# Geneva must finally face Sudan > Introduction: an emergency meeting that comes too late - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Editorial - Published: 2026-07-03 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-geneve-doit-enfin-regarder-le-soudan-en-face ## Introduction: an emergency meeting that comes too late ### Five countries finally break the silence **Germany**, **Ireland**, the **Netherlands**, **Norway**, and the **United Kingdom** have called for an **emergency meeting** of the **UN Human Rights Council** in **Geneva** to address the Sudanese crisis, as the city of **el-Obeid** faces an intensified siege by the **Rapid Support Forces**. I welcome this initiative, but I refuse to celebrate it unreservedly: it comes after months of near-total indifference toward a country collapsing before our eyes, a silence that should trouble anyone who claims to care about the consistent defense of human rights. ### Why this editorial now Roughly **500,000 civilians** are now under threat in **el-Obeid**, according to **Al Jazeera's** coverage. The el-Fasher precedent, where documented atrocities followed the **RSF's** capture of the city, gives this Geneva meeting an urgency I refuse to downplay. It is precisely because the worst is still avoidable that this editorial demands action, not just a statement, and precisely because words alone have already failed once in el-Fasher that they cannot be allowed to fail a second time in el-Obeid. ## What this diplomatic request reveals ### An implicit admission of collective failure The simple fact that five Western countries deem it necessary to force a special session of the **Human Rights Council** reveals, implicitly, the failure of the ordinary mechanisms for monitoring the Sudanese crisis since the conflict began in April 2023. This admission, even an implicit one, deserves to be underlined: existing instruments were not enough to prevent the fall of **el-Fasher** nor the atrocities that followed, and no amount of diplomatic language can retroactively undo that failure. ### A narrow but real window Unlike **el-Fasher**, where the alarm came too late, the situation in **el-Obeid** is being documented in real time. This **emergency meeting** therefore still has an open window for action, provided it leads to something more than another statement. It is this difference in timing that, in my view, makes this diplomatic initiative potentially decisive, if it is followed by concrete effects. ## The weight of the el-Fasher precedent ### Facts that leave no more room for doubt The **Sudanese Doctors Network** documented the detention of **20 doctors** by the **RSF** after the fall of **el-Fasher**, and a **UN** report published in February warned of a risk of war crimes, describing violence "shocking in its scale and brutality." These facts, corroborated by several independent sources, leave no room for reasonable doubt about the nature of the abuses committed by the paramilitary militia led by **Hemedti**, nor about the scale of what a similar campaign could inflict on el-Obeid. ### A repetition that would be unforgivable If **el-Obeid** were to meet the same fate as **el-Fasher** after the international community had access to all this documented information in advance, this repetition would constitute a collective moral failure of a severity rarely reached in the recent history of humanitarian crises. It is this responsibility of knowing in advance that distinguishes ordinary negligence from a truly unforgivable failing. ## The double-standard argument ### A moral consistency to own I unambiguously support Western backing for **Ukraine** against **Vladimir Putin's** Russian aggression. But that conviction is precisely what obliges me to demand the same vigilance toward **Sudan**, on pain of hollowing out the very principle of universal human rights defense. A **Human Rights Council** that acts quickly for some crises and slowly for others would lose all long-term moral credibility, and would hand every authoritarian regime a convenient argument to dismiss human rights language as pure hypocrisy. ### The risk of compassion fatigue The multiplication of simultaneous global crises — **Ukraine**, the **Middle East**, **Sudan** — feeds a form of compassion fatigue among the Western public, sometimes exploited by certain governments to justify their selective inaction. This fatigue must never become an acceptable excuse for abandoning a population of **500,000** **civilians** to their fate, however understandable the exhaustion of Western publics facing so many simultaneous emergencies may be. ## What Geneva should actually decide ### Beyond mere verbal condemnation A verbal condemnation of the **RSF**, however firm, will not protect a single additional civilian in **el-Obeid**. The **Human Rights Council** must consider concrete mechanisms: independent investigators on the ground, protected humanitarian corridors, and coordinated pressure on the militia's external financing networks. Without these concrete measures, this **emergency meeting** risks reproducing the ineffectiveness already seen before the fall of **el-Fasher**, turning a genuine opportunity into yet another symbolic gathering with no lasting consequence on the ground. ### The need for sustained follow-up A special session is only worthwhile if it comes with a regular follow-up mechanism, able to maintain diplomatic pressure on the **RSF** and their presumed outside backers, long after the cameras have turned away from **el-Obeid**. It is this consistency, more than the spotlight of a single meeting, that will determine whether **Geneva** truly made a difference for **Sudan**. ## The responsibility of Western powers ### A duty that goes beyond charity The Western countries that pushed for this **emergency meeting** request, including the **United Kingdom** and **Germany**, bear a responsibility that goes beyond a simple humanitarian gesture: they hold the diplomatic and financial levers needed to genuinely influence the course of the Sudanese conflict. This responsibility means going beyond statements to consider targeted sanctions against the networks that arm and finance the **RSF**, and to use every economic and diplomatic tool available rather than treating condemnation as the endpoint of engagement. ### The credibility test for the West How can we demand that **Russia** respect international law in **Ukraine** if the **West** itself applies that law selectively elsewhere in the world? This uncomfortable question deserves an honest answer from our leaders. **Sudan** has become, whether we like it or not, a test of moral consistency for Western democracies as a whole. ## The silence of the great powers ### A notable absence Neither **China** nor **Russia** backed this request for an **emergency meeting** on **Sudan**, two powers that nonetheless sit on the **UN Security Council** and hold real influence over certain regional actors involved in the Sudanese conflict. This silence is not trivial. It is a reminder, once again, of the structural difficulty the multilateral system faces in acting quickly when diverging geopolitical interests clash within the very bodies meant to protect civilians. ### A lesson for the post-war period in Ukraine How the **Human Rights Council** handles the Sudanese crisis also offers an instructive precedent for how the international community will one day need to handle accountability for the crimes committed by **Russia** in **Ukraine**. If multilateral mechanisms fail in **Sudan**, it will be harder to convince public opinion that they will work better elsewhere, including against **Vladimir Putin**. ## What Western citizens can demand ### Citizen pressure as leverage Beyond foreign ministries, the pressure of Western public opinion remains an underestimated lever for pushing governments to turn this emergency meeting into concrete actions rather than a mere diplomatic show. Citizens who demanded stronger support for **Ukraine** against **Putin** hold the same legitimacy to demand comparable attention for **Sudan** and its **500,000** civilians threatened in **el-Obeid**. ### The role of independent media Sustained media coverage, like that provided by **Al Jazeera** and **Deutsche Welle**, remains essential to keep up pressure on Western governments and prevent **Sudan** from fading back into media obscurity once the **Geneva** meeting ends. It is also the role of independent columnists like me to refuse that return to obscurity, article after article, as long as the crisis remains unresolved. ## Conclusion: the hour of choice for the Council ### An opportunity not to be wasted This emergency meeting in **Geneva** represents a rare opportunity to act before, not after, a new humanitarian tragedy in **Sudan**. The **Human Rights Council** holds in its hands the information needed to avoid repeating the mistake made with **el-Fasher**. Wasting this opportunity would amount to betraying the very fundamental mission of this multilateral institution. ### What history will remember In a few months, history will judge whether this special session helped avert an announced catastrophe in **el-Obeid**, or whether it was just another diplomatic note in the dusty archives of missed opportunities. For my part, I choose to hope this time will be different, while refusing to lower my guard until concrete actions have followed the words. **Sudan** does not need new verbal compassion from Western capitals; it needs concrete, funded, and sustained decisions. That is the only measure that will matter when judging, in a few months, whether **Geneva** truly made a real and lasting difference for the residents of **el-Obeid** and for an entire Sudanese country on the edge of a humanitarian abyss. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Al Jazeera — UN Human Rights Council to hold urgent meeting on Sudan crisis, July 1, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/1/un-human-rights-council-to-hold-urgent-meeting-on-sudan-crisis) - [UN News — Report on the risks of war crimes in el-Fasher, February 2026](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166960) ### Secondary sources - [Al Jazeera — Can Sudan's Rapid Support Forces take control of el-Obeid, July 1, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/video/inside-story/2026/7/1/can-sudans-rapid-support-forces-take-control-of-el-obeid) - [Deutsche Welle — Sudan: Warnings mount over the risk of new mass atrocities, 2026](https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-warnings-mount-over-the-risk-of-new-mass-atrocities/a-77709377) - [The Guardian International — coverage of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/international) - [Al Jazeera — full file on the Sudanese conflict, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/where/sudan/) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. 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