# EDITORIAL: Gdańsk 2026 — 160 Agreements and €10 Billion, but the War Still Burns > I acknowledge that there is something absurd about commenting from the outside on a conference aimed at rebuilding a country fighting for its existence. But the absurd does not excuse one from analysi - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Editorial - Published: 2026-07-02 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-gdansk-2026-160-accords-et-10-milliards-d-euros-mais-la-guerre-brule-e ## Introduction: The Most Practical Conference in History — Is That Enough? ### What Gdańsk delivered on June 25 and 26, 2026 On **June 25 and 26, 2026**, the city of **Gdańsk** hosted the **Ukraine Recovery Conference** (**URC 2026**). The official results are impressive: **160 agreements** signed for a value of over **€10 billion**. A **first tranche of €3.2 billion** under the new **European Union** financial instrument. A **$3.4 billion agreement with the World Bank**. The launch of the **European Flagship Fund for Ukraine's Reconstruction** and the **Ukraine Transport Support Fund**. A separate tranche of **€6 billion** announced by **Ursula von der Leyen** specifically for **Ukrainian drone production**. Prime Minister **Yuliia Svyrydenko**, according to **Interfax Ukraine**, called this gathering "the most practical conference in history." That is not nothing. It would even be impressive if the war were not there, burning in the background — roughly **200 combat engagements per day**, according to **Euromaidan Press**. But the war is there, precisely. And it is from that tension between the air-conditioned conference rooms of Gdańsk and the trenches of **Pokrovsk** that this editorial wants to speak. ### Where I stand from the outset I will be direct: I believe this conference represents real progress. I also believe it remains insufficient in the face of the scale of the challenge. Both things are true simultaneously, and pretending one cancels the other would be dishonest. My role as a columnist is to hold that tension without resolving it too quickly in either direction. ## What the €10 Billion Conceals ### The $52 billion external financing gap To understand what **€10 billion** truly means, it must be placed against its context. Ukraine's external financing gap for **2026** is estimated at **$52 billion**, according to **Euromaidan Press**. Even with the **€28.3 billion** in defence support envisaged within the **€90 billion EU** package, a significant portion of Ukraine's needs remains unfunded. The **€10 billion from Gdańsk**, symbolically important as it is, represents only a fraction of what Ukraine needs in a single year. This arithmetic is uncomfortable. It must not lead to disparaging what was accomplished — it must lead to measuring the gap that remains. The **160 agreements** are not empty promises: some involve concrete projects, such as the **Italian investor's factory** built in the **Bila Tserkva Industrial Park** within a year of the Rome conference. But others are political commitments whose translation into actual projects will take years. ### The notable absentee — Zelenskyy and security guarantees **Volodymyr Zelenskyy** was not in Gdańsk. His absence, highlighted by **Euromaidan Press**, kept the conference at the level of a prime ministers' forum — useful, but insufficient to address issues that only a head of state can advance: **security guarantees**, the pace of **EU integration**, defence coordination at the highest level. Prime Minister **Svyrydenko** was not invited to the **EU Eastern Flank Summit** held in parallel. Her confirmed bilateral meetings were limited to representatives from **the Czech Republic**, **Finland**, **Estonia**, and host **Donald Tusk**. For the most threatened nation in Europe, that level of attention is insufficient. ## The €6 Billion for Drones — the Real Advance ### Ursula von der Leyen and the acknowledgment of reality The most concrete announcement at Gdańsk — the one that seems most operationally significant to me — is the **separate tranche of €6 billion** announced by **Ursula von der Leyen** specifically for **Ukrainian drone production**. This is not reconstruction in the traditional sense. It is defence. It is a recognition that Ukraine cannot rebuild if it is not able to defend itself, and that funding its drone production is an investment in European security as much as in Ukrainian survival. Ukraine already produces roughly **4 to 5 million drones per year**, according to estimates from the **Council on Foreign Relations** cited by **Euromaidan Press**. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence's target is **7 million**. Von der Leyen's **€6 billion** is intended to finance the scale-up needed to reach that target — and potentially beyond. This is industrial wartime policy, and it is exactly what the situation demands. ### The main obstacle: not engineers, but capital and certification The analysis from **Euromaidan Press** is nuanced, however: "The main obstacle to drone production scale-up is not a shortage of engineers or ideas, but capital, certification, and the absence of integration into **EU** and **NATO** procurement ecosystems. The agreements signed have not removed these obstacles." This analytical honesty is valuable. Money alone is not enough if European certification procedures and NATO supply chains remain poorly adapted to the speed of Ukrainian innovation. ## What the Conference Does Not Say Enough — Defence as Reconstruction ### Defence had its parallel event, not its own line in the communiqué A revealing detail from **Euromaidan Press** deserves direct quotation: defence "had its own parallel event, but not its own line in the final communiqué." This imbalance between defence's symbolic presence on the agenda and its absence from written commitments is significant. It reflects a political discomfort: simultaneously rebuilding and defending is a Ukrainian reality that European partners still struggle to fully integrate into their conceptual framework for reconstruction. Reconstruction, in the traditional conceptual framework, is imagined after the war. Ukraine, however, rebuilds **during** the war — under bombardment, with workers who can hear air raid sirens on their construction sites. This gap between donors' mental categories and Ukrainian reality creates friction in resource allocation. Von der Leyen's **€6 billion for drones** may be the first sign that this mental barrier is beginning to fall. ### The 15 Ukrainian-Polish agreements — a model of genuine partnership Among the **160 Gdańsk agreements**, **15** were **Ukrainian-Polish government-to-government agreements**, including cooperation between state enterprises and credit agencies, according to **Euromaidan Press**. This figure deserves emphasis: **Poland** is the partner that has most thoroughly integrated Ukrainian reality into its own security and economic policies. Its geographic proximity to the conflict, its own history, and its acute awareness of the Russian threat make it a model of what European engagement with Ukraine can produce in concrete terms. ## Trump, NATO, and the Transactional Equation ### Rutte and the 195,000 American jobs In the context of Gdańsk and reconstruction efforts, the statement by **NATO** Secretary General **Mark Rutte** in the **Financial Times** of **July 1** is directly relevant. Rutte argues that European arms orders in the American market reach **$300 billion**, supporting "nearly **195,000 American jobs**." This is the economic argument designed to convince **Donald Trump** to maintain American engagement in the alliance. For Rutte, Ukraine's reconstruction is inseparable from American military support — the two reinforce each other within a transactional framework that Trump can understand. I feel ambivalent about this transactional rhetoric. It is politically necessary to sustain the engagement of an administration that reasons in terms of immediate returns. But it narrows the moral frame of the debate — Ukraine is not just an American arms market, it is a democracy fighting for shared values. **Trump is a necessary evil for the West** in this context: his transactional frame compels allies to quantify and justify every commitment, which is exhausting but not entirely without use. ### The 0.25% GDP aid plan — the failure before the summit Rutte's plan to require **NATO** members to devote **0.25 percent of their GDP** to direct Ukrainian aid failed even before the **Ankara Summit of July 7**. It was blocked by the **United Kingdom**, **France**, **Spain**, **Italy**, and **Canada** — five of the alliance's most influential members. This failure does not invalidate Gdańsk's accomplishments, but it underlines the difficulty of converting political commitments into binding obligations. Without rigid collective commitment mechanisms, international coordination remains hostage to each government's goodwill in the face of domestic constraints. ## What I Expect from the Ankara Summit ### The questions that will remain open after Gdańsk The **NATO Ankara Summit**, opening on **July 7, 2026**, is the next opportunity to measure the solidity of Western commitment. Several questions will remain open after Gdańsk: **long-term security guarantees** for Ukraine — what form, what duration, what obligation? — were not resolved in Gdańsk. The question of Ukrainian **NATO membership** officially remains on the table but without a timeline. Defence funding for Ukraine beyond current commitments remains insufficient against the **€136 billion** total needs for **2026**. Ankara will not resolve all of this in two days. But Ankara can send a signal about the direction the alliance is heading — toward greater support, toward greater clarity on guarantees, toward a more binding framework for member contributions. Or toward a status quo that translates into Ukrainian fatigue on the ground. ### What the editorialist in me demands I write this editorial with the conviction that Gdańsk's **160 agreements** are real and important — but insufficient. That the **€6 billion for drones** is progress — but must be accompanied by procurement procedure reform. That Rutte's **0.25 percent GDP** decision should be retried at Ankara with greater political resolve. And that **Zelenskyy** should have a full seat, with full authority, at every meeting concerning his country's future. ## The Lessons of Gdańsk for Future Reconstruction ### Rebuilding while burning — a world first What happened in Gdańsk is, in a sense, without precedent in modern history. Rarely has a reconstruction conference been held for a country actively at war, simultaneously seeking to fund both its defence and its rebuilding. The formulation from **Euromaidan Press** is striking: "Rebuilding Ukraine while it burns." Rebuilding while it burns — an image that captures all the heroic absurdity of Ukraine's situation. This situation imposes adaptations that classical international reconstruction mechanisms are not designed to manage. Projects must be conceived to withstand potential new destruction. Investments must be secured against strike risks. Supply chains must route around active combat zones. These constraints are not reasons not to invest — they are design parameters that must be integrated from the outset. ### The Rome conference as precedent — and its lessons The reconstruction conference in Rome, which preceded Gdańsk, produced one directly measurable concrete result: a factory built in the **Bila Tserkva Industrial Park** by an Italian investor, completed in under a year. That is the kind of result Ukraine's reconstruction needs to multiply — concrete, rapid projects with documented outcomes. Gdańsk's ambition to be "the most practical in history" must be measured in the coming months against the number of such concrete projects actually implemented, not merely against the number of agreements signed. ## The Commitments That Must Survive Gdańsk ### From agreements on paper to projects on the ground The history of reconstruction conferences is littered with commitments that did not survive the return of delegates to their capitals. The **post-Gdańsk challenge** is precisely that: transforming **160 signed agreements** into projects effectively funded, launched, and monitored. **Euromaidan Press** notes that some agreements are already tied to concrete projects — but others are political commitments whose translation into actual construction will demand sustained pressure from civil society, institutions, and the media. The Ukrainian arms export mechanism adopted on **July 1, 2026** — under which **20 percent of revenues from finished goods** and **30 percent from components** feed the **State Defence Fund** — is precisely the kind of durable institutional structure that can extend Gdańsk's effects beyond the final communiqué. It transforms a conference into a mechanism. That is the model that must be replicated. ### The role of civil society and the media Ukraine's reconstruction cannot be solely the business of governments and international financial institutions. **Ukrainian civil society** — NGOs, journalists, entrepreneurs, local communities — plays an indispensable role in monitoring the implementation of commitments, preventing corruption, and adapting projects to real on-the-ground needs. The **160 Gdańsk agreements** need **160 field teams** to turn them into concrete reality. ## Conclusion: Gdańsk, the Necessary but Insufficient Step ### What the conference actually accomplished Ultimately, **Gdańsk 2026** accomplished something important: it transformed the discourse on Ukraine's reconstruction from a post-war hypothesis into an ongoing reality. The **160 agreements**, the **€10 billion**, the **€6 billion for drones**, the World Bank agreement — all of it is real, concrete, and directly useful to Ukraine. The political dynamic of the conference — governments committing, companies investing, financial institutions activating mechanisms — is itself valuable. What Gdańsk did not accomplish: significantly reduce the gap between Ukrainian needs (**$52 billion external deficit** for **2026**) and available resources. Produce binding security guarantees. Fully integrate the defence dimension into written commitments. These shortfalls must not be dressed up as successes they are not. **Ukraine needs the West to hold a Gdańsk every quarter, not every year.** **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Euromaidan Press — Rebuilding Ukraine while it burns — what URC 2026 actually delivered — June 28, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/28/rebuilding-ukraine-while-it-burns-calling-it-progress-what-ukraine-recovery-conference-2026-actually-delivered/) - [Interfax Ukraine — Ukraine lines up 160 recovery deals worth over EUR 10 bln in Gdańsk — June 26, 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/1179839.html) - [Euromaidan Press — Ukraine daily review — June–July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/category/ukraine/daily-review/) ### Secondary sources - [The Guardian — Ukraine war briefing — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/27/ukraine-war-briefing-russian-occupied-crimea-declares-emergency-as-zelenskyys-forces-step-up-attacks) - [Al Jazeera — Three killed as Ukraine and Russia trade attacks overnight — June 27, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/27/three-killed-as-ukraine-and-russia-trade-attacks-overnight) - [Interfax Ukraine — General Ukraine news — July 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1180088-amp.html) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/editorial-gdansk-2026-160-accords-et-10-milliards-d-euros-mais-la-guerre-brule-e