# DECODING: TRUMP "NECESSARY EVIL" — WHAT THIS FORMULA REALLY REVEALS

> Some political formulas, despite their apparent simplification, contain more truth than pages of analysis. "Trump, a necessary evil for the West" is one of those formulas. It is neither a compliment — "evil" is there, black and precise — nor a definitive condemnation — "necessary

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-24
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-trump-mal-necessaire-ce-que-cette-formule-revele-vraiment

## Introduction: Naming Trump a "necessary evil" — neither insult nor absolution

### A formula that captures a fundamental tension

Some political formulas, despite their apparent simplification, contain more truth than pages of analysis. **"Trump, a necessary evil** for the **West**" is one of those formulas. It is neither a compliment — "evil" is there, black and precise — nor a definitive condemnation — "necessary" softens the judgment without absolving it. It says something honest about the relationship between a **liberal democracy** and a president whose methods sometimes contradict the values he claims to defend, but whose power sometimes accomplishes what liberal democracy itself cannot. This formula deserves to be seriously decoded — not to mechanically validate it, but to understand what it says and what it hides.

In June 2026, the **West** has been living with **Trump** for eighteen months of his second term. Eighteen months during which he signed quantum executive orders reflecting a coherent technological vision, waged a war against **Iran** to prevent **nuclear proliferation**, pressured **NATO** so its allies spend adequately on their own defense, and reduced the American trade deficit with **China**. These results are real. And eighteen months during which he cast doubt on the unconditional solidarity of NATO's **Article 5**, weakened multilateral institutions, normalized an instrumentalized relationship to facts, and waged a four-month war without authorization from **Congress**. These risks are real too. It is precisely this cohabitation of results and risks that underpins the formula "**necessary evil**."

### Why this decoding now — and why it is urgent

The formula "**Trump**, **necessary evil**" is often used as a convenient posture to justify inaction in the face of his excesses — **"yes, but he is necessary"** — or as a condescending posture to avoid acknowledging his results — **"yes, but he is an evil."** Neither use is honest. This decoding proposes a third path: take the formula seriously as an analytical tool, identify precisely what is "evil" (with facts), what is "necessary" (with facts), and what is neither. Because in the complexity of the world of 2026, formulas that oversimplify are dangerous. Those that synthesize honestly are rare and precious.

The context of June 2026 makes this decoding particularly urgent. The Iranian deal of **June 17** hangs in its **60 days**. **Ukraine** holds but awaits guarantees. **China** continues to arm. **NATO** is transforming under pressure. The quantum executive orders of **June 22** reveal a technological vision. The **War Powers** vote of **June 23** reveals Trump's institutional limits. In eighteen months, Trump has produced more major **geopolitical** events than most presidents in four years. And each of these events illustrates, in its own way, why the formula "**necessary evil**" deserves a close look — with the precision it demands and the honesty it imposes.

*I have used the formula "necessary evil" for a long time to talk about Trump. It is my way of staying honest with myself: I don't like him. I respect some of his results. These two things can coexist. This decoding is my attempt to explain why this coexistence is possible — and what it costs.*

## The "evil": what is documented, precise, and non-negotiable

### The erosion of the democratic relationship to facts

Let us begin with the "evil" precisely. The first documented element is the systematic erosion of the shared relationship to facts in American **political culture** under **Trump**. This is not a partisan assertion — it is a phenomenon documented by researchers in political communication, verification journalists, and non-partisan academic institutions. The speech of **June 23, 2026** is a recent example: Trump cites the figure of a **67% reduction in the trade deficit with China** without specifying his methodology, calls a preliminary memorandum contested in its details a "peace deal," and presents as accomplished an Iranian denuclearization that is for now only a promise in a **60-day** document.

These three examples are not lies in the strict sense — they are calculated simplifications, selective presentations of complex realities, victories claimed before their conditions are fully met. But their accumulation over eighteen months, in a media space amplified by social networks and **Truth Social**, produces a cumulative effect on the quality of American public debate. When the president repeats often enough "it's the greatest deficit reduction in history," this claim settles into minds independently of its verification. And a democracy whose relationship to facts is chronically distorted is a democracy that makes poor decisions on incorrect foundations. This is the first documented "evil."

### The fragmentation of institutional alliances

The second documented "evil" is the fragmentation of Western **institutional alliances** — not their destruction, but their increased conditionality. **NATO**, the **WTO**, multilateral climate commitments — these institutions have been either weakened, threatened, or deconstructed in their logic by the **Trump** administration. **NATO's Article 5**, which since 1949 was an unconditional guarantee, is now conditional on spending commitments — according to Trump's and **Hegseth**'s recurring declarations. This conditionality may be functionally useful (it forces allies to spend more), but it creates a structural risk: an adversary who calculates that Article 5 is conditional has less reason to fear a collective response.

The conditionality of **Article 5**, should it be confirmed by an American non-response to aggression against a **NATO** ally that had not met its spending targets, would weaken the entire Western **deterrence** system in a way that could cost lives and **sovereignty**. This theoretical possibility is documented in the strategic analyses of think tanks like the **FDD**, Brookings, or the Council on Foreign Relations. It is not imminent — but it exists as a risk, and that is sufficient to classify it under the "evil."

*Some days I read the news and tell myself that Trump is the greatest disruptor of the world order since 1945 — not necessarily in the negative sense, but in the literal sense: he disrupts, he questions, he forces adjustments. Other days I tell myself that some of these disruptions create voids that adversaries will fill, and that this filling will be far worse than the disrupted status quo. Both evaluations coexist in my head. It is uncomfortable. It is honest.*

## The "necessary": what justifies keeping the term despite the cost

### Pressure on Iran: necessary and courageous

Now the "necessary." First element: **Trump**'s Iran policy. **Iran** has been developing a nuclear program for years. Every American administration since 2003 has tried to manage it — through diplomacy (**Obama**, **JCPOA** 2015), through sanctions (Trump first term), through multilateral pressure (**Biden**). None succeeded in eliminating Iran's nuclear capability. Trump, in 2026, did what his predecessors had not dared to do: directly strike Iranian nuclear installations in cooperation with **Israel**, impose a naval blockade that reduced Iranian oil exports to **zero in May 2026** according to **FDD**, and forced Iran to the negotiating table from a militarily weakened position.

This result — a militarily weakened **Iran** compelled to negotiate its denuclearization — was, according to the **FDD** and other national security experts who share **Trump**'s objectives, necessary to prevent **nuclear proliferation** in an already unstable region. The methods used are debatable. The final outcome is still uncertain. But the bare fact that an Iran which thought it could quietly develop a nuclear weapon finds itself in June 2026 in a militarily weakened negotiating position — that is real, documented, and was necessary if one shares the objective of nuclear non-proliferation.

### Pressure on NATO: a painful but effective electroshock

Second "necessary" element: the pressure on **NATO**. For decades, most European Alliance members did not meet the **defense spending** objective of **2% of GDP** — officially set in 2014. The **United States** funded 70% or more of the Alliance's military capabilities. This asymmetry was unsustainable long-term for American taxpayers and dangerous for Alliance cohesion. **Trump** applied brutal pressure — conditionality of defense, troop reductions in **Europe**, public threats of disengagement — that produced measurable results: **$90 billion** in increased defense spending by Europe and **Canada** in 2025, a **20%** increase, according to data cited by **Rutte** at the NATO ministerial of **June 18, 2026**. A NATO objective of **5% of GDP** by 2035 — unimaginable two years ago — is now adopted.

This pressure worked where years of polite discussions had not. It was uncomfortable, sometimes humiliating for allies, sometimes counterproductive in its formulations. But its net result is an **Atlantic Alliance** more militarily capable than the one of January 2025. This is "necessary" in the sense that the Russian threat — documented by the war in **Ukraine** since 2022 — demands real defense capabilities, not unmet targets. **Trump** provided the incentive that traditional diplomatic politeness had failed to create.

*The pressure on NATO. You can criticize it in method — and I do criticize certain aspects. But I remember a conversation with a former Canadian diplomat who told me: "We knew since 2010 that we weren't spending enough. Nobody had the political will to change that. Trump created this political will, in his own way." This observation is honest. It doesn't validate everything Trump does. But it says that sometimes, a brutal electroshock accomplishes what courteous diplomacy does not.*

## Technological competition with China: necessary and well-directed

### The quantum executive orders as an example of well-executed "necessary"

The presidential executive orders of **June 22, 2026** on **quantum computing** — **"Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation**" and **"Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks"** — represent an example of "necessary" policy executed coherently. **China** is investing massively in quantum technologies. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could render obsolete the cryptographic systems that protect the military, diplomatic, and civilian communications of Western democracies. The American response — industrial investment (**$2 billion** in May), institutional mandates, **post-quantum** cryptographic standards — is proportionate to the identified threat.

These executive orders engage a dozen federal agencies in precise calendar objectives. They mobilize industrial actors (IBM, Google) with public-private partnership mandates. They provide for technological counterintelligence via the expansion of the **QCPT**. It is not perfect — the workforce question remains a major blind spot. But it is coherent, documented, and oriented toward a real threat. This is an example of what **Trump** can do when his technical advisors prevail over his communication impulses — a serious policy, institutionally anchored, that will probably survive his term.

### The trade war with China: an imperfect but real lever

**Trump**'s commercial policy on **China** is probably the most contested aspect of his economic record. Tariffs have reduced Chinese imports — but partly at the cost of trade diversion through third countries (Vietnam, Mexico, Malaysia) that does not resolve the question of technological dependence on **Beijing**. Costs have been partly borne by American consumers through higher prices. And China's response — sanctions on 46 American defense firms on **June 22, 2026**, controls on **rare earths** — creates vulnerabilities in American military supply chains.

And yet this policy has had a knock-on effect on Western allies who began reconsidering their own economic dependencies on **China**. **Canada**, under **Carney**, announced it would "recalibrate" its relationship with **Beijing**. The **European Union** accelerated its **de-risking** policy on Chinese technologies. These developments — partially caused, partially catalyzed by the **Trump** posture — represent a strengthening of Western strategic coherence vis-à-vis China. This "necessary" is imperfect in execution. It is coherent in direction.

*The trade war with China. I remember writing in 2018 that Trump was taking reckless risks. Eight years later, I must acknowledge that Western economic dependence on China was effectively a systemic risk — and that nobody else but Trump had the brutality necessary to name it and begin to correct it. That doesn't make his methods perfect. But it makes his diagnosis retrospectively less crazy than it seemed in 2018.*

## Where the formula falls short: what "necessary evil" doesn't say

### The victims of the "necessary": an ignored accounting

The formula "**necessary evil**" has a major blind spot: it doesn't name the victims of the "necessary." When the American-Iranian war began on **February 28, 2026**, Iranian civilians were killed or wounded in the initial strikes. When the naval blockade reduced Iranian exports to zero in May, millions of **Iranians** saw their economy collapse even further — people who have no control over the decisions of the regime that governs them. These human costs are not in the strategic calculations that lead to the formula "necessary evil." They deserve to be named — not to invalidate the strategy, but so the human cost is integrated into the evaluation.

Likewise, allies whose economic dependence on **China** is being brutally questioned by **Trump**'s commercial policies — emerging countries, Southeast Asian economies — are paying transition costs that **Washington** does not finance. The formula "**necessary evil**" applies from a Western point of view. It does not apply in the same way from the point of view of the people paying the price of this "necessary" without benefiting from it. This asymmetry is a serious limitation of the formula, and a serious limitation of the **foreign policy** that flows from it.

### The risk of habituation: when the "necessary evil" becomes just "evil"

There is a specific risk in the formula "**necessary evil**": habituation. If one too easily accepts that some evils are necessary, one ends up having no objection to additional evils. The conditionality of **Article 5** is an "evil" one accepts because the "necessary" of **NATO** pressure is more immediate. The erosion of the relationship to facts is an "evil" one minimizes because the fight against **China** is more urgent. The war without authorization from **Congress** is a constitutional "evil" one writes off to the "necessary" of Iranian denuclearization.

Each time one accepts an "evil" as "necessary," one lowers one's tolerance threshold for the next "evil." And when evils accumulate without the "necessaries" truly materializing — if **Iran** resumes enrichment in five years, if **NATO** fractures over a crisis that reveals the conditionality of **Article 5**, if the relationship to facts in American democratic culture reaches a point of irreparability — then the formula "**necessary evil**" proves to have been an anesthetic more than an analysis. This is the risk that must be named, even if one chooses to maintain the formula despite it.

*Habituation. That is the word I don't use enough in my columns on Trump. Each exception one accepts makes the next easier to accept. And if one looks at the history of democracies that slid toward something less democratic, it is rarely through a brutal rupture. It is through a series of accepted exceptions, each "necessary" in its moment. I'm not saying Trump is leading America toward authoritarianism. I'm saying that habituation is a real risk that the formula "necessary evil" should remind us to watch.*

## The strategic reading: "necessary evil" in the history of great powers

### Historical precedents: when democracy needed difficult leaders

The formula "**necessary evil**" is not an invention of the **Trump** era. The history of Western democracies offers several precedents of leaders whose methods contradicted the values they defended, but whose results were judged necessary in retrospect. **Franklin Roosevelt** interned Japanese-American citizens during World War II — a documented "evil," recognized as such since then. The Supreme Court upheld this decision in 1944. And yet Roosevelt is generally judged to have been a necessary president for the survival of Western democracy against fascism. **Churchill** authorized the bombing of German civilian cities and made deeply criticizable colonial decisions — and is at the same time the man who refused to surrender to Hitler when nobody else was holding firm.

These precedents do not validate the "evil." They illustrate that there are moments in history when the tension between values and power is irreducible — where imperfect leaders, with contestable methods, nonetheless accomplished what purer leaders would not have had the brutality or resolution to accomplish. The question is not whether **Trump** resembles Roosevelt or **Churchill** — he doesn't in his values or character. The question is whether the current historical moment — technological competition with **China**, Iranian **nuclear proliferation**, war in **Ukraine**, weakening of **NATO** — requires a certain level of strategic brutality that conventional leaders cannot supply. Answering "yes" to this question is to accept the formula "**necessary evil**."

### What Trump says about the West that produced him

The formula "**necessary evil**" also says something about the **West** that produced **Trump** — not just about Trump himself. If the West had known how to build **military alliances** robust enough without Trump's pressure, if European democracies had reached the **2% of GDP** without ultimatums, if multilateral institutions had had the teeth needed to manage Iranian **nuclear proliferation** and Chinese expansionism — Trump would not have been "necessary." He was produced, in part, by the failures of the systems he disrupts. And this should invite serious reflection on those systems themselves, beyond the management of Trump.

The **NATO** that had not respected its spending commitments for ten years. The negotiations with **Iran** that had failed to produce verifiable denuclearization under the **JCPOA**. The technological dependence on **China** that had been allowed to develop without constraints for decades. These pre-existing failures created the space in which **Trump** became "necessary." Correcting these failures — with or without Trump — is the real long-term policy of the **West**. And that, at bottom, is the deepest lesson of the formula "**necessary evil**": it should not justify a permanent dependence on an "evil." It should inspire a reform of the structures that made it necessary.

*The West produced Trump because it needed someone to do things its own institutions refused to do. That is an uncomfortable truth that European and Canadian progressives don't want to hear. But if one prefers that Trump no longer be "necessary," the answer is not to ignore him or denounce him. It is to build more robust alliances, more effective institutions, and more coherent policies toward China and Russia. The antidote to the "necessary evil" is to eliminate the "necessary." It starts with us.*

## Trump and Ukraine: the ultimate test of the formula

### If Ukraine holds, Trump was "necessary"

The ultimate test of the formula "**Trump**, **necessary evil** for the **West**" will be played out on **Ukraine**. If at the end of Trump's term in January 2029, Ukraine is still sovereign, territorial, and on the path to integration into Western security structures, with a **Putin** constrained to limits he can no longer force — then Trump will have been "necessary" on the most fundamental dossier of European security. Because he will have maintained — even ambiguously, even conditionally, even generating frustration among his allies — American support for a country fighting to defend the founding principle of the post-war order: the borders of states are inviolable.

If, conversely, **Trump** negotiates a deal that abandons Ukrainian territories, **geopolitically** neutralizes **Ukraine**, or leaves **Putin** with enough room to try again in ten years — then the "necessary" term of the formula will be retroactively invalidated on its most important dossier. Because a **West** that doesn't hold on Ukraine against **Russia** cannot credibly defend its interests against **China** over Taiwan, against **Iran** in the Middle East, or against any future challenge. Ukraine is the credibility test of the entire formula.

### The formula seen from Kyiv: a perspective that counts

Seen from **Kyiv**, the formula "**Trump**, **necessary evil**" has a particular flavor. Ukrainians know what an "evil" is — four years of war, cities destroyed, tens of thousands dead, millions displaced. They have a genuine tolerance for "evil" when the price paid is worth it. What they expect from Trump — what would make him "necessary" in their eyes — is real security guarantees, continued weapons deliveries, and support for their integration into Western security structures that would make a future Russian aggression too costly for **Putin** to attempt.

For now — June 2026 — **Trump** has given ambiguous signals on **Ukraine**. Support continues. Strategic clarity is missing. And this ambiguity, for Ukrainians dying on the Pokrovsk front, is the real test of whether Trump deserves to be called "necessary." Not the speeches at the **White House**. Not the posts on **Truth Social**. But what will concretely happen to their country in the months to come. That verdict has not yet been rendered.

*Let's call him Alexei — because he exists, this Ukrainian soldier, thousands of times over on the front, even if I have not met him. For him, Trump is not an intellectual formula. He is a factor in the equation of his survival. Will the ammunition arrive? Will American support hold? These concrete, vital questions decide whether the formula "necessary evil" has real meaning or is just a luxury of an analyst warm in his office.*

## The values that must resist: the "evil" that cannot be normalized

### The red lines that cannot be crossed in the name of the "necessary"

If the formula "**necessary evil**" is to be used honestly, it also requires defining the lines that cannot be crossed in the name of the "necessary" — the elements of the "evil" that cannot be accepted without democracy itself being irreversibly affected. First red line: freedom of the press and access to information. If **Trump** were to directly attack the media with legal instruments to silence critics — beyond the hostile rhetoric toward media that is already his trademark — that would be an "evil" that exceeds any "necessary."

Second red line: electoral integrity. If the verification and certification mechanisms of American elections were weakened, bypassed, or delegitimized, that is an evil that would invalidate any **geopolitical** "necessary." Democracies survive difficult presidents. They survive less well with compromised electoral systems. Third red line: separation of powers and judicial independence. If American courts lost their capacity to counterbalance executive power, the entire system that allows containing presidential excesses would collapse. These red lines had not been crossed in June 2026 — but their identification is an obligation of any honest observer who uses the formula "**necessary evil**."

### What allied Western nations must do: neither capitulation nor rupture

For **America**'s allies under **Trump** — European, Canadian, Japanese, Australian governments — the formula "**necessary evil**" has a clear practical implication: **neither capitulation nor rupture**. Not capitulation, because certain elements of the "evil" — the conditionality of **Article 5**, war without authorization from **Congress**, the instrumentalization of facts — deserve to be named and contested even at the cost of tension with **Washington**. Not rupture, because the elements of the "necessary" — the fight against **China**, Iranian denuclearization, the strengthening of **NATO** — are also our objectives, and distancing oneself from them for reasons of ideological posturing would be a costly strategic mistake.

This position — critical on methods, allied on objectives — is uncomfortable. It demands permanent analytical clarity, vigilance on drift, and the capacity to maintain functional relationships with an administration whose values one doesn't fully share. This is a difficult exercise. It is also the exercise that defines what it means to be an adult and sovereign ally of **Trump**'s America — rather than an admiring vassal or an impotent critic.

*Neither capitulation nor rupture. That is my formula for the allies of Trump's America. It will satisfy neither Trump's unconditional supporters nor his absolute opponents. That is precisely why it seems right to me. Comfortable positions are rarely honest ones in international politics. And honesty is what I try to bring to this decoding — not certainties, but a rigorous analysis of a complex reality.*

## The formula in the mirror of history: how will we judge it in twenty years?

### The scenarios that will validate or invalidate the formula

In twenty years, how will historians judge the formula "**Trump**, **necessary evil** for the **West**"? Two polar scenarios. First scenario: Iranian denuclearization holds, **Ukraine** has joined **NATO** or an equivalent security structure, **China** has been constrained to commercial rebalancing without war, and NATO has become a truly effective military **alliance** at **5% of GDP**. In this case, historians will say that Trump, despite his obvious flaws, accomplished a necessary strategic transformation that his more conventional predecessors had not known how to carry out. The formula will be validated.

Second scenario: **Iran** resumes enriching uranium in five years, **Ukraine** accepted a peace that looks like a defeat, **China** took advantage of the disorganization of Western **alliances** to advance its pawns on Taiwan and in the **South China Sea**, and American democratic culture is so fragmented that the 2030 elections are held in a context of contested legitimacy. In this case, historians will say that **Trump** was more "evil" than "necessary" — that his disruptions of alliances and norms cost more than they brought. The formula will be invalidated.

### What belongs to us today

The truth of June 2026 is that we are still in the course of history — not in the hindsight that allows definitive historical judgment. What belongs to us today is not to decide whether **Trump** will be judged well or poorly in twenty years. It is to exercise our responsibility as citizens and allies with the lucidity that the formula "**necessary evil**" demands: acknowledge the real results, name the real costs, identify the lines not to be crossed, and work to build a **West** less dependent on a "necessary" that is also an "evil." This is long, difficult work, with no guarantee of success. It is also the only work worth doing if one truly believes in the values the West claims to defend.

The formula "**Trump**, **necessary evil** for the **West**" is not a conclusion. It is a starting point — for more rigorous analysis, more coherent policy, and a more robust democracy. If it produces this, it will have been useful. If it produces anesthesia — passive acceptance of a state of affairs judged inevitable — it will have become itself part of the problem it claims to analyze.

*In twenty years. I don't know what history will say about Trump. I don't know what I will say about him. What I know is that this decoding exists — that it was written honestly, with facts, without sidestepping the contradictions. If in twenty years a reader finds it and says "Maxime got the tensions right," that will be enough. Honesty has its own value, independent of history's verdict.*

## American democracy facing its own limits: the paradox of the "necessary"

### The value of honesty in formulas

Decoding the formula "**Trump**, **necessary evil** for the **West**" is not an academic exercise. It is a political necessity for any observer who wants to analyze the world of 2026 honestly. The formula resists two symmetrical temptations: the temptation of **Trumpism** (celebrate everything) and the temptation of anti-Trumpism (condemn everything). It imposes a rigorous accounting of results and costs. It obliges us to name the beneficiaries and the victims. It demands defining the red lines and shared objectives.

It is this rigor — not the formula itself — that is precious. And it is this rigor that the allies of **America**, the partners of **NATO**, the defenders of **Ukraine**, and the citizens of liberal democracies must maintain in the face of **Trump**, his successors, and all future leaders who invoke the logic of the "necessary" to justify methods we cannot entirely approve. Because the **West** is worth more than its imperfect leaders — and preserving it in the long run requires permanent lucidity about the difference between what is necessary and what is merely convenient.

*"Necessary evil." Two words to summarize a relationship I carry inside me like a stone in my shoe. I want the West to win. I want democracy to survive. I want Ukraine to hold. And for all that to happen, I need Trump to succeed on certain fronts. This sentence costs me something real to write. And it is precisely for that reason that I entrust it here — because what costs to write is often what is worth reading.*

## The comparative formula: how European and Canadian media treated "necessary evil"

### Media treatment of a formula that unsettles

The formula **"Trump, necessary evil** for the **West**" has circulated in European and Canadian media with radically different interpretations depending on editorial lines. Progressive media often cited it as a moral capitulation — resigned acceptance of leadership contrary to **democratic values**. Conservative media sometimes used it as an argument from authority — if even Trump's critics acknowledge his necessity, then he deserves support from pragmatic voters. Neither use is honest with the formula's complexity.

In **France**, **Le Monde** and **Libération** treated the formula with wariness — pointing to the risk of habituation to violations of **democratic norms**. In **Germany**, the **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung** produced more nuanced analyses, acknowledging NATO results while maintaining reservations about the conditionality of **Article 5**. In **Canada**, coverage was marked by the ambivalence of a country that suffered American tariffs while benefiting from **Washington**'s security umbrella. This diversity of media treatment reflects the diversity of relationships each country maintains with **Trump**'s **United States** — each sees the "evil" and the "necessary" from its own **geopolitical** situation.

*Media treatment of Trump. I read it in five languages. Each language produces a different Trump — the dangerous demagogue in French, the pragmatic transactional figure in English, the necessary disruptor in German. The reality of Trump exceeds all these national interpretations. That is what makes him so difficult to grasp and so easy to instrumentalize.*

## Trump and Canada: a "necessary evil" that directly costs

### Canadian tariffs: when the American "necessary" directly wounds the ally

For **Canada**, the formula "**Trump**, **necessary evil** for the **West**" has a particularly concrete dimension: American **tariffs** on steel, aluminum, automobiles, and Canadian agricultural products constitute a direct, measurable cost imposed by an ally who otherwise claims to defend the Western order. Under Trump's first term, these tariffs cost billions to the Canadian economy. Under the second term, the **Carney** government negotiated a firmer position — maintaining trade reprisals while maintaining cooperation on defense and security. This dual posture — economic resistance, security alignment — is precisely the operational definition of "neither capitulation nor rupture."

**Canada** illustrates better than any other country the tension contained in the formula. It is geographically, economically, and culturally intertwined with the **United States** in a way European allies are not. When **Trump** imposes tariffs, they land directly in the factories of **Windsor**, **Hamilton**, and **Oshawa**. When **Trump** demands more defense spending, it is the Canadian taxpayer who pays. When **Trump** says "I'm the boss," it is the Canadian prime minister who must navigate between national dignity and the practical necessity of a functional relationship with the most powerful neighbor on earth. The "**necessary evil**," for **Canada**, is not an abstract formula — it is a daily governance reality.

*Windsor. Hamilton. Oshawa. These Canadian manufacturing cities that feel Trump's tariffs in their cancelled orders, their threatened jobs, their deferred expansion plans. For them, "necessary evil" rings hollow. What matters to them is whether American buyers on the other side of the bridge are still ordering their products tomorrow morning. Geopolitics has this face too.*

## Trump's successors: who will inherit the "necessary" without the "evil"?

### Ron DeSantis, J.D. Vance, Nikki Haley: the 2028 contenders

The formula "**Trump**, **necessary evil**" implies that the "necessary" can be separated from the "evil" — that another leader could accomplish what Trump accomplishes without his most problematic methods. This premise deserves to be questioned. In the post-Trump era, the most serious Republican candidates for **2028** — **J.D. Vance**, **Ron DeSantis**, **Nikki Haley**, potentially others — are not carbon copies of Trump, but they inherit his rhetorical framework, his electoral base, and the political norms he has established. Can one be "less evil" than Trump while remaining sufficiently "necessary" to maintain the **geopolitical** gains he has produced?

The honest answer is: perhaps. **Nikki Haley**, in particular, has a **foreign policy** position that combines Trumpian strategic firmness with a more institutional posture — explicit support for **Article 5**, multilateral engagement, respect for **alliances**. But her hypothetical candidacy for **2028** is conditional on complex electoral dynamics within the post-**Trump** **Republican Party**. What is certain: Trump's successor inherits a transformed **geopolitical** landscape — a more militarily strong **NATO**, a constrained **Iran**, a more cautious **China** — and an American political space that has integrated permanent elements of the **Trumpian grammar** on foreign policy.

*J.D. Vance. Nikki Haley. Ron DeSantis. I watch them the way states watch their future presidents — with a curiosity mixed with anxiety. Which of them will be able to maintain what deserves to be maintained from Trump's legacy and correct what needs to be corrected? I don't know. And this uncertainty is itself an element of Trump's record: he transformed American politics, but did not ensure the continuity of his own transformations.*

## The formula in twenty languages: what translating "necessary evil" reveals

### When a political formula crosses linguistic borders

The formula **"necessary evil"** translated into different languages reveals important cultural nuances about how different societies conceptualize the relationship between ethics and politics. In English, **"necessary evil"** is a well-established expression in political culture — Abraham **Lincoln** used it to talk about war, the American founders to talk about government itself. In **German**, **"notwendiges Übel"** carries a Kantian connotation — something one accepts out of necessity but does not morally justify. In **Russian**, the equivalent **"neobkhodimoe zlo"** exists but is rare in political discourse — Russian political culture generally prefers more absolute categories (friend/enemy, powerful/weak) that leave no room for the nuance of ethical necessity.

These linguistic differences are not trivial. They point toward different political cultures in the face of the question of whether liberal democracies can, must, or are doomed to tolerate leaders who violate their own values to defend their interests. **French political culture**, marked by a republicanism that does not easily admit value compromises, generally has more difficulty with the formula "necessary evil" than **British political culture**, more empirical and pragmatic. **America** under **Trump** sits somewhere between the two — it produces the formula, debates it, and leaves it open without resolving it. That may be a sign of a still-living democracy.

*A formula in twenty languages. I think of all the columnists, analysts, editorialists who, this very evening in dozens of countries, are trying to find the right words to explain Trump to their readers. We don't all read each other. We don't all speak the same languages. But we all ask the same question: how to honestly analyze someone who produces results you don't approve of through methods you don't like? This decoding is my personal answer. It is not definitive. It is honest.*

## Conclusion: what the "necessary" demands of us

### Beyond Trump: building a West that no longer needs him

If the formula "**necessary evil**" has a utility beyond description, it is in pushing us toward its own obsolescence. The long-term objective of the **West** — if it wants to be faithful to its values — is to build **alliances**, institutions, and policies that no longer need an "evil" to be "necessary." Military alliances robust enough without ultimatums. Non-proliferation mechanisms with teeth. An industrial technological policy that doesn't depend on a single president to be decided. A relationship with **China** that manages competition without permanent escalation.

This program is ambitious. It far exceeds **Trump**. It demands the work of generations of policymakers, diplomats, military personnel, and citizens. But it is the only program that makes the formula "**necessary evil**" provisional rather than permanent. And it is for this reason that this decoding — which began with two words — ends with a much larger ambition: to build, together, a **West** that no longer needs to endure what it must endure today.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*What the necessary demands of us. Perhaps the most important phrase in this decoding. The necessary is not permission to look away. It is an obligation to look more precisely, to work harder, to build better. If Trump is necessary today, it is our collective weakness of yesterday that made him so. And the best way to honor him — if honor there must be — is to build a West that will no longer need him tomorrow.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [White House: Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation (EO) — June 22, 2026](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/ushering-in-the-next-frontier-of-quantum-innovation/)

- [FDD: Trump Administration Provides Billions in Unrestricted Oil Sanctions Relief to Iran — June 23, 2026](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/23/trump-administration-provides-billions-in-unrestricted-oil-sanctions-relief-to-iran/)

- [U.S. Department of War: Remarks by Secretary Hegseth at NATO Defense Ministerial — June 18, 2026](https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4521023/remarks-by-secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-at-the-2026-nato-defense-ministerial-i/)

### Secondary sources

- [Military Times / Reuters-Ipsos: Just one in four Americans believes the Iran war was worth its costs — June 23, 2026](https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/06/23/just-one-in-four-americans-believes-the-war-with-iran-was-worth-its-costs/)

- [The Hindu: Trump threatens to charge US tolls in Strait of Hormuz — June 21, 2026](https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/trump-threatens-to-charge-us-tolls-in-strait-of-hormuz-if-final-iran-deal-not-reached-in-60-days/article71127249.ece)

- [New York Times: Senate Votes to Direct End to Iran War, Rebuking Trump — June 23, 2026](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/23/us/politics/senate-trump-war-powers-iran.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-trump-mal-necessaire-ce-que-cette-formule-revele-vraiment