# DECODING: Who speaks for Europe? Zelensky's red line

> On June 21, 2026, in an interview given to TSN, the Ukrainian news channel, President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke words that irritated some of his European partners: "They [the Europeans] will decide on the format, and ultimately Ukraine will determine who represents Europe in the negotiations. They will propose several options." This formulation — Ukraine has a say in who represe

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-qui-parle-pour-l-europe-la-ligne-rouge-de-zelensky

## Key takeaways

- On June 21, 2026, Zelensky told TSN that Europeans would decide the format, but Ukraine would determine who represents Europe in the talks.
- France and Italy reportedly opposed an EU measure to bar former Russian soldiers from entering the EU, while Poland and the Baltic states take a firmer line.
- On June 7, 2026, the E3 (Britain, France, Germany) issued five joint conditions for peace, but the format excludes Poland and the Baltic states.
- The author links Zelensky's stance to the Minsk agreements, which he says created a gray zone Russia exploited before the 2022 invasion.
- The author proposes criteria for a representative, names Kaja Kallas as a plausible candidate, and calls for a formal consultation mechanism with Kyiv.

## Introduction: The uncomfortable question

### Zelensky issues an awkward demand

On **June 21, 2026**, in an interview given to **TSN**, the Ukrainian news channel, President **Volodymyr Zelensky** spoke words that irritated some of his European partners: "They [the Europeans] will decide on the format, and ultimately **Ukraine** will determine who represents Europe in the negotiations. They will propose several options." This formulation — Ukraine has a say in who represents it at the negotiating table — was perceived in certain capitals as a form of impertinence.

It is not impertinence. It is survival. A country that has been fighting for its existence for more than four years has the fundamental and inalienable right to demand that its interests be represented with integrity at any negotiating table where its fate will be discussed. If **Ukraine** cannot trust a unilaterally designated European representative, the credibility of the entire process collapses. **Zelensky** is not demanding to control European policy — he is demanding that someone who understands his position speak on his behalf.

### The context: peace negotiations are drawing closer

This discussion about European representation is not abstract — it anticipates an increasingly likely diplomatic process. In June 2026, the major European powers — **Germany**, **France**, the **United Kingdom** — are jointly developing a plan to bring **Putin** to the negotiating table. **Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni** supported the idea of a single EU representative for these discussions. The question is no longer whether negotiations will take place, but who, how, and under what conditions.

*The question "who speaks for Europe?" is one of the most important the old continent has had to ask itself in decades. And the fact that it is Zelensky — the president of a non-EU member country, in a state of war — who raises it with such clarity says a great deal about the divisions and shortcomings of European diplomacy.*

## European divisions: the challenge of coherence

### France, Italy and the temptation of pragmatism

The **European Union** presents a unified face in public on support for **Ukraine** — but behind the scenes, the divisions are real and deep. **France** and **Italy** opposed in June 2026 a measure to ban former Russian soldiers who had fought in Ukraine from entering the EU, according to **United24 Media**. This position — less hostile toward former Russian combatants — reflects a desire to maintain channels of dialogue with **Moscow** that other countries, notably the Baltic states and **Poland**, consider premature and dangerous.

This divide between "pragmatists" (France, Italy, sometimes Germany) and "hawks" (Poland, Baltic states) on the Russian question has run through the EU for years. It has sharpened since the start of the large-scale invasion. The "pragmatists" fear uncontrollable escalation and want to keep channels open with **Moscow**. The "hawks" believe that any dialogue without good-faith preconditions encourages the aggressor to continue.

### The E3 format: a coherence under construction

On **June 7, 2026**, at a meeting in **London**, **Great Britain**, **France**, and **Germany** jointly produced five conditions for peace in Ukraine — the first time the three major European powers have agreed in writing on the terms of a possible resolution to the conflict. This **E3** format document ("Europe 3") represents a step toward the diplomatic coherence that Zelensky has long demanded.

However, this informal three-country format does not represent all **27 EU members**. **Poland**, whose Prime Minister **Tusk** is one of the firmest voices on the Ukrainian question, is not in this format. Neither are the Baltic states. A single EU representative emerging from discussions dominated by the E3 format might not reflect the firmest line on Ukrainian rights — hence Kyiv's legitimate concern.

*The E3 format is progress — it is better than the diplomatic void that preceded it. But it leaves aside those who have the most to lose from a bad peace: Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine itself. A credible European diplomacy on Ukraine must include the voices closest to the threat.*

## Zelensky and diplomatic sovereignty

### The refusal of a second Minsk

Zelensky's position on European representation is largely explained by the memory of the **Minsk** agreements. In 2014–2015, the **Minsk I** and **Minsk II** agreements had been negotiated primarily by **France** and **Germany**, within the framework of the "Normandy Format," without Ukraine being able to impose its own terms. These agreements did freeze one phase of the conflict, but they created a gray zone in eastern Ukraine that Russia exploited for seven years to maintain destabilizing pressure on Kyiv — until the large-scale invasion of 2022.

Zelensky has repeatedly declared there will be no second Minsk. His concern is clear: if Europe chooses a representative perceived as too accommodating with Moscow, negotiations could produce an agreement resembling Minsk — a partial resolution that freezes the conflict without resolving it, leaves Russia with territorial gains, and fails to provide Ukraine with the security guarantees needed to prevent new aggression.

### The claim for NATO membership: the real guarantee

The ultimate security guarantee Ukraine seeks is membership in **NATO**. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty — under which an attack on one member is an attack on all — is the only credible guarantee that would make new Russian aggression prohibitively costly. Bilateral security guarantee agreements, however solid, do not carry the same credibility — the history of Ukrainian security agreements since the **Budapest Memorandum** of 1994 (which obtained guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom in exchange for Ukraine's renunciation of the inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal) demonstrates this tragically.

*The Budapest Memorandum remains one of the greatest diplomatic tragedies of the past thirty years. Ukraine renounced the largest nuclear arsenal in Europe in exchange for guarantees that proved worthless. Zelensky remembers. He knows better than anyone what paper guarantees are worth without credible enforcement mechanisms.*

## The representativeness question: who is legitimate?

### The President of the European Council, Rutte and NATO

Several names have circulated as possible European representatives in any eventual negotiations. **Mark Rutte**, Secretary General of **NATO**, represents the military alliance but not the EU. The **President of the European Council** represents member states but holds no foreign policy mandate. The **EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs** has a more relevant mandate. **Italian Prime Minister Meloni** herself suggested the appointment of a single representative — without specifying who, which reveals the difficulty of reaching a consensus.

Finnish President **Alexander Stubb**, often mentioned as a potential mediator, has publicly stated he does not see himself in that role. The institutional complexity of the EU makes the designation of a "single representative" difficult — such a position does not formally exist, and creating it would require consensus among 27 member states with sometimes divergent positions.

### The American position under Trump: absent or present?

The question of European representation is complicated by the ambivalent stance of the **Trump** administration. Defense Secretary **Hegseth** announced a six-month review of U.S. military presence in Europe. The **4,000 American soldiers** cancelled from Poland in May 2026 created uncertainty. And yet, **Trump** had supported the idea of a bilateral Zelensky-Putin meeting in June 2026.

The question arises: if the **United States** partially disengages, must Europe step in alone? And if so, with what coherence? The exclusion of American representatives from certain discussions — a demand Russia has sometimes advanced at Istanbul — is unacceptable to Kyiv. Ukraine knows that without the United States at the table, the balance of power tilts dangerously toward Moscow.

*American ambiguity under Trump is perhaps the most destabilizing factor in this equation. Not because Trump is "pro-Putin" in his intentions — he is above all unpredictable. And unpredictability is the enemy of deterrence and diplomacy. Europe must build its own coherence on the premise that it cannot count on Washington as it did five years ago.*

## The debate inside Europe: contradictory voices

### Sikorski, Tusk, the hawks of the East

Polish Foreign Minister **Radosław Sikorski** and Prime Minister **Donald Tusk** represent the firmest line on Ukraine support within the EU. For them, any negotiation must start from the principles of international law — territorial integrity, Russian withdrawal, solid security guarantees — and must not be rushed by a Western desire to exit the conflict quickly. This line is also that of the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, and Romania.

Facing them, leaders such as French President **Emmanuel Macron** — who has several times emphasized the importance of not "humiliating" Russia — or Italian Prime Minister **Meloni**, who maintains economic ties with Moscow, represent a more nuanced approach. This nuance is legitimate in principle — all diplomacy requires understanding the other party's perspective. But it becomes problematic when it leads to preliminary concessions that weaken Ukraine's position before negotiations have even begun.

### The risk of representation through weakness

If the designated European representative is perceived by Moscow as representing the most moderate line in the EU — rather than its firmest line — Russia will have every interest in exploiting that moderation to push for concessions. This is precisely what **Zelensky** seeks to avoid. A representative who yields on "realities on the ground" or on security guarantees, even with good intentions, would be catastrophic for Ukrainian interests.

*The risk of "representation through weakness" is real. I saw how the Minsk agreements were negotiated by parties convinced they were doing their best, and I saw the result. Goodwill alone is not enough at the negotiating table with a regime that views every concession as an invitation to demand another.*

## The Ukrainian claim: legitimate and practically complex

### The moral right and the institutional challenge

Morally, Zelensky's claim is indisputable. Practically, its implementation is complex. If Ukraine holds a veto over the European representative, who can impose their view if that representative is rejected? The **27 EU member states** can hardly accept that a third country — even a friendly one — has formal oversight over their institutional representation processes.

The solution, it seems, is political rather than legal. The EU should designate a representative who maintains a relationship of trust with **Kyiv** — someone whose public positions demonstrate a deep understanding of the Ukrainian stakes, and who has shown they would not sacrifice Ukraine on the altar of a quick deal. This de facto excludes candidates perceived as too accommodating toward Moscow. And it narrows the field of plausible candidates.

### Consultation, coordination, trust

The real answer to the question "who speaks for Europe?" is not a single name — it is a mechanism of **continuous consultation** between the European representative and **Kyiv**. Whether negotiations are conducted by an E3 representative, by the EU High Representative, or by an ad hoc designated figure, the sine qua non condition is that Ukraine is kept informed in real time, that its positions are faithfully reflected, and that the representative takes no decisions binding Ukraine without its explicit agreement.

*Trust is the key. Not naive trust — trust built on formal mechanisms of consultation and validation. Zelensky needs to know that the European representative speaks to him before speaking to Putin, not after. That is reasonable, that is necessary, and it is entirely compatible with the EU's institutional autonomy.*

## The memory of Minsk: why Ukraine says no to a second failed agreement

### The history of agreements that did not work

To understand why **Zelensky** demands oversight of European representation, one must return to the history of the **Minsk agreements**. **Minsk I** (September 2014) and **Minsk II** (February 2015) were negotiated within the so-called **Normandy Format** — **France**, **Germany**, **Ukraine**, and **Russia**. Ukraine was at the table, but its military weakness in 2015 had forced it to accept clauses — notably on the autonomy of certain eastern regions — that the Kremlin interpreted expansively and never respected in good faith.

These agreements created a gray zone in the oblasts of **Donetsk** and **Luhansk** that Russia exploited for seven years to maintain permanent destabilizing pressure on Kyiv — weapons deliveries to separatists, daily ceasefire violations, blocking of the political clauses' implementation. Ultimately, it was this security vacuum created by the Minsk agreements that facilitated the large-scale invasion of 2022. **Zelensky** drew the lesson: an agreement negotiated without credible enforcement guarantees, by mediators who do not fully share Ukrainian security concerns, is worse than no agreement at all.

### The E3 format: progress but insufficient

The joint declaration of the **E3** format (Great Britain, France, Germany) on **June 7, 2026** in **London** represents progress compared to past divisions. For the first time, the three major European powers agreed in writing on **five conditions** for peace in Ukraine — including Russian withdrawal, Ukrainian sovereignty, and security guarantees. But this informal document does not bind all **27 EU members**, and some of Ukraine's most ardent supporters — **Poland**, the Baltic states — are absent from the format.

The problem with the E3 format is precisely what **Zelensky** points to: it is dominated by powers that have historically sought to maintain channels with Moscow — notably **France** under Macron, who several times emphasized the importance of not "humiliating" Russia. A representative emerging from this format might not defend Ukrainian positions with the same firmness on the most sensitive points. Hence Kyiv's claim to oversight — not a formal veto, but a mandatory consultation and pre-established trust.

*The memory of Minsk is alive in every corridor of Kyiv. Those agreements were presented as a diplomatic victory — they turned out to be a humiliation that preceded an invasion. Zelensky cannot allow a second Minsk to occur, whatever pressure his allies exert. I understand that. And I think his allies should understand it too.*

## What "speaking for Europe" means in practice

### The required qualities of a credible representative

If **Europe** is to speak with one voice in any eventual negotiations on Ukraine, several qualities are required of its representative. The first is **credibility with Kyiv**: the representative must have demonstrated a deep understanding of the Ukrainian stakes, not merely rhetorical support. The second is **institutional legitimacy**: they must hold a clear mandate from all EU members, not just the major E3 powers. The third is **firmness before Moscow**: they must be capable of resisting Russian pressure tactics without seeking to preserve economic or political relations with Moscow.

These restrictive criteria de facto exclude several natural candidates. French President **Macron** — perceived in Kyiv as too conciliatory after his multiple telephone calls to **Putin** in 2022–2023 — would have difficulty earning Ukrainian trust. A representative from the Baltic states or **Poland** would have the credibility and firmness, but weaker institutional legitimacy within the E3 format that will dominate discussions. **EU High Representative** **Kaja Kallas** — former Estonian Prime Minister — combines strong anti-Russian credibility with an institutional mandate. She remains one of the most plausible candidates according to several European diplomatic analysts.

### The process as guarantee

Beyond the personality of the representative, it is the **consultation process** that can resolve the tension between European sovereignty and Ukrainian demands. If the EU establishes a formal mechanism by which the representative must consult **Kyiv** before and after each negotiating session, inform Ukraine of any compromise under consideration, and not commit Ukrainian positions without explicit agreement — the question of "who" becomes less critical. This is not a precedent without precedent: in EU trade negotiations, member states have strict consultation mechanisms that allow the Commission to negotiate while preserving national sovereignty.

The **European Council** of **June 2026** held what Zelensky described as "the longest discussion on Ukraine in all these years." This renewed seriousness is encouraging. But discussion alone is not enough — it must lead to a clear institutional mechanism, transparent to Ukraine, and binding on the European representative. That is the condition for Europe to be not only present at the negotiating table, but genuinely useful in building a just peace.

*The real question is not "who speaks for Europe" — it is "how can Europe guarantee to Ukraine that its voice will be heard." The answer requires formal mechanisms, not personal trust in a representative. Robust institutions are more reliable than individual relationships — that is the fundamental lesson of European integration.*

## Conclusion: Europe must speak with a strong and unified voice

### The lesson of recent history

The European Council of June 2026 held "the longest discussion on Ukraine in all these years" according to Zelensky himself — two hours of open discussion on European strategy in the face of the war. That is a sign of seriousness. It remains to convert that seriousness into a coherent and credible diplomatic position. Europe can play a decisive role in resolving this conflict — but only if it is capable of speaking with one voice, and if that voice reflects its most fundamental principles rather than its most immediate interests.

### Zelensky asked the right question

*"Who speaks for Europe?" — that may be the most important question the EU has to answer right now. Not only for Ukraine, but for itself. The answer it gives will say a great deal about what Europe truly is — an autonomous strategic actor capable of defending its values, or a space of perpetual compromises that always ends up bending to realities imposed by the most powerful.*

By raising the question of the European representative, **Zelensky** is not seeking to control the EU. He is seeking to ensure that the greatest European security crisis since the Second World War will be managed with the rigor and integrity it deserves. That is a legitimate demand. Europe should see it not as a provocation, but as an invitation to live up to its own ambitions. The diplomatic window is open until winter 2026, according to Zelensky himself. The time to decide "who speaks for Europe" is now.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Zelenskyy: Ukraine will decide who represents EU in talks with Russia — June 21, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/21/8040456/)

- [UNN — Zelenskyy stated Ukraine is ready for meetings, but Russia must make the first step — June 27, 2026](https://unn.ua/en/news/zelenskyy-stated-ukraine-is-ready-for-meetings-but-russia-must-make-the-first-step)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Putin: Russia ready for talks with Ukraine only if based on Istanbul 2022 agreements — June 23, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/23/8040766/)

- United24 Media — France and Italy oppose EU move on former Russian soldiers — June 2026

### Secondary sources

- [Eastern Herald — E3 Powers write Ukraine's peace template without Washington — June 8, 2026](https://easternherald.com/2026/06/08/e3-ukraine-peace-five-conditions-london-ceasefire-2026/)

- [The Guardian — NATO leaders fear they can no longer rely on US help — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

- RBC-Ukraine — Zelensky sends proposals to Putin's friends — June 26, 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-qui-parle-pour-l-europe-la-ligne-rouge-de-zelensky