# DECODING: Tanks in the Streets of Taipei: the Five-Day Exercise Preparing the Island for the Unthinkable

> Since June 22, 2026, Taiwan has transformed its urban arteries into combat corridors. Tanks, armored vehicles, columns of soldiers in combat gear have patrolled the streets of Taipei and other cities on the island, to the stunned gaze of passersby. This is not a coup. It is not a Hollywood production. It is a five-day immediate combat readiness exercise, ordered by Taiwan's mil

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-chars-dans-les-rues-de-taipei-l-exercice-de-cinq-jours-qui-prepare-l

## Introduction: When peace looks like war

### Armored vehicles on civilian avenues

Since **June 22, 2026**, **Taiwan** has transformed its urban arteries into combat corridors. Tanks, armored vehicles, columns of soldiers in combat gear have patrolled the streets of **Taipei** and other cities on the island, to the stunned gaze of passersby. This is not a coup. It is not a Hollywood production. It is a five-day **immediate combat readiness exercise**, ordered by Taiwan's military command as a direct response to the escalating provocations of China's **People's Liberation Army** (PLA).

The exercise carries a sober, almost bureaucratic name — **"immediate combat readiness"** — but its message is anything but discreet. For the first time in years, **Taiwan** is no longer hiding its war preparations behind diplomatic euphemisms. It is staging them, deliberately, in front of the world's cameras. The signal sent to **Beijing**, to **Washington**, and to Indo-Pacific allies is clear: **the island will fight**.

### A response to a threat that no longer hides itself

This spectacular deployment did not occur in a strategic vacuum. It is an explicit response to the **"real war"** military exercises the **PLA** conducted in the preceding weeks around the Taiwan Strait. Beijing no longer speaks of routine exercises — its generals now openly use the phrase **"real-war-oriented exercises"**, a martial vocabulary that would have been considered alarmist ten years ago.

The **Washington Post** of June 22, 2026 described in detail these tanks crossing residential neighborhoods, these soldiers practicing urban infiltration maneuvers, these simulations of critical infrastructure defense. The staging was that of an island preparing not for a distant eventuality, but for a threat knocking at its door. **The era of strategic ambiguity is over.**

*I will be direct: seeing tanks in the streets of a democratic city should chill us to the bone — not because Taiwan is becoming authoritarian, but because democracy has been reduced to flexing its muscles to survive. This is proof that deterrence only works when it is visible, tangible, credible. Taipei understood what too many Western capitals still refuse to admit.*

## The PLA shows its hand: "real war" exercises

### A military rhetoric crossing the Rubicon

The **People's Liberation Army** has radically changed its vocabulary in recent months. Its spokespersons and generals have abandoned cautious formulations to adopt language that leaves no room for interpretation: **"reunification by force is a viable option"**, **"exercises are war rehearsals"**, **"no territory is out of reach"**. This semantic shift is not trivial. In Chinese strategic culture, words precede actions — and **Beijing** knows it.

The **PLA**'s recent exercises around the strait included simulations of **naval blockades**, repeated amphibious landings, coordinated air strikes against fictional targets that bore a striking resemblance to Taiwanese military bases. All accompanied by ballistic missiles sent into maritime exclusion zones carefully chosen for their psychological value. **Beijing is no longer testing weapons — it is testing Taiwan's resolve and that of its allies.**

### The grey-zone doctrine pushed to its limits

**Beijing**'s strategy has for years rested on **"grey-zone warfare"**: aggressive actions that remain below the threshold of open war, sufficiently provocative to erode Taiwanese resolve without triggering a Western military response. Daily incursions into the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), intimidating naval maneuvers, massive disinformation campaigns — all instruments designed to psychologically exhaust an encircled island population.

But the escalation of these **"real-war-oriented"** exercises suggests that **Beijing** has decided to take a further step. You are no longer in the grey zone when you publicly announce that your maneuvers are **invasion rehearsals**. Taiwan's government registered this shift in tone and responded with the five-day exercise: a demonstration of **operational resilience** on the island's own soil, not merely on its territorial waters.

*What I find particularly chilling about Beijing's strategy is its calculated patience. China does not need to win quickly — it needs to demonstrate to every Taiwanese citizen that resistance will be costly, painful, perhaps futile. These "real-war" exercises are also a psychological war against a civilian population. And that is precisely why Taiwan's response, with its tanks in the streets, is an act of political courage as much as a military one.*

## Five days of exercise: what armored vehicles in the streets really mean

### The doctrine of total urban defense

The five-day exercise is not reducible to a parade of armored vehicles to impress foreign cameras. It is part of a **total defense doctrine** that **Taiwan** has been refining for several years. The core idea is simple but revolutionary for an island democracy: if the **PLA** lands, every square kilometer of the island must become a defensive battlefield. Every avenue, every building, every bridge — everything must be integratable into a resistance posture.

That is why tanks patrol residential neighborhoods. That is why soldiers conduct maneuvers in commercial spaces and around civilian infrastructure. The objective is to accustom the population to military presence, to map urban defense axes, and above all to signal to **Beijing** that any invasion would encounter a **scorched-earth resistance**, not a capitulation in open field. **Ukraine provided the lesson — Taiwan has memorized it.**

### The psychological dimension: familiarizing civilians with the reality of war

Beyond the operational dimension, the exercise serves a crucial psychological objective. Democracies tend to live in the comfort of peace until the moment it ceases abruptly. **Taiwan**, under growing pressure for several years, has decided to pull its citizens out of this protective lethargy. By seeing tanks in their streets, helicopters overhead, military columns in their neighborhoods, Taiwanese people are concretely experiencing what **war preparedness** means.

Surveys conducted on the island reveal a significant trend: the proportion of Taiwanese willing to fight to defend their territory increased following 2022, when Russia's invasion of **Ukraine** suddenly made concrete a threat that had seemed abstract. The five-day exercise capitalizes on this shift in mindset. It transforms the will to resist into a **defense culture**, into a collective reflex, into mental preparation as much as physical.

*I am convinced that the Ukrainian model was the psychological turning point for Taiwan. When you watched civilians from Kyiv take up arms, engineers transform into soldiers overnight, grandmothers making Molotov cocktails, you understood that national defense is not the exclusive business of professionals. Taiwan drew that lesson. The question is whether the West has drawn it for itself.*

## RIMPAC and Valiant Shield: the regional maritime context

### A Pacific bristling with allied warships

The Taiwanese land exercise is not unfolding in isolation. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific is witnessing one of the largest allied naval demonstrations of force in decades. Exercise **RIMPAC 2026** (Rim of the Pacific), which officially began on **June 24**, brought together **approximately 40 warships**, **25,000 personnel**, and **31 nations** in Hawaiian waters and beyond, running through **July 31**. Simultaneously, exercise **Valiant Shield 2026**, launched on **June 22**, mobilizes American forces and allies across the Indo-Pacific with a particular focus on high-intensity conflict scenarios.

The convergence of these three exercises — Taiwanese, RIMPAC, Valiant Shield — is not a scheduling coincidence. It is a **deliberate strategic coordination** aimed at sending a coherent message to **Beijing**: resistance to aggressive action will not be isolated, will not be Taiwan's alone, but collective, naval, aerial, and determined. **Deterrence is built through actions, not declarations.**

### The strategic message sent to Beijing

To understand why these simultaneous exercises matter, one must grasp the logic of extended deterrence. **Beijing** constantly calculates the cost of military action against **Taiwan** against the expected benefits. Every allied exercise demonstrating rapid power projection capabilities, every American warship training to operate in contested maritime spaces, every simulated coordinated strike — all of this enters the Chinese calculation.

Analysts at **ThinkChina** noted on June 25, 2026 that naval density in the western Pacific is reaching levels unseen since the Cold War. **Thirty-one nations** participating in RIMPAC — that is a coalition far exceeding the simple bilateral US-Taiwan framework. It is a signal that any aggression against **Taiwan** would have repercussions in capitals from Sydney to Tokyo, from Seoul to Ottawa. **The strategic cost of an invasion becomes difficult to quantify — and that is precisely the objective.**

*RIMPAC is often treated as a routine exercise, a grand annual naval parade. Wrong. In the context of 2026, with China orchestrating its own invasion rehearsals around Taiwan, every allied warship in the Pacific is a political declaration as much as a capacity demonstration. I hope decision-makers in Brussels and Berlin are reading the nautical charts as attentively as the mandarins of Zhongnanhai.*

## The European warning: finally a voice that counts

### European powers break their silence

On **June 24, 2026**, according to a report from **Yahoo News**, the leading European powers issued a **rare and explicit warning** about the threat China poses to **Taiwan**. This is not the first time Europe has spoken on the issue, but the tone and precision of this warning mark a departure from the usual diplomatic caution. European capitals specifically named the **People's Republic of China** as a source of destabilization in the Indo-Pacific — a gesture that would have been unthinkable five years ago.

This evolution reflects a painful but necessary awakening. Europe long treated the **Taiwan** question as an American-Asian problem, external to its immediate concerns. The war in **Ukraine** shattered that illusion. If a revisionist power can invade a European country in 2022, another revisionist power can invade an Indo-Pacific democracy in 2026 or beyond. **The geography of security no longer has airtight regional borders.**

### The credibility of the warning: words versus capabilities

The burning question is that of credibility. A diplomatic warning has value only if it is backed by power projection capabilities and the political will to use them. Yet Europe, despite real progress on defense spending since 2022, remains structurally limited in its ability to project power into the Indo-Pacific. French and British navies can deploy naval groups in the region — and they have. But the scale bears no comparison with that of the United States.

Yet the European warning has a symbolic and political value that exceeds its raw military capabilities. It breaks the fiction of a Europe indifferent to **Taiwan**'s fate. It complicates **Beijing**'s diplomatic calculation, which can no longer treat the affair as a bilateral Sino-American conflict. It also legitimizes **Taiwan**'s efforts to diversify its international support beyond the sole American umbrella. **In geopolitics, words sometimes precede actions — and sometimes they advantageously replace them.**

*The European warning on Taiwan is real progress, and I don't want to minimize it. But I remain skeptical about its concrete reach. Europe also multiplied firm declarations on Ukraine — and Putin overrode them. Beijing is watching. What Taiwan needs is not so much words as F-35s, anti-ship missiles and a formal commitment to retaliate. On that front, Europe still has a long road ahead.*

## The maritime quarantine simulation: the most feared scenario

### Tabletop exercise: simulating the unthinkable to make it thinkable

Alongside the ground military exercises, **Taiwan** conducted a tabletop exercise reconstructing the scenario of a **"quarantine"** imposed by Chinese forces on maritime access, according to **Bloomberg** of June 25, 2026. This type of exercise — bringing together political decision-makers, military officers, and civilian experts around a table to simulate crises — is valuable precisely because it forces participants to articulate responses to situations that the emotions and urgencies of the moment would make difficult to handle.

The **"quarantine"** is the scenario that **Beijing** theoretically prefers over a direct invasion. Instead of a massive amphibious landing — a risky operation, costly in lives, and potentially triggering a direct American response — China could opt for a gradual naval blockade, cutting **Taiwan** off from its energy imports, food, and electronic components. An island of **23 million inhabitants** entirely dependent on its imports would then be slowly strangled, without the act of war being legally incontestable.

### Taiwan's systemic vulnerabilities in the face of a blockade

**Taiwan** imports **97% of its energy**. It depends on maritime routes for virtually all of its raw materials and foodstuffs. In the event of an effective naval blockade, the island's strategic reserves — estimated at a few weeks for hydrocarbons — would rapidly deplete. The electronics industries, including **TSMC** and its chip factories upon which the entire world depends, would shut down for lack of components and energy.

This catastrophic scenario is what the tabletop simulation modeled. Participants had to answer brutal questions: how long can **Taiwan** hold under quarantine? At what point would internal pressures become unbearable? What would the American response be to a quarantine that is not technically a "war"? How would regional allies — **Japan**, **Australia**, **Philippines** — react? The conclusions of this exercise were not made public, but the mere fact of conducting it is revealing of the Taiwanese mindset.

*Maritime quarantine is, in my view, the most insidious and most difficult scenario to counter. A direct invasion — you see it coming, you name it, you can respond militarily. A quarantine is more ambiguous — and ambiguity is the favorite weapon of authoritarian regimes. Taiwan had the intelligence to simulate this scenario. The West should do the same, collectively, because if Taiwan falls through economic asphyxiation, the response cannot be exclusively military.*

## Beijing's retaliation against the 1260H list: technological escalation

### Washington extends its designation list — Beijing strikes back

On **June 26, 2026**, the **Institute for the Study of War** (ISW) published its China-Taiwan update, revealing that **Beijing** responded to the American expansion of the **"1260H list"** — designating Chinese entities linked to the military — with **export controls** and by prohibiting Chinese government entities from dealing with designated American companies. This commercial and technological escalation is inseparable from the military tensions around **Taiwan**.

The **1260H list** is an American legislative tool that imposes restrictions on Chinese companies deemed too close to the **PLA**. Its recent expansion targets new entities in the sectors of semiconductors, artificial intelligence and dual-use military technologies. **Beijing** perceives these measures as a systemic economic attack aimed at slowing its military modernization — and responds in kind, transforming commerce into a battlefield.

### The technology war as an extension of military competition

This technological escalation reveals the depth of the Sino-American rivalry. It is no longer simply about military tensions around the **Taiwan** Strait, but a systemic competition for mastery of the technologies that will define military superiority in the **21st century**: advanced chips, artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems, quantum communications. **Tomorrow's war is being prepared in today's laboratories.**

**TSMC**, the Taiwanese company that manufactures the world's most advanced chips, sits at the heart of this rivalry. **Beijing** wants its technological capabilities — either by developing them itself (with delay), or by controlling them through a takeover of **Taiwan**. This is one of the fundamental reasons why the island is so strategically important, beyond its geographical position. **Whoever controls TSMC controls the electronic brain of the world economy.**

*I don't think we've yet fully measured what Chinese takeover of TSMC would mean. It would not be merely a geopolitical defeat for the West — it would be an existential technological dependency. Beijing would have a leverage point over every smartphone, every computer, every weapons system our militaries use. That's why Taiwan is not just a question for Taiwanese people.*

## The total defense doctrine: the Ukrainian lesson applied

### From Kyiv to Taipei: how a democracy survives aggression

The five-day exercise draws directly from the Ukrainian experience. Since **February 2022**, the world has watched how a nation that appeared poorly prepared resisted invasion by a supposedly overwhelming military power. The factors behind this resistance are now well known: **civilian population morale**, society's capacity to mobilize, modern weaponry provided by determined allies, and above all a military doctrine adapted to the terrain and the asymmetric nature of the conflict.

**Taiwan** has drawn multiple lessons from this conflict. The first: the initial resistance counts more than anything else. The first hours and days of an invasion often determine the long-term outcome. If the **PLA** thinks it can decapitate the Taiwanese government in a few hours and present the world with a fait accompli, the five-day exercise demonstrates that the chain of command is decentralized, forces are dispersed, resistance is prepared to last. **There will be no quick victory for Beijing — not if Taiwan has anything to say about it.**

### The limits of the Ukrainian analogy

The analogy with **Ukraine** has its limits, however, and it would be intellectually dishonest not to acknowledge them. **Taiwan** is an island — it cannot receive military aid via land routes as **Ukraine** did through **Poland**. An effective naval blockade could totally isolate it. Moreover, **China**'s military power is incomparably greater than Russia's in 2022 — it possesses a modern navy, a considerable air force, and a ballistic missile capability that exceeds what **Russia** has used in **Ukraine**.

These differences do not mean that Taiwanese resistance is doomed to fail. They mean that its success depends even more radically on rapid and massive external support, on a clear American decision to intervene from the first hours of the conflict, and on an internal preparation that transforms every square meter of the island into a fortress. The five-day exercise works on this last point. **The first two depend on decisions that are not made in Taipei.**

*There is something profoundly unjust about Taiwan's situation: a living, innovative, peaceful democracy, compelled to prepare for a war it never wanted, imposed by a neighboring authoritarian regime that cannot tolerate its very existence. I am not naive about the geopolitical complexities of this relationship. But morally, the right is on Taipei's side — and that right deserves concrete protection, not emergency support declarations.*

## The American dilemma: ambiguous engagement or clear deterrence

### American strategic ambiguity: asset or trap?

For decades, the **United States** has maintained a policy of **strategic ambiguity** on **Taiwan**: selling weapons to the island, maintaining unofficial ties, but refusing to formally guarantee military intervention in case of a Chinese attack. This ambiguity is supposed to deter **Beijing** from acting, by leaving doubt about the American response, while avoiding provoking **China** with too explicit a commitment.

In the context of **2026**, this policy is showing its limits. **Beijing** has had time to observe the American response to the invasion of **Ukraine** — massive aid, but no direct intervention — and may be tempted to bet on a similar response for **Taiwan**. The five-day exercise is, among other things, a message addressed to **Washington**: **Taiwan is preparing to fight, but it needs to know with what guarantee.** Strategic ambiguity reassures diplomats — it leaves soldiers in uncertainty.

### Trump and the Pacific: unpredictable calculations

The **Trump** administration adds a layer of unpredictability to this equation. On one hand, **Trump** has maintained, even reinforced, arms sales to **Taiwan** and tightened technological sanctions against **China**. On the other, his erratic governing style and sometimes contradictory declarations on American commitments abroad create an uncertainty that **Beijing** reads carefully. A president who can declare that **NATO** is "obsolete" before claiming a "victory" in a deal with **Iran** does not inspire unlimited confidence in his Indo-Pacific commitments.

For **Taiwan**, the lesson is clear: counting on the **United States** is indispensable but insufficient. Internal preparation, civil resilience, deep territorial defense — these are what the island has direct control over. That is exactly what the five-day exercise aims to strengthen. **Better to build one's own fortress than to rely on the promise of a distracted savior.**

*Trump is, for Taiwan, a valuable but unpredictable supporter. His hostility to China is real — but it is often instrumentalized for trade negotiations rather than for a strategic defense of democracy. That's the problem with "necessary evils" in foreign policy: they serve when their interests coincide with yours, and not otherwise. Taiwan is right not to bet all its chips on Washington's constancy.*

## Regional allies: Japan, Australia, Philippines in the equation

### Tokyo: from cautious neutrality to assumed engagement

**Japan** has in recent years undergone one of the most spectacular strategic transformations of the postwar period. Constrained by its pacifist constitution since **1945**, Tokyo has progressively reinterpreted its constitutional constraints to give itself offensive military capabilities — the first in **70 years**. The announced doubling of the defense budget to reach **2% of GDP** by 2027, the acquisition of deep-strike missiles, the military reinforcement of the Ryūkyū Islands facing **Taiwan** — all of this draws a **Japan** actively preparing for the possibility of a regional conflict.

For **Taiwan**, Japan's transformation is a first-order strategic development. The **Ryūkyū** Islands, including **Okinawa**, form a chain less than **100 kilometers** from Taiwan's coasts. An active Japanese military base in this region would constitute an irreplaceable logistical support in case of conflict. And **Tokyo**, aware that the fall of **Taiwan** would make its own islands the next targets of **Beijing**, has no intention of watching passively.

### Australia and Philippines: the southern flank of Taiwan's defense

**Australia**, within the framework of the **AUKUS** pact and its participation in **RIMPAC 2026**, is strengthening its submarine capabilities and its operational ties with the American and British navies. Canberra has clearly identified **China** as its primary security concern and is adapting its military posture accordingly. Joint exercises, intelligence sharing, the regular deployment of Australian ships in the **South China Sea** constitute as many signals to **Beijing**.

The **Philippines** present a more complex profile. Manila has signed multiple defense agreements with **Washington**, granting access to several additional military bases on its territory within the **Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement**. But the **Philippines** remain economically very dependent on **China** and permanently navigate between attraction and repulsion. In case of conflict around **Taiwan**, the **Philippines**' position would be determinative — and always uncertain. **In Indo-Pacific geopolitics, uncertainty is a permanent given.**

*What strikes me about the regional coalition forming around Taiwan is its deep defensive logic. Japan, Australia, the Philippines do not support Taiwan out of love for abstract democracy — though that motive exists — but because they understand that their own security is tied to the island's fate. It is deterrence through converging interests, and that is the most robust form. Ideological alliances falter. Existential alliances hold.*

## Taiwan's defense industry: preparing the island to fight alone

### Toward strategic autonomy in armaments

**Taiwan** has been engaged for several years in an ambitious **strategic autonomy** program in armaments production. The island now manufactures its own submarines — the **IDS (Indigenous Defense Submarine)** program produced its first unit in **2023** — as well as long-range cruise missiles, stealth corvettes and drone systems. This military industrialization aims to reduce import dependency in case of blockade and to increase asymmetric deterrence capacity.

The **Hsiung Feng IIE** and **Yun Feng** missiles give **Taiwan** a strike capability against mainland Chinese targets — a significant doctrinal shift that transforms the island from a purely defensive power into an actor capable of threatening military infrastructure on the mainland. This deterrence through counter-strike threat is directly inspired by the Ukrainian strategy of strikes on Russian refineries. **If you attack my territory, your territory is not safe — that is the logic.**

### Remaining capability gaps

Despite this progress, significant capability gaps remain. **Taiwan's navy** remains inferior in number and tonnage to that of the **PLA**. The island's **missile defense**, though improved by the acquisition of **Patriot** and **THAAD** systems, would be overwhelmed by a massive saturation of ballistic and cruise missiles. And above all, **Taiwan**'s capacity to maintain its energy supplies under a blockade remains its structural Achilles' heel.

The five-day exercise does not solve these gaps — no exercise can. But it develops the resilience culture that will allow Taiwanese forces to maximize the use of their existing capabilities, to improvise under pressure, and to hold out long enough for allies to intervene. In modern warfare, **the duration of initial resistance is often more determinative than the raw balance of forces.**

*I hold genuine admiration for the way Taiwan builds its defense with the means at hand. This is not a country rich in natural resources, not a continental empire, not a superpower. It is an island of 23 million people that manufactures submarines, cruise missiles and microchips while organizing its own civil resistance. If that is not a lesson in democratic resilience, I don't know what is.*

## The ISW and the balance-of-power analysis: what numbers don't say

### Modeling the China-Taiwan conflict according to think tanks

The **Institute for the Study of War** regularly publishes analyses on the evolving balance of power between **China** and **Taiwan**. Its update of **June 26, 2026** reveals not only **Beijing**'s commercial counter-offensive against the 1260H list, but also the state of preparation of both parties. These analyses aggregate data from multiple open sources — satellite imagery, official statements, observed exercises — to build an overall picture.

Simulations conducted by institutions like the **Center for Strategic and International Studies** have modeled several scenarios for a **Taiwan** invasion. Their conclusions, published in 2023 and confirmed since, underlined that in most direct invasion scenarios, the **United States** and its allies could repel the **PLA** — but at a very high human and material cost. The five-day exercise aims precisely to improve these probabilities, to reduce these costs, to make **Beijing**'s calculation even less favorable.

### What the models do not capture

Mathematical models have their limits. They quantify missiles, ships, aircraft. They calculate the probabilities of air defense penetration. But they do not capture the fighting will of a civilian population, the genius of a commander under pressure, the capacity of a nation to reinvent itself under bombardment. **Ukraine** demonstrated that these intangible factors can overturn all of the models' forecasts.

That is why the five-day exercise — with its tanks in the streets, its soldiers in civilian neighborhoods, its deliberate staging of imminent war — is worth as much as the most advanced weapons acquisitions. It builds something that numbers do not measure: a **resistance culture**, a collective reflex, a determination that takes root in bodies and minds before the first shots are fired. **Future wars may be won as much in minds as on battlefields.**

*Simulation models are useful, but they have always left me uneasy when they become the sole basis for policy decisions. Humans do not behave like variables in an equation. The history of war is filled with armies that lost despite their theoretical superiority, and nations that survived despite all adverse predictions. Taiwan is betting on these unpredictable factors — and I think it is right to do so.*

## Toward 2027: possible scenarios according to analysts

### The dreaded temporal horizon

The year **2027** is cited by several American analysts and officials as the temporal horizon at which **China**'s military capabilities could allow it to consider military action against **Taiwan** with an improved probability of success. This date coincides with the centennial of the **People's Liberation Army** — a symbolically charged milestone for **Xi Jinping**'s regime. It also coincides with the projected completion of several major naval modernization programs.

This horizon is not a certainty. **Beijing** will not trigger a war simply because the calendar permits — the economic cost of a conflict, the uncertainties about the American response, the risks of a prolonged engagement all favor caution. But it fully justifies the urgency of Taiwanese preparations. If **2027** is a possible window, then **2026** is exactly the moment to consolidate defenses, train troops, accustom the population — which is precisely what the five-day exercise does.

### Signals that could precede an escalation

Analysts agree on several precursor warning indicators of military action: an intensification of PLA exercises without notice, unusual amphibious troop movements, official rhetoric on "reunification" crossing a new threshold, or an internal crisis in **China** pushing **Xi Jinping** to seek a nationalist diversion externally. None of these signals are currently flashing bright red — but several are at orange. **The five-day exercise is a proportionate response to a threat level that has risen one notch.**

What is certain is that the exercise of **June 2026** is not the last of its kind. If current trends persist — escalating Chinese provocations, maintained Taiwanese resolve, American and allied support — these urban military displays will become a constant feature of Taiwanese life. Like Israeli conscription, like Finnish exercises, like Ukrainian air raid sirens before **2022**. **An encircled democracy learns to live in a state of permanent vigilance.**

*I don't know what will happen in 2027. No one really does, including at Zhongnanhai. But I know that history punishes democracies that rest on their laurels and rewards those that prepare. Taiwan is preparing. Europe is slowly waking up. And somewhere, in the calculations of Beijing's strategists, this visible preparation counts — perhaps more than all the missiles in the world.*

## The semiconductor diplomacy: TSMC as a de facto geopolitical shield

### The microchip as strategic deterrence

In all of this military equation, one silent actor plays a role of **involuntary deterrence**: **TSMC**, the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer that produces the world's most advanced chips. The company alone represents more than **90% of global manufacturing capacity** for chips smaller than 7 nanometers. Without it, the smartphones, computers, weapons systems and autonomous vehicles of the Western world would shut down within months of an interruption in its production. This is a **technological dependency** that transcends borders and alliances.

This reality creates what strategists call the **"silicon shield"**: the idea that **Beijing** would hesitate to destroy or conquer **Taiwan** precisely because a disruption of **TSMC** would affect its own economy, its own technology industries, its own military ambitions. **China** remains partially dependent on Taiwanese chips for its advanced weapons systems. **Touching TSMC is potentially shooting oneself in the technological foot.**

### The limits of the silicon shield against Xi's ambitions

**Xi Jinping** has for several years launched a massive **technological autonomy** program, known as **"Made in China 2025"**, aimed at reducing this dependency on foreign chips. Billions of yuan have been invested in domestic foundries like **SMIC**. The results remain disappointing relative to the ambitions: **SMIC** is at least **five to ten years** behind **TSMC** on the most advanced technologies. This lag constitutes a real brake on any military adventure.

But the **silicon shield** has its limits. If **Xi Jinping** decides that **national reunification** outweighs economic considerations — a nationalist calculation that his regime could impose on its population — then rational economic logic gives way before ideology. The five-day exercise in **Taiwan** does not rest on the hope that **Beijing** will be reasonable. It rests on the certainty that if **Beijing** is not reasonable, the island will fight. **Both logics must coexist for deterrence to hold.**

*I am convinced that the silicon shield is real but fragile. It deters a rational economic calculation — it does not stop a nationalist paroxysm. And Xi Jinping, since 2012, has demonstrated his capacity to sacrifice economic dividends on the altar of national power. Global dependency on TSMC is a chance for Taiwan, not a guarantee. Treating a chance as a certainty is committing the very error that deterrence aims to prevent.*

## Conclusion: The island that refuses to die in its sleep

### Five days that are worth a message

The five-day exercise that put tanks in the streets of **Taipei** is not a sign of imminent war. It is precisely the opposite: it is an act of deterrence, a demonstration of resolve that aims to make war less likely by making it more costly for the aggressor. **Taiwan** is telling **Beijing**: we are ready, we will fight, you will not find an island that surrenders at the first salvos. It is a sober, realistic message, deeply rooted in the lessons of recent history.

The context is one of an Indo-Pacific undergoing full strategic recomposition: **RIMPAC** bringing together 31 nations in Pacific waters, **Valiant Shield** practicing high-intensity scenarios, a **Europe** breaking its silence on the Chinese threat, regional allies consolidating their capabilities. **Taiwan** is no longer alone in this collective show of force. The strategic isolation **Beijing** dreamed of — an island alone against a continent — is dissolving.

### What the world must retain

What **Taiwan** is accomplishing with its readiness exercises deserves the attention and respect of every democracy. It demonstrates that an open, pluralistic, innovative society can also be resolutely capable of defending itself. It proves that freedom is not incompatible with vigilance, that democracy can integrate national defense into its culture without sacrificing its fundamental values. It offers the West a model of democratic resilience that we all need.

The world watches **Taiwan** with an anxiety that too few translate into concrete commitment. This five-day exercise is an invitation — an invitation to choose sides before choices are imposed by the force of events. The tanks in the streets of **Taipei** are rolling for **Taiwan**. But their message resonates far beyond the strait. **It is addressed to each and every one of us.**

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*What I take from this five-day exercise is an obvious truth that too few want to hear: peace is not maintained by the goodwill of democracies alone. It is maintained by their capacity to fight. Taiwan understood this before we did. When the tanks return to the barracks, the message will remain in the streets. And in minds. That is the point.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Washington Post — Taiwan launches a 5-day combat readiness exercise against Chinese maneuvers — June 22, 2026](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/22/taiwan-hosts-military-drills-readiness-china/0c4d53a2-6e13-11f1-8730-e7fd0e2a6404_story.html)

- [Bloomberg — Taiwan conducts a maritime quarantine simulation exercise by Chinese forces — June 25, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-25/taiwan-tabletop-drill-simulates-maritime-quarantine-by-chinese-forces)

- [Institute for the Study of War (ISW) — China-Taiwan Update: June 26, 2026 — June 26, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-june-26-2026/)

- [ThinkChina — Why the Pacific is filling with warships: RIMPAC and the new military contest — June 25, 2026](https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/why-pacific-filling-warships-china-rimpac-and-new-military-contest)

### Secondary sources

- [Yahoo News — European powers issue a rare warning about the Chinese threat against Taiwan — June 24, 2026](https://www.yahoo.com/news/world/articles/european-powers-issue-rare-warning-115803855.html)

- [Ground News / Bloomberg — Context on Russia's war and global military spending — June 23, 2026](https://ground.news/article/bloomberg-russia-to-increase-war-spending-by-an-additional-45-trillion-rubles-in-2026)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decryptage-chars-dans-les-rues-de-taipei-l-exercice-de-cinq-jours-qui-prepare-l