# COMMENTARY: The jihadist-Tuareg alliance shaking the Malian junta

> Some alliances should, on paper, be impossible. The one now uniting JNIM, the Sahelian franchise of Al-Qaeda, and the Azawad Liberation Front, a largely secular Tuareg separatist coalition, is one of them.

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentary-the-jihadist-tuareg-alliance-shaking-the-malian-junta

## Key takeaways

- According to Le Monde's July 7, 2026 investigation, the two groups coordinated over several months, starting with tacit non-aggression understandings, to weaken the junta.
- The April 2026 offensive saw the capture of Kidal and the assassination of Mali's defense minister in a raid on Bamako's airport; the July offensive took Anefis.
- The junta's official communications minimize setbacks, and it increasingly relies on Russia's Africa Corps, whose performance at Anefis is questioned.
- The author sees the alliance's main weakness in the incompatible end goals of the two groups, and cites historical precedents of such alliances breaking down.
- The article describes Western caution, Russia's stretched resources, and the fractured ECOWAS as factors limiting an effective response.

## Introduction: a marriage of convenience redrawing the Sahel

### Yesterday's enemies, today's shared adversary

Some alliances should, on paper, be impossible. The one now uniting **JNIM**, the Sahelian franchise of Al-Qaeda, and the **Azawad Liberation Front**, a largely secular Tuareg separatist **coalition**, is one of them. According to an investigation published by **Le Monde** on July 7, 2026, these two movements, long rivals on both ideological and territorial grounds, chose to combine forces to methodically weaken the Malian military **junta** — with a success that now worries the entire region.

This tactical **convergence**, documented through months of on-the-ground journalism, is not a case of mutual ideological conversion. It reflects cold warrior pragmatism: each side understood it stood to gain more by jointly neutralizing a common adversary than by fighting each other over visions of society that remain, themselves, deeply incompatible.

### Why this alliance changes the military calculus

The result of this pragmatism is already visible on the map of **northern Mali**. The capture of **Kidal** in April 2026, then **Anefis** in July, demonstrate an operational **coordination** capacity that neither **JNIM** nor the **FLA** could have achieved alone. This tactical synergy poses, for the Malian **junta** and its Russian partner, a far more serious structural problem than a mere localized uptick in violence.

This commentary does not intend to minimize the deep differences separating these two movements. But it would be irresponsible to keep analyzing them separately while their coordinated actions redefine, before our eyes, the balance of power across the entire western **Sahel**.

*I find this **alliance** deeply troubling, precisely because it proves that tactical effectiveness can transcend ideological divides once thought irreconcilable. The day ideological enemies choose to unite against a failing state, that state has already lost a battle far more important than the one on the ground.*

## What Le Monde's investigation reveals about this alliance

### A coordination going back several months

According to **Le Monde**'s investigation, this cooperation between **jihadists** and Tuareg separatists did not begin with the July **offensive**, but built up gradually over several months, through tacit non-aggression understandings and then increasingly ambitious joint operations. This long timeline shows this is not a one-off tactical accident, but a deliberate, matured strategy on both sides.

Le Monde's journalists documented how this **alliance** was structured around a clearly identified shared objective: overthrowing, or at least durably weakening, the military **junta** ruling from **Bamako**. This shared objective was enough to overcome, at least temporarily, decades of mutual distrust between Islamist and secular separatist movements in the region.

### A precedent worrying regional analysts

This documented **convergence** between **JNIM** and the **FLA** constitutes, according to several analysts cited in specialized press, a potentially contagious precedent for other Sahelian theaters, from **Burkina Faso** to **Niger**, where similar dynamics between armed groups with different motivations could emerge if local political circumstances allow.

This Malian precedent deserves, on that basis, particular attention from Western intelligence services and regional organizations like **ECOWAS**, which must now factor this hypothesis of tactical inter-movement cooperation into their risk assessments for the entire Sahelian belt.

*A piece of journalism like Le Monde's is sometimes worth more than ten official intelligence reports, because it documents, on the ground, a reality governments often prefer to downplay. This **alliance** deserved to be named clearly, and that is exactly what this reporting achieved.*

## Kidal, the first joint victory that changed everything

### An assassination that marked a turning point

The April 2026 **offensive**, which let the **FLA** and **JNIM** seize **Kidal** while assassinating Mali's defense minister in a raid on **Bamako**'s airport, remains the founding episode of this tactical **alliance**. This dual operation, both territorial and politically targeted, demonstrated an operational sophistication that surprised even the most seasoned observers of the Sahelian file.

Assassinating a sitting minister, in the capital itself, is an act of considerable political gravity, far beyond a simple territorial gain in a remote region. This choice to directly target central power in **Bamako**, rather than settle for territorial gains in the north, reveals a strategic ambition that goes well beyond the Tuareg independence cause alone.

### A junta that never truly recovered from that shock

The Malian **junta**, led by military officers who came to power promising more effective **security** than previous civilian governments, has never fully recovered from that double shock in April. The loss of **Kidal**, combined with the assassination of its defense minister, durably weakened the security legitimacy on which it had built its power grab.

It is against this backdrop of already-installed fragility that the July **offensive** against **Anefis** should be understood: not as an isolated event, but as the logical continuation of a methodical weakening strategy that had already proven its effectiveness months earlier.

*Assassinating a defense minister in his own capital is not an ordinary act of war, it is a calculated act of political brutality as a message. I refuse to normalize this act by reducing it to just another statistic in an already too-bloody conflict.*

## The junta's strategy facing this double threat

### A communications strategy that poorly masks the scale of the problem

Facing this unprecedented **alliance**, the Malian **junta**'s official communications swing between denial and systematic minimization. Successive statements, describing situations as "under control" or attacks "vigorously repelled," contrast sharply with ground testimonies gathered by independent media and regional officials describing a far more troubling reality.

This gap between official rhetoric and documented reality is not unique to **Mali**; it characterizes most military regimes facing security setbacks they cannot publicly admit without further weakening their own legitimacy. But in Mali's case, the gap seems to widen with each new episode of this war.

### A growing dependence on the Africa Corps

To offset its own operational weaknesses, the Malian **junta** relies increasingly on Russian **Africa Corps** paramilitaries, whose effectiveness, as the events at **Anefis** demonstrated, remains itself questionable. This growing security dependence on a partner with mixed concrete results illustrates the strategic dead end **Bamako** now finds itself in.

This dead end is not new, but it grows more visible and harder to mask every month, as the coordinated armed groups of **JNIM** and the **FLA** demonstrate their ability to strike ever more symbolic and strategic targets across Malian **territory**.

*A **junta** that communicates through euphemisms and depends on a military partner as unreliable as the **Africa Corps** is not a junta in a position of strength — it is a junta managing, day after day, a crisis it no longer really controls. This must be said bluntly, even if it displeases **Bamako**.*

## The ambiguous role of local populations in this conflict

### An allegiance sometimes forced, sometimes sincere

Understanding this **jihadist**-**Tuareg** alliance's relative success requires examining the relationship local populations have with these armed groups. In certain areas of northern Mali, some of the population's allegiance, or resignation in lieu of it, stems from the Malian state's chronic inability to provide basic public services, **security**, education, healthcare, in regions abandoned for years by successive administrations.

This structural state failure creates a vacuum that armed groups, whether **jihadist** or separatist, know how to exploit by presenting themselves, sometimes with a degree of local effectiveness, as credible alternatives to an absent state. This phenomenon does nothing to excuse the documented abuses committed by these groups, but it helps explain part of their durable territorial roots.

### A population held hostage by a war beyond its control

It would nonetheless be wrong to reduce the entire population of northern Mali to support, even passive, for these armed groups. Numerous accounts gathered by humanitarian organizations instead describe a population held hostage, forced to deal with multiple armed actors whose objectives and methods it shares neither, but from which it also cannot disengage without immediate risk to its own **security**.

This human complexity, too often flattened in oversimplified geopolitical analyses, deserves to be restored with its full nuance, since it is ultimately what will determine whether this **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance** endures over the long run.

*I distrust any analysis that would reduce northern Mali's populations to mere supporters or passive victims. The human reality of this war is more complex, more painful, and deserves far more nuance than military maps allow.*

## The structural limits of this improbable alliance

### Fundamentally incompatible end goals

Despite its documented tactical effectiveness, this **alliance** between **JNIM** and the **FLA** rests on fragile ideological foundations. The FLA's project — Tuareg autonomy or independence with a largely secular character — is structurally incompatible with JNIM's project of establishing a rigorist Islamist order across Malian **territory**. These two visions of society cannot, in the long run, durably coexist within the same territory freed from **Bamako**'s control.

This fundamental incompatibility is this **alliance**'s main structural vulnerability, and several regional analysts believe it could, in the medium term, trigger a rupture between the two movements once their common adversary is sufficiently weakened to no longer justify such an unnatural cooperation.

### A historical precedent urging caution

This scenario of a deferred rupture is not hypothetical: similar alliances between Islamist and ethnic separatist movements have already been observed, then broken, in other African conflicts, notably in **Mali** itself during the previous Tuareg uprisings of the 2010s, when temporary tactical cooperation eventually gave way to direct clashes between the two camps.

This historical lesson calls for a cautious reading of the current **alliance**'s long-term solidity, without underestimating the very real and immediate threat it poses to the Malian **junta** in the months ahead.

*I would not bet on this **alliance**'s longevity beyond a few years, given how fundamentally irreconcilable **JNIM**'s and the **FLA**'s visions of society remain. But I would be careful not to underestimate its immediate damage, because history teaches us that unnatural alliances can wreak havoc long before they dissolve.*

## The West facing an uncomfortable strategic dilemma

### Neither the junta nor its adversaries are desirable partners

This situation places Western powers in an uncomfortable strategic dilemma. The Malian **junta**, born of a coup and allied with **Russia**, is not an ideologically desirable partner for Western capitals. But the alternative, a victory for the **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance**, would represent an objectively worse scenario, with the potential establishment of extended **jihadist** territorial control at the heart of the **Sahel**.

This dilemma partly explains the relative Western discretion on this file, caught between refusing to legitimize an authoritarian **junta** close to **Moscow** and fearing the far graver prospect of a territorial shift toward reinforced **jihadist** control in an already fragile region.

### An inaction that also carries a strategic cost

This Western caution, while diplomatically understandable, is not without strategic cost. The void left by the withdrawal of French and UN forces continues to be filled, however imperfectly, by a Russian-Malian partnership whose documented ineffectiveness at **Anefis** guarantees no durable containment of the **jihadist** and separatist threat in the region.

This prolonged Western silence could, over time, prove costly if the **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance** keeps gaining ground without any credible alternative, Western or regional, being put on the table to contain this troubling dynamic.

*I understand Western reluctance to wade back into this Sahelian quagmire after the already-documented failures of previous interventions. But silence is not a strategy either, and this diplomatic void objectively benefits those with no interest in seeing stability return to the region.*

## Russia, an involuntary arbiter of this crisis

### A partner without the means to match its ambitions

**Russia**, through its security partnership with the Malian **junta**, has involuntarily become an arbiter of this crisis, without having the material and human resources needed to fully play that role. The **Africa Corps**' documented setbacks at **Anefis** illustrate this structural inability to durably shift a balance of power that keeps evolving, week after week, against **Bamako** and its allies.

This situation exposes **Moscow** to considerable reputational risk on the African continent: if its privatized **security** model fails to contain an increasingly **offensive** **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance**, it is its entire influence strategy in sub-Saharan Africa that could be weakened in the eyes of other potential client governments.

### A strategic priority elsewhere, notably in Ukraine

It must also be recalled that **Russia** continues to concentrate the bulk of its military and political resources on its prolonged aggression against **Ukraine**, where **Vladimir Putin**'s army is also struggling to achieve the decisive results promised to its domestic public. This dispersal of Russian resources across several theaters, **Ukraine**, post-Assad Syria, and now the **Sahel**, structurally limits **Moscow**'s ability to devote sufficient means to each of these files.

This strategic dispersal partly explains why the **Africa Corps**, already undersized relative to the vastness of Sahelian **territory**, cannot durably reverse a dynamic that keeps favoring the **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance** on Malian ground.

***Putin** is playing too many tables at once, **Ukraine**, Syria, now the **Sahel**, and this dispersal costs him dearly on every theater where his partners expected more robust support. **Mali** is discovering today, at its own expense, the real limits of the Russian power it was sold as a security guarantee.*

## What this crisis reveals about Sahelian governance

### A military junta model failing its own criteria

This **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance** and its repeated successes amount, implicitly, to a harsh verdict on the military **junta** governance model that several Sahelian countries have adopted in recent years by rejecting their previous civilian governments. The founding promise of these juntas, more effective **security** achieved through tougher military means, now runs into concrete results that flatly contradict that founding narrative.

This finding should not, however, lead to naive nostalgia for previous civilian governments, whose own security records were nothing exemplary. But it calls for an honest, dispassionate assessment of the actual effectiveness of the military model currently in place in **Bamako**, beyond mere political legitimization discourse.

### An entire region searching for a viable model

This search for a viable governance model for the **Sahel** extends well beyond Mali's case alone. It concerns an entire region simultaneously facing **jihadist** threats, ethnic and separatist tensions, persistent structural poverty, and growing geopolitical competition between Western, Russian and Chinese powers for regional influence.

It is this combination of challenges, rarely treated with the complexity it deserves in Western analyses, that explains the persistent difficulty in finding a durable answer to the Malian crisis and, more broadly, to all the dynamics of **instability** running through the Sahelian belt for over a decade.

*We too often judge these military juntas solely by their democratic legitimacy, which is fair, but we sometimes forget to also judge them by the success criteria they set for themselves. On that exact measure, the promised **security**, Mali's record remains damning.*

## The regional consequences of a Malian collapse

### A risk of contagion toward neighboring countries

If the **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance** keeps advancing at the pace observed since April 2026, the risk of contagion toward neighboring countries, particularly **Niger** and **Burkina Faso**, themselves facing active jihadist dynamics, can no longer be ruled out by regional analysts. A durably fragmented **Mali**, with a north structurally escaping **Bamako**'s control, would create a territorial sanctuary whose destabilizing effects would extend well beyond Mali's borders.

This prospect of regional contagion justifies a far more sustained diplomatic and security mobilization from regional organizations like **ECOWAS**, whose collective effectiveness also remains to be proven against a threat that has already shown its capacity for adaptation and cross-border **coordination**.

### A stake reaching beyond the African continent alone

This persistent Sahelian **instability** also has repercussions beyond the African continent, notably through the migration flows it feeds toward Europe and the arms, drug and human trafficking routes it helps secure for transnational criminal networks profiting from the surrounding security chaos.

These international repercussions alone justify the Malian crisis receiving far more sustained attention from Western capitals, beyond the ethical considerations tied to the fate of civilian populations directly affected by this conflict.

*I reject the idea that the **Sahel** is a distant problem concerning only Africans themselves. The consequences of this **instability**, migration, trafficking, exported terrorism, concern us directly, and current Western indifference risks costing dearly in years to come.*

## The deafening silence of the international community

### Media coverage disproportionate to the stakes

Compared to the media and diplomatic attention given to other contemporary conflict zones, the Malian crisis receives disproportionately weak coverage relative to its real stakes. This relative invisibility is not neutral: it reflects an implicit hierarchy of international crises that continues to systematically disadvantage African conflicts, even when their geopolitical consequences extend far beyond the continent concerned.

This media and diplomatic hierarchy has concrete consequences for the mobilization of international resources available to respond to this crisis, whether humanitarian aid, diplomatic mediation, or political pressure on the actors involved, Russian and **jihadist** alike.

### A collective responsibility to bear

This collective responsibility for the relative silence around the Malian crisis does not concern Western governments alone, but also media outlets, international organizations and, more broadly, a global public opinion that often pays selective attention to conflicts based on criteria that should not be mere geographic or cultural proximity.

Breaking this silence, rigorously documenting this **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance** and its consequences, is a necessary, even if modest, first step toward restoring this crisis the visibility it deserves given the real scale of the stakes it raises for the entire Sahelian region and, by extension, for international **security**.

*I include myself in this collective responsibility: how many articles have I devoted to **Ukraine** this year, how many to **Mali**? I see this disproportion in my own work too, and that is exactly why this commentary felt necessary today.*

## What the history of Tuareg uprisings teaches us

### A cycle of rebellions repeating for decades

Tuareg separatist demands in northern **Mali** did not begin this decade. They fit into a cycle of recurring rebellions dating back to the 1960s, with intensity peaks in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s, each time followed by fragile peace agreements that never truly resolved the structural grievances behind these repeated uprisings, notably the sense of economic and political marginalization felt by northern Tuareg populations.

This historical recurrence calls for a long-term reading of the current crisis, which cannot be resolved through a one-off military response, however effective in the short term, without addressing the structural economic and political causes fueling, cycle after cycle, these same separatist demands for more than half a century.

### A radical novelty: the alliance with jihadism

What distinguishes the current cycle from previous ones, however, is precisely this tactical **alliance** with **JNIM**, absent from earlier Tuareg rebellions that had, for the most part, remained faithful to a secular and nationalist framework of grievances. This radical evolution reflects a political despair deep enough to justify, in the eyes of **FLA** leaders, cooperation with a movement whose societal goals nonetheless differ radically from their own.

This historical novelty is, on its own, a sufficient alarm signal to justify a complete reassessment of crisis-management strategies by all actors concerned, Malian, regional and international, who too often continue applying outdated frameworks to a situation that has, itself, profoundly evolved.

*This **alliance** with jihadism marks a historic rupture in the Tuareg movement, and I cannot help seeing in it a sign of deep political despair. When secular separatists choose to ally with Al-Qaeda, it means every other option had, at some point, seemed definitively exhausted to them.*

## The Arab Spring precedent and its short-lived alliances

### Circumstantial coalitions that often fell apart

Recent history in the Middle East and North Africa offers several examples of circumstantial coalitions between ideologically incompatible movements, temporarily united against a central power perceived as illegitimate, before turning on each other once that shared objective was achieved. Post-Gaddafi Libya, early-civil-war Syria, offer instructive parallels for anticipating the possible trajectory of the **JNIM**-**FLA** **alliance** in **Mali**.

These precedents suggest that even a partial victory for this **alliance** against the Malian **junta** could paradoxically open a new phase of internal conflict between the two movements, each then seeking to impose its own vision of governance on the territories conquered together.

### A lesson Bamako could exploit strategically

This predictable fragility could, theoretically, be exploited by the Malian **junta** and its Russian partners, who would have an interest in waiting and letting this unnatural **alliance** exhaust itself from within rather than multiplying costly and so far largely ineffective offensives. Nothing suggests, however, at this stage, that **Bamako** has the strategic patience needed to favor this approach over immediate military responses.

This strategic question, calculated patience versus immediate military reaction, should nonetheless occupy a central place in the deliberations of Malian and Russian military staffs, given how much regional history suggests that time often works against ideologically incoherent alliances.

*I obviously do not recommend passivity in the face of such a serious threat, but I note that regional history offers useful lessons that **Bamako** seems to be completely ignoring in its current handling of this crisis.*

## The regional actors watching with concern

### Algeria, the nervous neighbor of a fragmented Mali

Among the regional actors most attentive to this crisis is **Algeria**, whose southern border directly adjoins the zones now disputed between the Malian **junta** and the **JNIM**-**FLA** **alliance**. Algiers has always treated the stability of its Malian neighbor as a matter of direct national **security**, given the historical, ethnic and commercial ties crossing this Saharan border.

This Algerian concern has, in the past, translated into mediation attempts between **Bamako** and Tuareg movements, now complicated by the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Algiers and the Malian **junta** in recent years, amid regional influence rivalries.

### ECOWAS, an organization with limited means

**ECOWAS**, the West African regional organization, also remains, theoretically, a central actor but one concretely limited in its ability to influence this crisis, especially since **Mali** suspended its participation in the organization years ago, alongside **Burkina Faso** and **Niger**, forming a bloc of military juntas openly wary of traditional regional mechanisms.

This regional institutional fracture considerably complicates any coordinated collective response to a **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance** that, itself, recognizes no administrative borders and continues operating according to its own territorial logic, independent of the region's official state boundaries.

*A region institutionally fractured facing an armed **alliance** that superbly ignores those same fractures — that is the imbalance that should worry every West African diplomat. The **Sahel** cannot stabilize as long as its own regional institutions remain as divided as the armed groups they claim to fight.*

## Conclusion: an alliance that should alarm far beyond Mali

### A finding that transcends Malian borders

At the end of this commentary, one finding stands out with a clarity that should worry far beyond Mali's borders alone: the **alliance** between **JNIM** and the **FLA** has demonstrated, in just a few months, a tactical effectiveness that seriously threatens the Malian **junta**'s authority over the whole of its northern **territory**. This effectiveness, documented through successive town captures and increasingly ambitious coordinated operations, can no longer be ignored or downplayed by regional and international actors.

This finding does not imply resignation in the face of this troubling dynamic. It requires, on the contrary, a renewed mobilization of all actors concerned, Malian, regional and international, to prevent this unnatural **alliance** from continuing to thrive on the void left by the Malian state's chronic inability to assert its own territorial sovereignty.

### A lesson not to forget for the region's future

The main lesson from this crisis, for the future, lies in the absolute necessity of tackling the structural causes of Sahelian **instability**, economic marginalization, failing public services, a lack of prospects for a large youth population, rather than settling for exclusively military responses whose relative ineffectiveness has already been demonstrated, both by past Western interventions and by the current Russian partnership.

This lesson, however difficult to implement amid an active conflict, is the only durable path toward eventually defusing a **jihadist**-**Tuareg** **alliance** that, for now, keeps thriving on the gaping cracks of a Malian state desperately seeking its own authority.

*I end this commentary without a miracle solution to offer, because none exists for so complex a file. But I refuse to end on a purely fatalistic note: this **alliance** is not invincible, and its internal ideological fragility remains, in the long run, its greatest structural weakness.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [How Malian jihadists and pro-independence groups joined forces to overthrow the junta — Le Monde, July 7, 2026](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2026/07/07/how-malian-jihadists-and-pro-independence-groups-joined-forces-to-overthrow-the-junta_6755235_124.html)

- [Convoy carrying Russian fighters attacked in Mali — Reuters, July 9, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/convoy-carrying-russian-fighters-attacked-mali-sources-say-2026-07-09/)

- [Tracking violent extremism in the Sahel — Council on Foreign Relations, updated July 2026](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel)

### Secondary sources

- [Jihadists and Tuareg allies fight for control of strategic camp in northern Mali — Africanews, July 7, 2026](https://www.africanews.com/2026/07/07/jihadists-and-tuareg-allies-fight-for-control-of-strategic-camp-in-northern-mali/)

- [Timeline of the 2026 Mali offensives — Wikipedia, accessed July 13, 2026](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Mali_offensives)

- [Malian rebels launch widest offensive since 2012 — The Rio Times, July 6, 2026](https://www.riotimesonline.com/mali-attacks-widest-offensive-2026/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentary-the-jihadist-tuareg-alliance-shaking-the-malian-junta