# DECODING: Ukraine holds 22 Belarusians, offers one spy in trade

> Twenty-two Belarusian nationals who fought for Russia are now held in Ukrainian prisoner-of-war facilities, up from a previously reported 17, according to Ukraine 's Coordination Headquarters for the treatment of…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decoding-ukraine-holds-22-belarusians-offers-one-spy-in-trade

## Key takeaways

- The count rose from 17 to 22 with no public explanation of when or how the extra five were captured.
- Seven dual Belarusian-Russian citizens have been exchanged since 2022, likely easier to route through Russian-Ukrainian channels.
- Kardach was arrested on January 21, 2026 while working for the Coordination Headquarters; her preliminary investigation is complete and she is in pre-trial detention in Kyiv.
- Bohdan Okhrimenko said Russian and Belarusian authorities were informed of the offer and are "in no hurry" to reclaim their "compromised" agents, citing the Khochu k svoim program, whose figures were not detailed.
- The Coordination Headquarters did not provide the number of Ukrainians held in Belarusian prisons.

Twenty-two **Belarusian** nationals who fought for **Russia** are now held in Ukrainian prisoner-of-war facilities, up from a previously reported 17, according to **Ukraine**'s **Coordination Headquarters** for the treatment of **prisoners of war**, cited by **Ukrainska Pravda** on **July 27, 2026**. That number, revised upward without **public** explanation for the change, sits at the center of a quieter story: **Kyiv** is offering to trade a woman accused of spying for **Belarus**'s security service, and neither **Minsk** nor **Moscow** appears to want her back. *A number that grows by five without comment is still a number someone chose not to explain.*

The offer concerns **Ina Kardach**, a **Belarusian** national detained since **January 21, 2026** on suspicion of **espionage** for **Belarus**'s **KGB**, the State Security Committee. She had worked, until her arrest, for the very **Coordination Headquarters** now proposing to trade her away. That detail alone turns this into more than a routine prisoner story: it is an institution offering up someone who once sat inside it.

This **decoding** lays out what is documented, what is claimed without confirmation, and what the **silence** from **Minsk** and **Moscow** says about the value both governments place on their own people. **Bohdan Okhrimenko**, head of the **Coordination Headquarters** Secretariat, has framed that silence directly, and this piece takes his framing as a starting point, not as an established fact.

## The count that changed: 17 to 22

### What Radio Liberty reported before

**Radio Liberty** had previously identified **17 Belarusian nationals** who fought for **Russia** and were captured by **Ukraine**, a figure that circulated in earlier reporting before this week's update. The jump to **22**, confirmed by the **Coordination Headquarters** in response to a Radio Liberty inquiry and relayed by **Ukrainska Pravda**, represents a 29 percent increase with no **public** accounting of when or how the additional five were captured.

Numbers like these are not neutral bookkeeping. Each one represents a person whose government has not, in the sources reviewed, issued any **public** statement acknowledging their capture or advocating for their return. *A government that will not count its own captured soldiers has already decided how much they are worth.*

### Seven already exchanged since 2022

Since the war began in 2022, **seven dual Belarusian-Russian citizens** have already been exchanged for Ukrainian nationals held in Russian captivity, according to the **Coordination Headquarters**. These **seven** held citizenship in both countries, a detail that likely eased their inclusion in exchanges brokered primarily with **Moscow** rather than **Minsk** directly.

The distinction matters for **the 22** now held: it is not yet documented how many of them hold only **Belarusian** citizenship, without the dual status that made the earlier **seven** easier to fold into Russian-Ukrainian **exchange** mechanisms. That gap in the record is one of several this piece cannot close.

## Ina Kardach: the spy Ukraine wants to trade away

### An arrest inside the institution now offering the trade

**Ina Kardach** was arrested on **January 21, 2026**, suspected of **espionage** on behalf of **Belarus**'s **KGB**, while working for the **Coordination Headquarters**, the same body responsible for Ukrainian prisoner-of-war affairs. The preliminary investigation into her case is complete, and she is currently held in **pre-trial detention** in **Kyiv**, according to **Ukrainska Pravda**.

An alleged spy working inside the office that manages POW exchanges is not a minor irony. It raises the obvious question of what she had access to, and for how long, before her arrest — a question the sources reviewed do not answer. *An institution that catches a spy inside its own walls owes an explanation it has not yet given.*

### What Ukraine is offering, and to whom

**Kyiv** has proposed exchanging **Kardach** for Ukrainian nationals, with both **Russian and Belarusian authorities** informed of the offer and of **Ukraine**'s stated readiness to proceed, according to **Okhrimenko**. This is a specific, named offer, not a general call for prisoner exchanges — **Kardach** is the named asset Ukraine is prepared to release.

What remains unconfirmed is whether **Kardach** herself has been formally charged, convicted, or remains under investigation at the time this offer was extended. The presumption of innocence applies to her case as it does to any accused person not yet convicted, and this piece treats her status accordingly.

## Okhrimenko's account of a trade nobody wants

### "Neither is in a hurry"

**Bohdan Okhrimenko**, head of the **Coordination Headquarters** Secretariat, said: "Russian and **Belarusian** authorities have both been informed of this possibility and of **Ukraine**'s readiness to do so." He then added the more pointed observation: "But neither is in a hurry to get back their 'compromised' agents, as evidenced by statistics from the state project Khochu k svoim." *An offer made and left unanswered is its own kind of answer.*

The word "compromised" is **Okhrimenko**'s characterization, attributed to him directly, not an independently verified assessment of how **Moscow** or **Minsk** actually views these individuals. It reflects the Ukrainian official's interpretation of the **silence**, which this piece reports as his stated view rather than as an established fact about Russian or **Belarusian** intentions.

### "Khochu k svoim": the program behind the claim

The Ukrainian state project **Khochu k svoim**, meaning "I want to go back to my own," is the statistical basis **Okhrimenko** cited for his claim that **Moscow** and **Minsk** are slow to reclaim their captured citizens. The program's exact figures were not detailed in the sources reviewed, which limits how precisely this claim can be evaluated here.

What can be said is that **Okhrimenko** chose to cite a named, checkable program rather than make an unsupported assertion, which gives his claim more weight than a bare accusation would carry, even without the underlying numbers published alongside it in this reporting window.

## The documented asymmetry: Ukrainians in Belarusian prisons

### A question the Coordination Headquarters did not answer

The **Coordination Headquarters** did not respond, in the reporting reviewed, to questions about the total number of Ukrainian nationals currently held in **Belarusian** prisons. **This gap is significant**: an institution willing to disclose a revised count of 22 captured Belarusians did not, in the same **exchange**, provide the mirror figure for Ukrainians held on the other side.

Silence on this specific number could reflect operational sensitivity, incomplete information, or simple oversight. None of these explanations can be confirmed from the sources available, and this piece flags the gap rather than filling it with assumption. *The number an institution won't give is often the one that matters most.*

### Why this asymmetry shapes the negotiation

Without a **public** figure for Ukrainians held in **Belarus**, it is not possible to assess whether **Kyiv**'s offer of **Kardach** for an unspecified number of Ukrainian nationals represents a favorable, unfavorable, or roughly even **exchange** in scale. The absence of that number leaves outside observers unable to judge the proportionality of the proposed trade.

This is not a criticism of **Ukraine**'s negotiating position, which it is not this piece's place to second-guess. It is a limit on what can be verified: the trade's fairness, by the numbers alone, cannot currently be assessed from **public** reporting.

## Olenivka's shadow over any prisoner discussion

### An anniversary observed the same week

Ukrainian President **Volodymyr Zelensky** marked the anniversary of the **Olenivka** tragedy in remarks reported by **UNN**, stating "we will not forget any crime against our people." Olenivka, where Ukrainian **prisoners of war** died in a 2022 incident at a Russian-controlled facility, remains a reference point for how Ukrainian officials frame the stakes of any prisoner **exchange** with **Russia** or its allies.

A memorial event for fallen **Azov** fighters tied to the same anniversary was canceled on Maidan, according to **NV.ua**, a detail that speaks to the sensitivity still surrounding this file years later. *An anniversary marked by a canceled memorial says as much as one that goes ahead.*

### Why Olenivka colors this specific offer

Any Ukrainian offer to **exchange** a **Belarusian** national, however minor her role appears next to the scale of Olenivka, takes place against a backdrop where trust in exchange mechanisms with **Russia** and its allies remains damaged by an unresolved atrocity. The **Kardach** offer is a small transaction by comparison, but it is not happening in a vacuum.

This context does not change the facts of the **Kardach** case itself. It does explain why Ukrainian officials, including **Okhrimenko**, frame prisoner exchanges in terms of who is "in a hurry" and who is not — trust, after Olenivka, is not assumed by default on either side.

## What Belarus's silence signals

### No public Belarusian statement on the offer

**Belarusian** authorities have not publicly confirmed, denied, or commented on **Ukraine**'s offer to **exchange** **Kardach**, in the sources reviewed for this piece. That **silence** is consistent with **Okhrimenko**'s characterization of **Minsk** as unhurried, but it is not, by itself, proof of the motive he attributes to that unhurriedness.

A government might stay silent for reasons ranging from strategic calculation to simple bureaucratic delay, and this piece cannot distinguish between those explanations from the **public** record available. *Silence explains nothing on its own. It only invites explanations that cannot be checked.*

### Belarus's broader role as a co-belligerent, not a bystander

**Belarus** has functioned throughout the war as a staging ground and logistical partner for Russian operations, a status that makes its citizens' presence among captured combatants in **Ukraine** unsurprising rather than anomalous. The 22 now held reflect that broader entanglement, not an isolated case of foreign nationals swept up by accident.

This context matters for judging **Minsk**'s **silence**: a government that has consistently avoided formal co-belligerent status while materially supporting **Russia**'s war has strong incentive to avoid **public** statements that would draw attention to its own citizens fighting on Russia's side.

## Russia's parallel silence, a different calculation

### Why Moscow might not want Kardach discussed publicly

**Russia**'s **silence** on the **Kardach** offer may reflect a different calculation than **Belarus**'s: acknowledging interest in a **Belarusian** intelligence asset accused of **espionage** could raise uncomfortable questions about coordination between Russian and Belarusian security services that neither government has chosen to detail publicly.

This is inference, not established fact, and this piece labels it as such. What is documented is only that no Russian statement on the **Kardach** offer appears in the sources reviewed, alongside no **Belarusian** one either.

### The seven prior exchanges as the only precedent available

The **seven** dual **Belarusian**-Russian citizens already exchanged since 2022 remain the only concrete **precedent** for how this kind of case has been resolved before. Their dual citizenship likely simplified those negotiations by routing them through established Russian-Ukrainian **exchange** channels rather than requiring separate engagement with **Minsk**.

**Kardach**, described in the sources as **Belarusian** without mention of Russian citizenship, may not fit that same channel, which could partly explain why her case appears stalled compared to the **seven** resolved earlier. This piece states this as a plausible explanation, not a confirmed one.

## What the Coordination Headquarters gains by going public

### Pressure through disclosure

By publicizing both the revised count of 22 and **Okhrimenko**'s pointed characterization of Russian and **Belarusian** reluctance, **Ukraine**'s **Coordination Headquarters** applies a form of **public** pressure that costs it little and could, in theory, prompt a response from either government keen to avoid the appearance of abandoning its own citizens.

Whether that pressure succeeds cannot yet be assessed. *Making a private stalemate public is itself a negotiating move.* No response from **Moscow** or **Minsk** had appeared in the sources reviewed at the time of this writing.

### The risk of overplaying the disclosure

There is a risk that publicizing the offer, and the accusation of reluctance that came with it, hardens rather than softens the positions of **Moscow** and **Minsk**, neither of which has strong incentive to appear to respond to **public** pressure rather than private diplomacy. This piece does not know which effect will dominate.

What can be said is that the **Coordination Headquarters** chose transparency over quiet negotiation in this instance, a choice with its own risks and its own possible benefits that only time will **clarify**.

## The information gaps that remain

### Unanswered questions about the additional five

The circumstances under which the count grew from 17 to 22 were not detailed in the sources reviewed: no dates, locations, or units were specified for the additional five Belarusians now counted among the captured. This piece does not fill that gap with speculation.

Readers should treat the count itself as confirmed by the **Coordination Headquarters** while treating the underlying circumstances as undisclosed, a distinction this piece maintains throughout rather than blurring for narrative convenience.

### Unanswered questions about Kardach's formal legal status

Whether **Kardach** has been formally charged under Ukrainian law, and with what specific offense beyond the general characterization of **espionage**, was not detailed in the sources reviewed. Her case remains, as far as this piece can establish, at the stage of a completed preliminary investigation and **pre-trial detention**.

This piece maintains the presumption of innocence for **Kardach** throughout, treating the **espionage** allegation as an accusation attributed to Ukrainian authorities rather than as an established fact of her conduct.

## What the exchange program's own numbers imply

### A named program without published figures

Khochu k svoim, cited by name in **Okhrimenko**'s remarks, is a Ukrainian state initiative tracking Russian and **Belarusian** prisoners who express interest in **exchange** or repatriation. Its precise enrollment figures were not published in the sources reviewed, which limits independent verification of Okhrimenko's claim about the pace of Russian and Belarusian reclaiming of their own citizens.

A program can exist and be cited honestly without its full statistics being made **public** at every stage. This piece treats the absence of published numbers as a gap in available evidence, not as a reason to doubt the program's existence, which Ukrainska Pravda's report treats as an established Ukrainian government initiative.

### Why the missing statistics still matter

Without the underlying enrollment and **exchange**-rate data from Khochu k svoim, outside observers cannot independently confirm whether **Okhrimenko**'s characterization of Russian and **Belarusian** reluctance reflects a documented pattern or a single anecdotal impression drawn from recent cases including **Kardach**'s own.

This piece flags that limitation rather than treating **Okhrimenko**'s framing as proven by data it has not seen. The claim remains credible, attributed, and unverified all at once, a combination this piece holds throughout rather than resolving prematurely.

## The precedent this case sets for future exchanges

### A test case for non-dual citizens

Unlike the **seven** dual **Belarusian**-Russian citizens already exchanged, **Kardach**'s case, if resolved, would establish a **precedent** for negotiating the release of Belarusian nationals who do not hold Russian citizenship, a category that may cover a larger share of **the 22** now held than the dual-citizenship cases resolved earlier.

How this specific case is resolved, or left unresolved, will likely shape how **Ukraine** approaches the other 21 Belarusians currently in its custody, none of whom, based on the sources reviewed, has been named individually in this reporting window.

### What resolution, or its absence, would signal to Minsk

If **Belarus** declines to engage on the **Kardach** offer despite her documented value as a former insider at the **Coordination Headquarters**, that non-response would itself be informative: it would suggest **Minsk** places a higher priority on avoiding the appearance of intelligence cooperation with **Kyiv** than on recovering its own citizen.

Conversely, a quiet negotiation leading to her release would suggest the **public** **silence** observed so far is tactical rather than a genuine indifference to her case. This piece cannot yet determine which scenario is unfolding, and states that limitation plainly rather than guessing at **Minsk**'s internal deliberations.

## How this compares with Russia's own prisoner disclosures

### Moscow's own numbers, rarely volunteered

**Russia**'s defense ministry has, across the broader war, generally been far less forthcoming than **Ukraine**'s **Coordination Headquarters** about prisoner counts on either side, a pattern consistent with **Moscow**'s approach to this specific case as well. No Russian figure for Ukrainian prisoners held on Russian territory accompanied this reporting window.

This asymmetry in transparency, **Ukraine** disclosing revised counts and **Russia** disclosing none, is itself part of the broader information war around this conflict, though it does not, on its own, establish which side treats its prisoners more humanely.

### What transparency costs and buys Ukraine

By publishing a revised, larger count of Belarusians held, **Ukraine** accepts the minor reputational cost of appearing to have undercounted previously, in **exchange** for the diplomatic value of demonstrating good-faith **disclosure** that neither **Moscow** nor **Minsk** has matched.

Whether that transparency ultimately produces a faster resolution of the **Kardach** case, or of the broader 22, cannot be assessed from the current record. It remains, for now, a policy choice whose payoff is not yet visible.

## What outside observers should watch next

### A response from Minsk or Moscow, however brief

The clearest signal of movement in this case would be any public acknowledgment from Belarusian or Russian officials that the Kardach offer has been received and is under consideration. No such acknowledgment appears in the sources reviewed at the time of this writing, and its absence should not be read as a final rejection, only as the current state of the record.

A statement, even a dismissive one, would represent more engagement than the silence observed so far. This piece will treat any future statement from either government as a material development worth revisiting.

### Whether the count of 22 grows again

If Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters revises the count of captured Belarusians upward again in coming weeks, that pattern would suggest an active front where Belarusian nationals continue to be captured fighting alongside Russian forces, rather than a fixed historical total from earlier phases of the war.

Tracking whether the number holds at 22 or moves again is a simple, verifiable test of whether Belarusian involvement in frontline combat is ongoing or has tapered off, a distinction this piece cannot yet resolve from a single data point.

Twenty-two Belarusians sit in Ukrainian custody, five more than previously reported, and **Kyiv** has offered to trade one accused spy for an unspecified number of Ukrainians held in return. **Bohdan Okhrimenko's** account is that neither **Moscow** nor **Minsk** is in a hurry to reclaim their own. That account has not been confirmed or denied by either government in the sources reviewed, and it should be read as the Ukrainian official's characterization, not as settled fact.

What is documented: a number that grew without **public** explanation, an accused spy who once worked inside the office now offering to release her, and a matching figure for Ukrainians in **Belarusian** prisons that was requested and not given. *An exchange offer made into silence is still, for now, only an offer.* *The number withheld tells you where the leverage actually sits.* *A spy inside the exchange office is a story about trust, not just about war.* *Two governments' silence is not the same silence, even when it sounds identical.* Until **Minsk** or **Moscow** responds, or the **Coordination Headquarters** names the missing figure, this remains an offer without an answer. *A war measured in exchanges nobody finishes is still a war being fought on paper too.* *Kardach's fate now depends on two governments deciding she is worth claiming.* *Twenty-two became a number the moment nobody explained where the extra five came from.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — 22 Belarusians held, exchange offer for Kardach — July 27, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/27/8046070/)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Related diplomatic context — July 28, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/us-makes-key-statement-at-un-on-ukraine-russia-1785239888.html)

### Secondary sources

- [Kyiv Post — Related prisoner and front-line context — July 2026](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/81267)

- [UNN — Zelensky marks Olenivka anniversary](https://unn.ua/en/news/we-will-not-forget-any-crime-against-our-people-zelenskyy-on-the-anniversary-of-the-olenivka-tragedy)

- [NV.ua — Olenivka memorial event canceled on Maidan](https://english.nv.ua/nation/terrorist-attack-in-olenivka-memorial-event-for-fallen-azov-fighters-canceled-on-maidan-50627875.html)

- [mezha.net — Ukraine marks Olenivka anniversary](https://mezha.net/eng/bukvy/a71999ef_ukraine_marks_olenivka/)

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decoding-ukraine-holds-22-belarusians-offers-one-spy-in-trade