# DECODING: Kim Jong Un's Choe Hyon destroyer and the doctrine of the bristling sea

> On June 23, 2026, in the port of Nampo, west of Pyongyang, Kim Jong Un attended in person the official commissioning ceremony of the Choe Hyon, the first destroyer of the North Korean navy. 5,000 tonnes of steel, 145 meters in length, up to 88 vertical launch cells for missiles of various types, four fixed-face phased-array radars, a 127-mm main gun at the bow. This vessel, bui

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-le-destroyer-choe-hyon-de-kim-jong-un-et-la-doctrine-de-la-mer-heriss

## Introduction: Nampo, June 23, 2026 — a date that changes the sea

### The ceremony and its symbolism

On **June 23, 2026**, in the port of **Nampo**, west of **Pyongyang**, **Kim Jong Un** attended in person the official commissioning ceremony of the **Choe Hyon**, the first destroyer of the North Korean navy. **5,000 tonnes** of steel, **145 meters** in length, up to **88 vertical launch cells** for missiles of various types, four fixed-face phased-array radars, a **127-mm** main gun at the bow. This vessel, built at the Nampo shipyard, is not just another warship. It is the symbol of a major strategic transition: **North Korea** is no longer defending its coastline. It is beginning to project power into open water.

In his ceremonial address, Kim Jong Un spoke words that deserve to be examined one by one: **"The naval nuclear weapons program is following its planned trajectory without any deviation."** And further: **"It has clearly become a thing of the past that our navy exists only as a force defending our coastal waters."** This is not hollow propaganda for domestic consumption. It is a declaration of doctrine. **Pyongyang is formally announcing the end of its navy's defensive posture.**

### A destroyer that changes the regional equation

To understand the significance of the **Choe Hyon**, you have to understand what the North Korean navy was before it: a glorified coast guard, made up primarily of small fast boats, Romeo-class submarines dating from the 1960s, and a handful of modernized corvettes. That navy was designed to harass, not to fight. It lacked the capacity to venture far from the coast, let alone maintain a permanent presence in international waters.

*The Choe Hyon is a paradigm shift. This is not a question of tonnage — 5,000 tonnes is modest by American or even South Korean naval standards. It is a question of signal. Kim Jong Un is telling his generals, his neighbors, and the entire world: our navy is no longer an instrument of coastal defense. It is now an arm of our nuclear deterrence, capable of operating wherever we decide to operate. That is a geopolitical declaration as much as a naval program.*

## Anatomy of the Choe Hyon: what its sensors and missiles reveal

### A formidable armament on paper

According to analyses by **Naval News** and information published by the North Korean state agency **KCNA**, the **Choe Hyon** carries a complex weapons system. The vessel has **88 vertical launch cells** arranged in five distinct configurations — one forward, four aft — capable of carrying strategic nuclear cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. It also features **8 angled concealed launchers** built into the central superstructure, **8 short-range missiles** of the Russian-designed Pantsir-M type, and a **127-mm main gun**. The full payload potentially amounts to up to **104 missiles** of varied types.

**Naval News** analysts who scrutinized satellite imagery and official photos from the ceremony noted that **the launch cells underwent at least two significant rounds of modifications** between April 2025 and June 2026, indicating a rapid optimization process. They also noted that the ship carries four fixed-face phased-array radar panels — an advanced guidance and detection technology — and a complete electronic warfare suite. For a country whose economy represents a fraction of South Korea's, this is a remarkable technological investment.

### The limits experts flag

Technological enthusiasm deserves to be tempered. South Korean analysts, notably **Yang Mu-jin** of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, publicly noted that the **Choe Hyon** lacks an **advanced anti-missile defense radar** — the hallmark of a modern destroyer by Western or Japanese standards. **"It looks more like an attack destroyer packed with various missiles,"** Yang Mu-jin stated, underscoring the asymmetry between the ship's offensive firepower and its defensive capabilities. The key question — which no one can answer without real-world testing — is whether the electronic systems and missiles are genuinely operational at their stated specifications, given North Korea's difficulty obtaining components under sanctions.

*The difference between a destroyer and a ship loaded with missiles is fundamental in naval doctrine terms. A modern destroyer is an integrated system: missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, land strike, amphibious support. If the Choe Hyon is primarily a missile launcher with a hull around it, it is a real asymmetric threat but not necessarily a credible symmetric adversary for the American or Japanese navy. The distinction matters for correctly assessing the threat.*

## The doctrine of the bristling sea: naval nuclearization as strategy

### The history of North Korean naval nuclearization

**Kim Jong Un**'s drive to arm the North Korean navy with nuclear capabilities dates back at least to **August 2023**, when he delivered a speech at a naval anniversary that formalized the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the navy. That decision marked a transition: from a doctrine centered on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles toward a doctrine of **"multidimensional and effective operations."** The Choe Hyon is the culmination of that doctrine.

Kim Jong Un personally oversaw, in **March 2026**, a cruise missile launch test from the **Choe Hyon** during the ship's qualification trials, including what Pyongyang describes as **"strategic"** cruise missiles — a term Pyongyang systematically uses to designate nuclear capabilities. In **April 2026**, he supervised a second launch from the deck of the destroyer. These tests are not technical demonstrations: they are political messages to **South Korea**, **Japan**, and the **United States**.

### The West Sea as strategic theater

The decision to assign the **Choe Hyon** to the **West Sea Fleet** — rather than the East Sea Fleet as initially expected — is itself a strong signal. The **West Sea** (called the Yellow Sea in international terminology) is the theater where the contested maritime boundary between the two Koreas — the **Northern Limit Line (NLL)** — is located. It is the zone where the most serious naval confrontations between Seoul and Pyongyang have occurred, including the Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2010. Placing the most powerful destroyer Pyongyang has ever built in that high-tension zone is a calculated provocation.

*The assignment to the West Sea strikes me as deliberately provocative. Kim Jong Un is sending his nuclear toy to where structural tension with Seoul is highest. It's a message to South Korea first, and Japan second. North Korea is not yet trying to project power far — not yet. It is first seeking to dominate its immediate environment. The Choe Hyon is a weapon of regional coercion before it is a weapon of global power projection.*

## Russian assistance: the hidden hand inside the hull

### Evidence of military-technical cooperation

South Korean intelligence services and several independent analysts, including those at **Naval News**, identified clearly Russian technological influences in the visible specifications of the **Choe Hyon**. The ship's short-range missile system resembles the Russian naval **Pantsir-M**. Some cruise missiles tested from the destroyer display aerodynamic characteristics reminiscent of Russian **Kh-35** missiles or their derivatives. Analysts cited by the **New York Times** noted that **"some of the armaments, including a supersonic cruise missile, appear to incorporate Russian technology."**

This cooperation fits a pattern of rapidly deepening military ties between **Pyongyang** and **Moscow** since 2023. **North Korea** supplied **Russia** with millions of artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles for the war in Ukraine. In exchange, **Russia** transferred advanced military technologies to Pyongyang — missiles, sensors, naval propulsion. The **Choe Hyon** is partly the product of that exchange. The **illegal character** of these transfers under UN Security Council resolutions appears to concern neither Moscow nor Pyongyang.

### The triangular axis: Pyongyang-Moscow-Beijing

North Korea's naval buildup fits within a triangular strategic axis. **China** benefits from a nuclearized North Korea as a strategic buffer and source of destabilization for American alliances in the Asia-Pacific. **Russia** sees Pyongyang as a supplier of ammunition for Ukraine and as a strategic partner in its opposition to the liberal international order. And **North Korea** receives from both allies diplomatic protection at the Security Council, military technologies, and a market for its weapons.

*This triangular axis is what makes the North Korean threat particularly difficult to contain. Isolated, Kim's regime would be economically strangled. Protected by Chinese and Russian vetoes at the Security Council, supplied with technology by Moscow, and benefiting from Beijing's tolerance of its oil trade, Kim Jong Un can defy international norms without paying the price. This is not unpredictable geopolitics. It is a system functioning exactly as its architects designed it.*

## The announced buildup: what comes after the Choe Hyon

### The Kang Kon and the 10,000-tonne cruisers

At the **June 23** ceremony, Kim Jong Un announced several future milestones in the North Korean naval program. The second destroyer of the Choe Hyon class, the **Kang Kon**, will be commissioned **soon**. Kim also announced the start of construction on **10,000-tonne strategic warships** — using the term "strategic," clearly signaling nuclear capabilities. And the long-term objective is to produce **two surface vessels per year**, including at least one 10,000-tonne cruiser. If that pace is maintained for **five years**, the North Korean navy would count approximately **10 major destroyers or cruisers** by end of 2031.

Kim Jong Un also indicated that the Choe Hyon and Kang Kon destroyers could form a **"dual deterrence"** — one in the West Sea, one in the East Sea — creating a two-front naval nuclear shield that would bracket South Korea with Japan within reach. According to analyst **Yang Mu-jin** of the University of North Korean Studies, these destroyers could also serve as a **"vanguard"** to demonstrate the North Korea-China-Russia alliance in both seas.

### The nuclear submarine: the ultimate ambition

The North Korean naval program extends beyond destroyers. Kim Jong Un announced at the **April 27, 2025** ceremony — the launching of the Choe Hyon — his intention to build a **nuclear-powered submarine**. Pyongyang has already tested what it presents as a nuclear-capable submarine hull, the **Hero Kim Kun Ok**, though analysts have expressed serious doubts about its actual capabilities. North Korean doctrine clearly aims at nuclear triad: land-based missiles, naval missiles on destroyers, and missiles aboard submarines. If achieved, this triad would make North Korea's deterrence structurally comparable to that of major nuclear powers.

*The North Korean nuclear triad is still very far from being real — nuclear submarines are among the most complex weapons systems to build and maintain. But the ambition is clearly articulated. And what concerns me is that every time Western experts said "Kim Jong Un can't do that," he eventually did. The history of North Korea since 2006 is a succession of red lines crossed that no one managed to stop.*

## Implications for the balance in the East China Sea

### Impact on South Korea and Japan

For **South Korea**, whose navy has 12 major destroyers of the King Sejong and Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin classes, each displacing between **7,000 and 11,000 tonnes**, the entry into service of the **Choe Hyon** represents an evolution in the threat but not an immediate break in naval superiority. The South Korean navy remains technologically far superior, with its Aegis systems and integrations with American forces. But a North Korean destroyer capable of firing nuclear missiles from the West Sea creates a new tactical dimension that Seoul's military planners must integrate into their crisis scenarios.

For **Japan**, whose interests in the Korean peninsula are directly at stake, North Korean naval nuclearization reinforces the case for an **acceleration of Japanese rearmament**. The **Kishida** government and its successors had already decided to double Japan's defense budget over five years, notably to develop **counter-strike** capabilities. The Choe Hyon announcement will only accelerate those processes. **Japan** has the industrial and technological capacity to respond to the escalation. The question is political.

### Impact on the United States and NATO

For the **United States**, North Korean naval nuclearization complicates the architecture of deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region. The **US 7th Fleet** homeported at **Yokosuka** remains by far the most powerful naval force in the region. But every improvement in North Korea's offensive capabilities increases the potential cost of a conflict and makes deterrence more complex to sustain. If the **Choe Hyon** can genuinely fire nuclear cruise missiles within range of Japan or American bases at **Okinawa**, it adds another layer to an already complex theater.

*The proliferation of North Korean nuclear vectors — land missiles, naval missiles, soon perhaps submarines — poses a fundamental question to American deterrence strategy: how do you deter an adversary diversifying its second-strike capabilities to the point of making any preventive nuclear decapitation attempt uncertain? The honest answer is that you cannot deter at 100 percent. And Pyongyang's accumulation makes that uncomfortable truth increasingly hard to ignore.*

## International sanctions: a leaking shield

### Why sanctions have not stopped the program

The **Choe Hyon** was built and armed despite one of the most comprehensive international sanctions regimes ever imposed on a state. Since **2006**, reinforced after each nuclear test, **Security Council** resolutions prohibit North Korea from importing advanced military equipment, fuel beyond strict quotas, dual-use electronics, and materials for its missile and nuclear programs. These sanctions have a real effect on the country's general economy. They have not stopped the military program.

The reason is simple: **Chinese and Russian vetoes** at the Security Council have blocked any tightening of sanctions since 2022. **Beijing** has maintained hydrocarbon flows to Pyongyang well beyond authorized quotas, as documented by UN expert panel reports. And North Korea-Russia military cooperation — including transfers of military technologies in exchange for Ukraine war ammunition — constitutes a deliberate and acknowledged violation of sanctions by a permanent Security Council member. The sanctions regime has become a partially functional fiction.

### Technology transfers: institutionalized violations

The **UN expert panel** report on North Korea, published before the panel's dissolution by Russian veto in 2024, documented dozens of cases of illicit military technology transfers. Satellite imagery, ghost vessel navigation signals, financial transactions through third-country intermediaries — all of it built a clear picture of an institutionalized circumvention network. Since the expert panel's dissolution, international monitoring has weakened considerably. The international community is less well informed about what North Korea is actually doing militarily. That information gap is not an accident. It is the deliberate result of the Russian veto.

*The dissolution of the UN expert panel on North Korea through Russian veto is one of the most cynical acts in recent geopolitics. Moscow eliminated the monitoring mechanism precisely when its own military cooperation with Pyongyang would have been most likely to be documented and condemned. It was a successful act of institutional cover-up, and no one has really found a way to counter it.*

## Kim's statements: decoding the language of threat

### "A different mission, in different waters"

In his speech on **June 23, 2026**, Kim Jong Un declared that the North Korean navy would henceforth **"undertake a different mission"** and operate in **"a different space of waters."** He did not specify what he meant. Analysts have proposed several interpretations: a declaration of a unilateral maritime line encroaching on South Korean waters — a maritime variation of the **"land demarcation line"** between the two Koreas; an ambition to patrol international waters between Korea and Japan; or simply a rhetorical projection designed to reinforce the internal deterrence posture.

What is certain is that the formula "it has clearly become a thing of the past that our navy exists as a force defending our coastal waters" constitutes a formal renunciation of the defensive posture. **Kim Jong Un** is officially announcing an offensive posture for his navy. And the **nuclear cruise missiles** aboard the Choe Hyon give it a pre-emptive strike capability that North Korea did not previously possess from the sea. This is a documented doctrinal change attested by the head of state's own official declarations.

### The "waters of enemies"

Kim Jong Un was even more explicit during the ceremony: he described the Choe Hyon's mission as including **"the patrol and pre-emptive neutralization of the waters where the assets and military bases of hostile nations are deployed."** These "hostile nations," in Pyongyang's lexicon, refer first to South Korea, then to Japan and the United States. The phrase "pre-emptive neutralization" linked to a vessel carrying nuclear missiles constitutes a declaration of pre-emptive nuclear strike capability from the sea. This is not rhetoric. It is an operational statement.

*The phrase "pre-emptive neutralization" in Kim's speeches struck me. In any other geopolitical context, a power publicly declaring that its new destroyer is meant to "pre-emptively neutralize" foreign military bases would trigger an immediate and severe international response. In North Korea's case, we've almost grown used to it. And that gradual habituation to North Korean rhetorical escalation is precisely what Pyongyang is working to install.*

## The international community's response: insufficient and predictable

### Official reactions

The international reaction to the commissioning of the **Choe Hyon** was predictably muted. The **United States**, through the **Indo-Pacific Command**, issued a routine statement on the "ongoing monitoring" of the North Korean threat and the commitment to defend allies. **South Korea** held inter-ministerial security meetings. **Japan** convened a cabinet briefing session. The **European Union** did not issue a specific communiqué. **China** maintained its customary diplomatic silence on North Korean military files. **Russia**, whose technicians may have contributed to the very construction of the vessel being celebrated, said nothing at all.

This moderation of the international response is not wisdom. It is institutionalized powerlessness. The available pressure mechanisms — additional sanctions, diplomatic isolation — are blocked by Chinese and Russian vetoes. Military options are not seriously being considered. We are therefore left with statements of "concern" and "close monitoring." Pyongyang is right not to be impressed.

### The precedent and its implications

What is happening with the North Korean naval nuclear program establishes a troubling precedent: a power can develop a naval nuclear strike capability in violation of all international resolutions, be aided by two permanent Security Council members, and receive for its trouble nothing but declarations of "concern." This model will be observed by other powers considering similar weapons programs. The international community's deterrent capacity erodes one warship at a time.

*I'm not an advocate of preemptive military adventures. But I am convinced that things need to be called what they are. The international community has no effective response to North Korean naval nuclearization. We are navigating in a mode of managing accomplished facts. And today's accomplished fact — the Choe Hyon — will be surpassed in five years by two destroyers, then a 10,000-tonne cruiser. The escalation is programmed. Non-response authorizes it.*

## What the Yellow Sea is about to become

### A theater of rising tensions

The **Yellow Sea** — called the West Sea by North Koreans — is already one of the most unstable maritime theaters in the world. The **Northern Limit Line**, unilaterally drawn by the United States after the Korean War, is contested by Pyongyang, which has never recognized it. Naval incidents — the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010, the shelling of Yeonpyeong the same year — have already killed South Korean soldiers and civilians. The introduction of the **Choe Hyon** into this theater adds a nuclear dimension to a confrontation that was already dangerous.

The long-term question is whether **North Korea** will attempt to impose a **unilateral maritime boundary** in the Yellow Sea, backed by the implicit threat of its naval nuclear missiles. Such a maneuver — using the Choe Hyon's presence to pressure South Korea into withdrawing from certain contested maritime zones — would be a direct application of the "pre-emptive neutralization" doctrine Kim declared. It would be a major escalation. It would also be a perfect replication of Iran's tactic in the Strait of Hormuz: using military capability to impose de facto maritime sovereignty that international law does not recognize.

### The shadow over Asian navigation corridors

More broadly, North Korea's naval nuclear program casts a shadow over the navigation corridors crossing Asian seas. The **Tsugaru Strait** between Honshu and Hokkaido, the **Jeju Channel** between Korea and Japan, the commercial shipping routes to the ports of **Busan** and **Tokyo** — all of these passages could theoretically be threatened by North Korean naval missiles. Even if the military objective differs from Iran's in the Strait of Hormuz, the logic of coercion through the threat of maritime interference is the same. And it will be even more effective when Pyongyang has a fleet of several destroyers and a nuclear submarine.

*There is a troubling geopolitical coherence in the fact that two of the powers the West identifies as its principal adversaries — Iran and North Korea — simultaneously developed in 2026 strategies based on control or threat of maritime corridors. This may not be explicit coordination. But it is certainly a convergence of doctrines, and that convergence deserves a Western strategic response of proportionate weight.*

## North Korean nuclear submarines: the real state of capabilities

### The submarine program: displayed ambition, debated technical reality

**North Korea** has repeatedly displayed its ambitions in nuclear-powered submarines. **Kim Jong Un** personally attended the launch of the first so-called "nuclear-powered" attack submarine in September **2023**, named the **Hero Kim Kun Ok**. But Western defense experts quickly pointed out that the vessel on display resembled a modified conventional diesel-electric submarine more than a true nuclear-powered submersible. Mastering a miniaturized nuclear reactor — necessary for a real nuclear submarine — exceeds the currently documented industrial capabilities of **Pyongyang**.

This technical distinction is fundamental. A nuclear-powered submarine can remain submerged for months, cross oceans without surfacing, and operate in zones conventional vessels cannot reach. A conventional submarine, even one carrying ballistic missiles, must surface regularly to recharge its batteries — making it vulnerable to detection. If **North Korea** does not yet have true nuclear propulsion, its **SLBM** (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile) program remains a real threat but geographically more limited than **Pyongyang**'s propaganda presents it.

### SLBMs: the real strategic advance to watch

Independently of the propulsion question, North Korea's progress on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (**SLBMs**) is documented and significant. **North Korea** has tested several variants of the **Pukguksong** missile — solid-propellant missiles capable of being launched from submarines. These tests have demonstrated growing capabilities in range, accuracy, and concealment of the launch platform. The combination of an operational SLBM with even a conventional submarine creates a potential nuclear second-strike that is difficult to pre-emptively neutralize.

It is this combination — SLBM plus hard-to-locate submarines — that gives the North Korean naval program its real strategic value, regardless of the reality of the submersibles' nuclear propulsion. For **Seoul**, **Tokyo**, and their American allies, the threat lies not in the technical details of propulsion. It lies in the multiplication of potential nuclear attack vectors that complicate any missile defense and any retaliation calculus.

*The technical debates about the actual propulsion of North Korean submarines matter to defense analysts. For the West and its Asia-Pacific allies, what matters is the trajectory: North Korea is systematically advancing toward a complete nuclear triad — land, air, and naval missiles. It doesn't matter whether the submarine presented in 2023 was truly nuclear or a staging exercise. The direction is clear. And a clear direction deserves a clear strategic response.*

## The Trump factor: between denial and deal

### The legacy of the Kim-Trump summits

There is a particular irony in the fact that North Korea's naval buildup is accelerating under **Donald Trump**'s second term — the same man who organized three historic summits with **Kim Jong Un** during his first term, in **Singapore** in 2018, in **Hanoi** in 2019, and at **Panmunjom** in 2019. Those summits generated hopes of denuclearization that proved entirely illusory. Since then, Kim Jong Un has conducted dozens of missile tests, developed ICBMs capable of reaching the American mainland, and commissioned his first nuclear destroyer. The "love" Trump spoke of in describing his relationship with Kim produced no disarmament.

The Trump 2.0 administration had not, as of **June 26, 2026**, articulated a clear policy toward North Korea. The United States is absorbed by the Iranian crisis and trade tensions with China. Pyongyang is exploiting that strategic distraction to advance its programs in relative silence. **Kim Jong Un** is a careful observer of American priorities, and he knows exactly when to strike when Washington is looking elsewhere.

### Denuclearization: dead, buried, and tombstoned

The commissioning of the **Choe Hyon** is also a political statement on denuclearization. Pyongyang had already declared its status as an **"irreversible"** nuclear power in its constitution in 2022. Launching a permanent naval nuclear program is a further institutionalization of that status. A naval nuclear program is not as easy to dismantle as land-based enrichment sites. The navy is distributed, mobile, and difficult to verify. Complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of **North Korea** — the official objective of American policy for decades — is, at this point, to put it plainly, political fiction.

*Complete denuclearization of North Korea will not happen. I write that clearly because I believe we would collectively be better served by starting from that reality rather than denying it. The real question is: how do we manage and contain a permanently nuclear North Korea? That question is infinitely harder and more uncomfortable than repeating the denuclearization objective. But it is the only honest question.*

## The international response: sanctions, dialogue, and permanent deadlock

### Security Council sanctions: a cracked regime

The international community responded to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic program with a **UN Security Council** sanctions regime — the most severe ever imposed on a state. These sanctions cover exports of coal, iron, seafood, and other natural resources that represented a significant share of **Pyongyang**'s hard currency revenues. They also target imports of petroleum products and machinery used in the military program.

But this sanctions regime is now widely circumvented, with the explicit complicity of **China** and **Russia**. **Moscow**, since the war in **Ukraine**, has deepened its economic and military ties with **Pyongyang** — in exchange for ammunition and North Korean soldiers deployed in **Ukraine**. **China** maintains informal trade flows that allow **North Korea** to survive economically despite formal sanctions. The result: the sanctions exist on paper; their real effectiveness is limited by two permanent **Security Council** members that have decided their strategic interests supersede their obligation to comply.

### Negotiations: a diplomacy in clinical death

Since the failure of the **Hanoi** summit in **2019** — where **Trump** rejected the deal proposed by **Kim** — negotiations on the North Korean nuclear program have been in a state of clinical death. The **Biden** administration offered dialogue without preconditions, rejected by **Pyongyang**. Under **Trump**'s second term, contradictory signals are sent — informal diplomatic openings alternate with US-South Korean military exercises that irritate **Kim**. The negotiating window, if it exists, is narrow and poorly defined.

Analysts most familiar with the file suggest that any negotiation with **Pyongyang** should now start from a different premise: **North Korea** will not voluntarily denuclearize. The real question is whether some form of transparency, capping, or control can be negotiated that reduces risks without seeking the complete nuclear capitulation that **Kim** will never give. This reassessment of realistic diplomatic objectives is politically painful but perhaps necessary to escape permanent deadlock.

*We need the courage to acknowledge that complete North Korean denuclearization is probably no longer an achievable objective in the short or medium term. Kim Jong Un watched Gaddafi get overthrown after abandoning his nuclear program. He drew his conclusions. His nuclear program is his insurance policy against regime change. Negotiating with that reality rather than against it is not capitulation. It is realist diplomacy. And it is what the world needs.*

## Toward a new security architecture in the Asia-Pacific

### The strengthening of American-Asian alliances

North Korea's naval buildup is accelerating the restructuring of security alliances in the Asia-Pacific. The **AUKUS** partnership — Australia, United Kingdom, United States — which will provide Australia with nuclear-powered (conventionally armed) submarines, gains strategic relevance in this context. The deepening US-Japan defense relationship, with Japan's defense budget rising to **2 percent of GDP** and the development of counter-strike missiles, responds directly to the North Korean naval threat. And trilateral US/South Korea/Japan military exercises have intensified.

These reinforced alliances are necessary, but they carry their own risks. Every tightening of the allied military posture in the Asia-Pacific is used by **Kim Jong Un** as rhetorical justification to accelerate his own programs. This is the classic dynamic of the **security dilemma**: every defensive action is perceived by the adversary as offensive and justifies escalation. In the Korean case, this spiral is compounded by the existential nature that Kim's regime attaches to its nuclear arsenal. It will not yield as long as the regime exists.

### The need for an adapted deterrence doctrine

The emergence of a North Korean naval nuclear strike capability requires an adaptation of allied deterrence doctrine. This is no longer simply a question of land-based missile defense — the **THAAD system** deployed in South Korea or the **SM-3 system** on Japanese destroyers. It is also a question of the capacity to detect and track North Korean destroyers at sea, to neutralize them before they reach their firing position, and to maintain a sufficiently credible naval deterrent presence that a North Korean first strike from sea would be clearly suicidal for the regime. This more complex doctrine demands more resources, better coordination, and a political willingness to maintain a forward posture in the Asia-Pacific that American budget constraints will place under pressure.

*The Choe Hyon poses a question I cannot resolve: how far is Kim Jong Un willing to go? Is he rational in the classical deterrence sense — someone who will not cross a certain threshold because the consequences would be fatal to him? Or is he operating in a logic of controlled escalation, estimating that the West will never escalate to direct confrontation? I don't know. And that "I don't know" is itself a form of strategic information: uncertainty about Kim's intentions is part of his deterrence power.*

*What this crisis in the East China Sea reveals above all is our own inability to imagine new solutions. We apply twentieth-century analytical frameworks to twenty-first-century conflicts. And in the meantime, the lines keep moving.*

## Conclusion: a sea that will never be the same

### What the Choe Hyon changed

On **June 23, 2026**, something changed in the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific. **North Korea** shifted from a land nuclear power to a nuclear power with maritime delivery vectors. The Yellow Sea, already one of the most tense zones on the planet, just acquired a permanent nuclear dimension. And the doctrine of "pre-emptive neutralization" announced by Kim Jong Un for his new destroyer defines a framework in which North Korea grants itself the right to strike at sea before being attacked — a maritime first-strike doctrine that should alarm every one of Pyongyang's neighbors.

This decoding cannot conclude with a solution, because there is no simple one. The international community faces a North Korea that advances, that is protected, that will not voluntarily disarm, and whose naval nuclear program has just entered an operational phase. The response requires reinforced alliances, an adapted deterrence, and a political truth no one wants to say: **containing North Korea** is the realistic objective. **Denuclearizing it** is no longer.

### The next milestones to watch

In the coming months, the points to watch are clear: the commissioning of the **Kang Kon**, the second destroyer; the announced start of construction on **10,000-tonne cruisers**; and missile tests from both destroyers, each of which will constitute a test of doctrine. If **Kim Jong Un** keeps to the announced timelines, the North Korean navy by 2030 will be unrecognizable compared to what it was in 2020. This transformation is not hypothetical. It is programmed, announced, and underway. The Choe Hyon is not the end of a story. It is the prologue of a bristling sea.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Al Jazeera — North Korea commissions warship as Kim eyes nuclear navy — June 24, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2026/6/24/north-korea-commissions-warship-as-kim-eyes-nuclear-navy)

- [Naval News — North Korea commissions first guided-missile destroyer — June 26, 2026](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/north-korea-commissions-first-guided-missile-destroyer-plans-cruiser/)

- [New York Times — North Korea deploys its first destroyer, vowing nuclear power — June 25, 2026](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/25/world/asia/north-korea-destroyer-nuclear.html)

- [AP via SFGate — North Korea's Kim claims progress on nuclear-armed navy — June 24, 2026](https://www.sfgate.com/news/world/article/north-korea-s-kim-claims-progress-on-22317962.php)

### Secondary sources

- [Wikipedia — North Korean destroyer Choe Hyon (commissioning history, specifications)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korean_destroyer_Choe_Hyon)

- [Naval News — North Korea's new destroyer sets sail, tests missile systems — March 9, 2026](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/north-koreas-new-destroyer-sets-sail-for-the-first-time-tests-missile-systems/)

- [Japan Times — Kim unveils plans for new warships and nuclear navy — June 24, 2026](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/06/24/asia-pacific/north-korea-nuclear-navy/)

- [Bloomberg — North Korea deploys new destroyer, vows to push for nuclear navy — June 24, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-24/north-korea-deploys-new-destroyer-vows-to-push-for-nuclear-navy)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-le-destroyer-choe-hyon-de-kim-jong-un-et-la-doctrine-de-la-mer-heriss