria. An agreement that freezes the nuclear program but does not touch this regional power projection capacity eliminates only one dimension of the Iranian threat. It would be naive to present it as a complete victory for Western security.

### The proxy network: Tehran's real power structure

**Iran**'s true geopolitical power does not lie in its centrifuges — it lies in its network of **armed proxies** across the Middle East. **Hezbollah** in Lebanon and Syria, the **Houthis** in Yemen, **Islamic Jihad** in Gaza, **Popular Mobilization Units** in Iraq — these forces constitute a distributed army that Tehran has commanded, funded, and armed for decades. This distributed power architecture allows it to project influence and generate regional instability without directly engaging in conflict, maintaining a level of ambiguity that complicates any Western response.

A nuclear agreement that releases **frozen assets**, lifts sanctions on Iranian oil exports, normalizes economic relations with **Tehran** — can involuntarily strengthen this proxy infrastructure by increasing **Iran**'s financial resources. That is precisely what happened after the **2015 JCPOA**: the partial sanctions relief was followed by intensified Iranian support for **Hezbollah** and the **Houthis**. Any new diplomacy with Tehran must draw that lesson from recent history.

*Iran is a textbook case of the dissociation between economic normalization and change in strategic behavior. In 2015, we lifted sanctions hoping to modify Tehran's behavior. The result was the reverse: resources freed up and invested in proxy wars in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. If the same logic applies in 2026, the Iranian oil dollars that return to global markets will fund the same networks. That mechanism must be understood clearly before signing anything.*

## The European Union and Iran: the limits of a purely economic approach

### European commercial interests facing security imperatives

The **European Union** has a complicated relationship with **Iran**. On one hand, member states like **Germany**, **France**, and **Italy** have historically had significant commercial interests in Iran — energy, infrastructure, industry. On the other, Iran produces drones that kill Ukrainian civilians, missiles that strike **Tel Aviv** through its proxies, and continues to violently repress all domestic dissent. Reconciling these two realities into coherent policy is the impossible task the **EU** has been attempting for years.

The European temptation is to separate the files: treat the nuclear program as an international security problem, and the proxies and human rights as distinct problems that should not block nuclear diplomacy. This compartmentalization is politically understandable — but strategically incoherent. **Tehran** uses precisely this compartmentalized logic to its advantage: it negotiates on the nuclear program to obtain economic concessions, without any counterpart on its regional behavior. The **West** would gain from addressing these files in a more integrated manner, even if diplomatically more difficult.

### European credibility at stake on the Iran file

Europe's credibility in managing the Iranian file has been severely eroded over the years. The **INSTEX** mechanism created to maintain trade with Iran despite American sanctions never functioned effectively. The **Vienna** negotiations stalled for years without conclusion. **France**, **Germany**, and the **United Kingdom** — the famous «**E3**» — maintained a dialogue, but without the credible threat leverage that alone forces Tehran to make real concessions. Without concrete pressure capacity, European diplomacy on Iran sometimes looks more like a façade management exercise than effective negotiation.

In 2026, the context has changed: **Iran** has been designated by several European governments as co-responsible for the war in Ukraine through its drone deliveries. This designation creates an opening for a firmer European posture that explicitly ties economic normalization to binding commitments on proxies and drones. If **Europe** does not use this window of opportunity, it will leave the **United States** to conduct the diplomacy with Tehran alone — and will lose its relevance on this file for a generation.

*Europe has a rare opportunity in 2026: the Ukrainian context gives it moral legitimacy and a concrete political argument to demand that Iran cease its weapons deliveries to Russia as a precondition for any normalization. If it does not use this argument — out of fear of irritating Tehran or poorly disguised economic self-interest — it disqualifies itself as a serious geopolitical actor. Diplomacy without conviction is just commerce in disguise.*

## Conclusion: peace with Iran is not decreed, it is negotiated with exigence

### 60 days to build or to squander a historic opportunity

The **60 days** of the U.S.-Iran roadmap will pass quickly. At their end, either a serious agreement will have been drafted with robust verification mechanisms and concrete commitments on the nuclear program and regional behavior, or we will have another insufficient agreement that prolongs uncertainty and creates new loopholes to exploit. The choice belongs to the negotiators, but citizen and journalistic vigilance over this process is a condition of the quality of the result.

**Iran** is a real power, with legitimate interests, a population suffering under sanctions, and a sophisticated diplomatic culture. These realities deserve recognition. But recognizing Iran's complexity cannot translate into naivety about its nuclear intentions or blindness to its destabilizing regional activities. Both realities coexist, and Western policy must address them both simultaneously.

### What Ukraine, Taiwan, and Hormuz have in common

**Ukraine**, **Taiwan**, and **Hormuz** are three pressure points on the same system: the liberal international order built after 1945 to which the West owes its level of prosperity and security. These pressure points are exploited by powers — **Russia**, **China**, **Iran** — that want to revise that order to their benefit. The response cannot be fragmented, with files treated in separate silos. It must be coherent, coordinated, and sustained by a political resolve that the West will need to find within itself — beyond electoral cycles and immediate economic interests.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*I must name my own position: I am deeply skeptical about Iran's capacity to honor a nuclear agreement while maintaining its network of armed proxies. This skepticism is not paranoia — it is grounded in the history of 2015-2018 and the Iranian drone deliveries to Russia documented from 2022 to 2026. I may be wrong. But the West has the right to demand proof to the contrary before opening the economic floodgates.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [US and Iran agree to a roadmap for a final deal within 60 days — WWNO/NPR, June 21, 2026](https://www.wwno.org/npr-news/2026-06-21/the-u-s-and-iran-agree-to-a-road-map-for-a-final-deal-mediators-say)

- [US and Iran at odds over nuclear inspections and Hormuz — Al Jazeera, June 24, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/6/24/iran-war-live-trump-tehran-at-odds-over-nuclear-inspections-hormuz)

- [What the US and Iran agreed and disagreed on at the first day of talks — Al Jazeera, June 23, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/23/what-the-us-and-iran-agreed-and-disagreed-on-first-day-of-talks)

- [Islamabad MOU: 14 points, $300 billion, Hormuz reopening — Ground News, June 23, 2026](https://ground.news/article/b656df9e-fc5e-46f1-a8e0-3254c5ac107a)

### Secondary sources

- [US and Iran offer different accounts of nuclear inspections — Washington Times, June 23, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/23/us-iran-offer-different-stories-nuclear-inspections-negotiations/)

- [Ukrainian drones at 1,300 km: the Iran-Russia link and the war — Euromaidan Press, June 25, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/25/drones-flew-1300-km-to-russias-ufa-then-struck-bashneft-refineries/)

- [ISW: analysis of connections between the Iran file and the Ukrainian conflict — ISW, June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/)

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-hormuz-rouvert-paix-factice-pourquoi-l-occident-ne-doit-pas-baisser-la