# DECODING: Air Defense, Kyiv's Absolute Priority as the Hardest Summer Hits

> On the night of July 6, 2026, Russia fired 23 ballistic missiles at Kyiv. None was intercepted. According to Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ihnat, stocks of Patriot interceptors were, at that exact moment,…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/decoding-air-defense-kyiv-s-absolute-priority-as-the-hardest-summer-hits

## Key takeaways

- Ukrainian air force spokesman Yuriy Ihnat said Patriot stocks were exhausted at the time, and the strike killed between eleven and seventeen people.
- Patriot production is limited to roughly 500 to 600 interceptors a year, and demand comes from Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan and several Gulf states.
- The NATO Ankara summit produced at least 70 billion euros in aid pledges for 2026, but no firm guarantee on immediate Patriot deliveries.
- Trump promised Zelensky a Patriot production license, but the article notes that implementation may only come in late 2027 or 2028.
- A Russian strike on Kyiv on July 9, the day after that promise, killed 31 people, which the author reads as deliberate retaliation.

## Introduction: when the sky becomes the main front

### Eleven dead, seventeen wounded, zero ballistic interceptors

On the night of **July 6, 2026**, **Russia** fired 23 ballistic missiles at **Kyiv**. None was intercepted. According to Ukrainian air force spokesman **Yuriy Ihnat**, stocks of **Patriot** interceptors were, at that exact moment, exhausted, leaving the Ukrainian capital fully exposed to a strike that killed between eleven and seventeen people according to successive tallies. This figure is not a statistical accident: it is the direct, documented consequence of a weapons shortage that Ukrainian authorities have been denouncing for months.

This precise moment, this night when **Kyiv** found itself defenseless against ballistic missiles, sums up the central stake of summer 2026: air defense is no longer just one subject among others in the war in **Ukraine**. It has become the absolute priority, above even discussions of territorial movement in the **Donbas**.

### A problem known for months, now reaching a breaking point

Ukraine's defense minister wrote to roughly forty partner countries demanding the urgent release of available **Patriot** systems, according to information relayed by **Euromaidan Press** in early July. This all-out diplomatic push illustrates the urgency felt in **Kyiv**, where every week without additional interceptors translates into civilian lives lost during Russian strikes.

A European loan of roughly **one billion euros** would fund the purchase of around a hundred additional **Patriot** systems, while a German contract for PAC-2 units is also nearing finalization. These efforts, though real, are still not enough to close the immediate gap facing the Ukrainian air force this summer.

*Eleven dead because the stockpiles ran empty. That sentence alone should be enough to convince any hesitant Western ally. This is not rhetoric — it is a brutal military equation that Kyiv itself documents, without needing to exaggerate anything.*

*And it must be said plainly: this shortage is not a geographic fate. It is the result of Western allocation choices that took too long. The interceptors exist in the world; the only question is who agrees to part with them.*

## The geometry of the problem: why Patriots are so scarce

### A rare weapon, produced slowly, demanded everywhere

The **Patriot** system, built by **Lockheed Martin** for the launcher and **RTX** for the interceptors, remains one of the few effective defenses against Russian **Iskander**-type ballistic missiles or North Korean **KN-23** missiles. Its production, however, remains limited to roughly 500 to 600 interceptors per year worldwide, a pace far too slow to meet combined demand from **Ukraine**, **Israel**, **Taiwan** and several **Gulf** states.

This structural scarcity turns every **Patriot** interceptor into an object of intense diplomatic competition among **Washington's** allies, each seeking to secure its own share of an insufficient global stock. **Ukraine**, despite its status as a country in active war against a nuclear power, must nonetheless negotiate on the same footing as partners not engaged in direct conflict.

### An efficiency rate that justifies Ukraine's demand

According to **NATO's** After Action Review analysis, the demonstrated effectiveness of **Patriot** systems against Russian **Iskander**-type missiles has reportedly doubled over recent months of combat, a weighty technical argument that **Kyiv** uses to justify its repeated requests to Western partners. This figure, documented by an institution as rigorous as **NATO**, goes far beyond mere wartime communication rhetoric.

This proven technical effectiveness makes the slowness of Western deliveries all the more frustrating for Ukrainian authorities. Having a weapon that works, yet being unable to obtain it in sufficient quantity, is a particularly cruel situation for a country that counts its defenses in remaining missiles rather than statistical probabilities.

*A weapon twice as effective as before, and yet still just as scarce for those who need it most. This contradiction sums up rather well the bureaucratic absurdity that sometimes surrounds Western military support, even when the political will appears present.*

## The NATO Ankara summit, a partial and belated response

### Seventy billion euros, but no guarantee on Patriots

The **NATO** summit held in **Ankara** on July 8 allowed allies to pledge at least **70 billion euros** in military aid to **Ukraine** for 2026, with a commitment to maintain comparable levels in 2027. NATO's overall defense spending has crossed the **1.8-trillion-dollar** threshold, up nearly 11% from the previous year, a signal of Western rearmament unseen since the end of the **Cold War**.

Despite these impressive financial announcements, no firm guarantee was given on the immediate delivery of additional **Patriot** interceptors, with the matter still hanging on country-by-country bilateral negotiations. Money alone, without available industrial capacity to produce more weapons, does not resolve the fundamental scarcity problem afflicting this particular system.

### The Patriot license promise, symbolic but not immediate

It was in this setting that U.S. President **Donald Trump** promised **Volodymyr Zelensky** a license allowing **Ukraine** to produce its own **Patriot** interceptors domestically, an announcement received with cautious optimism in **Kyiv**. The American president nonetheless publicly acknowledged that manufacturers **Lockheed Martin** and **RTX** had not yet been informed of this decision, nor of the precise terms negotiated.

This promise, however welcome politically, changes nothing about this summer's critical situation. Military experts point to possible implementation only in late 2027 or 2028, a timeline that does nothing to address the urgency currently felt by Ukrainian air defenders.

*Seventy billion euros is a figure that impresses in a press release. But no euro replaces an interceptor that does not yet exist in a warehouse. One must applaud the money while refusing to confuse a financial promise with an immediate solution.*

## Ukrainian air defense beyond Patriots alone

### A multi-layer system that remains broadly effective

It would be misleading to reduce all of Ukraine's air defense to the single question of **Patriots**. According to assessments from the **Institute for the Study of War**, **Ukraine** maintains an interception rate of roughly 80% against Russian cruise missiles and above 90% against **Shahed**-type drones, thanks to a combination of Western systems, upgraded Soviet-era equipment, and locally developed electronic-warfare capabilities.

This overall performance, often overshadowed by headlines about **Patriot** shortages, demonstrates real defensive resilience that deserves recognition. The problem does not lie with the entire Ukrainian air-defense system, but specifically with its limited capacity to intercept the fastest and hardest-to-shoot-down ballistic missiles.

### Interception munitions, a resource depleting faster than launchers

On July 8, **Russia** fired 169 drones and seven missiles, including five ballistic ones, at Ukrainian targets. The five ballistic missiles and roughly twenty drones reached their objectives across some fifteen different locations, according to Western news agencies, illustrating the persistent difficulty in systematically intercepting this specific type of threat even when **Patriot** launchers remain operational.

This distinction between available launchers and sufficient interception munitions is a technical point often overlooked in public discussions. A **Patriot** system without interceptors to fire becomes an empty shell, however sophisticated its guidance and radar-detection technology may be.

*Ninety percent against Shaheds, but zero against ballistic missiles on a night of shortage. This two-speed statistic illustrates exactly why one must never generalize about Ukrainian air defense: it excels on one front, is vulnerable on another, and both truths coexist.*

## What Russian strikes reveal about their own priorities

### Deliberate escalation after every Ukrainian diplomatic gain

On July 9, one day after **Donald Trump's** announcement of the **Patriot** license, **Russia** launched a combined strike on **Kyiv** that killed 31 people, the deadliest of the year on the Ukrainian capital. This timing, documented by several international news agencies, suggests a deliberate retaliatory logic rather than an operational coincidence.

This reaction confirms a pattern already observed repeatedly since the start of the invasion: every signal of strengthened Western support for **Ukraine** seems to trigger, almost mechanically, a deadly response from the **Kremlin** against civilian populations. This is a Russian strategic choice, not a quirk of military timing.

### Targeting residential areas, a disturbing constant

The July 9 strikes hit residential neighborhoods of **Kyiv**, far from any identifiable military infrastructure, according to findings from Ukrainian municipal authorities. This choice of targets, repeated strike after strike since 2022, illustrates a deliberate intent to terrorize the civilian population rather than an occasional guidance error.

Documenting this repeated pattern is not a propaganda exercise: it is a journalistic obligation in the face of accumulating physical evidence, strike after strike, in areas where no legitimate military target exists.

*Thirty-one civilians killed the day after a promise of aid, in residential neighborhoods, with no military target nearby. I refuse to call that bad luck. It is a deliberate strategy of terror, and naming it clearly is the least owed to the victims.*

## Patriot interceptors as diplomatic currency among allies

### The dilemma of countries with systems deployed elsewhere

Several Western countries, including **Germany**, the **Netherlands** and **Greece**, currently have **Patriot** systems deployed on their own territory or as part of **NATO** missions elsewhere in the world. Handing these systems over to **Ukraine** would mean reducing their own air-defense coverage, a delicate political and military trade-off for governments that must also answer to their own publics on national security.

This dilemma partly explains the slow pace of deliveries despite near-unanimous recognition, in the **West**, of the urgency of Ukraine's situation. It is not simply a matter of insufficient political will, but also of real material constraints that each government must weigh.

### Financing rather than direct donation as the preferred solution

Faced with this reluctance to hand over already-deployed systems, several European countries now favor financing new purchases rather than directly donating their own stocks. The one-billion-euro European loan mentioned earlier illustrates this approach, which strengthens Ukrainian capabilities without directly weakening the air defenses of donor countries.

This workaround, though pragmatic, takes time: several months typically pass between the financing decision and the actual delivery of ordered systems, a delay the situation on Ukrainian ground does not always allow to absorb without additional losses.

*I understand the logic of any government protecting its own citizens before another country's. But I refuse to find it satisfactory when the price of that caution is counted in Ukrainian civilian lives lost for lack of interceptors delivered on time.*

## The strategic role of air defense in this war of attrition

### Protecting civilians, but also preserving the military industrial base

Ukrainian air defense does not only protect civilians in their homes: it also protects military infrastructure, command centers, and weapons-production capacity that allow **Ukraine** to keep waging its own strike campaign against Russian targets. A country unable to defend its own skies eventually sees its entire defense industrial base threatened simultaneously.

This dual function, civilian and military, explains why air defense occupies such a central place in current Ukrainian strategic discussions, even more so than certain segments of the ground front which, though deadly, do not directly affect Ukraine's ability to wage its remote war against **Russia**.

### A direct link to Ukraine's long-range offensive capacity

Paradoxically, the more **Ukraine** invests in its air defense, the more resources it frees up for its own offensive strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, such as those seen at **Syzran** or in the **Don-Azov** canal in July. Defense and offense, in this war, are not opposites: they reinforce each other in a two-way attrition logic.

This strategic interdependence strengthens the argument that every **Patriot** interceptor delivered to **Ukraine** not only saves lives immediately, but also indirectly contributes to Ukraine's ability to keep pressure on the Russian war economy.

*It is often forgotten that defending Ukrainian skies also lets Ukraine keep striking Russian oil elsewhere. This link between defense and offense deserves repeating every time an ally hesitates to deliver one more Patriot system.*

## International comparisons on Patriot scarcity

### Israel, Taiwan and the Gulf, competitors in the same queue

**Ukraine** is not the only country demanding more **Patriot** interceptors. **Israel** maintains constant demand against threats from Iranian missiles and their regional proxies, while **Taiwan** seeks to strengthen its own defenses against growing potential Chinese pressure. Several **Gulf** states round out this list of priority clients for **Washington**.

This international competition for a scarce resource illustrates just how structurally insufficient current **Patriot** production remains against a global demand that keeps growing as geopolitical tensions intensify across several continents at once, from **Europe** to **Asia** to the **Middle East**.

### Why Ukraine's case nonetheless remains a priority

Unlike **Israel**, **Taiwan** or the **Gulf** states, **Ukraine** suffers documented, deadly Russian ballistic strikes every week, in a high-intensity active conflict that has lasted more than four years. This factual reality should, logically, place Ukrainian requests at the top of Western allocation priorities, even though diplomatic and industrial reality does not always follow this logic consistently.

It is this gap between the factual urgency of Ukraine's need and the bureaucratic slowness of Western deliveries that fuels the legitimate frustration expressed by **Kyiv** authorities for months on this exact issue.

*I do not minimize the needs of Israel or Taiwan, but neither country suffers, every week, deadly ballistic strikes on its civilians the way Ukraine does. Priority here should be a moral obvious, not merely a diplomatic calculation between allies.*

## The industrial dimension: producing more, producing faster

### The limits of the current Western production chain

Global production of **Patriot** interceptors, concentrated mainly in the **United States**, remains constrained by complex supply chains involving hundreds of specialized component suppliers. Accelerating this production would require major industrial investment and several years before any significant effect on available volumes appears.

It is precisely this structural industrial constraint that makes the promise of a Ukrainian production license both symbolically important and limited in its immediate effects. Building a new production chain, even with the necessary political agreement, takes time that the situation on the ground does not always allow one to wait for calmly.

### The Japanese precedent as a realistic timeline reference

According to defense expert **Oleh Katkov**, cited by several Western media outlets, **Japan**, which obtained **Patriot** production rights several years ago, took roughly two years between the initial agreement and the start of actual production. If **Ukraine** follows a similar timeline, local production could not begin before 2028, well past the critical period of summer 2026.

This Japanese precedent, documented and verifiable, tempers the enthusiasm surrounding **Donald Trump's** announcement without fully invalidating it. It is an investment in the future of Ukrainian air defense, not a solution for the current emergency.

*Two years is the Japanese timeline from agreement to production. Ukraine does not have two years to wait calmly while its civilians die under ballistic missiles. This promise is good for 2028, not for this summer, and that must be said without dodging it.*

## The documented human consequences of the shortage

### Families paying the price of a distant strategic deficit

Behind every statistic of unintercepted missiles are Ukrainian families whose survival chances are directly determined by **Patriot** allocation decisions made in distant Western capitals. This human reality, often reduced to numbers in military reports, deserves to be named with the gravity it demands.

Documenting this human consequence is not sensationalism: it is acknowledging that bureaucratic decisions on weapons allocation have direct, measurable effects on the lives of civilians who have no control whatsoever over these distant diplomatic negotiations.

### A responsibility shared between the aggressor and hesitant allies

Primary responsibility for these deaths remains, unambiguously, with **Russia** and **Vladimir Putin**, who choose to fire ballistic missiles at residential areas. But a secondary, more diffuse responsibility also falls on Western decision-making processes that take months to deliver defense systems whose urgency has long been documented.

Naming this shared responsibility in no way absolves the Russian aggressor. It simply recalls that Western support, however real on paper, must still prove its ability to translate into concrete, rapid protection for Ukrainian civilians exposed to this risk every night.

*Russia fires the missiles — that is an absolute, non-negotiable fact. But when an allied country waits months before handing over an already-built system, it too carries, to its own measure, a share of the moral responsibility for what happens during that wait.*

## Scenarios for the coming autumn and winter

### A critical window before the likely seasonal intensification

Western military analysts anticipate a possible intensification of Russian strikes as autumn and winter 2026 approach, a period during which **Moscow** has historically sought to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure to maximize civilian suffering during the cold season. This outlook makes rapidly resolving the **Patriot** shortage all the more urgent in the coming weeks.

If the deliveries promised at the **Ankara** summit actually materialize within the announced timeline, **Ukraine** could enter this critical period with reinforced stocks. If they are delayed, as has happened repeatedly since 2022, this summer's situation could repeat itself with even greater intensity.

### The Western political stakes behind every delivery decision

Every decision to deliver additional **Patriot** systems to **Ukraine** remains subject to the internal political dynamics of donor countries, where opposition to continued military aid sometimes finds significant electoral traction. This political reality, specific to each Western democracy, adds a further layer of uncertainty to a matter already complex on the industrial and diplomatic front.

It is this convergence of industrial, diplomatic and internal political constraints that makes the Ukrainian air-defense file so difficult to resolve quickly, despite a documented human urgency that should, logically, accelerate every step of this process.

*Autumn is approaching and no one can guarantee the shortage will be resolved in time. It is this uncertainty, more than any statistic, that should worry anyone following this issue seriously rather than with convenient optimism.*

## What the West still has to prove on this exact issue

### Many promises, still-incomplete execution

The **Ankara** summit, the **Patriot** license promise, the seventy billion euros announced: all of these are positive signals on paper, but none yet replaces the concrete, rapid delivery of additional interceptors into currently insufficient Ukrainian stocks. The gap between diplomatic announcement and operational execution remains the main point of vigilance for seriously assessing this issue.

This journalistic vigilance is not an exercise in gratuitous cynicism toward Ukraine's Western allies. It is a rigorous method that systematically distinguishes political announcements from measurable results on the ground, a crucial distinction in a matter where every delay potentially translates into additional human losses.

### Western centrality remains the best available option

Despite these legitimately criticizable delays, the alternative to Western support, however imperfect, would be abandoning **Ukraine** to unprovoked Russian aggression, a scenario that would durably weaken the credibility of the entire rules-based international order that the **West** claims to have defended for decades.

It is this Western centrality, imperfect but real, that must continue to structure the response to this air-defense crisis, with constant pressure to accelerate deliveries rather than resignation in the face of already-documented bureaucratic delays.

*Criticizing Western slowness does not mean abandoning support for Ukraine. On the contrary, it means demanding that this support, already committed on paper, finally translate into concrete results for the civilians who wait each night to find out whether the sky will protect them.*

## The next concrete steps to watch on this file

### The real timeline of deliveries promised in Ankara

In the **weeks following** the **NATO** summit in **Ankara**, attention will turn to how quickly the seventy billion euros pledged actually translate into concrete deliveries of **Patriot** systems and additional interceptors. This real timeline, more than the initial announcements, will determine whether this critical shortage can be resolved before autumn.

Ukrainian authorities will very likely continue to publicly document each night without sufficient interceptors, a transparency strategy meant as much to inform the population as to keep diplomatic pressure on hesitant Western allies.

### The technical negotiation of the local production license

The **second element** to watch concerns the real progress of technical negotiations between **Kyiv**, **Washington**, **Lockheed Martin** and **RTX** over the precise terms of the production license announced by **Donald Trump**. These negotiations, if they progress quickly, could constitute a positive signal for the future, even though their concrete effects will not be felt before 2027 or 2028.

It is this double timeline, immediate urgency and long-term investment, that now structures the entire Ukrainian air-defense file for the months and years ahead.

*Two clocks are running at once: this summer's urgency, and the Patriot license clock ticking toward 2028. Confusing the two is a false reassurance. Both must be tracked separately, never letting the second mask the urgency of the first.*

## The role of European partners in future production

### A European defense industry trying to catch up

Beyond the American file, several European countries are also seeking to strengthen their own production capacity for air-defense systems compatible with Ukrainian needs. **Germany**, through its PAC-2 contract nearing finalization, illustrates this European desire not to depend solely on the American production chain to meet Ukraine's urgent needs.

This **diversification** of supply sources, if it materializes, could eventually reduce Ukrainian dependence on a single American supplier subject to sometimes unpredictable internal political trade-offs. It is a strategy of diplomatic resilience as much as military resilience for **Kyiv**.

### Inter-allied coordination, a permanent logistical challenge

Coordinating deliveries from several different countries, each with its own approval procedures and budget constraints, adds a layer of administrative complexity to an already humanly urgent matter. This European fragmentation, quite real, contrasts with the simpler unity of command that **Russia** enjoys for its own military decisions.

Strengthening this inter-allied coordination, notably through existing **NATO** structures, is an ongoing effort that Ukrainian authorities have been calling to accelerate for months, with uneven results so far depending on the country involved.

*Europe is trying to become less dependent on Washington on this file, and that is good news in the long run. But in the short term, this diversification adds administrative complexity at exactly the moment Ukraine needs simplicity and speed of execution.*

## Conclusion: a priority that can no longer tolerate any delay

### What the facts establish beyond any possible ambiguity

At the end of this factual review, one conclusion stands out with rare clarity in this complex conflict: air defense now constitutes **Kyiv's** absolute priority, documented by real shortages, avoidable deaths, and repeated diplomatic requests to dozens of Western partners. This is not an opinion — it is an operational reality verifiable strike after strike.

The announcements from the **Ankara** summit, however welcome in principle, do not yet resolve this immediate deficit. The promise of a local production license, symbolically important, will not produce its effects for several years, well past the critical period **Ukraine** is currently going through.

### A collective responsibility that extends beyond the Ukrainian case alone

This Ukrainian air-defense file raises, more broadly, the question of the **West's** ability to translate its declared solidarity into concrete, rapid protection for an ally in active war. It is a credibility test that extends beyond the Ukrainian theater alone and could influence how **China**, **Iran** or **North Korea** perceive the real reliability of Western commitments to their partners.

This is why this file, far from being a mere technical question of military logistics, deserves the sustained attention of everyone who still believes in the centrality of the **West** as guarantor of the international order against authoritarian powers seeking to destabilize it.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [United24 Media, ongoing coverage of Ukrainian air defense — July 2026](https://united24media.com/)

- [Ukraine urges partners to urgently release Patriot missiles — Euromaidan Press, July 2, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/07/02/ukraine-urges-partners-to-urgently-release-patriot-missiles/)

- [Kyiv Independent, coverage of Russian strikes in July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/)

- [268 clashes recorded on the front on July 9 — Ukrainska Pravda, July 9, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/09/8043170/)

### Secondary sources

- [Patriot missile shortage leaves Kyiv undefended — The Wall Street Journal, July 2026](https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraines-shortage-of-patriot-missiles-leaves-kyiv-undefended-4a8059bb)

- [Patriot interceptor shortage left Kyiv exposed to overnight Russian air attacks, military says — Gwara Media, July 2026](https://gwaramedia.com/en/patriot-interceptor-missile-shortage-left-kyiv-exposed-to-overnight-russian-air-attacks-military-says/)

- [Trump promises Patriot license at NATO summit — Associated Press, July 8, 2026](https://apnews.com/article/nato-trump-iran-ukraine-turkey-d393e8ef6103e32c984c4337a82930b1)

- [Building Patriots in Ukraine also serves Lockheed's interests, McCaul says — Bloomberg, July 11, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-11/ukraine-building-patriots-is-in-lockheed-s-interest-mccaul-says)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/decoding-air-defense-kyiv-s-absolute-priority-as-the-hardest-summer-hits