# EXPLAINER: 60 economies in Trump's crosshairs — forced labor and Chinese overcapacity

> On June 2, 2026, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer announced a proposal for new tariffs striking 60 economies — virtually all

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-23
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-les-60-economies-dans-le-viseur-de-trump-entre-travail-force-et-surca

## Introduction: A tariff wall rebuilt brick by brick

### When the Supreme Court forces Trump to reinvent himself

On **June 2, 2026**, U.S. Trade Representative (**USTR**) Jamieson Greer announced a proposal for new tariffs striking **60 economies** — virtually all of the United States' significant trading partners — at rates of **10% or 12.5%**, citing their collective failure to prohibit or enforce bans on imports made with **forced labor**. This did not come out of nowhere: it is the meticulous counterattack of an administration forced, since the Supreme Court's February 2026 ruling invalidating IEEPA tariffs, to rebuild its trade arsenal on stronger legal foundations — **Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974**, that proven old weapon courts have never managed to neutralize.

The scope is staggering: according to the **Bloomberg Tariffs Tracker**, these 60 economies represent **more than 99% of American imports**. In other words, Trump is not targeting a few rogue states — he is targeting the entire planet, with surgical precision across two distinct categories: those that have laws against forced labor but do not enforce them (**10%**), and those that do not even have such laws (**12.5%**). The rhetoric is clever. The mechanism, formidable.

### The legal context: rebuilding the wall

The Supreme Court had struck hard in February 2026, ruling unconstitutional the "Liberation Day" tariffs based on emergency economic powers. Trump, forced to fall back on a 10% tariff under Section 122 — a mechanism limited to **150 days**, expiring on **July 24, 2026** — needed durable solutions before that deadline. The Section 301 investigations launched in March 2026 were designed precisely to fill that legal void. According to **Reuters**, Greer had himself announced his intention to present "potential options" to Trump before the expiration, targeting in particular industrial overcapacity, forced labor, and unfair trade practices.

*I'll admit it: at first, I found this tariff dance exhausting — a permanent escalation, an interminable standoff. But digging into the legal mechanics, I understood something. This is not chaos. It is a deliberate, methodical reconstruction of a trade pressure system that the courts had temporarily dismantled. The brutality of the method is debatable. The strategic objective deserves to be taken seriously.*

## The list of 60 economies: a revealing cast

### Two speeds, two justifications

The architecture of the new tariffs is built on a binary logic. In the first group, subject to the **10%** rate, are **Canada, Mexico, the European Union, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Argentina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala**, and others. These countries have prohibitions on importing goods produced with forced labor, or have made commitments under free trade agreements — but the USTR found their **enforcement insufficient**. In the second group, struck at **12.5%**, are the remaining 46 countries: **China, Brazil, India, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Vietnam, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Turkey**, and dozens of others. Their common offense: having no effective legislation against imports made with forced labor.

This classification is not trivial. According to an analysis by the law firm **Miller Chevalier**, based on the Federal Register notice, the USTR explicitly acknowledges that some partners like Canada or the United Kingdom have laws — the British **Modern Slavery Act** being regularly cited as an example — but considers them insufficiently enforced in practice. It is a legally precarious but politically powerful posture: it allows striking close allies without having to accuse them of active complicity with forced labor.

### The exemptions that speak volumes

Equally revealing are the **exemptions set out in Annex A** of the proposal. Products already subject to **Section 232** tariffs — that is, steel, aluminum, and copper — would be exempt from this new tariff layer, to prevent unmanageable stacking. **USMCA-compliant** goods from Canada and Mexico would also benefit from exemptions. But Miller Chevalier notes an important gap: unlike the Section 122 tariffs, this proposal does not provide the same exemptions for certain Chapter 98 customs codes allowing duty-free imports, notably agricultural provisions. It is precisely these technical details that make the difference between a symbolic measure and a genuine supply chain shock.

*There is something ironic about the European Union — self-proclaimed champion of social rights and decent work — finding itself in the same basket as authoritarian regimes, even if at a lower rate. It is not entirely unjust: the European ban on imports of goods made with forced labor does not take effect until December 2027. Trump is not inventing anything here. He is pointing to a real inconsistency, even if his methods grate.*

## The forced labor rhetoric: political weapon or documented reality?

### An investigation conducted since March 2026

The USTR's formal investigation into forced labor in 60 economies was launched on **March 12, 2026**, the day after the parallel investigations into industrial overcapacity. The legal basis — Section 301 — authorizes the U.S. government to impose trade sanctions against any country whose practices are deemed "unjustifiable" or "unreasonable" and that harm American trade. The USTR's conclusion is clear: countries that allow the importation of goods produced with forced labor **distort global market conditions** by permitting these goods to enter international trade at artificially low costs. In doing so, they disadvantage American companies that comply with stricter — and therefore more expensive — social standards.

The 98-page report produced by the USTR is a serious document. It carefully distinguishes between countries that have adopted prohibitions but do not enforce them (**Canada, the EU, Mexico, Pakistan** are cited by name) and those that have adopted no restrictions at all. This legal granularity lends relative credibility to the approach — even if, as Greer himself stated according to **Axios**, the political objective is clear: "It is unacceptable that our major trading partners have taken no action against the importation of goods made with forced labor."

### China at the center: state-maintained overcapacity

**China** is cited in both simultaneous investigations: that on forced labor (at 12.5%) and that on structural overcapacity, launched the same month against **16 economies**. It is in this second track that the mechanics of Chinese industrial dominance are most thoroughly documented. The USTR's Federal Register notice lists for China: **electronic equipment, machinery, automobiles, plastics, steel articles, toys, textiles, optical products, lithium-ion batteries, polyethylene terephthalate, ships, aluminum, and electric vehicles** — a near-exhaustive list of the global manufacturing economy.

*Is the American rhetoric on forced labor entirely sincere? Of course not. It also serves to work around court decisions. But that does not make it false. Forced labor in Xinjiang is documented by dozens of independent organizations. Chinese overcapacity in steel, aluminum, and semiconductors is a measurable reality. One can criticize the pretext without denying the substance.*

## Industrial overcapacity: the heart of the problem

### Sixteen economies targeted, a precise argument

In parallel with the forced labor tariffs, the USTR launched on **March 11, 2026** a separate investigation into **structural overcapacity and manufacturing overproduction** in 16 economies: **China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India**. The targeted sectors cover 22 industrial value chains: steel, aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, glass, machine tools, robotics, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, transportation equipment, and many others.

The USTR's operational definition of overcapacity is precise: production capacities "decoupled from market signals — supply, demand, investment — and sustained by subsidies, suppressed wages, state-owned enterprises engaging in non-commercial behavior, persistent market access barriers, insufficient environmental and social protections, subsidized loans, and regressive monetary practices." This definition targets **the Chinese model directly**, even when applied to other countries.

### Steel: a symptomatic sector

Steel is the archetypal example of Chinese overcapacity. According to **Reuters**, China produced **961 million tons of steel in 2025**, representing more than half of global output — while its domestic demand collapsed with the real estate crisis. Chinese steel exports hit **records in 2025** despite growing trade barriers, according to Reuters. China may announce capacity reduction plans — its NDRC published new guidelines in March 2026 — but the World Steel Association warned that "there is no practical short-term solution." Overcapacity is structurally embedded in the local economy: closing a steel plant in China means touching jobs, entire municipalities, regional banks.

*I long underestimated the scale of this structural problem. When China exports 120 million tons of steel per year while being subsidized at every stage — electricity, land, credit — it is not engaging in trade. It is engaging in geopolitics. And the United States, by imposing tariffs, is not engaging in primitive protectionism. It is defending itself against a systemic distortion that the market alone cannot correct.*

## Aluminum: record production, global shock

### China at its historical maximum

In aluminum, the situation is even more tense. In May 2026, **Bloomberg** reported that Chinese daily aluminum production had reached an **all-time record of 129,000 tons per day**, driven by record margins and a global shortage linked to the Iran conflict. In January 2026, China's statistical bureau had already confirmed that annual 2025 production reached **45.02 million tons**, a historical record, rising each year since the start of the decade, according to **Bloomberg**. At the same time, China was cutting its growth targets for nonferrous metals — from 5% to 1.5% per year for 2025–2026 — under pressure from domestic surpluses.

The paradox is striking: China produces more aluminum than the planet needs, at a moment when global prices are kept artificially high by other factors. The Trump administration responded by actively encouraging American reindustrialization: **Century Aluminum** and **Emirates Global Aluminum** announced in 2026 the construction of a **new aluminum smelter in Oklahoma** — the first in the United States in decades, according to the White House.

### Semiconductors: the battle of the century

The case of **semiconductors** is of a different nature. Here, overcapacity is not yet the central problem: it is **American dependence** on foreign suppliers. In January 2026, a presidential proclamation on semiconductors noted that the United States produced only **10% of the chips it consumed**, while representing approximately a quarter of global demand. **Taiwan** and **China** are at the top of the list of economies targeted by the overcapacity investigation in semiconductors. The USTR noted that Taiwan's semiconductor sector rests on extraordinary industrial concentration, while China is massively investing in state-subsidized production capacity for intermediate-level chips.

*Semiconductors are the sinew of war — literally. Not a single modern weapons system, not a smart power grid, not a critical infrastructure that does not depend on these components. When Trump imposes 25% tariffs on certain imported chips and launches investigations into Taiwanese and Chinese overcapacity, he touches the very heart of Western technological sovereignty. The method is clumsy. The stakes are existential.*

## The European reaction: between stated solidarity and defended interests

### The Turnberry agreement under threat

The European Union found itself in a delicate position. On one hand, it "fully shares" American concerns about forced labor — the European Commission itself adopted a regulation prohibiting imports of goods produced with forced labor, even if it does not take effect until **December 2027**. On the other, it considers that the proposed tariffs violate the **Turnberry agreement** negotiated in July 2025, which had set a ceiling of **15% on most goods**. The Commission was explicit: it expects the United States to "fully respect the terms" of that agreement, and warned it would respond "with firmness and proportionality" to any tariff violating that commitment, according to **Bloomberg**.

Jamieson Greer attempted to reassure, declaring on June 4, 2026 that "a deal's a deal" for economies that had negotiated tariff ceilings, according to **Bloomberg**. But the ambiguity remains: Trump trade agreements are **non-binding frameworks**, as Axios reminds us, and new Section 301 actions are expected. The EU is in a race against the clock: either it sufficiently strengthens its enforcement of anti-forced-labor law before the hearings scheduled for **July 7, 2026**, or it finds itself struck at 10% on a market where it exports hundreds of billions of dollars.

### The United Kingdom and Canada: allies in the crosshairs

The **United Kingdom** reacted with relative equanimity, pointing out that its **Modern Slavery Act** already constitutes a robust legal framework. A government spokesperson indicated that British companies' preferential access to the American market "remains unchanged" under the bilateral trade agreement currently under negotiation, according to **The Guardian**. **Canada**, for its part, is in a more paradoxical situation: cited in the USTR report as having theoretically adopted a prohibition on forced labor imports, but judged insufficient in its enforcement. Ottawa thus inherits a 10% tariff — the lowest, but symbolically significant in the context of already highly strained Canada-U.S. trade tensions.

*There is something deeply uncomfortable about seeing Canada, Australia, or Norway placed in the same package as authoritarian regimes — even at a lower tariff rate. These are democracies, reliable partners, NATO allies. But realpolitik does not bother with nuance: Trump needs a global lever, and these universal tariffs are that lever. The discomfort does not mean total injustice.*

## China under double pressure: forced labor and overcapacity

### Beijing on both lists

**China** is the only major economy to appear simultaneously in both Section 301 investigations — forced labor (12.5%) and structural overcapacity (rate to be determined). This is where the American strategy reveals its deep coherence. Not only does Beijing have no prohibition on importing goods made with forced labor — placing it ipso facto in the 12.5% category — but its key manufacturing sectors (steel, aluminum, semiconductors, electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries) are judged to be structurally distorted by massive state subsidies. The USTR's overcapacity report is particularly detailed on China, citing its **overseas production and distribution network** as an additional vector of global distortion.

**China** recorded a trade surplus of **$1.189 trillion in 2025**, according to **The Guardian** — a sum comparable to Saudi Arabia's GDP. That surplus is the product of an economic model in which investment exceeds the global average by **20 points of GDP**, while domestic consumption falls short by as much. The result is inevitable: excess production, massive low-price exports, and the destruction of manufacturing capacity in competing countries. According to economists cited by **Reuters**, this model is fundamentally "decoupled from market demand."

### Beijing pushes back, but the numbers speak

China promised to reduce its overcapacity in steel and oil refining in the **NDRC annual report in March 2026**, as reported by **Reuters**. But as that same source notes, the reform commitments are less specific than in previous cycles. According to World Steel Association Director General Edwin Basson, "there is no practical short-term solution": Chinese steelmaking is too embedded in the local economy to be restructured quickly. In the meantime, **Chinese steel exports in 2025 reached a record 119.02 million tons**, according to Reuters — a 7.5% increase — despite growing trade barriers everywhere.

*I have no illusions about Beijing. This is not a market economy that went wrong — it is a state capitalist system designed precisely to maximize global market share at the expense of common rules of the game. When Trump says he is fighting "Chinese overcapacity," I often listen with skepticism. But the numbers — a trillion-dollar surplus, steel export records despite declared overproduction — force an uncomfortable honesty.*

## Impact on global supply chains

### 99% of American imports affected

With **99% of American imports** covered by the 60 targeted economies, the impact on supply chains is structural. International trade lawyer Augustine Lo, quoted by **Axios**, warned as early as June 3, 2026 that some importers might seek to "front-load or advance their imports to hedge against uncertainty." This anticipation creates its own distortions: bottlenecks at ports, inventory pressures, rising transportation costs. The public comment period — with a hearing set for **July 7, 2026** — offers an adjustment window, but markets do not wait.

For sectors as interconnected as **electronics**, **automobiles**, or **semiconductors**, the implications are immediate. The USTR's note on semiconductor overcapacity specifically targets **Taiwan** — whose TSMC produces the bulk of the world's most advanced chips — and **Malaysia**, a hub for chip assembly and testing. For American automakers sourcing components in **Mexico** (itself on the 10% list), the question of USMCA compliance becomes central: USMCA-compliant goods would be exempt, but the line between compliance and non-compliance is complex to establish.

### The textile mechanism: an interesting precedent

A lesser-known aspect of the USTR proposal deserves attention: the **textile mechanism**. The USTR proposes that a certain volume of textile and apparel imports benefit from a reduced rate, in exchange for reciprocity on American fiber exports to those countries. This mechanism — if adopted — would constitute a precedent for other sectors. The USTR explicitly requests opinions on whether a similar mechanism should be considered for other industries. That is an important signal: even in an administration with a protectionist reputation, there are margins for sectoral negotiation that can soften the impact on supply chains of good-faith allies.

*What I observe in the reactions of American importers is a form of tariff fatigue. Not the anger of the early Trump years, but a strategic weariness — the feeling of permanently navigating regulatory uncertainty. That may be the most underestimated cost of this policy: not the tariff itself, but the systemic unpredictability it generates, which paralyzes investment decisions long before they are felt at customs.*

## The overcapacity investigation: what has not yet been decided

### Sixteen economies in waiting

While the forced labor tariffs were formally proposed on June 2, 2026, the **structural overcapacity investigation** covering 16 economies — launched on March 11 — is still ongoing at the time of writing. According to **Bloomberg Economics**, a tariff proposal could emerge "as early as this week" — suggesting an imminent acceleration. For Greer, the logic is clear: "We will certainly be presenting the president with options if these investigations show what we think they might show, namely that there is an enormous overcapacity problem in China and other countries," he said on **CBS Face the Nation** on May 17, 2026.

The stakes are considerable. The 16 targeted economies represent approximately **75% of American imports**, according to Bloomberg. For China specifically, the question of **Section 301 tariff stacking** is thorny: new overcapacity tariffs would add to existing forced labor tariffs, themselves on top of previous Section 301 tariffs. Miller Chevalier notes it remains "unclear" how these layers stack. China already faces American customs duties of **47.5%**, according to The Guardian — above the viability threshold for most Chinese exporters.

### The singular case of Singapore

**Singapore** is a fascinating case study in the overcapacity investigation. The city-state contested the American trade data as early as March 2026, claiming it actually had a **trade deficit** with the United States — not the surplus Washington attributes to it, according to **Bloomberg**. The USTR nevertheless targets its semiconductor, electronics, petrochemical, and pharmaceutical sectors, noting that its **industrial utilization rate** and manufacturing capacity raise questions. Singapore is a regional hub, not a producer in the Chinese sense — but in the American logic of supply chain reconfiguration, even logistics nodes are now targets.

*Singapore on the overcapacity list — that is where the American rhetoric starts to lose its coherence. Singapore is not China. It is a rule-of-law state, a strategic ally in the Pacific, a market democracy. Including it in a "Chinese-style" industrial overcapacity investigation reflects either an analytical error or a deliberate intention to use these investigations as a generalized negotiating lever. Those are not the same thing — and it needs to be said.*

## Working around the courts: Section 301 as legal shield

### A weapon courts have never managed to bring down

The Trump administration's legal strategy deserves analysis in its own right. After its IEEPA tariffs were struck down by the Supreme Court in February 2026, Trump did not resign himself — he pivoted. **Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974** is far more legally robust: it has survived all challenges since the 1980s, including before international tribunals. Greer was explicit: "These investigations could act as a tool for enforcing recent trade agreements," he told Bloomberg Television. That is a sophisticated procedural use: deploying Section 301 investigations not only to impose new tariffs but to **compel partners to honor their bilateral commitments**.

This approach has a historical precedent. The Section 301 tariffs against China initiated under the Obama administration and then reinforced under Trump I (2018–2019) survived all domestic legal challenges. A WTO panel did find them unlawful, but Washington blocked the appeals mechanism by refusing to appoint new judges. The **legal durability** of this weapon is now proven — which explains why the Trump 2.0 administration has made it its central trade instrument.

### The July 24, 2026 countdown

The deadline of **July 24, 2026** is the true metronome of this entire sequence. On that day, the temporary tariffs of **10–15%** imposed under Section 122 automatically expire. Without congressional legislation to extend them — and Congress, even a Republican one, is not enthusiastic about transferring tariff powers to the executive — the administration absolutely must have finalized its Section 301 tariffs before that date to maintain continuous tariff pressure. According to **Bloomberg**, the forced labor tariffs are designed precisely to "ensure there is no gap in tariffs upon the expiration" of Section 122.

*This countdown mechanic reminds me of emergency military deployments: building the permanent legal base while the temporary base still holds. There is a certain strategic cleverness in this approach — even if it also reveals that Trump never had the legal foundation he believed he had in 2025. That should invite some humility about the solidity of the future Section 301 tariffs themselves.*

## Impact on Asian allies: Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Vietnam

### Export-dependent economies under pressure

**Taiwan** appears in **both Section 301 investigations**: forced labor (10%) and semiconductor overcapacity. For an economy whose prosperity depends almost entirely on exporting chips to the United States, that is considerable pressure. **South Korea** is in the 12.5% category for forced labor, and in the overcapacity investigation for its steel, ships, chemicals, and semiconductors. **Japan** is also struck at 12.5% and cited for its automotive sector — particularly for what the USTR calls "firms continuing to operate without being profitable," a direct reference to Japanese industry's practice of preserving employment at any cost.

**Vietnam** deserves special mention. Cited in the overcapacity investigation for its electronics, footwear, textiles, and steel — as well as for **currency undervaluation** and **foreign exchange market intervention** — Vietnam is on the front line of both tariff shocks. It was precisely Vietnam that had most benefited from industrial relocations from China in the wake of the 2018–2019 trade war. Section 122 had provided a temporary reprieve, Axios recalls. That reprieve is ending.

### The strategic disconnect: when allies pay the price of anti-China firmness

There is a fundamental contradiction in the American strategy: targeting economies like Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan — crucial military allies, partners in defense supply chains — with the same tools used against China. That approach risks undermining precisely the industrial and technological partnerships that the United States seeks to consolidate against Beijing. According to **Foreign Policy**, the Trump administration launched its overcapacity investigations in March 2026 targeting notably countries whose trade surpluses with the United States reflect past American offshoring decisions — not deliberate market distortions.

*Here is the dilemma I cannot resolve: Trump is right on the substance — Chinese overcapacity is a real threat, forced labor distorts global markets, action was needed. But the method — striking everyone with the same stick — risks alienating allies who are precisely those needed to form a united front against Beijing. Firmness, yes. Strategic indifference to alliances, no.*

## Next steps: hearings, adjustments, probable escalation

### The comment period as a last chance

In accordance with Section 301 procedures, the tariffs proposed on June 2, 2026, are **not yet finalized**. A 30-day public comment period was opened, with a **public hearing set for July 7, 2026**. Stakeholders — importers, industries, foreign governments — can suggest modifications to the scope of the action: removal or retention of certain customs codes in Annex A, parameters of the textile mechanism, sectoral exemptions. According to Miller Chevalier, the probable effective date is set for **July 24, 2026**, in perfect synchronization with the expiration of Section 122 tariffs.

For companies and foreign governments, these 30 days constitute a critical window. Several countries — particularly within the EU — have already signaled their intention to make their case at the hearings, highlighting their forced labor legislation. The **European Parliament** has adopted its anti-forced-labor regulation, even if its application comes after the American deadline. Jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, which already have laws in force, have solid factual arguments for obtaining an exemption or reduction.

### The overcapacity investigation: the next shock

Simultaneously, the overcapacity investigation into 16 economies must produce its conclusions in the coming months. For **China**, the implications are heaviest: additional specific tariffs on steel, aluminum, semiconductors, electric vehicles, and batteries would stack on top of the 47.5% already in place. The U.S.-China truce agreement expires "in the fall of 2026," according to Axios — meaning the coming months could see a **major new escalation** of the trade war. Bloomberg Economics anticipates that the new overcapacity measures could affect **75% of additional American imports**, well beyond the 60 economies already targeted by the forced labor tariffs.

*What concerns me most in this sequence is the invisible cumulative effect. Tariff by tariff, investigation by investigation, the world fragments into increasingly sealed commercial blocs. That is not inherently bad — some decoupling from China is strategically necessary. But when you also fragment supply chains with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, you are destroying precisely the industrial resilience that the tariffs were supposed to build.*

## The grand American narrative: reindustrialization or illusion?

### Spectacular announcements, real timelines

Behind the tariff mechanics lies an ambition: **American reindustrialization**. The White House announced in June 2026 that more than **4 million tons** of new American steelmaking capacity will come online in the next two years, in states like West Virginia, Arkansas, and South Carolina. New aluminum smelters and massive investments in copper are also underway. According to the White House white paper, the United States became in 2025 the **third largest steel producer in the world**, thanks to Section 232 tariffs. That trajectory is real.

But the timelines of heavy industry are not those of trade policy. Building an aluminum smelter takes years, not months. Training skilled steelworkers, building domestic raw material supply chains — all of that takes a decade, not a presidential term. Tariffs create incentives; they do not create factories. In the interim, it is American consumers and manufacturers who pay the difference between global prices depressed by Chinese overcapacity and the protected prices in the American domestic market.

### China adapts, redirects, resists

The great lesson of the first Trump trade war (2018–2019) is that **China does not capitulate**. It adapts. Its trade surplus in 2025 — the first to exceed one trillion dollars — illustrates this paradoxical resilience: American tariffs channeled Chinese exports toward other markets (Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia), without globally reducing their volume. Beijing launched 20 free trade agreements currently under negotiation, according to Reuters, precisely to reduce its dependence on the American market. Chinese companies are building **overseas production networks** — notably in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand — to circumvent American tariffs. Section 301 closes those escape routes one by one. But Beijing keeps opening new ones.

*I watch this trade war as one would watch an asymmetric boxing match: Trump hits hard, improvising the rules in real time, with fragile but constantly renewed legal protections. China absorbs, dodges, adapts, and plays the long game. In the West, we want results in quarters. In Beijing, they think in decades. That may be the real asymmetry — not economic, but temporal.*

## Conclusion: necessary firmness, methods to refine

### Trump as the necessary evil of the Western trade order

At the end of this analysis, one conclusion emerges with all its complexity: Trump's tariffs on 60 economies are **debatable in their form, but defensible in their substance**. Forced labor genuinely distorts global markets. Chinese overcapacity in steel, aluminum, and semiconductors represents a structural threat to Western industries. And **Section 301**, however brutal in its universal application, is one of the few tools that can withstand legal challenges and produce real pressure on recalcitrant economies. The fact that close allies are affected is not a bug in the system — it is the consequence of an approach that refuses to treat friends and enemies differently on questions of social standards and trade practices.

What remains problematic is **strategic indifference to alliances**. Striking Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, or Australia with the same tools as China, at precisely the moment when these countries are essential to building a Western technological and industrial front against Beijing, is a contradiction the administration has not yet resolved. Firmness is necessary. Discernment between allies and adversaries is equally so.

### What this changes, concretely

For global supply chains, the probable entry into force on **July 24, 2026** of the forced labor tariffs marks a point of no return. Companies sourcing from the 60 targeted economies — that is, virtually all global multinationals — will need to **urgently map** their exposure, identify products eligible for Section 232 exemptions, assess their USMCA or equivalent compliance, and anticipate the possible stacking of overcapacity tariffs from fall 2026. The question is no longer whether Trump's tariff wall will hold legally. Section 301 ensures that. The question is whether the West will be able to coordinate its response to Chinese overcapacity with enough coherence to avoid doing more damage to itself than to Beijing.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Miller Chevalier — Trade Compliance Flash: New forced labor tariffs, what importers should know — June 8, 2026](https://www.millerchevalier.com/publication/trade-compliance-flash-new-forced-labor-tariffs-what-importers-should-know)

- [USTR — Federal Register Notice: Section 301 investigation into structural industrial overcapacity, 16 targeted economies — March 11, 2026](https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2026/USTR%20301%20FRN%20Industrial%20Excess%20Capacity%203-11-26.pdf)

- [White House — Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump updates tariffs on steel, aluminum, and copper imports — June 2, 2026](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/06/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-updates-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-and-copper-imports/)

### Secondary sources

- [The Guardian — Trump threatens 60 trading partners with forced labor tariffs — June 3, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/jun/03/trump-threatens-tariffs-60-countries-forced-labour)

- [Axios — Trump announces new tariffs on trading partners — June 3, 2026](https://www.axios.com/2026/06/03/trade-tariffs-trump-greer)

- [Bloomberg — Trump rebuilds tariff wall citing forced labor — June 3, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-03/us-proposes-broad-tariffs-of-at-least-10-citing-forced-labor)

- [Bloomberg — Greer says deal's a deal for economies with capped U.S. tariffs — June 4, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-04/greer-says-deal-s-a-deal-for-economies-with-capped-us-tariffs)

- [Reuters — China again targets overcapacity in commodity sector — March 5, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-again-targets-overcapacity-commodity-sector-2026-03-05/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-les-60-economies-dans-le-viseur-de-trump-entre-travail-force-et-surca