# COMMENTARY: Zaporizhzhia Nuclear — The 750 kV Line Repaired but Unusable, the Danger Persists

> Since March 24, 2026, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe — the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), occupied by Russia since March 2022 — has been receiving its external electricity supply from a single backup line: the 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 line. The main line that should power it — the 750 kV Dniprovska line — has recently been technically repaired but still cannot

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-zaporijjia-nucleaire-la-ligne-750-kv-reparee-mais-inutilisable-le-da

## Introduction: A nuclear power plant on a single power thread

### A permanent risk scenario since March 2026

Since **March 24, 2026**, the largest nuclear power plant in **Europe** — the **Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant** (**ZNPP**), occupied by **Russia** since March **2022** — has been receiving its external electricity supply from a single backup line: the **330 kV Ferosplavna-1** line. The main line that should power it — the **750 kV Dniprovska** line — has recently been technically repaired but still cannot be returned to service. The reason: a substation located more than **100 kilometres** to the northwest of the plant sustained damage so severe during military operations in May **2026** that experts from the **International Atomic Energy Agency** (**IAEA**), who visited the site, observed near-total destruction of its essential equipment.

This situation — a **6-reactor** nuclear power plant, the most important on the continent, powered by a single backup line in an active war zone — is one of the most alarming nuclear risk situations in modern history. It unfolds in silence, far from the headlines covering the latest drone strikes or diplomatic negotiations. Yet if that backup line were severed, the **ZNPP** would be forced to switch to its emergency diesel generators — a situation already experienced seven times since the invasion began. A single accident, a single failure, and we are talking about a major nuclear incident in the heart of **Europe**.

### The local ceasefire and IAEA repairs

The extraordinary logistical complexity of what the **IAEA** managed to organize must be acknowledged. Repairs to the **750 kV Dniprovska** line required a **local ceasefire** negotiated by the UN agency along the front line — a front line running precisely through the infrastructure zone to be repaired. Demining teams had to secure corridors to allow technicians access to damaged pylons and cables. All of this, in a zone where every night brings its share of drone strikes and artillery shells. **IAEA** Director General **Rafael Mariano Grossi** confirmed the state of the work and the substation's condition in official communications.

*The IAEA is negotiating local ceasefires to repair nuclear power lines in a war zone. If someone had described this scenario to me in 2021, I would not have believed it. In 2026, it is our reality. And the worst part is that we have almost grown accustomed to this level of chronic danger.*

## The geography of risk: why the substation is critical

### A broken power chain over 100 km away

To understand why the repaired **750 kV** line cannot be returned to service, you need to understand the geography of the power grid. A **750-kilovolt** line does not operate in isolation: it must be connected to transformation substations at both ends, capable of handling voltage levels and distributing energy to the local grid. The damaged substation — located more than **100 kilometres** to the northwest of the **ZNPP** — is precisely the missing link. Without it, even if the main line's cables are intact, electricity cannot flow. It is like having a perfectly repaired pipe with a broken tap at one end.

**IAEA** experts who visited the substation found severe damage to essential equipment — transformers, circuit breakers, control systems. This type of high-voltage equipment is extremely difficult to replace quickly: manufacturing and delivery lead times are measured in months, and parts available in Ukrainian stockpiles are virtually nonexistent after four years of war and hundreds of strikes on the national power grid.

### The 330 kV line: a safety net, not a solution

The **330 kV Ferosplavna-1** backup line currently powering the **ZNPP** is designed as an **emergency backup** — not as a permanent main supply. It offers lower power transmission capacity than the main **750 kV** line, and is therefore less robust against load fluctuations. More importantly, it represents a **single point of failure**: if this one line were to be damaged — by a strike, a technical fault, or extreme weather — the plant would have no external power supply at all.

*A single power wire between the nuclear plant and safety. Just one. In a war zone. That is the real situation at Zaporizhzhia in June 2026. The silence of the international community on this permanent risk stuns me. If this line goes down, we will be talking about Chernobyl, not a drone.*

## The context of Russian occupation of the ZNPP

### Four years of occupation unprecedented in nuclear history

The **Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant** has been occupied by Russian armed forces since early March **2022** — a situation without precedent in the history of nuclear energy worldwide. No civilian nuclear power plant had ever been militarily occupied before. The plant's **6 reactors** have been shut down since autumn **2022**, but reactors in cold shutdown still require external power supply to maintain the cooling of spent fuel — a failure of that cooling potentially leading to partial core meltdown and radioactive releases.

Since **2022**, the **ZNPP** has lost its external power supply connection seven times, forcing the use of emergency diesel generators. Each of those episodes put the nerves of the global nuclear community on edge. An eighth episode — or a more prolonged one if diesel reserves ran out — would represent a catastrophic risk for **Ukraine** and for all of **Europe**.

### Russia: legally and practically responsible for safety conditions

It is essential to state who is responsible for nuclear safety at the **ZNPP** under current conditions. Russian forces occupying the plant are legally responsible for its safety under international humanitarian law and nuclear safety conventions. Every time safety conditions at the **ZNPP** deteriorate — whether power outages, infrastructure destruction, or security incidents — primary responsibility rests with **Russia**, which illegally occupies this site.

*Russia occupies a nuclear power plant and the international community negotiates local ceasefires with it to repair power lines. There is something deeply absurd about this picture. The aggressor receives technical concessions because it holds a nuclear facility hostage. Putin has understood how to use nuclear fear as a shield.*

## The implications for regional security

### A nuclear incident: consequences at European scale

In the event of a prolonged total loss of external power and depletion of diesel reserves, a nuclear incident at the **ZNPP** would have consequences reaching far beyond Ukrainian borders. Atmospheric dispersion models show that significant radioactive releases could reach **Poland**, **Romania**, **Moldova**, **Hungary**, and potentially more distant areas depending on weather conditions. All of **Europe** is therefore indirectly affected by **ZNPP** safety — which justifies the **IAEA**'s engagement and the ongoing diplomatic pressure on **Russia** to guarantee minimum safety conditions.

The permanent **IAEA** delegation maintained on-site since September **2022** is a crucial element of monitoring and early warning. Its continued presence, despite war conditions and security incidents, represents a remarkable commitment by the agency and its Director General **Grossi**.

### The local ceasefire: a fragile diplomatic innovation

The **local ceasefire** mediated by the **IAEA** around the **ZNPP** and along the repair line is a fragile diplomatic construction. It enabled repairs to the **750 kV** line — but the damaged substation remains a major obstacle. The durability of this ceasefire in a context of active fighting is uncertain. If the parties resume strikes in the protected zone — intentionally or accidentally — the plant's safety conditions could deteriorate sharply.

*A local ceasefire to repair a nuclear power line: it is proof that diplomacy can still function even in the horror of this war. It is also proof of the total absurdity of this situation. We negotiate a pause in the bombardment to save a power plant — and on the other side, missiles continue to fall on Kyiv.*

## The current situation: risk maintained but not immediate

### The six reactors in cold shutdown

The current technical situation at the **ZNPP** must be described accurately to properly contextualize the risk. The plant's **6 reactors** have been shut down since late **2022** — in what is called "cold shutdown." In this state, the reactors are not producing electricity and are not undergoing nuclear fission. However, they continue to generate residual heat from the decay of fission products accumulated in the spent fuel. This **residual decay heat** must be maintained indefinitely — for months, even years — to prevent fuel meltdown and radioactive releases.

It is precisely for this cooling that the external power supply is indispensable. Cooling pumps, control systems, safety lighting — all of this requires a stable, continuous power supply. The **Ferosplavna-1** backup line currently provides this supply, but with a reduced safety margin.

### Ongoing repairs and an uncertain timeline

Repairs to the damaged substation — a prerequisite for returning the **750 kV** line to service — are not expected "in the near future," in the **IAEA**'s words. This means the **ZNPP** will remain dependent on its single backup line for an indefinite period. The ongoing deterioration of the plant's safety conditions — in a context where the war shows no signs of abating — keeps the risk level at an unacceptably high level for a nuclear installation.

*No timeline, a single backup line, repairs that cannot be completed while the war continues. Zaporizhzhia is the nuclear time bomb that no one really wants to talk about because no one knows how to defuse it without stopping the war first.*

## The IAEA between monitoring and powerlessness

### Grossi's impossible mission

**IAEA** Director General **Rafael Mariano Grossi** is in an extraordinarily difficult position. His agency is responsible for monitoring global nuclear safety — but has no means of compelling **Russia**, a nuclear power and permanent member of the **UN Security Council**, to comply with safety standards. His repeated calls for a "nuclear safety perimeter" around the **ZNPP**, his risky field missions, and his alarm communiqués have received no coercive response from the international community.

What **Grossi** has achieved — maintaining a permanent on-site presence, negotiating local ceasefires, securing access for repairs — is considerable under the circumstances. But it is insufficient to guarantee real nuclear safety as long as **Russia** militarily occupies the plant.

### Minimum requirements for real nuclear safety

International nuclear experts agree on the minimum conditions for genuine **ZNPP** safety: the withdrawal of armed forces from the plant, the restoration of Ukrainian or international civilian control, and the repair of the entire power supply grid. None of these conditions are currently met. Short of that, the two absolute minimum conditions are: maintaining external power supply on at least one functioning line, and keeping diesel reserves at a level sufficient to cover several weeks without external supply.

*Grossi does what he can with the tools he has. But the truth no one says loudly enough is this: as long as Russia occupies Zaporizhzhia, European nuclear safety depends on the good will of a regime that bombs hospitals. That is a situation the West should not accept.*

## Historical precedents and nuclear doctrine in conflict zones

### Situations without equivalent in nuclear history

The situation at the **Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant** is without precedent in the history of civilian nuclear power. Never before had an installation of this scale — six reactors, the largest plant in **Europe** — been militarily occupied by a foreign power in an active state of war. The international agreements governing the protection of nuclear sites — notably the **Geneva Conventions** and the **1977 Additional Protocols** — simply had not anticipated this scenario.

The **IAEA** found itself in a paradoxical position: its inspection teams have maintained a permanent presence on-site since September **2022**, but their capacity for action is limited to monitoring and reporting. They can neither order the Russian army to leave, nor physically guarantee the safety of operations. Their regular reports document a troubling situation — **insufficient staff**, **degraded safety equipment**, **psychological pressure** on Ukrainian engineers forced to work under occupation — but the mechanisms to remedy the situation are absent.

### Russia and nuclear risk as a pressure tool

Several experts and military analysts have advanced the hypothesis that **Russia** is deliberately using the implicit nuclear threat its presence at **Zaporizhzhia** represents as a geopolitical pressure tool. By maintaining permanent uncertainty around the plant, the **Kremlin** creates a zone of restraint — a space where Western allies and **Ukraine** itself hesitate to intensify certain types of military operations out of fear of a nuclear incident for which they could be held responsible.

This strategy of **indirect nuclear blackmail** is characteristic of Russia's approach throughout this conflict: using the fear of escalation to maintain a tactical asymmetry. The international community must recognize this manipulation for what it is and develop responses that do not reward this type of behaviour. The ultimate solution remains the same: a complete **Russian** withdrawal from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including the **Zaporizhzhia** plant.

*Using a nuclear power plant as a geopolitical shield is a form of nuclear terrorism that international law has not yet managed to properly define and punish. It is an urgent gap in the law of armed conflict.*

## Crisis-exit scenarios and security guarantees

### Russian withdrawal: the only lasting solution

Nuclear safety specialists are unanimous: the only solution guaranteeing the long-term security of the **ZNPP** is the withdrawal of Russian military forces and the restoration of Ukrainian control over the installation. All other solutions — enhanced international observer presence, bilateral guarantees, buffer security zones — are stopgaps that do not resolve the fundamental problem of the military occupation of a civilian nuclear site.

In a ceasefire or negotiated settlement scenario, the question of the **ZNPP** will need to be addressed as an absolute top priority, before even the discussion of territorial borders. The plant's safety represents an interest that is not only Ukrainian but European and global — the fallout from a serious accident would respect no political border.

### The international community facing its obligations

Signatories to the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** (**NPT**), permanent members of the **UN Security Council**, member states of the **IAEA** — all have a moral and legal obligation to apply maximum pressure on **Russia** to restore normal safety conditions at **Zaporizhzhia**. Economic sanctions, exclusions from international bodies, bilateral diplomatic pressure — all these levers must be applied with intensity proportional to the risk this situation poses.

Inaction is not a neutral choice — it is a decision that implicitly validates Russia's strategy of taking civilian nuclear infrastructure hostage. If this precedent is left without adequate response, it opens the door to similar behaviour in future conflicts, with potentially catastrophic consequences for global nuclear security.

*The **ZNPP** is the thermometer of the international community's cowardice or courage. As long as Russian forces are stationed there without consequence, it is a signal sent to all malicious actors: nuclear sites can be used as instruments of blackmail.*

## Conclusion: nuclear emergency in a distracted world

### The normalization of risk is itself a danger

One of the most disturbing aspects of the **ZNPP** situation is the **progressive normalization of the risk** in public and media perception. Each incident — each loss of external power, each activation of diesel generators, each alarming **IAEA** report — generates less reaction than the previous one. This normalization of nuclear danger is itself a risk: it reduces political pressure on **Russia** to improve safety conditions, and it diminishes international vigilance at the precise moment when the technical situation is deteriorating.

### The repaired 750 kV line, blocked: symbol of an impasse

The **750 kV** line, repaired but unusable, waiting for impossible repairs on a substation damaged in an active war zone, is a perfect symbol of the impasse in **ZNPP** nuclear safety management. Technical solutions exist. Financial resources could be mobilized. But the constraint is neither technical nor financial — it is geopolitical and military. As long as **Russia** occupies the plant and the war continues, the **ZNPP** will remain the most dangerous nuclear time bomb in **Europe**.

*A nuclear power plant occupied by an army at war. That is the very definition of an unacceptable situation. The international community does not have the luxury of looking away and hoping it ends well — nuclear accidents do not respect borders.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Key power line at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant repaired but cannot currently be put back into operation — June 26, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/26/8041243/)

- [The Guardian — Ukraine war briefing: Ballistic missile attack in Kyiv forces residents into shelters — June 28, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/28/ukraine-war-briefing-ballistic-missile-attack-in-kyiv-forces-residents-into-shelters)

### Secondary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Russia has hit Ukraine's energy system 6,000 times. Allies pledge €375 million in Gdańsk — June 25, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/25/russia-has-hit-ukraines-energy-system-6000-times-allies-pledge-e375-million-in-gdansk-but-fund-is-still-short/)

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukraine faces possible daily 5-hour power cuts in July–August — June 25, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-could-face-5-hours-of-daily-power-outages-if-russia-resumes-major-attacks-amid-prolonged-heat-waves-ukrenergo-ceo-says/)

- [The Guardian — Russian-occupied Crimea declares emergency as Zelenskyy's forces step up attacks — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/27/ukraine-war-briefing-russian-occupied-crimea-declares-emergency-as-zelenskyys-forces-step-up-attacks)

- [Euromaidan Press — Russo-Ukrainian war, day 1583: Russia bombs Ukraine's grain ports — June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/russo-ukrainian-war-day-1583-russia-bombs-ukraines-grain-ports-ahead-of-harvest/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-zaporijjia-nucleaire-la-ligne-750-kv-reparee-mais-inutilisable-le-da