# DECODING: Satellite Images Show Iran Rebuilding Its Nuclear Sites > Satellite images analyzed in early July 2026 show reconstruction activity at the Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin sites, two Iranian installations tied to the regime's military nuclear program. - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Analysis - Published: 2026-07-20 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decoding-satellite-images-show-iran-rebuilding-its-nuclear-sites ## Introduction: what the images taken from above reveal ### A memorandum signed in June, already contradicted in July **Satellite images** analyzed in early **July 2026** show **reconstruction** activity at the **Pickaxe Mountain** and **Parchin** sites, two Iranian installations tied to the regime's military **nuclear program**. This documented reconstruction comes barely three weeks after the signing, on **June 17, 2026**, of the **Islamabad memorandum**, meant to frame a lasting de-escalation between **Tehran** and the **Western coalition** led by **Washington**. This analysis examines precisely what these images reveal, what they do not allow us to state with certainty, and why this **reconstruction**, if confirmed in its scale and military purpose, would constitute a direct **violation** of the spirit and probably the letter of an **agreement** signed less than a month ago. ### Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin, two names that keep coming back The underground complex at **Pickaxe Mountain**, also known by its Iranian name **Kolang Gadar**, and the **Parchin** site, long associated with tests linked to nuclear weapons design according to several earlier **International Atomic Energy Agency** reports, are two installations that keep recurring in Western analyses of Iran's military **nuclear program** over the years. This recurrence of these two sites in Western concerns is not incidental: it reflects a strategic continuity on the part of the Iranian regime, which, despite successive cycles of negotiations, **sanctions**, and now direct military strikes since February, has never fully abandoned the infrastructure tied to its most sensitive nuclear ambitions. ### A question that goes beyond the technical dimension alone Beyond the mere technical question of whether this **reconstruction** constitutes a formal **violation** of the **Islamabad memorandum**, this episode raises a broader question about the very nature of diplomatic **trust** in a conflict where each side seems to anticipate, from the moment an **agreement** is signed, its possible future violation by the other party. This mutual anticipation of bad faith, should it become the structuring norm of relations between **Tehran** and the **Western coalition**, would make any future de-escalation extremely difficult to build on solid ground, whatever the precise content of the formal commitments written into any future potential **agreement**. *When both sides negotiate an agreement while already anticipating its future violation, that is no longer really diplomacy — it is an armed truce dressed up as a treaty. This cynical clear-sightedness may explain, better than anything else, the speed of this reconstruction.* *Three weeks. That is how long it apparently took Tehran to start violating an agreement it had just signed. If this reconstruction is confirmed, it will say everything about the real value the Iranian regime places on its own diplomatic signature.* ## What the satellite images precisely show ### Earthmoving and excavation activity documented Satellite analyses point to significant earthmoving and excavation activity at the **Pickaxe Mountain** complex, consistent with repair or expansion work on underground tunnels damaged by Israeli and American strikes carried out since the conflict began in February 2026. These visual signatures, though indirect, are generally considered by satellite imagery experts to be reliable indicators of ongoing **reconstruction** activity. This technical reading of the images, cautious but consistent across several independent analysts who examined the same photographs, does not, however, allow for absolute certainty about the exact purpose of this work, whether it amounts to restoring the site to its pre-strike use or reconfiguring it toward new capabilities. ### No direct evidence of a restart of enrichment activities It is essential to note that these **satellite images** document civil engineering and excavation work, but do not, by themselves, constitute direct proof that uranium enrichment activities or nuclear weapons design work have actually resumed at these specific sites. This technical distinction, often lost in the most alarmist commentary, nonetheless remains essential for rigorously assessing the real scope of this **reconstruction**. This methodological caution takes nothing away from the potential gravity of the situation: even a simple restoration of the physical infrastructure at these sites, absent evidence yet available of a restart of the most sensitive activities, would already constitute a significant **violation** of the spirit of the **Islamabad memorandum** signed in June. *We must resist the temptation of the alarmist shortcut: images of excavation are not proof of a bomb under construction. But we must also resist the opposite temptation, that of downplaying what these images do in fact document — physical reconstruction already under way.* ## The Islamabad memorandum and its precise commitments ### What Tehran had agreed to do on June 17 The **Islamabad memorandum**, signed on **June 17, 2026**, under Pakistani mediation, provided for a ceasefire between **Tehran** and the US-Israeli coalition, along with Iranian commitments to limit certain activities linked to its military **nuclear program**, in exchange for a gradual easing of Western military pressure on Iranian territory. This **agreement**, presented at the time as a major diplomatic breakthrough after months of open war since February, relied heavily on the good faith of Iranian commitments, in the absence of an intrusive **verification** mechanism comparable to the one that existed under the 2015 nuclear deal before its collapse under the first **Trump** administration. ### A verification architecture already fragile from the outset This relatively light **verification** architecture of the **Islamabad memorandum**, compared to the far more intrusive mechanisms of the 2015 **agreement**, was already a structural weakness identified by several Western analysts as soon as the agreement was signed in June, who feared precisely a scenario in which **Tehran** would use the military lull to quietly rebuild certain capabilities without international verification being able to detect it in time. This structural weakness, if confirmed as the main cause of this rapid reconstruction apparently undetected through the usual diplomatic channels, should push Western negotiators to fundamentally revise their approach to future agreements with a regime that has once again demonstrated its ability to exploit every gap left by insufficiently robust **verification** mechanisms. *We already knew, back in June, that this memorandum rested on a risky bet: trusting that Tehran would honor its commitments without a sufficiently robust verification mechanism. Three weeks later, that bet appears to be lost.* ## The Western reaction to this documented reconstruction ### Washington and Israel on heightened alert Facing these **satellite images**, **Washington** and **Israel** have stepped up their **surveillance** of sensitive Iranian sites, an expected reaction given the long history of close cooperation between American and Israeli **intelligence** services on the Iranian nuclear file. This heightened vigilance comes alongside a likely reassessment of available military options should this **reconstruction** be confirmed in its most worrying scale and purpose. This rapid Western reaction illustrates the extreme sensitivity of this file for **regional security**: unlike other more ambiguous violations observed during this conflict, a confirmed **reconstruction** of Iranian military nuclear capabilities would cross a threshold the **Western coalition** has always described as absolutely unacceptable, including at the cost of resuming direct strikes. ### President Trump facing a credibility dilemma American President **Donald Trump**, who had presented the **Islamabad memorandum** as a significant diplomatic victory for his administration, now finds himself facing a **credibility** dilemma should this **reconstruction** confirm the failure of an **agreement** he himself helped negotiate. This situation could push him toward an all the more determined military response, to avoid any appearance of diplomatic weakness toward **Tehran**. This dynamic of personal **credibility**, characteristic of **Trump's** governing style, could paradoxically make de-escalation even harder to achieve, insofar as any future **negotiation** with **Tehran** will now have to contend with a documented precedent of failure that will make the domestic American political sale of a similar new **agreement** far more difficult. *Trump sold this memorandum as a victory; he will now have to publicly acknowledge that Tehran appears to have already betrayed it. On firmness toward Iran, he is right to insist. On managing his own diplomatic credibility, the questions are legitimate.* ## The Iranian regime's position on these revelations ### A predictable but unconvincing official denial The Iranian regime has, unsurprisingly, denied any **violation** of the **Islamabad memorandum**, presenting the work observed in the **satellite images** as mere repairs to civilian infrastructure damaged by Western strikes, with no link to any restart of military nuclear activities prohibited by the **agreement** signed in June. This official line of defense, while plausible in theory given the technical ambiguity inherent in **satellite images**, runs into the very nature of the sites in question: neither **Pickaxe Mountain** nor **Parchin** is strictly civilian infrastructure, which makes the Iranian justification all the harder to accept without an independent, detailed international examination of the exact nature of the work under way. ### A fait-accompli strategy reminiscent of past precedents This Iranian strategy of quiet **reconstruction** followed by official denial once discovered recalls documented precedents in the history of Iran's **nuclear program**, where **Tehran** has regularly bet on the slowness of international **verification** processes to advance its capabilities before the international community could react in a coordinated, effective way. This strategic continuity, if confirmed once again with the **Pickaxe Mountain** and **Parchin** episode, would demonstrate that neither prolonged economic sanctions nor months of direct military strikes since February have fundamentally altered the Iranian regime's strategic calculation about the value of its military nuclear capabilities for its political survival and its regional standing. *Tehran is repeating a script we already know: deny, downplay, buy time. The problem for the regime is that this script has been identified so many times by Western intelligence services that it no longer convinces many people outside its own supporters.* ## The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this file ### Access to the sites that has remained limited for months The **International Atomic Energy Agency** has had very limited access to sensitive Iranian nuclear sites for several months, a restriction imposed by **Tehran** that considerably complicates any independent, detailed verification of the exact nature of the work observed in the satellite images of **Pickaxe Mountain** and **Parchin**. This limited access, already problematic before the signing of the **Islamabad memorandum** in June, has not been substantially improved by that agreement, which partly explains why the international community now finds itself largely dependent on commercial satellite images alone to assess the reality of this reconstruction, rather than direct, detailed inspection reports. ### An agency under pressure to obtain rapid clarifications Facing these revelations, the **International Atomic Energy Agency** finds itself under growing diplomatic pressure to secure from **Tehran** expanded access to these specific sites, a request that risks running into the same systematic refusal the Iranian regime has maintained for many months across all of its sensitive installations. This persistent impasse over inspection access illustrates one of the most important structural limits of the entire non-proliferation regime applicable to **Iran**, a limit that neither economic sanctions nor direct military strikes have so far managed to resolve satisfactorily. *A verification agency with no access to the sites it is supposed to verify is just a diplomatic shell. As long as Tehran can systematically refuse inspection, these satellite images will remain our only real window onto what is actually happening there.* ## Historical precedents of reconstruction after strikes ### Natanz and Fordow, examples already documented in this conflict This is not the first time, since the conflict began in February 2026, that satellite images have documented reconstruction activity at Iranian sites struck by the Israeli-American coalition. Similar observations had already been reported concerning the **Natanz** and **Fordow** sites, suggesting a resilience and reconstruction capacity within the Iranian nuclear program greater than some initial Western assessments had estimated after the first waves of strikes. This resilience capacity, documented repeatedly, should push Western military planners to revise their assumptions about the real durability of damage caused by airstrikes and cruise missiles against deeply buried underground infrastructure, which appears harder to durably neutralize than initial assessments of the military campaign suggested. ### A strategic lesson on the limits of the military option alone This repetition of strike cycles followed by rapid reconstruction at several distinct sites is an important strategic lesson: the military option alone, even applied consistently since February, does not appear sufficient to durably eliminate the Iranian regime's military nuclear capabilities, which strengthens the case for a more sustained combination of coordinated military, diplomatic, and economic pressure. This strategic lesson, if taken seriously by Western decision-makers, should lead to a revision of the current approach, favoring a combination of strengthened verification, sanctions targeted at **IRGC** financial networks, and occasional military pressure, rather than a strategy relying solely on repeated cycles of airstrikes with apparently temporary effects. *If the repeated strikes since February have not prevented this new reconstruction, we need the honesty to recognize that the military option alone has its limits. That does not mean abandoning firmness — it means pairing it with a more complete strategy.* ## The impact of this reconstruction on Israel's regional allies ### Immediate concern in Jerusalem This documented reconstruction fuels immediate, legitimate concern in **Jerusalem**, where the Israeli government has always regarded the complete, lasting neutralization of the Iranian military nuclear program as an existential strategic objective, independent of the cycles of diplomatic negotiation conducted by **Washington** with **Tehran** over the years. This Israeli concern, widely shared by several Western analysts specializing in nuclear proliferation, could translate into increased pressure on **Washington** for a more determined resumption of strikes against these specific sites, before the reconstruction observed crosses a threshold of maturity that would make any future neutralization more costly and risky. ### Israeli-American coordination tested by this new escalation This situation once again tests the strategic coordination between **Israel** and the **United States** on the Iranian nuclear question, two allies who share the same ultimate objective but may diverge on the timing and intensity of the appropriate military response to this reconstruction documented by the most recent satellite images. This coordination, essential to maintaining coherent, effective pressure on **Tehran**, will likely need to intensify in the coming weeks if this reconstruction is confirmed in its scale, in order to avoid any strategic divergence between **Washington** and **Jerusalem** that would directly benefit an Iranian regime seeking to exploit every crack in the Western alliance. *Israel and the United States share the same ultimate goal on Iran's nuclear program, but history has shown that timing disagreements between these two allies can be costly. Tehran is watching closely for every possible crack in this coordination.* ## The diplomatic consequences for the memorandum's credibility ### An agreement whose political survival is now at risk This documented reconstruction, if confirmed in its scale and military purpose, directly threatens the political survival of the **Islamabad memorandum** signed barely three weeks earlier, an agreement that had nonetheless been presented by its negotiators as the foundation for a lasting de-escalation between **Tehran** and the Western coalition after months of open war since February 2026. This rapid fragility of the agreement illustrates a broader structural difficulty in negotiations with the Iranian regime: every signed agreement seems to contain within it the seeds of its own contestation, given how weak mutual trust between the parties remains after decades of tension and several successive cycles of broken or disputed agreements. ### A precedent that will complicate any future negotiation This episode, should the reconstruction be confirmed as a proven violation, will significantly complicate any future attempt at diplomatic negotiation with **Tehran**, with Western decision-makers now having to factor in an even higher level of distrust toward Iranian commitments, whatever the apparent quality of diplomatic guarantees offered in future discussions. This **heightened distrust**, while understandable given the precedent documented by these satellite images, must not, however, lead to a total abandonment of the diplomatic path, which remains, despite its demonstrated limits, a necessary component of any Western strategy aimed at a lasting resolution of this prolonged confrontation with the Iranian regime. *Every broken agreement makes the next one harder to negotiate and to sell politically. That may be the most lasting cost of this documented reconstruction: not just rebuilt tunnels, but a little more diplomatic trust destroyed for years to come.* ## The technical dimension of satellite imagery analysis ### The methodological limits of this type of remote analysis Satellite imagery analysis, while a valuable tool for monitoring sites where direct access is denied, carries important methodological limits that must be systematically acknowledged: it cannot confirm with absolute certainty the exact purpose of the activities observed, nor detect underground installations deep enough to escape the resolution of currently available commercial sensors. These methodological limits, well known to analysts specializing in this field, should encourage a cautious reading of every new set of images, without calling into question the overall value of this monitoring tool, which remains, absent inspections authorized by **Tehran**, one of the only independent sources of information available on the real state of these sensitive sites. ### A convergence among several sources that strengthens the credibility of these observations The credibility of these satellite observations is strengthened by the convergence of several independent analyses carried out by different specialized organizations, both Western and Israeli, which separately examined the same geographic areas and reached largely similar conclusions about the nature and scale of the reconstruction activity observed at these two specific sites. This **methodological convergence** among independent sources is a serious argument in favor of the general reliability of these observations, even though it does not remove the need for direct, detailed international verification, the only means capable of definitively resolving any ambiguity about the exact purpose of this reconstruction documented from space. *I trust the convergence of several independent analyses more than a single isolated source. But I remain honest about the limits of this tool: satellites see a great deal, but they do not see everything, and certainly not what happens deep inside the deepest tunnels.* ## What this reconstruction reveals about Iranian nuclear doctrine ### A strategic resilience that goes beyond immediate military calculation This capacity for rapid reconstruction, documented repeatedly since February at different sites within Iran's military nuclear program, reveals a strategic resilience that goes beyond immediate military calculation: it reflects a long-term doctrine in which the regime views its nuclear capabilities as an existential pillar of its political survival, justifying continued investment despite the considerable economic and military cost of repeatedly rebuilding them. This doctrine of resilience, if confirmed as the correct reading of the Iranian regime's intentions, suggests that neither prolonged economic sanctions nor repeated cycles of military strikes will, on their own, be enough to convince **Tehran** to durably abandon its military nuclear ambitions, as long as the regime perceives these capabilities as essential to its survival against Western pressure. ### A threat that fits into a broader axis of regimes hostile to the West This Iranian nuclear persistence fits into a broader geopolitical context in which **China**, **Russia**, and **North Korea** are watching closely how this confrontation plays out, each of these regimes drawing strategic lessons about the West's ability to durably constrain a determined adversary pursuing military nuclear capabilities despite sustained international pressure for years. This systemic dimension of the Iranian crisis, linked to the broader dynamics of proliferation and defiance toward the **West** observed among these other hostile regimes, reinforces the overall strategic stakes of this documented reconstruction: beyond the Iranian case alone, it is the credibility of the entire Western non-proliferation architecture being tested by this specific episode. *Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang are all watching closely whether Tehran manages to rebuild its nuclear capabilities despite Western pressure. Every sign of weakness in our response to Iran directly feeds their own strategic calculations elsewhere in the world.* ## The options available to the Western coalition ### A targeted resumption of strikes against these specific sites The Western coalition led by **Washington**, in close coordination with **Israel**, has the option of a targeted resumption of strikes against **Pickaxe Mountain** and **Parchin** should this reconstruction be confirmed in its most worrying scale and military purpose, an option that offers the advantage of an immediate demonstration of firmness but carries the risk of a new general escalation of the conflict across all its other regional fronts. This military option, while it responds to the perceived urgency of the situation, will need to be weighed carefully against the risk of reviving an already intense regional escalation, including the recent missile fire on several **Gulf** allies and the worrying incident near the civilian **Bushehr** plant, two developments that already illustrate the fragility of the current regional situation. ### Strengthened targeted sanctions as a complementary option In addition to, or as an alternative to, a military resumption, strengthening sanctions targeted at **IRGC** financial networks and at individuals directly involved in overseeing this reconstruction is a complementary option capable of increasing pressure on **Tehran** without necessarily reviving a generalized military escalation in the immediate term. This combined approach, blending targeted economic pressure with a credible military option held in reserve, could offer the Western coalition greater strategic flexibility than relying solely on a new wave of strikes, while maintaining enough firmness to deter **Tehran** from continuing this reconstruction without significant consequence. *I do not believe the choice is only between immediate strikes and inaction. Combining targeted sanctions with a credible military option held in reserve offers more strategic flexibility than a purely reflexive reaction to this documented reconstruction.* ## What this crisis reveals about the future of arms control ### A challenge to classic verification mechanisms This documented reconstruction, occurring barely three weeks after the signing of an agreement meant to frame a lasting de-escalation, calls into question the relevance of classic diplomatic verification mechanisms against a regime with concealment and underground reconstruction capabilities as developed as those **Tehran** has demonstrated for several years. This methodological challenge should push the international community to invest more heavily in independent satellite surveillance and technical intelligence capabilities, less dependent on Iranian goodwill in authorizing direct inspections, an investment that could prove decisive in detecting future similar violations more quickly. ### A lesson that extends well beyond the Iranian case for all of non-proliferation This methodological lesson extends far beyond the Iranian case alone: it questions the robustness of the entire international non-proliferation architecture against regimes determined to pursue their military nuclear ambitions despite signed agreements, an issue that also concerns monitoring of the North Korean program and, potentially, other regional actors who might be tempted to follow a similar model of concealment. It is this systemic dimension, more than this specific Iranian episode documented by these satellite images alone, that should guide Western thinking on the future of international verification mechanisms, in a world where remote surveillance technology keeps advancing but where the political will of certain regimes to conceal their most sensitive activities seems just as determined. *This matter extends far beyond Iran alone. If Tehran can rebuild three weeks after signing an agreement without anyone detecting it through the usual diplomatic channels, it is our entire system of international verification that needs rethinking, not just our Iran policy.* ## What this affair reveals about Western diplomatic fatigue ### Growing weariness with repeated cycles of negotiation and violation This documented reconstruction fits into a now-familiar cycle of negotiation, agreement signing, and apparent violation, a pattern repeated so often over the years in relations between the **West** and **Tehran** that growing **diplomatic fatigue** is beginning to set in among several **Western decision-makers**, who are increasingly questioning the real usefulness of negotiating new agreements with a regime that appears structurally unable, or unwilling, to durably honor its commitments. This **fatigue**, while understandable after so many similar cycles, carries its own risk: it could push certain **Western governments** toward a premature abandonment of any future diplomatic attempt, even as the **diplomatic path**, despite its repeatedly demonstrated limits, remains a necessary complementary tool for any lasting **containment** strategy against the Iranian regime. ### The risk of deepening polarization between hawks and dialogue advocates This apparent new violation also risks deepening the polarization already present within **Western governments** themselves, between advocates of a strictly military and security-focused line toward **Tehran** and those who continue to defend the need for parallel **diplomatic dialogue**, however imperfect, to avoid a prolonged military entanglement whose outcome remains uncertain. This internal polarization within Western democracies, should it intensify further in the wake of this documented reconstruction, could weaken the strategic coherence needed to maintain coordinated, effective pressure on the Iranian regime, a risk **Western allies** will have to manage with as much attention as the Iranian nuclear threat itself. *I understand Western weariness with these repeated cycles of negotiation and violation, but giving in to that weariness by abandoning diplomacy entirely would be a mistake. Military firmness and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive — they complement each other, even when Tehran seems to be doing everything it can to discourage both.* ## Conclusion: a reconstruction that tests Western resolve ### What can be stated with certainty today At the end of this analysis, one conclusion stands out, with the methodological caution required but also the clarity necessary: satellite images analyzed in early **July 2026** document reconstruction activity at the **Pickaxe Mountain** and **Parchin** sites, barely three weeks after the signing of the **Islamabad memorandum**, meant to frame a lasting de-escalation between **Tehran** and the Western coalition. This reconstruction, if confirmed in its military purpose, would constitute a serious violation of the spirit of that agreement. This documented reality, despite the methodological limits inherent in satellite imagery analysis, cannot be ignored by Western decision-makers, who will need to respond to this apparent provocation with a combination of military firmness, diplomatic pressure, and targeted sanctions, giving in neither to haste nor to complacency toward a regime that continues to demonstrate its determination to preserve its military nuclear capabilities. ### A vigilance that must remain constant in the months ahead This documented reconstruction is a lasting reminder that Western vigilance toward the Iranian military nuclear program can never let up, even after the signing of agreements presented as significant diplomatic breakthroughs. Only continuous monitoring, combining satellite imagery, technical intelligence, and sustained diplomatic pressure, will make it possible to detect in time any new similar attempt at concealed reconstruction. In the weeks following these revelations, the Western response to this specific episode will largely determine the future credibility of any negotiation with **Tehran**, a regime that, as this documented reconstruction shows once again, will abandon its military nuclear ambitions only under pressure sustained and credible enough to durably change its strategic calculation. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Live updates on Iran — The Jerusalem Post, July 10, 2026](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/2026-07-10/live-updates-902093) - [Satellite images show Iran reconstructing Pickaxe Mountain tunnel complex in apparent MOU violation — The Times of Israel, July 2026](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/satellite-images-show-iran-reconstructing-pickaxe-mountain-tunnel-complex-in-apparent-mou-violation/) - [Analysis of satellite images on the reconstruction of Iranian nuclear sites — Iran International, July 2026](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202607103676) ### Secondary sources - [Alarming new satellite images show signs Iran may be trying to rebuild suspected nuclear facilities — New York Post, July 11, 2026](https://nypost.com/2026/07/11/world-news/alarming-new-satellite-images-show-signs-iran-may-be-trying-to-rebuild-suspected-nuclear-facilities/) - [Exclusive investigation into satellite images of Iran's nuclear program — CNN, July 10, 2026](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/10/world/video/investigates-polglase-iran-nuclear-sat-imagery) - [Iran reportedly attempting to restore nuclear sites, new analysis finds — The Jerusalem Post, July 2026](http://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-902143) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. 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