# DECODING: Autonomous drones — Turkey, Iran and China are closing the gap on America

> The global military drone sector is undergoing an unprecedented structural transformation. The most conservative projections place the market at $55 billion by 2032, with a compound annual growth rate exceeding 30% for fully autonomous systems. More optimistic analyses suggest a

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/drones-autonomes-turquie-iran-et-chine-rattrapent-l-avance-americaine

## Key takeaways

- Projections put the military drone market at $55 billion by 2032, with optimistic estimates near $90 billion by the decade's end; the article presents these as indicative figures.
- Turkey's Baykar has grown defence exports from $1.67 billion in 2016 to a projected $11 billion in 2026, with the Bayraktar TB2 sold in more than 50 countries and the TB3 operating from short-runway ships.
- Iran's Shahed-136 has become a benchmark for low-cost kamikaze drones, and Iran supplies drone technology to proxies such as the Houthis.
- China's Wing Loong and Caihong are present in more than 15 countries, and a $5-billion Saudi deal would build a Wing Loong-3 assembly line.
- Ukraine has become the main drone testing ground, with fast, low-cost innovation and a rapidly growing counter-drone market.

## Introduction: The autonomous drone revolution is redrawing the global military map

### A $55-billion market that is drawing everyone in

The global military drone sector is undergoing an **unprecedented structural transformation**. The most conservative projections place the market at **$55 billion by 2032**, with a compound annual growth rate exceeding **30% for fully autonomous systems**. More optimistic analyses suggest a market approaching **$90 billion by the end of the decade**. This technological windfall no longer benefits the United States exclusively. **Turkey, Iran, and China** have reduced — sometimes dramatically — the American technological lead, and continue to do so at a pace that is alarming Pentagon strategists.

The **Pentagon's 2027 budget** allocates more than **$54 billion to its autonomous warfare group** (Defense Autonomous Warfare Group), according to data from **BriefGlance**. This is America's response to an uncomfortable reality: the United States is no longer the only power that masters combat drones. And in certain segments — **low-cost kamikaze drones, coordinated swarms, saturation drones** — they may have already lost their primacy.

### The Ukrainian lesson that changed everything

The war in Ukraine has served as a **global laboratory** for military drone technologies. Every producing nation has tested, observed, and adapted. The demonstration that relatively cheap drones could paralyse refineries, close airports, and disrupt major logistical lines at scale accelerated the race for autonomous capabilities everywhere. According to **Business Insider (June 25, 2026)**, the next generations of drones like the **Shahed are already choosing their own targets using artificial intelligence** — an evolution that Ukrainian engineers and their Russian adversaries have already incorporated into their doctrines.

*There is something vertiginous about the military technological innovation the war in Ukraine has produced. In a few years, countries like Turkey and Iran went from being consumers of American or Russian military technology to producers capable of exporting their own systems. This is a major geopolitical reversal that many Western capitals have not yet fully absorbed.*

## Turkey: from consumer to global exporter

### Baykar and the Turkish drone empire

The trajectory of **Baykar Makina** is one of the decade's most spectacular industrial success stories. In **2016**, Turkish defence exports totalled **$1.67 billion**. In 2026, they are expected to exceed **$11 billion**. The engine of this growth? The **Bayraktar TB2**, made famous in Ukraine, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh — and now sold in more than **50 countries**. Then came the **TB3**, capable of operating from short-runway carriers: it became the **first drone to take off and land from a short-runway ship** in November 2024, with more than **100 naval sorties** completed by June 2025.

The push into higher-end capabilities continues with the **Bayraktar Kizilelma**, a stealthy jet-powered combat drone that secured its **first export contract with Indonesia** in May 2026 — breaking into the high-end combat aviation segment previously dominated by the United States and China. Meanwhile, Turkey is now offering the **LHD-230**, a versatile amphibious ship capable of serving as a **naval drone carrier** for the TB3, for export. **Italy** is reportedly considering the acquisition of TB3s for its aircraft carrier **Cavour** via the **LBA Systems** joint venture between **Leonardo and Baykar**.

### Export networks in Africa and the Middle East

Turkey has built an impressive **African drone export network**: **Angola, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia** have all acquired Baykar drones. In **April 2026**, Turkey signed an on-site military training protocol with Niger. In the **Middle East**, Gulf monarchies are eyeing Turkish offerings with keen interest. Turkey has become a **low-cost security exporter**, offering an alternative to American platforms — subject to export restrictions tied to human rights — and to Chinese platforms, which raise concerns about data collection.

*Turkey has achieved something remarkable: building a drone industry that answers a real need from countries that cannot or will not buy American. This is smart defence capitalism. And it is changing the geopolitics of local conflicts at a speed the West did not anticipate.*

## Iran: from copy to dangerous original

### The Shahed as a technological evolution platform

**Iran** began its military drone programme by **copying and adapting** foreign technologies. Today, the **Shahed-136** — supplied to Russia in the hundreds for its strikes on Ukraine — has become a global benchmark in the category of **low-cost saturation kamikaze drones**. In **June 2026**, **Army Recognition** reported the deployment of the **electric Shahed-101**, a silent version designed for "**silent saturation attacks**" against Gulf states. The switch to electric propulsion makes these systems stealthier and harder to detect.

Even more alarming: the growing integration of **artificial intelligence** into Iranian systems. According to **Business Insider**, the evolution of Shaheds into systems that "**choose their own targets**" is now a documented reality on the Ukrainian battlefield. This evolution toward **autonomous decision-making** raises fundamental ethical and legal questions — and a genuine strategic concern for Gulf states facing this threat at close range.

### Iran as a technology supplier to its proxies

One of Iran's most effective strategies is **transferring drone technologies to its proxies**. **Houthis** in Yemen use Iranian-origin aerial and maritime drones to target commercial vessels in the Red Sea. This **asymmetric technology transfer** allows small non-state forces to challenge tier-one navies. The cost to Iran is minimal, the geopolitical impact maximal. This logic — **cheap technology, major strategic impact** — is precisely what Turkey and China have also understood.

*Iran has turned its drones into a low-cost foreign policy instrument. Supplying Shaheds to Russia earned it valuable military technology transfers. Equipping the Houthis allows it to disrupt global trade without risking a single Iranian soldier. This is an influence strategy with extraordinary returns — and one of the reasons why Tehran must be treated as a serious adversary, not as a naive potential partner.*

## China: the ambition for global drone segment domination

### Wing Loong and Caihong: conquering emerging markets

China has adopted an aggressive commercial strategy in the global military drone market. The **Wing Loong** (翼龙) from CAIG and the **Caihong** (CH) from CASC are present in **more than 15 countries**, primarily in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In **March 2026**, the **China Aviation Industry Corporation** signed a **$5-billion deal with Saudi Arabia** to build a Wing Loong-3 assembly line in Jeddah, with a production capacity of **48 aircraft per year**. This industrial offshoring to client countries is a market penetration strategy that goes far deeper than simple equipment sales.

The **Wing Loong X**, unveiled at the **World Defense Show 2026**, is positioned as an **autonomous anti-submarine warfare naval drone**. If this capability is exported, it would shift the balance of maritime surveillance across entire regions. China is no longer content with selling surveillance drones — it is now offering **autonomous naval combat systems**, a segment where the United States believed it held the lead.

### The commercial technology war with the United States

The Sino-American rivalry in the military drone sector is not played out only on battlefields — it is fought across **export control lists and sanctions**. On **June 22, 2026**, China added **10 American companies** to its dual-use export control list, including drone manufacturers **Teal Drones, Jaia Robotics**, and rare earth suppliers. Washington hit back by expanding its sector blacklist. This commercial technology war — in which control of rare earths (essential for drone manufacturing) plays a central role — is a battle for **industrial dominance in the coming decade**.

*China has a long-term strategy in military drones: sell today, create technological dependency, exercise political influence tomorrow. It's the same logic as its infrastructure investments in Africa. Countries that buy Chinese drones today will think twice before voting against Beijing at the United Nations tomorrow. This is weaponised soft power.*

## America's lead: real but diminished

### What the United States still has as an advantage

It would be wrong to say the United States has lost its leadership. In the most sophisticated segments — **stealthy high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) drones** like the **RQ-4 Global Hawk**, stealthy combat drones like the enhanced **MQ-9 Reaper** or the forthcoming **MQ-X** — the American lead remains significant. The **$54-billion allocation** to the **Defense Autonomous Warfare Group** in the 2027 budget represents an investment that neither Turkey, nor Iran, nor even China can match in the short term.

The United States also maintains a lead in **sensors, secure communications, electronic countermeasures, and autonomous targeting algorithms**. But the question is no longer whether America is ahead — it is whether **its competitive advantage is shrinking too fast** to be maintained against three actors simultaneously converging on the same capabilities.

### Proliferation as a systemic threat

The real risk is not that a Chinese or Iranian drone is technically equal to an American one — it is that the **proliferation of combat drones** across dozens of countries creates a qualitatively different global security environment. When **Houthis, Iraqi militias, armed African groups** possess long-range precision strike capabilities, conventional security guarantees weaken. The threat is no longer only from powerful states — it is from non-state actors armed with autonomous drones capable of striking anywhere.

*The world we are entering — one of autonomous drone swarms choosing their targets by AI, Turkish naval drone carriers, silent Iranian kamikazes, and Chinese Wing Loongs deployed across three continents — demands a fundamentally renewed Western security doctrine. I hope the relevant capitals are preparing that response. I have my doubts.*

## Ukraine as the global combat drone laboratory

### Innovations redefining military doctrines

Nowhere else in the world are combat drones tested, improved, and deployed at the scale seen in **Ukraine**. Since 2022, this conflict has become the world's greatest military laboratory for drones. **Ukrainian engineers** — often young entrepreneurs with no formal military background — designed FPV (**First Person View**) drones for under **$500 a unit** capable of destroying tanks worth several million dollars. These innovations emerge in weeks, not years — a development pace incompatible with traditional military acquisition cycles.

**Ukraine** formalised these innovation networks with the **Army of Drones** programme, launched by Deputy Prime Minister **Mykhailo Fedorov**. This programme allows **direct purchases of drones from Ukrainian start-ups**, bypassing the usual bureaucratic military procurement processes. The result: iteration cycles of a few weeks, testing under real combat conditions, and rapid adoption of the best solutions. Countries like the **United States, the United Kingdom, and France** are sending military delegations to observe these practices — and considering how to adapt these accelerated innovation models to their own more rigid acquisition systems.

*There is something deeply human about these young Ukrainians building drones in garages to defend their country. This is not abstract military technology — it is survival applied to engineering. And what this war has shown is that fast, distributed, pragmatic innovation can rival the military budgets of great powers. This is a lesson that Western military bureaucracies are struggling to digest.*

## The emerging counter-drone market: a neglected strategic opportunity

### Demand exploding in the face of multiplying threats

Faced with the proliferation of combat drones, a closely related market segment is growing even faster: **counter-drone systems (C-UAS)**. The war in Ukraine demonstrated that the ability to **intercept, jam, or destroy adversary drones** is as important as offensive capability. Ukraine produced **100,000 interceptor drones in 2025** and doubled that number in four months in 2026, according to minister **Fedorov**. These interceptors represent an exploding market: dozens of countries are seeking C-UAS capabilities to counter increasingly sophisticated drone threats.

**Lithuania** is developing its own autonomous interceptor. **Turkey** exports its **KARGU and ALPAGU** systems — autonomous loitering munitions — in 15 countries across four continents. South Korea is investing heavily in detection and neutralisation systems to counter the North Korean threat. And the **United States and Europe** are seeking to develop laser and microwave systems capable of neutralising entire swarms at low cost. This C-UAS segment alone could represent **several billion dollars** of market by 2030.

*There is a deep irony in the fact that drone proliferation simultaneously creates a market for drones themselves and for systems that counter them. It is a classic offence-defence dynamic, but accelerated by digital technologies. Countries that can master both sides of this equation — offensive drones and defensive countermeasures — will hold a major strategic advantage in 21st-century conflicts.*

## Artificial intelligence as the next technological threshold in drones

### From remote control to autonomous decision

The next technological threshold in drone warfare is **full autonomous decision-making**: a drone that identifies its targets, decides to attack them, and executes the strike without human intervention. This capability is already partially deployed in the most recent versions of Iranian **Shahed** kamikaze drones, according to **Business Insider**. It is under development in American, Chinese, and Turkish programmes. The integration of AI into weapons systems raises fundamental ethical and legal questions that are unresolved in international humanitarian law.

The question of **human control** — the ability of a human being to decide to kill or not to kill — is at the heart of debates at the **UN** on "**lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS)**." **China** is developing these capabilities while participating in UN debates — a way of shaping international norms from within to minimise constraints on its own programmes. The United States officially maintains the principle of "**meaningful human judgment**" in lethal decisions — but the operational requirements of swarm warfare could make this principle difficult to maintain in practice.

*The question of lethal autonomous drones troubles me deeply. Delegating the decision to kill to an algorithm means crossing a moral threshold I am not sure humanity is ready to cross deliberately and reflectively. And yet operational and competitive pressures are pushing in that direction. I have no answer to this question — only the concern that it is not being asked seriously enough before the systems are deployed.*

## Conclusion: The new geography of military power

### What this revolution changes in global balances

The democratisation of autonomous military drones is irreversibly redistributing global military power. States like Turkey, which lacked the means for sophisticated combat aviation, can now project power across multiple theatres simultaneously. Non-state actors backed by Iran can threaten global maritime trade. China converts drone sales into lasting geopolitical influence.

### The response that is needed

Faced with this reality, the West must accelerate its own development of **counter-drone measures, autonomous defence systems**, and above all, **international regulation** of fully autonomous weapons systems. The window of opportunity to establish norms is closing — every month of inaction is an opportunity for irresponsible actors to consolidate a reality that is difficult to undo.

*The autonomous drone revolution is not just another military trend — it is a rupture that redefines the balance of power between nations. Western democracies have long enjoyed comfortable technological superiority. Turkey, Iran, and China have closed that gap faster than anyone anticipated. And now **AI** arrives as an amplifier. I have no certainty about who will dominate this aerial century — only the concern that we are behind on questions we have not yet asked.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [BriefGlance — The New Arms Race: Autonomous Drones Fuel a $55B Defense Revolution — June 22, 2026](https://briefglance.com/articles/the-new-arms-race-autonomous-drones-fuel-a-55b-defense-revolution)

- [Army Recognition — Iran deploys electric Shahed-101 kamikaze drones for silent saturation attacks — June 22, 2026](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/iran-deploys-electric-shahed-101-kamikaze-drones-for-silent-saturation-attacks-across-gulf-states)

- [Business Insider — Next evolution of attack drones like Shaheds will see AI choosing their own targets — June 25, 2026](https://www.businessinsider.com/shaheds-ai-choose-target-attack-drones-serhii-flash-beskrestnov-ukraine-2026-6)

- [Brookings Institution — Turkey, Italy, and Europe's defense-industrial future — June 25, 2026](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/turkey-italy-and-europes-defense-industrial-future/)

### Secondary sources

- [Modern Diplomacy Briefing — Why the Iran War Made Turkey the Gulf's Most Valuable Defense Partner — June 25, 2026](https://mdbriefing.substack.com/p/why-the-iran-war-made-turkey-the)

- [Army Recognition — China Positions Wing Loong X Drone as Autonomous ASW Platform — 2026](https://www.armyrecognition.com/archives/archives-defense-exhibitions/2026-archives-news-defense-exhibitions/world-defense-show-2026/china-positions-wing-loong-x-drone-as-autonomous-asw-platform-for-naval-warfare)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/drones-autonomes-turquie-iran-et-chine-rattrapent-l-avance-americaine