# DECODING: Lithuania — Anti-Drone Ammunition at €2 Per Round to Hold NATO's Skies

> June 2026. In the Kaunas district, Lithuania, the state-owned Giraitė factory has launched production of ammunition that may seem unremarkable at first glance: cartridges in calibers 5.56mm and 7.62mm, the NATO infantry standard calibers. But what makes these cartridges extraordinary is their specific design for the neutralization of drones at distances of 50 to 100 meters. And

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-lituanie-des-munitions-anti-drone-a-2-euros-l-unite-pour-tenir-le-cie

## Introduction: A Lithuanian State Factory Invents the Answer to Kamikaze Drone Problem

### The Silent Revolution at the Giraitė Plant in the Kaunas District

June 2026. In the **Kaunas district**, Lithuania, the state-owned **Giraitė** factory has launched production of ammunition that may seem unremarkable at first glance: cartridges in calibers **5.56mm** and **7.62mm**, the NATO infantry standard calibers. But what makes these cartridges extraordinary is their specific design for the **neutralization of drones** at distances of **50 to 100 meters**. And their price: **€2 per round**. In a context where kamikaze drones threaten every military front and every civilian infrastructure in Europe, this quiet Lithuanian innovation deserves to be decoded in depth.

Lithuania developed this ammunition by drawing on the **direct lessons of the war in Ukraine**. Ukrainian soldiers discovered to their cost that standard infantry ammunition is poorly effective against small commercial drones repurposed for military use — the kind a Russian soldier can buy on Aliexpress for a few hundred dollars and transform into a guided bomb. Conventional ballistic trajectories are poorly suited to intercepting such small, mobile, and fast targets. **Giraitė** designed a specific solution to this precise tactical problem, at a **revolutionary unit cost**.

### Why €2 Per Round Is a Strategic Number, Not Just an Economic One

The logic of **economic asymmetry** is at the heart of the drone problem on contemporary battlefields. An Iranian Shahed drone costs approximately **$20,000**. But a modified commercial drone can cost **$500 to $2,000**. Conventional defense systems — interceptor missiles, anti-drone guns — cost **$50,000 to $500,000 per shot**. The economic asymmetry is therefore catastrophic: to neutralize a $500 drone, you may end up spending 500 times more. **Giraitė's €2 round** partially reverses this equation for a specific category of drones — those operating at close range.

For defenders of infrastructure, forward military positions, logistics convoys, or artillery positions — which face close-range drones — having a **dedicated anti-drone munition** at a cost comparable to a standard cartridge transforms tactics. Every infantry soldier can become a front-line anti-drone defender without costly specialized equipment. This is the democratization of anti-drone capability at the lowest tactical level — and this is precisely what the war in Ukraine has shown to be necessary in the face of the proliferation of small reconnaissance and attack drones.

*€2 per round. That is less than a coffee in Amsterdam. And it can neutralize a drone that would have killed a soldier or destroyed an armored vehicle. There is something profoundly right about this equation. The most relevant military innovation is not always the most sophisticated. Sometimes it is the simplest, the most accessible, the most reproducible. Lithuania just understood this better than many nations with ten times its defence budget.*

## The Technology Behind Giraitė's Anti-Drone Munition — How It Works

### The Specific Ballistic Design for Low-Altitude Aerial Target Neutralization

Standard infantry ammunition (**5.56mm NATO** and **7.62mm NATO**) is designed for flat trajectories toward human targets at typical distances of **200 to 600 meters**. The physics of their ballistic trajectory — projectile mass, form factor, muzzle velocity — is not optimized for intercepting small objects moving in three dimensions at short distances. **Giraitė's** munitions modify these parameters to improve the probability of neutralization in the **50–100 meter** window specific to close-range drones.

Without entering into technical details that fall under industrial and military secrecy, possible modifications include a **dispersal charge** (multiple projectiles rather than one), a **modification of projectile geometry** to maximize impact surface against a target with low radar and infrared signature, or an **adaptation of ballistic characteristics** for a more effective rising trajectory. Compatibility with the standard **5.56mm and 7.62mm** calibers means these munitions can be used in existing weapons — **M16, FAMAS, G36, AK** — without any equipment modification, which is a considerable logistical advantage.

### Effectiveness at 50–100 Meters — A Specific and Crucial Tactical Window

The **50 to 100 meter** window defines the operational domain of these munitions. Below 50 meters, a fast-approaching drone leaves little reaction time — the solution lies more in early detection and physical barriers. Beyond 100 meters, GPS jamming electronic systems or directed energy weapons become more appropriate. But within the **50–100 meter** window, a drone approaching a defensive position is often still neutralizable by sharpshooters or well-trained infantry units — provided they have the adapted munition.

This tactical window is precisely the one that posed the most problems for Ukrainian forces in the early phases of the war. Small **DJI Mavic** or equivalent drones, modified to drop grenades on trenches, operate in exactly this range. Hundreds of videos from the Ukrainian front show soldiers desperately trying to shoot down these devices with conventional ammunition — often unsuccessfully. **Giraitė's** munition is a direct response to this field reality, designed by a nation that analyzed these videos and drew the appropriate operational conclusions.

*The videos of DJI drones dropping grenades on Ukrainian soldiers in trenches are among the most dystopian images of this conflict. 21st-century war looks like this: a $400 quadcopter killing or wounding men trained for years. The Lithuanian response to this problem — a €2 cartridge — has something poignant in its simplicity. Sometimes the best innovations are not multi-million dollar systems. They are munitions cheaper than your lunch.*

## The First Clients — Sweden and France, Then a Growing Waiting List

### Initial Deliveries to Sweden and France — A Validation by Major Allied Armies

The significance of **Giraitė's** anti-drone munition's first clients goes beyond a simple commercial transaction. The fact that **Sweden** — a NATO member since 2024, with a rigorous army — and **France** — a major military power with a sophisticated defence industry — chose to be the first beneficiaries of this munition is a first-order technical and operational validation. These countries do not procure munitions lightly. They technically evaluated the product, tested its effectiveness, and concluded that the **Lithuanian munition** deserved to be integrated into their arsenal.

**France** in particular, whose **army** deploys units in varied operational contexts — from the **Sahel** to operations in Europe — is a particularly significant client. If the **French army** considers this **€2 munition** operationally useful, its cost-effectiveness is real. France has its own munitions industrial capabilities — **Eurenco**, **Sofema**, and others — and has no need to source from Lithuania by default. If it does so, it is because this specific product fills a genuine need at an unbeatable cost.

### Ongoing Negotiations — Czech Republic, Estonia, Belgium, Israel, Denmark

The list of countries in negotiation with **Giraitė** for anti-drone munition supply is revealing of international interest in this solution. **Czech Republic**: a nation strongly committed to supporting Ukraine and simultaneously strengthening its own defence. **Estonia**: a Baltic country on the front line of the Russian threat, devoting more than **3 percent of its GDP** to defence and seeking anti-drone solutions for its forces. **Belgium**: a NATO country modernizing its army after years of underinvestment. **Israel**: one of the countries with the most operational experience with the drone threat in real combat contexts.

**Israel's** interest is particularly significant. The Jewish state has one of the most sophisticated defence industries in the world and has direct experience with the drone threat in its recent military operations. If its acquisition teams are looking with interest at the Lithuanian munition, it is because it offers something that Israeli industry does not yet produce at the same cost conditions. This validation by **Israel** — in this specific domain — would be one of the strongest technological validations **Giraitė** could obtain.

*When Israel, which has one of the most advanced defence industries in the world, is interested in a Lithuanian €2 munition, I take note. In this domain, validation by the IDF is worth more than any European industrial certificate. It says something profound about the maturity of Lithuanian defensive innovation — and about the capacity of small countries to innovate where giants have failed.*

## The Objective of 5 Million Rounds Per Year — An Industrial Ambition to Decode

### What 5 Million Units Per Year Represents in Defence Capacity Terms

The objective of **5 million anti-drone rounds per year** set by **Giraitė** deserves perspective. **5 million units** at **€2** per unit represents an annual turnover of **€10 million** — modest on the scale of the international defence industry. But its operational value far exceeds its commercial value. With **5 million anti-drone rounds** per year, one can substantially equip the armed forces of several medium-sized NATO nations, create operational stocks sufficient for a high-intensity campaign of a few weeks, or provide the basic equipment for tens of thousands of infantry soldiers.

In the context of the **Baltic states** — Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia — which total a population of approximately **6 million inhabitants** and armies of some tens of thousands of soldiers, **5 million anti-drone rounds per year** represent significant coverage of front-line defence. It is also an export capacity that would allow **Giraitė** to become a reference supplier for all **Northern European NATO** forces in this specific category. **Lithuania** is thus positioning itself as a high-value-added niche producer in the European defence ecosystem.

### Scale-Up Constraints — Raw Materials, Personnel, and Certification

Reaching **5 million units per year** from a launch in **June 2026** requires an industrial scale-up that will not be without challenges. **Raw materials** — brass for casings, propellant powder, specific components of the anti-drone payload — must be sourced stably and in volume. **NATO certification** of munitions is a rigorous process that can take time for new calibers or design modifications. **Specialized personnel** for munitions production — a trade combining pyrotechnics, precision mechanics, and rigorous quality control — must be trained.

Lithuania has the advantage of having **Giraitė**, a state-owned factory with historical experience in munitions production. This is not a start-up starting from scratch. But even for an experienced producer, tripling or quintupling production capacity within a few years requires substantial investments in equipment and infrastructure. European programs like **EDIP** could play a role in financing this scale-up — a concrete example of how European financing could accelerate the expansion of a national defence industrial capacity in the collective interest of the alliance.

*5 million rounds per year. For a nation of 3 million inhabitants, this is a remarkable industrial ambition. Lithuania is not merely defending itself — it ambitions to defend its allies as well. There is something admirable about this posture from a nation that, facing an immediate Russian threat, chooses industrial action rather than panic. This is Baltic resilience. A model that major powers would do well to study.*

## The Lessons From the War in Ukraine That Guided the Design

### Ukrainian Field Reports as the Primary Source of Anti-Drone Doctrine

The genesis of **Giraitė's** anti-drone munition illustrates a military methodological approach that should be systematized throughout **NATO**: the direct integration of real-time field lessons into equipment development programs. **Ukraine** is the greatest **high-intensity combat laboratory** of the 21st century. The lessons learned there — on drones, missiles, electronic warfare, logistics under pressure — are available to any ally who takes the trouble to carefully listen to **Ukrainian officers and soldiers**.

Lithuania has proven particularly effective at drawing these lessons. Geographic and cultural proximity to **Ukraine**, acute awareness of the Russian threat, and a small size that facilitates rapid decision-making have allowed **Vilnius** to translate field observations into technical specifications more quickly than larger and more bureaucratic nations. The result — an operational anti-drone munition, tested, and already delivered to allies — in **less than four years** after the beginning of the full-scale war, is a performance that should serve as a model for others.

### The Limits of the Anti-Drone Munition and the Drone Categories It Does Not Cover

An honest decoding of **Giraitė's** munition must also clearly define what it does not do. Effective in the **50–100 meter** window, it is not a solution for Iranian **Shahed** drones operating at hundreds or thousands of kilometers. It is not an answer to high-altitude reconnaissance drones. It does not resolve the problem of coordinated drone swarms that saturate defenses. And it is not a substitute for electronic warfare systems that jam the communications and navigation of adversary drones.

These limits are important to understand to avoid seeing in **Giraitė's** munition a universal anti-drone panacea. It is a **specific tool for a specific problem**: small proximity drones that threaten infantry positions and lightly defended infrastructure. In this precise domain, it offers an accessible and economical solution. Complete anti-drone defence requires a **multi-layer approach** combining dedicated munitions like Giraitė's, electronic warfare systems, interceptor missiles for higher threats, and adapted training protocols. Lithuania has solved one layer of the problem. The other layers remain to be built.

*No weapon is a universal solution. Those who sell absolute military "game changers" are always wrong — or lying. The Lithuanian anti-drone munition is excellent in its niche. But the defence of a country, an alliance, a continent, is built in layers. In depth. Not with a single cartridge, however well-conceived. You need the €2 cartridge AND the millions for the electronic warfare system. That is integrated defence.*

## Lithuania's Strategic Positioning in the NATO Defence Ecosystem

### How a Country of 3 Million Inhabitants Becomes an Indispensable Defence Industrial Actor

Lithuania is a country of **3 million inhabitants**, a **NATO** member since 2004 and an **European Union** member since the same year. Long considered a country to be defended rather than a producer of defence capabilities, it has undergone a remarkable transformation since **2022**. The defence budget has been raised to more than **3 percent of GDP**. Massive investments have been made in reservist training. And companies like **Giraitė** have received ambitious industrial mandates to contribute to the alliance's arsenal.

This transformation is not accidental. It reflects a deliberate strategy by **Vilnius** to no longer be merely a recipient of collective security but to become an active contributor — and therefore a valued partner rather than a burden to protect. **Giraitė's** anti-drone munitions, exports to **Sweden, France, Denmark** and soon others, are concrete manifestations of this strategy. Every signed contract strengthens Lithuania's position as an indispensable alliance partner — a more solid security guarantee than any diplomatic declaration.

### The Baltic Defence Model — A Lesson for Europe

The three **Baltic states** have since 2022 developed a remarkably coherent national defence model. They have raised their defence budgets to levels that few NATO nations reach. They have developed their doctrines of **total territorial defence**, integrating civilians and military in systematic preparation for resistance. They have invested in specialized defence industrial capacities — anti-drone munitions in Lithuania, cyber-defence in Estonia, secure communications equipment in Latvia. And they have maintained **remarkable political consistency** in their support for Ukraine and their analysis of the Russian threat, when other European nations were wavering.

This model should inspire European nations far larger and far richer. **France**, **Germany**, **Italy** have incomparably larger defence budgets — but have shown strategic hesitations and execution delays that the **Baltic states** could not afford given their direct exposure to the threat. Sometimes geographic necessity is the best teacher of strategy. And Lithuania, with its **€2 anti-drone munitions**, teaches us that a country's size does not determine the relevance of its defensive innovation.

*The Baltic states look at the map and see Russia a few dozen kilometers away. No abstract geopolitical speeches needed to understand the threat. This physical proximity to the threat creates a strategic clarity that more distant nations struggle to achieve. Europe would do well to start listening more to Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn — and less to capitals that can still afford the luxury of ambiguity.*

## NATO Compatibility — The Key to the Lithuanian Solution's Scalability

### Why Compatibility With NATO Standard Calibers Is a Decisive Advantage

One of **Giraitė's** anti-drone munition's most important assets is its **compatibility with NATO standard calibers** — **5.56mm and 7.62mm**. This means no NATO country needs to acquire new weapons to use these munitions. Every assault rifle, every light or heavy machine gun in service in the alliance can fire these cartridges without modification. This is a considerable logistical and economic advantage for large-scale adoption by allied armies.

In the **NATO** ecosystem, caliber standardization is an absolute priority to guarantee **interoperability** between different member forces. NATO nations that use anti-drone munitions in proprietary calibers would face catastrophic logistical problems in combined operations. **Giraitė's** decision to rely on **5.56mm and 7.62mm** calibers is therefore strategically astute: it maximizes the potential market (all NATO armies) and simplifies operational adoption (no additional weapons training required). This is engineering in service of alliance strategy.

### Implications for NATO Group Purchasing — An Opportunity to Seize

If **Giraitė's** anti-drone munition is technically validated by several NATO members, there is a strong logic for a **group purchase at alliance level**. Precedents exist: NATO has already organized collective purchases for certain types of equipment, particularly through the **NSPA** (NATO Support and Procurement Agency). An NSPA contract for **Giraitė's** anti-drone munitions would generate even greater economies of scale on the unit price, guarantee **Giraitė** visibility on its demand that would facilitate scale-up investments, and standardize the close-range anti-drone response in all allied armies.

This NATO group contract opportunity is probably already in the ongoing diplomatic and industrial discussions. Negotiations with the **Czech Republic, Estonia, Belgium, Israel, and Denmark** mentioned in sources could form the basis of a buyers' coalition large enough to justify formalization through **NSPA**. If this materializes, **Giraitė** would transition from a Lithuanian national producer to a NATO-certified supplier — a considerable industrial status change that would open even broader markets.

*NATO bulk-buying Lithuanian anti-drone munitions at €2 per unit — that is an image I would have liked to see five years ago. Today it is possible. It is in the pipeline. And if it materializes, it will prove something important: small nations with great ideas can nourish collective defence. The alliance is only as strong as its most innovative members, not only its largest.*

## The Future of Anti-Drone Warfare — What the Lithuanian Munition Foreshadows

### The Technological Race Between Drones and Countermeasures — Where Do We Actually Stand?

**Giraitė's** anti-drone munition is a response to the drone threat of **2022–2026**. But drones evolve rapidly. **Inertial navigation** systems independent of GPS are becoming more accessible, making GPS jamming less effective. Drones equipped with **onboard cameras and AI** can avoid obstacles in real time. More resistant composite materials can make drones harder to neutralize through munition fragments. The legitimate question is therefore: what will be the operational lifespan of **Giraitė's** solution before adversaries adapt their drones to resist it?

This is the reality of every **technological race** in defence: today's solutions become tomorrow's vulnerabilities if innovation is not continuous. **Giraitė** and its industrial partners must already be planning the **next generations** of anti-drone munitions, anticipating the technological evolutions of adversary drones. The Ukrainian lesson is here as well relevant: the actors who survive in this war are not those with the best technology at a given moment, but those who innovate most quickly and continuously. Lithuania has shown it can innovate fast. It must now show it can do so continuously.

### Future Required Investments — Beyond 5.56mm and 7.62mm Munitions

To maintain its relevance in the anti-drone domain, **Giraitė** and the Lithuanian government will need to invest in next-generation solutions. **Remote-controlled anti-drone munitions** — projectiles that can adjust their trajectory after firing — are a technological pathway under development in several countries. **Integrated detection-identification-neutralization systems** — combining radar, AI, and munition in a complete portable solution — represent the horizon of front-line anti-drone defence. **Portable low-power lasers** for neutralizing drones at very short range could complement or replace munitions-based solutions.

The European **EDIP ecosystem** and NATO funding must support this development. Lithuania cannot alone finance the development of the next generation of anti-drone defence for the entire alliance. But it can design and produce these solutions if it has adequate funding. This is precisely the model of **specialization and collective financing** that the **European Union** and **NATO** must institutionalize to fully exploit the innovation capacities of their smaller but most motivated members.

*The drone war is not over. It is beginning. What we see in Ukraine — Iranian Shaheds, Ukrainian FPVs, modified Russian DJIs — is the prehistory of what drone warfare will be in ten years. Lithuania is right to build its capacities now, while the rules of the game are still relatively simple. In ten years, these €2 munitions may be outdated. But the industrial ecosystem, the knowledge, the partnerships forged — those will last.*

## Conclusion: Lithuania, Global Laboratory of Accessible Anti-Drone Defence

### A Reproducible Model for All of NATO

**Giraitė's** initiative is, at its scale, a model of defence industrial policy: identify an uncovered operational need (**low-cost short-range drone neutralization**), develop a solution compatible with existing standards (**NATO 5.56mm and 7.62mm calibers**), test it drawing on the direct lessons of the war in Ukraine, produce it at a revolutionary cost (**€2 per round**), and market it to qualified allies. Each step in this process is reproducible by other nations, other industrialists, for other unmet needs.

**Giraitė's** real innovation may not be the munition itself — remarkable as it is. It is the **process** that produced it. A process centered on real field needs, rapid in execution, compatible with alliance constraints, and focused on economic accessibility. If **NATO** and the **EU** can institutionalize this process at scale — financing dozens of similar initiatives in member nations of all sizes — collective European defence will be incomparably stronger than if it limits itself to a handful of multi-billion programs developed over decades.

### A Call to Ambition — Amplifying the Lithuanian Model

The **5 million anti-drone rounds per year** targeted by **Giraitė** are an honorable industrial objective. But at the scale of **NATO's** needs as a whole — 32 members with millions of soldiers — it is still a drop in the ocean. The alliance needs **ten, twenty Giraitės** to emerge in different member countries, each specialized in a specific anti-drone defence niche. Short-range dispersal munitions manufacturers. Producers of portable GPS jamming systems. Designers of rapidly deployable anti-drone nets. Innovators of low-power lasers for silent neutralization.

This diversity of approaches and specializations — financed by common programs like **EDIP** and **NSPA** group contracts — is the systemic response to the drone problem in the European collective defence context. **Lithuania** has shown the way with **€2** per round and **5 million units per year**. It remains for Europe as a whole to have the humility and clarity to learn from this example and amplify it to the scale of the real threat.

*Two euros. Five million units per year. A factory in the Kaunas district. This alone will not save Ukraine nor definitively discourage Putin. But it is a signal. The signal that Europe is waking up, small piece by small piece, innovation by innovation. And if enough of these small pieces assemble quickly enough, the overall picture will change. I hope we have the time. I hope we find the will. Ukraine, for its part, does not have the luxury of hoping — it acts. Let us draw inspiration from that.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [UA News — Lithuania begins production of anti-drone munitions — June 2026](https://ua.news/en/world/u-litvi-pochali-vipusk-protidronovikh-patroniv)

- [Brussels Times — EU prepares €165M defence boost to modernise munitions production lines — 2026](https://www.brusselstimes.com/2197057/eu-prepares-e165m-defence-boost-to-modernise-munitions-production-lines)

- [EU Perspectives — Paris saw the future of defence: can Europe keep pace? — June 2026](https://euperspectives.eu/2026/06/paris-saw-the-future-of-defence-can-europe-keep-pace/)

### Secondary sources

- [Euro-SD — Niewiadow/PGM: building Europe's next 40mm ammunition hub — June 2026](https://euro-sd.com/2026/06/sponsored-content/51236/niewiadow-polska-grupa-militarna-building-europes-next-40-mm-ammunition-hub-and-a-new-pillar-of-nato-security/)

- [Industry Alarm — Niewiadow/PGM deepens 155mm ammunition production with French partner — 2026](https://industryalarm.eu/polands-niewiadow-pgm-deepens-155-mm-ammunition-production-with-french-partner/)

- [Debug Lies Intel — European defence industrial surge: munitions boom amid rearm initiatives — June 2026](https://www.debugliesintel.com/european-defence-industrial-surge-munitions-boom-amid-rearm-initiatives/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-lituanie-des-munitions-anti-drone-a-2-euros-l-unite-pour-tenir-le-cie