# DECODING: Hormuz reopened: what the deal changes for global energy

> For months — since the outbreak of war between the United States, Israel, and Iran in February 2026 — the world had lived under the permanent threat of a total or partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This passage, only 33 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, lying between the Sultanate of Oman and Iran, is the jugular vein of the world energy economy: roughly 20% of glob

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-hormuz-rouvert-ce-que-l-accord-change-pour-l-energie-mondiale

## Introduction: the world breathes — but holds its breath

### The strait that rattled markets

For months — since the outbreak of war between the **United States**, **Israel**, and **Iran** in **February 2026** — the world had lived under the permanent threat of a total or partial closure of the **Strait of Hormuz**. This passage, only **33 kilometres** wide at its narrowest point, lying between the **Sultanate of Oman** and **Iran**, is the jugular vein of the world energy economy: roughly **20% of global trade in oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG)** passes through it every day. Block it, and you simultaneously hurt **Europe**, **Japan**, **China**, **South Korea**, and much of the global economy.

The signing of the **memorandum of understanding (MoU)** between the **United States** and **Iran** on **June 14, 2026** changed that equation — for now. The first tankers resumed navigation on **June 15**. In the week of **June 15–21**, **125 transits** were recorded — the highest level since the war began. A massive relief for global energy buyers. But that relief remains fragile, conditional, and freighted with fundamental questions about the durability of this unblocking.

### The essential terms for global energy

The agreement provides that **Iran** guarantees the free transit of commercial vessels through the **Strait of Hormuz**. In exchange, the **United States** suspended its sanctions on Iranian oil transactions for an initial period of **60 days**, effective **June 18, 2026**. The **US Treasury** confirmed the suspension. According to reporting by the **Washington Post**, **Iran** can now sell its oil freely, without restrictions, as long as the terms of the deal are respected. Approximately **$300 billion** in reconstruction was also discussed in the context of the deal's long-term prospects.

This combination — strait reopening plus sanctions exemption — represents a potentially significant supply shock on energy markets. **Iran** holds proven reserves of **157 billion barrels** of oil and vast natural gas reserves. Before sanctions, it exported up to **2.5 million barrels per day**. Even a partial return to those levels represents a meaningful addition to global supply.

*Hormuz reopened — it is the equivalent of a defibrillator applied to the global energy economy. The immediate effect is real. But a heart restarted on a fragile artery is a heart that needs watching.*

## The immediate impact on oil markets

### The price drop: good news and bad news

The reopening of **Hormuz** triggered an immediate drop in oil prices. Markets had built in a substantial geopolitical risk premium during the closure — prices had reached very elevated levels, putting pressure on oil-importing economies. The reopening released that pressure. For European and Asian consumers, for airlines, for manufacturing industries: this is direct good news.

But this price decline is bad news for producer countries that depend on high oil revenues — particularly **Russia**, whose **Urals crude** was already capped at **$44.10 per barrel** under the **21st EU sanctions package**. The more Iranian oil returns to market, the lower global prices go, and the tighter **Moscow**'s fiscal room becomes. On this specific point, the US-Iran deal carries an indirect benefit for **Ukraine**.

### The 35 million stored barrels: the flush effect

During the months of closure, tankers had been waiting in the **Persian Gulf**. According to **Kpler** data, at least **20 tankers** carrying **35 million barrels** had cleared the strait in the days following the signing. This "flush" of stored oil created additional short-term downward pressure on markets. Verified oil flow through **Hormuz** reached roughly **4.8 million barrels per day** — the highest level since the war began, according to **Kpler**.

These released stockpiles represented both an immediate commercial opportunity for tanker operators and a measure of the scale of the energy flow disruption caused by months of closure. Asian refineries that had been running at reduced capacity were able to restock. Futures contracts on **LNG** bound for **Japan**, **South Korea**, and **Taiwan** could be honoured.

*35 million barrels leaving the Gulf in a matter of days — imagine the reverse: 35 million barrels blocked for weeks. That simple calculation explains why the Strait of Hormuz has the power to tilt the global economy. And why control of it is a formidable strategic lever.*

## LNG and Europe: a particularly acute stake

### Europe's dependence on Gulf LNG

The closure of **Hormuz** hit **Europe** harder than initially expected. Since reducing Russian gas imports following the invasion of **Ukraine** in **2022**, **Europe** had diversified its **LNG** supply sources — turning notably to **Qatar**, the **United Arab Emirates**, and other **Persian Gulf** producers. But all of those exporters use the **Strait of Hormuz** for their deliveries. The strait's closure had therefore indirectly reinforced Europe's residual dependence on Russian energy — a painful strategic paradox.

The reopening of the strait corrects that situation. European **LNG** prices pulled back. Natural gas storage levels, which had been drawn down earlier than expected, could be rebuilt at more reasonable cost. For countries like **Germany**, **France**, and the **Netherlands** — which had hurriedly developed **LNG** receiving capacity since **2022** — the reopening of **Hormuz** was a direct economic priority.

### Taiwan and northeast Asia: vital relief

**Taiwan** imports **98% of its oil** and depends heavily on **LNG** for electricity generation. The closure of **Hormuz** had posed a direct existential threat to the island — all the more so given that this threat was compounding growing Chinese military pressure. Taiwan's prime minister had been forced to announce in **June 2026** that **LNG** prices for residential and electricity use would not rise until August — a promise that would have been impossible to keep without the strait's reopening.

**Japan** and **South Korea**, both heavily dependent on energy imports through the **Persian Gulf**, had suffered similar disruptions. For these advanced economies, the reopening of **Hormuz** was a direct economic and industrial imperative: factories, transport, power grids — everything depended on the resumption of flows.

*Taiwan surviving an energy crisis caused by Hormuz while resisting Chinese military pressure — that is the portrait of an island facing simultaneous threats on multiple fronts. That resilience deserves far more attention than it receives.*

## The fragility of the rebound: residual risks

### The June 26 incident: a revealing disruption

The fragility of the deal manifested almost immediately. On **June 26, 2026**, an attack on a cargo vessel in waters near **Hormuz** cast doubt on the security of the passage, according to **CNBC**. The incident briefly halted a **United Nations** evacuation plan and prompted some tankers to turn back. The episode illustrates the precarious balance of the situation: a single attack, a single incident, can undermine operator confidence in the safety of the passage.

The regional context remains volatile. Armed groups active in the area — **Houthis** in **Yemen**, pro-Iranian militias in **Iraq**, factions not under Tehran's direct control — could disrupt traffic independently of the Iranian government's willingness to honour the deal. An agreement signed with political officials does not guarantee the behaviour of every military actor in the region.

### The 60-day deadline and its uncertainties

The deal is structurally fragile because it rests on a temporary **60-day** sanctions suspension — during which the two parties must negotiate the terms of a final agreement. That window is extremely tight for resolving questions as complex as the Iranian nuclear file, the inspections question, verification mechanisms, and the long-term outlook for sanctions. The risk of the technical negotiations failing within that deadline is real — and if it happens, the sanctions suspension would lapse, potentially calling the entire normalization of traffic through **Hormuz** back into question.

Markets have taken note of this uncertainty. Despite the short-term price decline, oil traders are hesitant to commit to long-term low-price contracts in the region, maintaining a structural risk premium. That professional caution is justified by recent history: the region has already seen sudden escalations after periods of calm.

*60 days to resolve the Iranian nuclear file — that's the same deadline given to someone being evicted before they have to leave. The time pressure is real, and it risks producing either a rushed deal or a deadlock. In either case, the world holds its breath.*

## Iran, OPEC, and the long-term global market

### Iran's return to OPEC: what are the implications?

A durable return of **Iran** to the global oil market would reshape the **OPEC+** balance. **Saudi Arabia** and the **UAE**, the cartel's main producers, have maintained a policy of coordinated production cuts with **Russia** to support prices. An **Iran** exporting at full capacity — up to **2.5 million barrels per day** by its own estimates — creates competitive pressure within the cartel and makes coordinated cuts harder to sustain.

This dynamic could benefit global consumers — lower prices — but it also erodes the revenues of Gulf producers who need a minimum price to balance their national budgets. For **Saudi Arabia**, which generally puts its fiscal break-even around **$80–90 per barrel**, a massive influx of Iranian oil at lower levels poses a structural problem.

### Russian oil on the global chessboard

The impact on the Russian oil market cuts both ways. On one hand, increased competition from Iranian oil pushes global prices down, reducing **Moscow**'s revenues. On the other, if **Iran** and **Russia** maintain their economic cooperation, **Tehran** could theoretically help **Moscow** circumvent certain sanctions — by serving as a commercial intermediary or absorbing transactions that can no longer be conducted directly with **Russia**. This is a concern that Western intelligence services are watching closely.

**Putin** had moreover extended until end of **2027** his ban on Russian companies selling oil to buyers honouring the Western price cap — a measure aimed at maintaining revenues by redirecting sales toward **Asia**. The post-Iran-deal dynamic complicates that calculation, but does not undo it.

*The geopolitics of oil resembles a chess game whose board changes shape with every move. Iran returning to the market changes the rules for everyone — for Russia, for Saudi Arabia, and for European consumers hoping for stable prices.*

## The scenarios for the next 60 days

### Scenario 1: a successful final deal

In this scenario, the technical negotiations between **Washington** and **Tehran** succeed within the **60-day** window. **IAEA** inspectors gain access to Iranian nuclear sites. **Iran** formally commits — within a verifiable framework — to not developing nuclear weapons. Sanctions are lifted gradually and conditionally. The **Strait of Hormuz** remains open. Energy prices stabilize at levels manageable for global economies. This is the best scenario — and also the hardest to reach.

For this scenario to materialize, **Iran** would need to accept robust nuclear verification mechanisms, the **United States** would need to make a credible commitment to lasting sanctions relief, and both parties would need to overcome decades of mutual distrust in under two months. It is possible — but it would be a diplomatic achievement without recent precedent.

### Scenario 2: deadlock and a return to tension

In this scenario — unfortunately the more likely one, according to analysts cited by **Le Monde** — the technical negotiations do not succeed within the **60-day** window. The parties trade blame for the failure. The sanctions suspension lapses. **Iran** threatens to reduce traffic through **Hormuz** again. Energy markets slide back into uncertainty. Prices climb. The reprieve effect evaporates.

This scenario would be a disaster for all parties — including **Iran**, whose own economy suffers from the disruptions caused by sanctions. But the history of US-Iranian negotiations is dotted with exactly these recurring deadlocks. Vigilance is warranted.

*I wish I could predict which of these scenarios will play out. I cannot. What I know is that the next 60 days will be decisive — for global energy, for the Middle East, and indirectly for Ukraine. All the more reason to watch them closely.*

## Gulf producer states: winners or losers from the strait's reopening?

### Saudi Arabia facing a production dilemma

The reopening of the **Strait of Hormuz** puts **Persian Gulf** producer states in an ambivalent position. On one side, the end of the risk of export disruptions is excellent news for their logistics. On the other, the return of Iranian oil to markets — a direct consequence of the **US-Iran** deal — puts downward pressure on prices, reducing per-barrel revenues for all **OPEC+** members. **Riyadh** thus finds itself simultaneously relieved by the strait's stabilization and confronted with a potentially awkward Iranian partner in quota management.

**Saudi Arabia** responded by maintaining a wait-and-see posture, declining to comment publicly on the deal in any substantive way. Behind closed doors, Saudi officials reportedly expressed concerns about the pace of the US-Iranian rapprochement, which shifts the dynamics of their own relationship with **Washington**. If **Iran** becomes a reliable US partner again, the strategic weight of **Riyadh** in American regional policy is mechanically reduced — a prospect the Al Saud cannot ignore.

### The UAE and Qatar: two diverging strategies

The **United Arab Emirates** have pursued a strategy of diversifying export routes that makes them partly less dependent on the **Strait of Hormuz**. The **Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline**, linking Abu Dhabi's oil fields to the **Fujairah** terminal on the Arabian Sea, bypasses the strait and has a capacity of roughly **1.5 million barrels per day**. This infrastructure was designed precisely to reduce Emirati vulnerability to potential strait closures.

**Qatar**, for its part, exports primarily **liquefied natural gas** rather than crude oil. Its dependence on the **Strait of Hormuz** is therefore different — and its stakes in strait stability are particularly high. Doha welcomed the US-Iranian normalization, seeing in it an opportunity to reduce regional tensions that complicate its own relations with Tehran. Qatari diplomacy, known for its back-channel role, did in fact play a part in certain phases of the US-Iranian negotiations.

*The Persian Gulf is a powder keg whose stability depends on a balance among actors who have distrusted one another for decades. Hormuz open is good. But the underlying tensions — between Shia and Sunni, between Iran and Saudi Arabia, between regional ambitions and American interests — do not disappear with a deal signed in Washington. They simply go on standby.*

## The energy transition and Hormuz: when black gold meets the green revolution

### An oil crisis could have accelerated the transition — or paralysed it

The **Hormuz** crisis was a reminder of a reality that energy transition advocates do not always like to acknowledge: the world remains deeply dependent on **Middle Eastern** hydrocarbons, and that dependence will not disappear for several decades, even in the most ambitious renewable deployment scenarios. In **2026**, fossil fuels still account for roughly **80%** of the global energy mix. A supply shock of this scale would have had devastating consequences for economies that have not yet completed their transition.

Paradoxically, some economists and energy strategists argue that a prolonged oil crisis could have massively accelerated investment in alternatives. Prices at **$150 or $200 per barrel** would have made economically attractive some renewable energy projects that are currently only just at the break-even threshold. But that reasoning ignores the real economic suffering that such a crisis would have caused — particularly in developing countries, which are most dependent on hydrocarbon imports and least equipped for a rapid transition.

### Europe between relief and a hard look in the mirror

For **Europe**, the reopening of the **Strait of Hormuz** is major relief. After the gas price shock of 2022 linked to the war in **Ukraine**, a second energy shock linked to **Hormuz**'s closure would have represented an unprecedented double threat to the continent's economic stability. European industries — chemicals, steel, glass, ceramics — depend directly on stable energy prices to remain competitive against American and Asian players who enjoy structural cost advantages in energy.

But that relief should not extinguish the wake-up call. The **Hormuz** crisis was a warning: European energy security remains fragile, geopolitically exposed, insufficiently diversified. Investments in **renewable energy**, storage, energy efficiency, and supplier diversification are not ideological options — they are strategic necessities. The **Europe** that learned the lesson of Russian gas must now draw the lesson of **Hormuz**: every concentrated dependency is a strategic vulnerability.

*Hormuz reopening gives us time — a precious resource we have too often squandered. If Europe goes back to cruising on autopilot, convinced that crises always resolve themselves, it will make the same mistake for a third time. The time to build resilience is now — not when the next strait closes.*

## Conclusion: a reopened strait, an open global question

### The strait as a mirror of global geopolitics

The **Strait of Hormuz** is not merely a maritime passage — it is a mirror of the world's condition. Its closure for months revealed the vulnerability of the global economy to a single geographic transit point. Its reopening reveals the necessity of an international order in which no state can unilaterally hold such a chokehold over the vital flows of the global economy.

### What the US-Iran deal changes — and what it doesn't

The deal changes short-term oil flows, and that is a good thing. It does not fundamentally alter **Iran**'s nuclear intentions. It does not resolve the question of Iranian drones in **Russia**. It does not guarantee long-term stability of the passage. These are reasons to remain vigilant — and to insist that the **60 days** of technical negotiation produce a serious, verifiable agreement.

*The Strait of Hormuz is open. Energy is flowing. Markets are breathing. But beneath this restored normalcy, the fundamental architecture of global dependencies remains intact. The real decoding of Hormuz is not a story about a reopened strait — it is a story about lessons unlearned and energy transitions forever deferred until tomorrow.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [CNBC — 35 million barrels have left Hormuz since the US-Iran deal — June 24, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/24/oil-tanker-strait-hormuz-iran-deal.html)

- [CNBC — Shipping traffic rebounds in Hormuz, but confidence remains fragile — June 26, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/26/strait-of-hormuz-shipping-oil-us-iran.html)

- [Washington Post — Iran reopens Hormuz and can freely sell its oil — June 17, 2026](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2026/06/17/iran-us-israel-war-oil-deal-june-17-2026/5360ce54-6a35-11f1-830e-133d20cadd28_story.html)

- [World Oil/Bloomberg — US and Iran strike deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — June 14, 2026](https://www.worldoil.com/news/2026/6/14/u-s-iran-strike-deal-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz-sending-oil-lower/)

### Secondary sources

- [CNBC — Vance: the Iran deal is "very general" — June 15, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/15/vance-iran-deal-negotiations-nuclear.html)

- [Al Jazeera — IAEA demands "very strong" verification of Iran's nuclear programme — June 26, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/26/iaea-demands-strong-verification-of-irans-nuclear-programme)

- [Le Monde — Vance tasked with defending Trump's Iran deal — June 19, 2026](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/06/19/vance-tasked-with-defending-trump-s-iran-deal_6754661_4.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-hormuz-rouvert-ce-que-l-accord-change-pour-l-energie-mondiale