# DECODING: Japan "Offensive" — Beijing Attacks, Tokyo Responds, the Indo-Pacific Trembles

> On June 22, 2026, the PLA Daily — the official mouthpiece of the People's Liberation Army and one of the rare media outlets whose editorials directly reflect Beijing's military doctrine — published an analysis on Japan's largest annual live-fire exercise. Its conclusion was unamb

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-24
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-le-japon-offensif-pekin-attaque-tokyo-repond-l-indo-pacifique-tremble

## Key takeaways

- The PLA Daily piece, reported by the South China Morning Post, described Japan's exercise as part of an acceleration toward offensive capabilities.
- Japan's December 2022 strategy authorized counter-strike capability, set a 2% of GDP defense budget target by 2027, and included 400 Tomahawk purchases and upgraded Type 12 missiles.
- The author says the "offensive" label ignores Japan's defensive employment doctrine and that Beijing is pursuing a pressure strategy.
- Japanese missile deployments on the Ryukyu islands are described as complicating PLA operations and as a shield for Taiwan.
- Tokyo did not formally respond to the editorial, and the author notes the risk that the Chinese narrative spreads unchallenged.

## Introduction: when Xi Jinping's military mouthpiece sounds the alarm

### The PLA Daily takes aim at Tokyo

On **June 22, 2026**, the **PLA Daily** — the official mouthpiece of the **People's Liberation Army** and one of the rare media outlets whose editorials directly reflect Beijing's military doctrine — published an analysis on Japan's largest annual live-fire exercise. Its conclusion was unambiguous: "Japan's military forces will become more offensive, more dangerous, and more focused on actual combat." And further: Japan "was racing down the road of remilitarization." These formulations are not those of a nervous commentator. They are the formulations of a state propaganda machine officially naming an adversary.

The **PLA Daily** article of **June 22, 2026** — reported by its defense correspondent **Albee Zhang** for the **South China Morning Post** — described the exercise as a demonstration that Japan's weapons and operational methods "symbolize the acceleration of the Self-Defense Forces toward **offensive capabilities** in the context of Japanese military expansion." This is not neutral description. It is a **doctrinal declaration** on what Beijing perceives as a threat under construction.

### Context: Takaichi, Taiwan, and the statement that triggered everything

To understand the ferocity of the **PLA Daily**'s tone, one must trace back to **November 2025**. Japanese Prime Minister **Sanae Takaichi** had declared that Japan could take military action if conflict broke out in the **Taiwan Strait**. Beijing described that statement as "a serious breach of bilateral relations and a challenge to the postwar international order." In June 2026, this antagonism has only intensified, with the Tokyo-Manila negotiations on ZEE delimitation east of Taiwan. The **PLA Daily** is not attacking Japan in the abstract. It is attacking a Japan that, for the first time since 1945, publicly assumes its right to project force in the region.

*When the mouthpiece of a 2-million-man army calls a democratic country "remilitarized" because it conducts live-fire exercises on its own territory, something is profoundly inverted. Japan holds military exercises — legal, transparent, announced. China militarizes artificial reefs and sends its coast guard into neighboring states' waters. And it's Tokyo that's "offensive." This rhetoric is not an opinion. It is a weapon.*

## The live-fire exercise: what Japan demonstrated

### The largest annual Japan Self-Defense Forces exercise

The live-fire exercise that triggered the **PLA Daily**'s reaction is the annual exercise of Japan's **Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF)**, regularly held at the **Higashifuji firing range**, at the foot of Mount Fuji. This exercise involves hundreds of armored vehicles, artillery, and infantry units, and constitutes the main public showcase of Japan's ground military capability. It is open to international observers and media.

What the **PLA Daily** noted in June 2026 is the **qualitative change** in the systems and doctrines demonstrated in the exercise. The emphasis on **long-range strike capabilities**, **ground-to-ground missile systems**, and **force projection exercises** contrasts with the traditional defensive posture of the Self-Defense Forces. This shift reflects a massive doctrinal reorientation of Japan officially launched with the **revised National Security Strategy of December 2022**.

### The 2022 Strategy: the rupture the world didn't notice enough

In **December 2022**, Prime Minister **Fumio Kishida**'s government adopted a **National Security Strategy** that radically redefined Japan's defense posture. For the first time since 1945, Japan officially granted itself the right to a **counter-strike capability** — that is, the ability to strike enemy bases before being attacked, if an attack is considered imminent. This decision represents a break with seven decades of purely defensive doctrine.

Japan also committed to **doubling its defense budget** to reach **2% of GDP by 2027**, roughly **10 trillion yen** per year. It accelerated its purchases of **Tomahawk missiles** from the United States, developed its own long-range missiles, and converted some of its vessels into **light aircraft carriers** capable of operating **F-35Bs**. This is not rhetorical posturing. These are measurable budgetary and operational facts.

*In 2022, when Tokyo announced its new security strategy, much of the West applauded. Finally a serious ally in the Indo-Pacific. And it is precisely that seriousness that terrifies Beijing. A Japan that is no longer symbolically militarized but operationally capable is a fundamentally different problem for the PLA. The transformation is real. And the PLA Daily's reaction is equally so.*

## The "offensive capabilities" doctrine as seen from Beijing

### Offensive or defensive: semantics as a battlefield

The core of the **PLA Daily**'s accusation is that the capabilities Tokyo is developing are "offensive." But this characterization deserves analysis. The long-range missiles Japan is acquiring — including **Tomahawks** and its own derivatives of the **Type 12** — have ranges reaching up to **1,500 kilometers** in their most recent versions. These missiles can indeed strike Chinese territory from Japanese soil. In that very precise sense, they are "offensive."

But the Japanese doctrine that frames them remains fundamentally defensive: these missiles are to be used only for counter-strike operations in the context of an imminent or ongoing attack. The distinction between a defensive weapon and an offensive weapon lies not in the missile — it lies in the employment doctrine. And that is where Beijing plays on semantics: by labeling the weapon offensive, it sidesteps the doctrine and suggests an aggressive intent Tokyo has not explicitly formulated.

### The logic of fear versus the logic of deterrence

There is a genuine tension between two logics in this debate. The Japanese logic says: to deter China from attacking, Japan must be capable of imposing significant military costs. Therefore, long-range missiles are needed. The Chinese logic says: these missiles constitute an offensive threat requiring a response. Therefore, defenses must be increased. And that response reinforces Japan's fear. And that fear reinforces missile acquisition. This is the **security dilemma** in its most classical form.

This dilemma has no simple solution. But understanding that it exists is essential to not be swept away by the **PLA Daily**'s rhetoric. When Beijing says Japan is "offensive," it is not expressing a neutral analysis. It is expressing a **diplomatic pressure strategy** aimed at slowing Japan's military modernization, isolating Tokyo in Asian public opinion, and in turn justifying its own accelerated militarization. This is **geopolitical whataboutism** elevated to the status of state policy.

*The security dilemma is a geopolitical reality. But when China spends approximately 1.4 trillion yuan per year on defense by its own official budgets — and likely far more according to research institution estimates — and reproaches Japan for doubling its budget to reach 2% of GDP, the argument lacks credibility. The disproportion is so glaring it reveals the argument for what it is: a maneuver, not a sincere complaint.*

## The Self-Defense Forces in transformation: figures and reality

### Japan's defense budget: a historic increase

The figures are incontestable. Japan's **defense budget** for fiscal year **2024** stood at approximately **7.9 trillion yen** (roughly **52 billion U.S. dollars**), a **16% increase** from the previous year according to data from Japan's **Ministry of Defense**. The government has charted a trajectory toward **2% of GDP by 2027**, which would represent approximately **80 billion dollars per year**. This doubling over five years is unprecedented in Japan's modern history.

These resources fund the acquisition of **400 Tomahawk missiles** ordered from the United States, the development of extended-range versions of the **Type 12** missile, the conversion of **Izumo and Kaga destroyers** into **F-35B** carriers, and the development of the **Ryukyu Islands** as an advanced deployment zone. Each of these acquisitions responds to a rational analysis of the threat posed by **China's military rise**. Each is legal, transparent, and consistent with Japan's alliance treaties.

### Yonaguni, Miyako, Ishigaki: the Ryukyu defensive chain

One of the most significant transformations of Japan's military posture concerns the **Ryukyu Islands**, the chain of islands stretching between mainland Japan and Taiwan. Ground-to-air and ground-to-ground missile deployments have been carried out on the islands of **Miyako-jima**, **Ishigaki-jima**, and **Yonaguni**. Self-Defense Forces units have been stationed on islands that had no military presence for decades. These deployments transform the Ryukyus into a **defensive deterrence chain** against potential Chinese operations toward Taiwan.

For Beijing, this chain of armed islands is an existential threat to its ability to project its navy toward the western Pacific. The **Ryukyu** waters, regularly used by the **PLA Navy** for deployments to the east, could become significantly more risky with Japanese long-range missiles deployed on surrounding islands. That is the concrete context the **PLA Daily** designates when it talks about "offensive" capabilities.

*I understand Beijing's logic — intellectually. Japanese missiles on Yonaguni genuinely complicate the PLA's naval calculations. But understanding the logic does not mean endorsing it. Japan is a democracy defending itself within the framework of its legal alliances. China is an authoritarian regime militarizing reefs in international waters. These two realities are not equivalent, and presenting them as such is as much an analytical error as a moral failure.*

## The PLA's reaction: escalation, exercises, shows of force

### China's military exercises around Japan

Beijing's response to Japan's military buildup is not limited to **PLA Daily** editorials. The **PLA Navy** has multiplied its exercises and transits in the waters near the Ryukyus. **Carrier strike groups** have regularly used the **Miyako Strait** between Japanese islands to deploy into the western Pacific. These transits, legal under the **law of the sea**, are also capability demonstrations: China can navigate wherever it wants, and Japan sees it.

In **May 2026**, a strike group centered on the aircraft carrier **Shandong** had been deployed in the waters east of the Philippines, according to **ISW** data. This deployment, simultaneous with tensions around Taiwan and Japanese live-fire exercises, created an extremely tense operational environment across the entire Indo-Pacific arc. **The military density in the region has never been this high since the Cold War.**

### The missile race: when technology decides the balance of power

At the heart of China-Japan tensions lies a **missile race** that is redrawing regional balances. China has the **DF-17**, its hypersonic missile, which state media showed launched for the first time during exercises in June 2026. Japan is developing its own long-range missiles, including extended-range versions of the **Type 12** and hypersonic missiles in cooperation with the United States. Both countries are also investing in ballistic and hypersonic missile defenses.

This technological race is particularly worrying because it creates **mutual uncertainties**: neither Tokyo nor Beijing knows precisely where the current capability balance stands. This uncertainty can itself become a source of escalation — if one actor believes it has a window of opportunity, or fears seeing it close, it may be tempted to act before the balance tips against it. That is the classic logic of the **destabilizing arms race**.

*There's something deeply discouraging about this missile race. Not because it's irrational — it isn't, given China's posture. But because it consumes colossal resources that could go toward health, education, climate change. The security bill in the Indo-Pacific is partly the bill for Beijing's expansionist authoritarianism. And that bill is being paid by Japanese, Taiwanese, Australian, and American taxpayers who asked nothing of Xi Jinping.*

## Japan's overseas missile test: a historical precedent

### First long-range "offensive" missile test since World War II

In **May 2026**, Japan conducted its first long-range missile test outside its territory since World War II, according to **South China Morning Post** reports of **May 2026**. This test triggered an immediate condemnation from Beijing, which labeled it a dangerous escalation. China's **Ministry of Defense** demanded that Tokyo "**immediately stop**" activities that threaten regional stability.

This test represents a significant symbolic break. For 80 years, Japan maintained a strictly territorial defense posture, partly due to the constitutional constraints of Article 9 of its pacifist constitution, partly due to the historical memory of its role in World War II. Extending military tests outside national territory signals that this constraint is being progressively lifted, under the combined pressure of the Chinese threat, North Korean pressure, and American demands for a more equitable sharing of the defense burden.

### Article 9 and constitutional reinterpretation: Japan rearms legally

Article 9 of Japan's **1947 Constitution** prohibits Japan from maintaining war-potential armed forces and renounces the right to war as an instrument of national policy. Since 2015, the reinterpretation of this article by the **Abe** government — allowing for "collective self-defense" — opened the door to active participation in military operations with allies. The **2022 Strategy** took a further step by asserting the right to counter-strike capabilities.

These constitutional and doctrinal evolutions are not happening in secret. They are debated in **Japan's Parliament**, covered by the media, submitted to public opinion. That is how a democracy adapts its security policy — transparently, legally, with public debate. Beijing, which knows neither transparency nor public debate in its own military decisions, accuses Tokyo of a militarization that Japan did not initiate.

*The constitutional debate in Japan on Article 9 is one of the most fascinating of our era. A country that inscribed peace in its constitution after committing war crimes, now searching for a security doctrine facing a China that keeps rising in power. This is not irresponsible militarization. It is a democracy honestly trying to reconcile its memory with its security. And that deserves respect, not lectures from Beijing.*

## Implications for Taiwan: Japan as pivot

### Why Japan's rearmament reassures Taipei

From **Taiwan**'s perspective, Japan's military modernization is a structurally good development. A Japan capable of defending its own security and imposing costs on a Chinese offensive toward the Ryukyus reduces the burden resting exclusively on Washington. And a Japan that has explicitly recognized its security is linked to Taiwan's — as Prime Minister **Takaichi** did in November 2025 — is an ally of existential value for Taipei.

Geographically, **northern Taiwan** is less than **200 kilometers** from the Ryukyus. Any major Chinese military operation against Taiwan would necessarily pass through waters and airspace close to Japanese islands. In this context, Japan's ability to project force in those waters is not abstract. It is an operational reality that profoundly complicates PLA calculations for any conflict scenario around Taiwan.

### The Washington-Tokyo-Taipei triangle: a security architecture under construction

The strengthening of cooperation between **Washington**, **Tokyo**, and **Taipei** is one of the most significant developments in the Indo-Pacific since 2022. **Joint exercises**, **intelligence sharing**, and **defense industrial cooperation** among the three actors have multiplied. This triangular architecture is not a formal treaty — Taiwan is not recognized as a state by Washington or Tokyo — but it is increasingly operationally real.

For Beijing, it is this triangular architecture, more than any individual missile, that represents the fundamental threat. An armed but isolated Japan would be manageable. An armed Japan, coordinated with the United States and de facto aligned with Taiwan, represents a considerable strategic obstacle to any forcible seizure of the island. That is precisely why the **PLA Daily** attacks so hard: it aims to shatter the coherence of this architecture before it becomes irreversible.

*I think about this Washington-Tokyo-Taipei triangle and the fragility of its three sides. Washington can change policy. Tokyo can be divided. Taiwan can be subjected to unbearable pressure. Beijing knows this. And its rhetorical aggression against Japan aims precisely to introduce friction into this triangle. The question is whether the three democracies can resist this divisive pressure. The answer is not obvious.*

## Tokyo's reaction to the PLA Daily article

### A calculated silence or a measured response

The Japanese government did not formally respond to the **PLA Daily** article of **June 22, 2026**. This is a deliberate posture: responding to the editorials of the Chinese military's mouthpiece would grant them diplomatic legitimacy Tokyo prefers to deny them. Japan's strategy is to let actions speak rather than declarations — which means continuing to modernize the Self-Defense Forces, reinforce alliances, and exercise legal rights without justifying itself in response to Chinese accusations.

This posture is coherent and professional. But it carries a risk: in the void left by Tokyo, the **PLA Daily**'s narrative spreads without an immediate official counter-narrative. Less well-informed partners in the region may absorb the Chinese message without the Japanese antidote. The **narrative war** is won or lost in third countries, not in capitals that already understand each other.

### The Japanese diaspora and historical memory

The **PLA Daily**'s rhetoric about Japanese "remilitarization" is particularly insidious because it resonates with a real historical memory. Japanese war crimes in China, Korea, and other Asian countries during World War II are a documented historical reality. Beijing exploits this memory to present every Japanese military modernization as the beginning of a return to imperial militarism.

This instrumental exploitation of historical memory must be named clearly. The Japan of 2026 is a liberal democracy, a member of the **UN**, a signatory of all major arms control treaties, with a Parliament that debates every budget line. The comparison with Imperial Japan of 1937 is not an analysis. It is propaganda. And democracies that grant it credibility without critical examination are playing Beijing's game.

*Historical memory is sacred. The crimes of Japanese imperialism are real and documented. But Beijing invoking this memory to discredit a modern democracy and its legitimate defensive alliances is also an exploitation of memory. This is not doing justice to the victims of imperialism. It is using them as a shield to advance its own imperial ambitions. That distinction deserves to be made.*

## The future of China-Japan relations: toward a structural freeze?

### De-escalation mechanisms: rare and fragile

Despite tensions, **military communication mechanisms** between China and Japan exist. A **maritime and air communications mechanism** was established in **2018** to prevent accidental incidents. Meetings between senior military officials take place periodically. These channels are valuable — an unmanaged incident in the densely militarized waters around the Ryukyus could rapidly escalate into a major crisis.

But trust between the two countries has only eroded since 2022. **Takaichi**'s statements, Japan's missile acquisitions, Chinese operations around Taiwan, and **PLA Daily** provocations create a dynamic of mutual suspicion that makes de-escalation mechanisms less effective. **Communication channels not used in good faith do not reduce incident risk — they mask it.**

### The role of economic diplomacy: a constraint eroding

China remains Japan's **top trading partner**, with exchange volumes exceeding **300 billion dollars per year** in **2024** according to Japan's **Ministry of Finance** data. This economic interdependence was long presented as a moderating factor in tensions. But technological decoupling, export controls, and the diversification of Japanese supply chains are progressively reducing this moderating factor.

Japan is investing heavily to diversify its sourcing of **rare earths**, **semiconductors**, and **electronic components** — of which it depends on China. This diversification, which will take years, weakens Beijing's economic leverage over Tokyo. As that leverage weakens, the constraints on strategic confrontation between the two countries diminish. That is not good news for regional stability in the short term.

*Economic interdependence has long been the safety net of peace in East Asia. But when one party uses that interdependence as a weapon — threatening to ban rare earth exports, blocking agricultural imports — the net becomes a rope. And a rope can cut. The fact that Japan is working to reduce its economic dependence on China is not irresponsibility. It is strategic wisdom.*

## The Indo-Pacific on the brink of a historic realignment

### The Quad as an alternative architecture

Faced with rising China-Japan tensions, the **Quad** — grouping the **United States**, **Japan**, **Australia**, and **India** — emerges as the primary alternative regional security architecture to Beijing's unilateral domination. Quad meetings have intensified, joint military exercises are multiplying, and technological and industrial cooperation is deepening.

For Japan, the Quad is a strategic framework that complements rather than supplants its bilateral alliance with the United States. It allows Japan to exercise geopolitical influence commensurate with its economic and technological weight, without shouldering a direct confrontation. And for India, an ambivalent but increasingly engaged partner, the Quad represents a mechanism for managing its own relationship with China — with which it shares a contested land border and a recent history of military tensions.

### What the PLA Daily doesn't say: Chinese vulnerability

The **PLA Daily**'s rhetorical aggression toward Japan hides a reality Beijing would rather not reveal: China has its own strategic vulnerabilities. Its **dependence on oil imports** transiting through straits controlled by U.S. allies, its **technological dependence** on advanced semiconductors, its **border tensions** with India, its **internal economic imbalances** linked to the real estate sector and demographics. A rearmed Japan allied with the United States represents an additional constraint on a power that has its own constraints.

This reality does not diminish the danger that authoritarian China represents for the Indo-Pacific. But it nuances the image of an omnipotent power that the **PLA Daily**'s rhetoric seeks to project. **China is a formidable adversary and a structural problem for the international order. It is not invulnerable.** And a rearmed Japan, alongside its democratic allies, is a concrete illustration of this.

*The PLA Daily calls Japan remilitarized. But China spends roughly 2% of its GDP on defense, is building its fourth aircraft carrier, deploying hypersonic missiles, and sending its coast guard into other nations' waters. In this context, the article of June 22, 2026 looks less like a strategic alarm than an awkwardly held mirror. Beijing's rhetoric would have more credibility if it applied first to its own actions.*

## The 2022 National Defense Strategy: historic rupture or inevitable evolution?

### The three strategic documents of December 2022

To understand why the **PLA Daily** article of June 2026 specifically targeted Japan, one must return to the three documents published in **December 2022** by the Kishida government: the **National Security Strategy**, the **National Defense Strategy**, and the **Defense Buildup Plan**. Together, these documents represent the most significant strategic rupture in Japanese security policy since the drafting of **Article 9** of the Constitution in 1947. The National Security Strategy described China as an "unprecedented strategic challenge" and North Korea as a "more serious direct threat than ever." The document formally enshrined the counter-strike capability — what the PLA Daily article will call "**offensive capabilities**" — as a legitimized element of Japan's defense posture.

The **National Defense Strategy** and the **Defense Buildup Plan** translated this conceptual rupture into concrete figures: doubling the defense budget to **2% of GDP by 2027**, acquisition of **400 Tomahawk** long-range missiles, development of extended-range **Type 12 missiles** capable of reaching targets on the Asian continent, and reinforcement of forces in the southwestern islands facing Taiwan. These decisions triggered a predictable reaction from Beijing. In 2022, China protested diplomatically. In 2025 and 2026, it began responding militarily — exercises, incursions into airspace, the PLA Daily article. **The rhetoric followed Japan's capability changes with a three-year lag.**

### The constitutional question: Article 9 and its interpretations

**Article 9** of Japan's Constitution stipulates that Japan "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation." For decades, this provision was interpreted as prohibiting Japan from any military capability beyond strict self-defense. Successive governments maintained this interpretation, creating a paradox: Japan constitutionally prohibited war while maintaining **Self-Defense Forces** that constitute the world's fourth or fifth military power by budget. The reinterpretation of Article 9 by the **Abe government in 2015** had already loosened this constraint by authorizing "collective defense." The **2022** documents took a further step by legitimizing counter-strike capabilities.

Japan's domestic debate on Article 9 is not a technical debate. It reflects a deep tear in Japanese national identity between a pacifist culture rooted in the traumas of **Hiroshima**, **Nagasaki**, and World War II, and a geostrategic reality that makes unilateral pacifism increasingly costly in the face of Xi Jinping's China and Kim Jong-un's North Korea. The **PLA Daily** article strategically fed this internal Japanese debate by brandishing the specter of historical militarism. **Beijing knows the best way to slow Japanese rearmament is not military — it is to reactivate Japan's collective war memories.**

*Article 9. Seventy-nine years of constitutional peace inscribed in the fundamental law of a country. There is something vertiginous about watching Japan negotiate with this text — not to erase it, but to find what it still permits in a world its 1947 drafters hadn't imagined. Xi Jinping prefers a Japan paralyzed by its own principles. That is precisely proof those principles had, and still have, value.*

## Type 12 and Tomahawk missiles: reshaping the geography of power

### The upgraded Type 12 deployment: capabilities and range

At the heart of the **PLA Daily**'s reaction lies a concrete capability reality: Japan is developing and deploying long-range missiles that fundamentally change the regional military calculus. The **Type 12 missile** in its upgraded version — whose development was accelerated since 2022 — goes from a range of **100–200 km** to a target range of **1,000–1,500 km**. At this range, missiles fired from Japan's southwestern islands can reach targets on the Chinese coast, potentially including **Shanghai** and military infrastructure in **Fujian** facing Taiwan. That reality is precisely what the PLA Daily article designated as "**offensive**."

In parallel, the agreement to purchase **400 BGM-109 Tomahawk** missiles from the United States — announced in **2022** and currently being delivered — equips Japan with a precision strike capability at **1,600 km**, with combat-proven operational experience. These missiles would be deployed aboard **Maritime Self-Defense Force** destroyers. Together, the upgraded Type 12 and the Tomahawks create a deterrence capability that did not exist before **2022**. The question is not whether these capabilities are "offensive" or "defensive" — in Japan's counter-strike doctrine, they are both at once.

### China's reaction: between rhetoric and redeployment

Faced with Japan's rearmament, China has responded on two levels. On the rhetorical level, **PLA Daily** articles, **Ministry of Foreign Affairs** statements, and state media commentary have systematically denounced "Japanese militarism," invoking World War II memories. This rhetoric serves a precise function: feeding Japan's internal debate, reassuring Asian publics that fear a rearmed Japan, and creating international diplomatic pressure on Tokyo. On the operational level, China has multiplied incursions into **Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone**, intensified military exercises around the **Taiwan Strait** and the East China Sea, and accelerated the deployment of anti-access/area-denial capabilities targeting precisely Japan's power projection capabilities.

**PLA** exercises in spring and summer **2026** included simulations of blockading Japan's southwestern islands — notably **Okinawa** and the **Ryukyus**. These exercises are not invasion preparations. They are calculated demonstrations: Beijing tells Tokyo that a conflict around Taiwan would automatically isolate Japanese forward positions. **China's response to Japanese rearmament is less rhetorical than operational — and that is precisely what must be read in every Chinese military exercise.**

*400 Tomahawks. Not words in a communiqué. Missiles. Metal tubes filled with precision explosives that can cross 1,600 km in a few hours. When you look at the map — the Japanese islands, the Chinese coasts, Taiwan in between — you understand why Beijing reacted. Not because these missiles are an aggression threat. But because they make Chinese aggression infinitely more costly. And that is exactly their purpose.*

## A free and open Indo-Pacific: an architecture in accelerated construction

### The Quad and its offshoots: from vision to operational

Japan's rearmament response goes beyond national capabilities. It fits within a multilateral security architecture of which Japan has become a central architect. The **Quad** — grouping the **United States, India, Australia, and Japan** — has evolved since its reactivation in **2017** from an informal forum to a structure of substantive cooperation. The **2024 Quad Summit** produced concrete commitments on cybersecurity, maritime surveillance, technology cooperation, and resistance to information operations. Japan carries the Quad as a strategic priority: it is an alliance without formal mutual defense obligations, but with a growing density of interoperability.

In parallel, Japan has signed **Reciprocal Access Agreements** with Australia (2022) and the United Kingdom (2023), allowing cross-military deployments on each other's territories. These agreements allow Japanese forces to deploy to Australia and vice versa — a revolution in Japan's deployment doctrine. Prime Minister Kishida's visit to Washington in **2024** produced a significant strengthening of the **U.S.-Japan alliance** with deeper integration of military commands. **Japan is not rearming alone — it is integrating into a network of alliances designed to make the Indo-Pacific structurally unfavorable to any unilateral military adventure.**

### Japan-NATO cooperation: an unprecedented bridge between two security zones

One of the most remarkable developments in Japanese defense diplomacy since **2022** is the rapprochement with **NATO**. Prime Minister Kishida attended NATO summits at **Madrid (2022)** and **Vilnius (2023)** — a first for a Japanese leader. These presences symbolized something structural: the recognition that security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and Europe are interconnected. **Russia's support for North Korea** in exchange for weapons for the war in Ukraine made this interconnection undeniable. What China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are doing together in different geographic theaters is not a series of separate incidents. It is a coordinated strategy to challenge the liberal international order.

Japan-NATO cooperation translates concretely into intelligence exchanges on China and Russia, defense industrial cooperation, and joint exercises. Japan has become one of NATO's most active partners outside the Euro-Atlantic zone. This evolution deeply irritates Beijing, which sees in the Japan-NATO rapprochement a confirmation of its analysis that the West is trying to "encircle" China. **The PLA Daily article of June 2026 must be read in this global context — it is a response to a tightening alliance architecture, not just to Japan's most recent live-fire exercise.**

*I already hear the argument: "but Japan also has a history." Yes. Nanjing. Comfort women. The Empire. This history is real and it weighs, legitimately. But using this history to invalidate democratic Japan's right in 2026 to defend itself is manipulation. Japan in 2026 is a solid, transparent democracy under civilian control for seventy-nine years. Using the specter of 1937 to talk about Japan in 2026 is exactly what Beijing does — and that manipulation must be named for what it is.*

## Taiwan, central variable: what Japan's rearmament changes for Taipei

### The geography of Taiwan's defense: Japan as northern flank

In any military calculation about a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Japan is an inescapable variable. The **Ryukyu Islands** — and in particular **Okinawa**, which hosts the most important U.S. bases in the Asia-Pacific, including **Marine Corps Air Station Futenma** and **Kadena Air Base** — are less than **700 km** from Taiwan. Any American defense operation in the event of a Taiwan invasion would necessarily rely on Japanese military infrastructure. That is why the Kishida government announced in **2022** a massive reinforcement program for southwestern island defenses: anti-ship missiles, air defense systems, logistical capabilities.

Japan's rearmament creates for Taiwan a northern flank shield that did not exist at the same scale before **2022**. **Type 12 missiles** deployed in the **Ryukyus** can strike PLA vessels in the Taiwan Strait. Tomahawks on Japanese destroyers can reach command infrastructure on Fujian's coast. This reality changes Beijing's calculus: an invasion of Taiwan automatically triggers a confrontation with Japan, even if Tokyo has not formally declared war. **Japan's rearmament is therefore, in part, a silent life insurance policy for Taiwan.**

### Taipei's response to Tokyo's rearmament

Taipei observes Japan's rearmament with a mix of relief and vigilance. Relief, because every Japanese capability acquisition complicates Beijing's invasion calculations. Vigilance, because Japan's defense guarantees to Taiwan remain officially ambiguous — the Japanese government has no formal commitment to defend Taiwan, even if the **2022** documents recognize that stability in the Taiwan Strait is "**indispensable to Japan's security and prosperity**." This recognition is a near-implicit guarantee. It says: if Taiwan falls, Japan's own security is endangered. And Japan cannot remain passive in the face of a direct threat to its security.

In practice, Taiwan-Japan defense cooperation remains in the informal domain — unofficial intelligence exchanges, contacts between defense industrialists, missile systems cooperation. But the density of these exchanges has grown considerably since **2022**. The **PLA Daily** article of June 2026, targeting Japan's rearmament, also indirectly targeted this growing cooperation with Taipei. **Beijing understood that a rearmed Japan is the most dangerous strategic partner for Taiwan — not because it is far away, but precisely because it is so close.**

*Seven hundred kilometers. The distance between Okinawa and Taipei. Less than Paris to Berlin. In a world where missiles are measured in seconds of flight time, this proximity is a strategic reality neither Beijing nor Taipei can ignore. When Japan deploys missiles in the Ryukyus, it does so not only to defend Japan. It does so to defend a geopolitical space whose stability is vital to its own survival. Calling that "offensive" — as the PLA Daily does — is inverting cause and effect.*

## Conclusion: Japan chooses its security, the Indo-Pacific chooses its side

### A legitimate decision in the face of a real threat

What the **PLA Daily** article of **June 22, 2026** reveals is that Beijing is deeply uncomfortable with the emergence of a strategically active Japan. And this discomfort is proof that the Japanese strategy is working. An adversary at ease with your posture does not write furious editorials in its military mouthpiece. Beijing's anxiety is the measure of Japan's rearmament effectiveness.

Japan is not rearming to start a war. It is rearming because Xi Jinping's China has made regional military domination an explicit national priority, because North Korea regularly tests missiles capable of reaching Tokyo, and because the United States, under all recent administrations, has signaled that the security burden must be more equitably shared. **These are rational responses to concrete realities.** Calling it "remilitarization" changes nothing.

### The choice the West must make

The West must clearly choose its side in this debate. Either it supports a democracy's right to defend itself and modernize its armed forces within its legal alliances. Or it implicitly validates Beijing's rhetoric by treating Japan's rearmament and China's military expansion as symmetrical and equivalent phenomena. These two positions are not morally or strategically equivalent. And the Indo-Pacific, in the years to come, will be defined by the clarity or ambiguity of this choice.

*I think about Yonaguni. About Miyako. About Okinawa. Islands bearing scars from World War II that today host Japanese missiles facing a China that builds artificial islands and sends its coast guard into neighboring states' waters. History has a formidable sense of irony. But in that irony, there are men and women who chose to stand up for their security. That choice deserves to be respected, not condemned from Beijing.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [South China Morning Post — Japan's latest live-fire drill is about offence, not defence: PLA Daily — June 22, 2026](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3357913/japans-latest-live-fire-drill-about-offence-not-defence-pla-daily)

- [South China Morning Post — China condemns Japan's first overseas 'offensive missile' test since WWII — May 2026](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3352646/china-condemns-japans-first-overseas-offensive-missile-test-wwii)

- [Institute for the Study of War (ISW) — China & Taiwan Update — June 18, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-june-18-2026/)

### Secondary sources

- [South China Morning Post — The quiet escalation unfolding around Taiwan's remote outposts — June 14, 2026](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3357065/quiet-escalation-unfolding-around-taiwans-remote-outposts-beijing-sends-ships)

- [People's Daily — Int'l community must stay on high alert to Japanese militarism: FM spokesperson — June 12, 2026](https://en.people.cn/n3/2026/0612/c90000-20466826.html)

- [South China Morning Post — Beijing vows to strike back if Japan uses military force in Taiwan Strait — November 2025](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3332673/beijing-vows-strike-back-if-japan-uses-military-force-taiwan-strait)

- [China Daily — Chinese defense spokesman warns against Japan's military activities — June 16, 2026](https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202606/16/WS6a311630a310986e2b4604fb.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-le-japon-offensif-pekin-attaque-tokyo-repond-l-indo-pacifique-tremble