# DECODING: Submarines and electronic warfare: Moscow arms Pyongyang to the teeth

> When Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un signed their mutual defense treaty in June 2024, many Western analysts shrugged. A dictator running on fumes, they said, cozying up to a pariah regime to get artillery shells. Two years later, that naive picture has shattered. What is happening between Moscow and Pyongyang is no longer a munitions-for-labor exchange — it is a systematic milit

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-sous-marins-et-guerre-electronique-moscou-arme-pyongyang-jusqu-aux-de

## Introduction: a military alliance reshaping the axis of danger

### The silent pact that has Seoul and Washington worried

When **Vladimir Putin** and **Kim Jong-un** signed their mutual defense treaty in June 2024, many Western analysts shrugged. A dictator running on fumes, they said, cozying up to a **pariah regime** to get artillery shells. Two years later, that naive picture has shattered. What is happening between **Moscow** and **Pyongyang** is no longer a munitions-for-labor exchange — it is a **systematic military technology transfer**, methodical and **potentially irreversible**.

According to an analysis published on **June 25, 2026** by the **Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)**, Russia has transmitted to North Korea technologies covering **submarine propulsion**, **acoustic stealth**, **Pantsir-M air defense systems**, and **advanced electronic warfare**. In parallel, the accuracy of North Korean **KN-23** ballistic missiles has been significantly improved using Russian guidance data. This is no longer cooperation — it is **proliferation**.

### Second anniversary, first serious warning

On **June 19, 2026**, the exact second anniversary of the Russia-North Korea mutual defense treaty, **Kim Jong-un** demanded a drastic acceleration of national military reconstruction from his generals. The language used in North Korean state media was unambiguous: a **destructive military posture**, an army capable of striking at any time, in any place. Not rhetoric — a roadmap.

Meanwhile, **Volodymyr Zelensky** was alerting the international community: **10,000 North Korean soldiers** are deployed on Russian territory, according to his own intelligence services. Seoul confirmed on its end that approximately **11,000 DPRK soldiers** had been sent to the Kursk region, of whom around **2,300 have been killed** since the start of their deployment. These are figures that stagger the mind — and that reveal the true depth of this bilateral commitment.

*I have to be honest: when I first read these figures, I thought it was propaganda exaggeration. I was wrong. Two years of signals ignored by the West, and here we are — North Korean submarines that will soon be quieter than ever.*

## The technology transfers: what Moscow is really giving Kim

### Submarines, silence, and stealth: a revolution beneath the seas

The most alarming of the transfers concerns **submarine technology**. Russia, whose navy has developed decades of expertise in **silent propulsion** and **acoustic signature reduction**, is now transmitting this precious know-how to Pyongyang. North Korean submarines, historically noisy and detectable, could within a few years become a real threat to the **South Korean navy** and American aircraft carriers in the Yellow Sea.

The FDD specifies in its book **Axis of Aggressors** that these transfers include techniques for **anechoic coating**, vibration reduction, and propulsion system design — exactly what North Korea needed to modernize its fleet of conventional submarines. It is a **twenty-year technological leap** that Pyongyang could never have achieved on its own, even in a decade.

### Electronic warfare: jam, blind, paralyze

The **electronic warfare** transfers are equally concerning. Russia, drawing on its experience in Ukraine — where it has refined its systems for **GPS jamming**, interception of encrypted communications, and drone neutralization — is now exporting these capabilities to the DPRK. According to the FDD, Pyongyang is receiving equipment and training that allows it to jam adversary guidance systems and neutralize enemy military communications in real time.

For Seoul, which has announced plans to deploy an army of **500,000 soldier-drones** and **20,000 autonomous drones** by 2030, these transfers represent a direct threat. If North Korea can jam the guidance signals of South Korean drones, Seoul's entire defense doctrine — built on technological drone superiority — collapses. This is not an abstract threat — it is a real vulnerability.

*Electronic warfare is the domain the West understands least and fears most. When Russia exports this expertise, it is not selling weapons — it is selling strategic blind spots. And the buyers know exactly how to use them.*

## The KN-23 boosted by Russian data: lethal precision

### A transformed North Korean ballistic missile

The **KN-23**, a short-range ballistic missile built by North Korea on the Russian Iskander model, was already a formidable weapon. But since the start of intensive military cooperation with Moscow, its **accuracy has been considerably improved**. Russian data on inertial guidance, GPS terminal corrections, and impact analysis have been integrated into new versions of the missile, according to FDD findings.

This refinement is not trivial. An **upgraded KN-23** can now strike precise military targets — air bases, ammunition depots, command centers — with a considerably reduced margin of error. For South Korea, this means that military infrastructure previously believed to be beyond accurate strike range is now a potential target. The strategic equation of the **Korean Peninsula** has just changed.

### Pantsir-M: North Korean air defense in transformation

Added to these transfers is the transmission of the Russian **Pantsir-M** anti-aircraft system, designed to neutralize cruise missiles, drones, and low-altitude aircraft. For a North Korea whose air defense historically rested on aging Soviet equipment, acquiring this technology represents a major qualitative leap.

The **Pantsir-M** can process multiple targets simultaneously, reacts within seconds, and can be deployed on mobile vehicles — making its location and preemptive destruction far more difficult. **South Korea** and the United States, whose deterrence doctrine rests on the ability to strike deep with precision strikes, will now have to contend with an adversary capable of protecting its most sensitive sites.

*We are talking about systems that Russia itself uses against Ukrainian drones. This is not surplus exports — it is exports of operationally proven, combat-tested equipment. Kim Jong-un is receiving the lessons of the Ukraine war without having had to pay for them.*

## North Korean soldiers in Russia: cannon fodder or combat apprentices?

### 11,000 soldiers deployed, 2,300 dead: the price of partnership

The deployment of North Korean soldiers in Russia constitutes the other — human — dimension of this alliance. According to figures from **Seoul** confirmed by Ukrainian sources, approximately **11,000 DPRK soldiers** were deployed in the Kursk region since late 2024. Approximately **2,300 of them have been killed**, according to estimates — a casualty rate of roughly 21%, a brutal figure even by this war's standards.

**Volodymyr Zelensky** described this presence as **incredibly dangerous**, not because of the individual military value of these soldiers — who often proved poorly trained for modern conventional warfare — but because of what they bring home: real combat experience, drone warfare tactics absorbed in the field, and direct knowledge of Western weapons systems supplied to Ukraine.

### South Korea accepts prisoners: a major diplomatic signal

A quiet but weighty development: **Seoul** has agreed to receive North Korean soldiers captured by the Ukrainian army who volunteer for transfer to South Korea. It is a diplomatically complex decision — Pyongyang treats any captured soldier as a traitor — but it sends a clear message: South Korea views these soldiers as victims of the Kim regime, not as irreconcilable enemies.

This initiative also allows South Korean intelligence services to obtain firsthand information on the training, equipment, command structures, and combat lessons learned by North Korean units deployed in Russia. It is **valuable human intelligence** that will feed Seoul's strategic planning for years to come.

*These North Korean soldiers are, above all, hostages of a regime that sent them to die in order to fund its own military modernization. There is something profoundly cynical in that — and something equally cynical in the way Moscow used them as bargaining chips.*

## Russian concern over U.S.-South Korean exercises

### Moscow steps out of its reserve and raises its voice

On **June 25, 2026**, the official Russian agency **TASS** published a Foreign Ministry statement expressing **growing concern** over the joint military activities of the United States and South Korea in the region. Moscow denounced what it called "deliberate escalation" and "destabilization of the Korean Peninsula" — an extraordinary claim from a country importing missiles there and sending foreign soldiers.

This Russian diplomatic outburst reveals an often-overlooked reality: **Russia does not view Northeast Asia as a secondary theater**. It has direct strategic interests there — notably maintaining a **buffer-state North Korea** — and is investing heavily in terms of military and political capital. Moscow's complaint is therefore less a diplomatic protest than a warning: touch this balance and we will see.

### Washington caught between two fires: Ukraine and Korea

For the American administration, this evolution places Washington in an unprecedented strategic situation. The United States must simultaneously support Ukraine against Russia, reassure South Korea in the face of an increasingly sophisticated North Korea, and manage a tense relationship with a **China** watching every move. Military resources, command systems, intelligence flows — everything is under strain at once.

The question posed to Washington is no longer only **how to restrain Putin in Europe** — it is now **how to respond to a North Korea that will tomorrow hold the technologies Russia developed against NATO**. That is a question without a simple answer, and America's Asian allies know it.

*Trump, who always wanted to negotiate with Kim, finds himself in an absurd position: the man he wanted to flatter is now building silent submarines with the help of Europe's enemy. There is no possible deal with a regime that uses peace as cover for its military modernization.*

## The Axis of Aggressors: what the FDD book reveals

### An assumed proliferation doctrine

The **Foundation for Defense of Democracies** published in 2026 a work titled **Axis of Aggressors**, which documents in detail the systemic nature of Russia-North Korea military cooperation. The work goes far beyond weapons exchanges — it demonstrates the existence of a **shared proliferation doctrine** aimed at counterbalancing Western technological superiority by equipping authoritarian regimes with cutting-edge technologies.

According to this analysis, Russia is not only seeking North Korean munitions to fuel the war in Ukraine. It is seeking to build a **network of alternative military powers** — including Iran and, to some extent, China — that together saturate Western surveillance, response, and deterrence capabilities. This is a **long-term strategy**, not a short-term survival measure.

### Iran, China, Russia, North Korea: the convergence of threats

The FDD report highlights that **Iran** also benefits from Russian technology transfers — notably in drones and ballistic missiles — while **China** observes, absorbs, and develops its own synergies with this axis. It is no coincidence that the four regimes coordinate their diplomatic signals, military provocations, and counter-media narratives with **striking regularity**.

Faced with this axis, the West still struggles to formulate a coherent response. Sanctions strike, but transfers continue. Declarations condemn, but treaties proliferate. **NATO**, the **European Union**, the **G7**, and Indo-Pacific democracies must now envision a coordinated response that transcends the traditional geographic boundaries of their alliances.

*We tend to think of these crises as separate — Ukraine on one side, Korea on the other, Taiwan somewhere else. That is exactly the misperception this axis hopes to sustain. They are linked. They feed one another. And our response must be too.*

## The Kim doctrine: acceleration at any cost

### Kim demands faster, stronger, more secret

The message from **Kim Jong-un** to his generals, reported in North Korean state media on the treaty's second anniversary, was unequivocal: accelerating the **national defense program** is an **absolute non-negotiable priority**. Kim specifically cited the need to improve **precision strike capabilities**, develop **conventional nuclear submarines**, and strengthen **offensive cyber capabilities**.

Each of these priorities corresponds exactly to the domains in which Russia is currently transferring technologies to Pyongyang. This is not a coincidence — it is a program. Kim knows what he is receiving, Putin knows what he is giving, and both regimes share a vision of what they are building together: a **parallel deterrence architecture** that would make any Western military intervention in their sphere of influence extremely costly.

### The destructive posture: rhetoric or operational planning?

The expression used in North Korean state media — **destructive military posture** — is not pure rhetoric. Experts in North Korean military doctrine see it as a reference to a strategy of **massive preemptive strikes** designed to neutralize adversary military advantages before those can be deployed. Combined with the new Russian technologies, this doctrine acquires an **operational credibility** it did not have three years ago.

**South Korea's National Intelligence Service** confirmed that Pyongyang has intensified simulation exercises targeting air bases and naval installations. These simulations now incorporate scenarios of **prior electronic jamming** — exactly what Russian electronic warfare technology enables. The loop is complete.

*There is something chilling in the methodology of all this. No rush. No improvisation. Just patient, brick-by-brick construction of a military capability that will be formidable in five years. The urgency is now — not when the submarines are silent.*

## What can the West do? The options on the table

### Sanctions, counter-proliferation, and shared intelligence

The Western response to this proliferation axis begins with strengthening **technology export control regimes**. **Dual-use technologies** — electronic components, specialized materials, simulation software — continue to reach Russia via third countries, notably China, Turkey, and certain Central Asian states. Closing these gaps is an absolute priority, but one requiring diplomatic cooperation that the West has yet to fully mobilize.

On **shared intelligence**, the Five Eyes, NATO, and Indo-Pacific democracies (Japan, South Korea, Australia) must intensify cooperation to monitor in real time the technology transfers between Moscow and Pyongyang. More robust **early warning** mechanisms would allow anticipating and blocking transfers before they become operational.

### Strengthening Seoul: advanced deterrence as a response

For **South Korea**, the response requires accelerating its own military modernization — and strengthening American presence on the peninsula. The **500,000 soldier-drones** program announced by Seoul is a direct response to Pyongyang's growing capabilities. But more is needed: strengthening **deep-strike** capabilities against North Korean launch sites, developing robust **electronic countermeasures**, and ensuring that American submarines in the Yellow Sea maintain a **durable acoustic superiority**.

**NATO**, for its part, should formally recognize the strategic link between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. The war in Ukraine is not separate from the rise of North Korean power — it is its direct fuel. Acknowledging this reality is the first step toward a coherent response.

*I am not a general, and I do not claim to have the solution. But I know that fragmented responses — a sanction here, a statement there — have never stopped a serious proliferation program. What is needed is a doctrine. A real one. Now.*

## Conclusion: the axis that grows while the West deliberates

### A **window of opportunity** that is closing

The history of unchecked military proliferation is always the same: the warning signs are visible, there is deliberation, then delay, and one day you find yourself facing an adversary armed with technologies you did not think were within their reach. Russia-North Korea military cooperation is no longer at the signal stage — it is at the stage of facts. Quieter submarines, more accurate missiles, operational electronic warfare systems, soldiers hardened by modern combat: the North Korea of 2028 will look nothing like that of 2022.

The West still has a window to act — reinforcing sanctions, plugging technology transfers, consolidating Indo-Pacific alliances, and above all, treating this threat for what it is: an integral component of the strategic challenge posed by the Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis. Deliberating for another five years is not an option. Proliferation does not wait.

### The price of inaction

Every technology transferred today is a strategic decision that North Korea will no longer have to make tomorrow. Every North Korean soldier returning from Russia is a potential war instructor. Every upgraded KN-23 is an additional threat against South Korean cities. The cost of inaction is not paid in deliberations — it is paid in human lives, regional destabilization, and a Western credibility that erodes with each ignored transfer.

This is not alarmism. It is strategic accounting. And the numbers, for now, are not in our favor.

*I have no absolute certainty about what Kim Jong-un will do with these technologies. But I am certain of one thing: he knows exactly what he will do with them. And that should be enough to shake us out of our collective torpor.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Foundation for Defense of Democracies — Kim pushes for faster North Korean defense buildup with Russia's help — June 25, 2026](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/25/kim-pushes-for-faster-north-korean-defense-buildup-with-russias-help/)

- ABC News — North Korea vows destructive military posture — June 25, 2026

- [TASS — Russia expresses concern over US-South Korea military activities — June 25, 2026](https://tass.com/politics/2151513)

- [Ground News — Zelensky: 10,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia — June 2026](https://ground.news/article/there-are-10-000-dprk-troops-in-russia)

### Secondary sources

- [Ground News — North Korea vows deeper ties with Russia — June 19, 2026](https://ground.news/article/n-korea-vows-deeper-ties)

- [Euromaidan Press — Context: authoritarian axis military cooperation — June 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/04/ukraine-logs-heaviest-deep-strike-month-of-the-year-hitting-18-oil-and-gas-facilities-in-russia/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-sous-marins-et-guerre-electronique-moscou-arme-pyongyang-jusqu-aux-de