# COMMENTARY: Xi in Pyongyang — the shadow alliance reshaping the world order

> I won't pretend this is a total surprise. What strikes me is the speed with which Beijing decided to publicly drop the ideal of denuclearization — as if the position had been maintained solely to pres

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-xi-a-pyongyang-une-alliance-de-l-ombre-qui-redessine-l-ordre-mondial

## Introduction: When the Beijing-Pyongyang axis breaks its silence

### A visit that fools no one

On **June 8 and 9, 2026**, **Xi Jinping** set foot in **Pyongyang** for the first time in nearly **seven years**. This was no courtesy call. It was a deliberate signal sent to **Washington**, **Seoul**, **Tokyo**, and every capital watching closely. The Chinese president does not travel without precise strategic calculation — every appearance is a foreign policy declaration dressed up as diplomatic ceremony.

The summit's outcome was summarized in carefully chosen terms by North Korean state media: a **"strategic plan of great scope"** aimed at consolidating the **"most powerful and strategic relations"** between the two countries. Free translation: an architecture of mutual dependence that makes **North Korea's** denuclearization not only unlikely but now officially buried.

### The most revealing silence in recent diplomatic history

What strikes — and should alarm — is what the official Chinese communiqués did not say. According to analyses published since **July 1, 2026**, the joint declarations **conspicuously omitted any mention of denuclearization**. This is not an oversight. It is a rhetorical capitulation. For decades, **China** claimed to support a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula. That position has now been abandoned — without fanfare — through the most loaded absence in all of this first half of 2026's geopolitical news cycle.

**China** did not initially want **North Korea** to become a nuclear power. Today, it acts as though that is an established fact to be managed. This is a fundamental shift in posture that deserves far more attention than the text of the official agreements.

## A "strategic plan" that lays the groundwork for military cooperation

### Military cooperation at the heart of the text

According to **Al Jazeera**, citing **Yonhap** agency sources on **July 1, 2026**, **Xi Jinping** actively pushed at the **Pyongyang** summit for enhanced cooperation in three areas: **diplomatic**, **law enforcement**, and **military**. This last category is the one that should draw the attention of defense analysts in the West. When the world's second-largest military power formally opens the door to military cooperation with an isolated, heavily armed nuclear state, the consequences extend far beyond the Korean Peninsula.

The formula adopted by both leaders — the **"most powerful and strategic relations"** — is not an empty metaphor. It is a contractual commitment. **Kim Jong Un** described the meeting as a **"historic occasion"** that deepened friendship between the two countries. In North Korean rhetoric, this kind of formulation means that concrete commitments were made, even if the details remain opaque to outside observers.

### The Tumen River question and the port of Rason

Among the elements circulating in geopolitical analyses in the wake of the summit, the potential opening of the **Tumen River** and the **port of Rason** to Chinese navigation stands out as one of the most economically significant. **Rason** is a special economic zone at the junction of North Korean, Russian, and Chinese borders. Naval access there would allow **China** to bypass some of its geographic constraints for access to the Sea of Japan. This is not trivial: it represents a potential reshaping of regional maritime logistics.

These discussions have not been officially confirmed at this stage, but their persistence in serious analyses published since early July 2026 suggests they rest on solid sources. What **North Korea** would gain is equally clear: economic resources and international visibility that sanctioned isolation has long denied it.

## 98% of North Korean trade: a dependence that creates domination

### The number that says it all

According to data published by the South Korean Ministry of Economy and Finance and cited in **Al Jazeera**'s coverage on **July 1, 2026**, **China** accounted for nearly **98% of North Korea's foreign trade in 2024**. This figure is not just another statistic: it is the foundation of the entire relationship between **Beijing** and **Pyongyang**. When a country depends on a single partner for nearly 98% of its international trade, that partner is not an ally — it is the master of its economy.

This dependence should theoretically have given **China** considerable leverage to constrain **Pyongyang** in limiting its nuclear ambitions. That leverage was never seriously used, and the June 2026 visit confirms it will not be. On the contrary, **Beijing** has decided to transform this dependence into loyalty rather than constraint. This is a deliberate strategic choice that reveals the true hierarchy of Chinese priorities: the stability of an allied regime takes precedence over nuclear non-proliferation.

### The sanctions regime: an architecture that is cracking

The international sanctions regime against **North Korea** has always had a gaping flaw: it required **China's** cooperation to be effective. For years, **Beijing** maintained a facade of compliance with those sanctions while allowing informal trade and parallel channels to operate. With the open consolidation of Sino-North Korean ties in **June 2026**, even that facade is disappearing. The sanctions regime against **Pyongyang** is losing all practical credibility — which will have direct implications for non-proliferation efforts elsewhere in the world.

Western allies who still believed they could convince **China** to apply economic pressure on **North Korea** must now revise their calculations. The window for coercive diplomacy through **Beijing** appears officially closed following the summit of **June 8–9, 2026**.

## Kim Jong Un and the signal of "unequivocal" alignment

### A carefully calculated vocabulary

**Kim Jong Un** welcomed **Xi Jinping**'s visit as an **"unequivocal alignment signal."** This formulation is not rhetorical: it is operational. In **Pyongyang**'s logic, such a signal means that **North Korea** can now act with increased confidence on the regional and international stage, knowing its large neighbor offers enhanced diplomatic and economic protection. The messages sent to **Washington** and **Seoul** are clear: maximum pressure will not work if **Beijing** does not play along.

**Kim Jong Un**'s official statements at the summit were particularly elaborate. He affirmed that the position of his Party and government was to **"regularly develop the DPRK-China friendly relations"** with socialism at its core. This shared ideological language is reminiscent of Cold War solidarities — but today it is dressed in a far more pragmatic reality: two authoritarian regimes protecting each other against external pressures.

### The Pyongyang-Moscow rapprochement as backdrop

**Xi**'s visit to **Pyongyang** fits within a broader geopolitical context than Sino-North Korean relations alone. **North Korea** has grown extremely close to **Russia** since 2022, culminating in the deployment of thousands of North Korean soldiers to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine — a fact confirmed by numerous sources in 2025 and 2026. **China** could not ignore this reality: its North Korean ally is now also a war partner of **Moscow**.

This **Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang** triangle now constitutes a coherent axis of authoritarian states mutually supporting each other in resisting Western pressure. The June 2026 visit consolidated the Sino-North Korean branch of this axis, complementing the already well-documented Sino-Russian ties. For **NATO**, the **European Union**, and Pacific democracies, this is no longer a theoretical scenario — it is the operational reality they face.

## Denuclearization: the officially abandoned objective

### A doctrinal shift of great consequence

The omission of any mention of **denuclearization** in the official communiqués from the **Pyongyang** summit of June 2026 represents far more than a diplomatic drafting detail. For decades, **China**'s official position — at least the one it presented at international forums — was that the Korean Peninsula should remain free of nuclear weapons. That position appeared in joint declarations, co-signed UN resolutions, G20 communiqués. It may have been hollow in practice, but it had normative value.

By abandoning it — even tacitly, even through omission — at the **June 2026** summit, **Beijing** signals to other nuclear or nuclear-aspiring states in the region and beyond: non-proliferation is no longer a red line for **China** when its geostrategic interests are at stake. This precedent is dangerous well beyond the Korean Peninsula.

### International efforts put to rest

International diplomatic efforts to end North Korea's nuclear program have, according to numerous analyses published in spring 2026, **failed**. The Six-Party Talks, bilateral US-North Korean negotiations, UN pressure — none of these frameworks produced a lasting result. **Xi**'s visit to **Pyongyang** formally closes the book on this last diplomatic sequence. The era of negotiated pressure appears over; we are entering a period in which **North Korea** is treated as a de facto nuclear power, one to be contained but not disarmed.

This reality forces regional democracies — **South Korea**, **Japan**, **Australia** — to reassess their security posture with increased urgency. Discussions about bolstering **Seoul**'s nuclear capacity and reinforcing the American nuclear umbrella in the region will inevitably intensify in the coming months.

## North Korean soldiers in Ukraine: the direct link to the war in Europe

### A military engagement that changes everything

The context of **Xi**'s visit to **Pyongyang** cannot be separated from the most striking military fact of this alliance: the deployment of **thousands of North Korean soldiers** in **Ukraine** alongside Russian forces. This fact, confirmed by multiple Ukrainian and Western sources in 2025, transformed **North Korea** from a mere arms supplier into an active participant in the war in Europe. North Korean prisoners of war captured by Ukrainian forces have been interrogated, and some reportedly expressed a wish to defect to **South Korea**.

What this means for the Sino-North Korean relationship is fundamental: by strengthening his ties with **Pyongyang** in **June 2026**, **Xi Jinping** is indirectly endorsing North Korea's military engagement in Ukraine. **China** thus finds itself linked, even indirectly, to **Putin**'s war machine through its displayed solidarity with an ally actively fighting alongside Russian forces. This is a position that Western democrats cannot fail to notice.

### Seoul caught between two fires

Ukrainian Foreign Minister **Andrii Sybiha** traveled to **Seoul** in early July 2026 to discuss the fate of North Korean prisoners of war captured in Ukraine. **South Korea** maintains that these soldiers are **"constitutionally considered South Korean nationals"** and stated it would welcome any prisoner wishing to come to Seoul. This position illustrates the extraordinary complexity facing **Seoul**: its large northern neighbor is fighting in **Ukraine**, its large western neighbor is consolidating ties with that same northern neighbor, and its American ally is sending mixed signals about its commitment to the region.

The emerging coordination between **Kyiv** and **Seoul** on the question of North Korean prisoners represents a notable geopolitical development: two countries facing threats from the same authoritarian axis finding themselves cooperating pragmatically on the ground.

## Iran, Russia, North Korea, China: the axis taking shape

### A network of mutual solidarities

**Xi Jinping**'s visit to **Pyongyang** in **June 2026** fits within the progressive structuring of a network of authoritarian states that mutually support each other in resisting Western pressures and sanctions. **Russia** receives ammunition and North Korean soldiers for its war in Ukraine. **Iran** has supplied drones to **Russia**. **China** supplies **Russia** with dual-use components and indirectly finances its war effort. And now, **China** consolidates its ties with **North Korea** at the very moment it is actively fighting in Ukraine.

This is not a coincidence. It is a deliberate architecture of resistance to the liberal international order. Western democracies face not separate crises — Ukraine, the Middle East, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula — but a coordinated systemic challenge, even if sometimes informal in its coordination. The Western response will need to match that coordination, which will require a strategic coherence that democracies have not always managed to sustain.

### Multilateral institutions under pressure

The **UN Security Council**, supposed guardian of the international order, is structurally paralyzed on all these issues by the veto rights of **China** and **Russia**. Sanctions against **North Korea** cannot be strengthened or effectively maintained without Chinese cooperation. Pressure on **Russia** to end its war in Ukraine runs into the same veto. These institutional paralysis points are not accidents — they are the product of a deliberate and coordinated use of blocking power by states that have decided the multilateral order no longer serves their interests.

The future of multilateralism depends in part on the ability of democracies to build alternatives — more agile coalitions, sanction mechanisms that do not require the unanimity of the Permanent Five. The consolidation of the Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang axis accelerates this urgency.

## Xi Jinping and the long game: Taiwan in the background

### The parallel no one wants to name

The sharpest observers of Chinese foreign policy consistently point to a reality that diplomats avoid stating publicly: the consolidation of **Beijing**'s alliance with **Pyongyang** has a direct dimension with regard to **Taiwan**. If the United States and its allies are forced to simultaneously manage an activated North Korean threat — a confident **North Korea** backed by **China** — their capacity to focus on defending **Taiwan** is reduced. This is the logic of multiple strategic distractions.

**Xi Jinping** is playing multi-dimensional chess. Consolidating the North Korean front, increasing economic pressure on **Europe** through trade relations, quietly supporting the Russian war in Ukraine, all while accumulating military capabilities in the **Taiwan** strait — this is a strategy of saturating adversarial resources rather than direct confrontation. Democracies that respond to each crisis in isolation are playing exactly the game **Beijing** wants them to play.

### The missing strategic response

Faced with this complex architecture, Pacific democracies — **United States**, **Japan**, **Australia**, **South Korea** — have intensified their coordination through forums like the **Quad** and reinforced bilateral defense agreements. But these responses remain fragmented. There is not yet a unified strategic vision that links the defense of **Taiwan**, Korean Peninsula security, and support for Ukraine within a coherent framework. This lack of coherence is one of the structural assets of the authoritarian axis.

The **NATO** summit in Ankara on **July 7–8, 2026** could be an opportunity to begin filling this gap — provided allies agree to treat Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security as linked rather than separate challenges. This is a necessary step for any coherent Western strategy against the **Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang-Tehran** axis.

## The Western reaction: between concern and powerlessness

### Declarations with no grip on reality

Official Western reactions to **Xi**'s visit to **Pyongyang** were predictable: concern expressed, calls on **China** to exercise its influence, demands for a return to dialogue. These formulations are hollow. **China** has clearly signaled that it no longer considers denuclearization an operational objective. Asking **Beijing** to "exercise its influence" to constrain **Pyongyang** is like asking someone to bite the hand they have just reinforced.

The real question is not whether the West should express its concern — of course it should. The real question is what tools it still possesses to influence an axis that has deliberately built its architecture to resist Western pressures. Additional sanctions? **China** absorbs or circumvents them. Diplomatic pressure? **Beijing** blocks at the **Security Council**. Support for internal opponents? Nonexistent in a hermetically totalitarian state like **North Korea**.

### The option of reinforced deterrence

What remains, concretely, is deterrence reinforcement. The United States has maintained its nuclear umbrella over **South Korea** and **Japan**. Joint military exercises have been intensified. Missile defense systems have been deployed in the region, despite **Beijing**'s protests. These measures do not solve the North Korean nuclear problem, but they maintain a balance that prevents **Pyongyang** from translating its nuclear capabilities into concrete political advantages in the region.

The question now is whether **Xi**'s **June 2026** visit will encourage **North Korea** to cross new thresholds in its ballistic and nuclear programs, emboldened by its large neighbor's explicit support. Future North Korean ballistic tests — inevitable — will be observed through a new lens following this diplomatic consolidation.

## The North Korean economy: how the Chinese axis sustains the regime

### A dependence that perpetuates the regime's survival

With nearly **98% commercial dependence** on **China** in 2024, **North Korea** cannot survive economically without **Beijing**'s goodwill. And the regime of **Kim Jong Un** uses the economic resources thus generated — however modest — to fund its nuclear and ballistic programs, maintain the security apparatus that smothers all internal dissent, and feed a military elite that constitutes the regime's pillar. **China**, by maintaining this vital economic lifeline, bears co-responsibility for perpetuating a regime that oppresses its 26 million citizens.

This moral reality is uncomfortable for **Beijing**, which prefers to speak of "non-interference in internal affairs." But the economics are unambiguous: maintaining a trade flow that represents **98%** of a country's foreign commerce means keeping that country alive. This support carries a human cost that grand diplomatic principles cannot erase.

### The impact on the North Korean people

What is most conspicuously absent from the diplomatic narrative surrounding **Xi**'s visit to **Pyongyang** is the North Korean population itself. The **26 million North Koreans** living under one of the world's most repressive regimes never sit at the center of discussions about strategic agreements and grand plans. They bear the consequences — food shortages, total surveillance, forced labor, the inability to emigrate freely — of a geopolitics from which they are excluded.

Every time the international community treats **North Korea** as a mere strategic problem to contain rather than a population to help, it makes the tacit choice to leave an entire people hostage to a dynastic regime. **Xi**'s visit reinforces this regime. That is a moral fact that the coldness of diplomatic relations should not obscure.

## The nuclear precedent: what Pyongyang is teaching the world

### The lesson other states are drawing

One of the most enduring consequences of **North Korea**'s trajectory is the signal it sends to other states that might consider developing nuclear weapons. The lesson is brutal in its simplicity: if you persist in your nuclear program despite international sanctions and pressure, if you are sufficiently strategically useful to a great power, you will eventually be recognized as a de facto nuclear power and treated as a partner. The abandonment of any mention of denuclearization in the Sino-North Korean communiqués of **June 2026** dangerously amplifies this signal.

**Iran** is watching. States that abandoned their nuclear programs under international pressure — like **Gaddafi's Libya** — often came to tragic ends. **North Korea**, by contrast, resisted and survived — to the extent a regime of that type can survive. The precedent is there, visible to anyone willing to read it.

### A non-proliferation architecture in peril

The **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**, already fragile for years, suffers a new blow from this evolution in Chinese posture. **China** is itself a signatory and declared nuclear power under the NPT. By treating nuclear **North Korea** as a normal strategic partner without conditioning that relationship on denuclearization progress, **Beijing** is eroding one of the fundamental international norms of security law. The long-term consequences of this normative hollowing-out will be difficult to measure but impossible to ignore.

Democracies that believe in a rules-based world order — starting with **G7** members and **European Union** nations — must clearly name this normative erosion and draw practical consequences for their engagement with **China** on all other issues.

## The NATO Ankara summit: how to respond to this axis

### A strategic opportunity for the Alliance

The **NATO** summit in **Ankara** on **July 7–8, 2026** arrives in a strategic context weighed down by June's events: the consolidation of the **Beijing-Pyongyang** axis, the continuation of the war in Ukraine, persistent tensions on the Iranian nuclear file. This summit should be an opportunity to elaborate a coherent response not to each of these crises separately, but to their common logic: the structuring of a global authoritarian axis that contests the liberal international order.

That would require **NATO** members to agree to broaden their strategic framework beyond traditional Euro-Atlantic security to explicitly integrate the implications of Chinese policy for global security. This is a step that some allies — particularly in central and eastern Europe — are ready to take, but that others still hesitate to make for economic reasons tied to their trade relations with **Beijing**.

### The risk of strategic incoherence

If the Ankara summit limits itself to defense spending commitments and declarations of support for Ukraine without addressing the Sino-Russian-North Korean axis as a whole, it will miss the principal strategic challenge. **Russia** cannot be treated in isolation from its partners: its ability to continue the war in Ukraine depends in part on **China**'s tolerance for its component purchases, and on its deliveries of North Korean armaments.

A coherent strategy would require explicitly linking pressure on **Russia** to costs imposed on **China** for its support of **Moscow** and **Pyongyang**. This is politically difficult, economically costly, and yet strategically inevitable if democracies want to maintain their influence over the evolution of the Ukrainian conflict and the overall security architecture.

## Police cooperation: when repression becomes exportable

### A surveillance agreement with profound implications

One of the least commented-upon elements of the strategic plan adopted at the **Xi-Kim** summit of **June 2026** is the law enforcement dimension of the enhanced cooperation. **Xi Jinping** explicitly pushed for **police cooperation** between the two countries — which, in the context of two authoritarian regimes, does not simply mean sharing intelligence on ordinary crime. It potentially means coordination on the surveillance of their nationals abroad, on the repression of dissidents and deserters, on the sharing of surveillance technologies.

**China** is one of the world's most advanced states in technologically monitoring its population and its expatriates. Transferring part of this expertise to **North Korea** — already one of the world's most authoritarian states — represents a reinforcement of the repressive capacity of **Kim Jong Un**'s regime. The thousands of North Koreans who have fled the regime and live in **China**, **South Korea**, or elsewhere would be the first potential victims of enhanced Sino-North Korean police cooperation.

### North Korean refugees in China: a vulnerable population

It is estimated that tens of thousands of North Koreans live illegally in **China**, fleeing the misery and repression of the **Pyongyang** regime. **Beijing**'s official policy is to treat them not as refugees but as illegal economic migrants, and to return them to **North Korea** where they face labor camps or worse. This policy, already inhumane in its current logic, could harden further under a formalized police cooperation framework between the two countries.

The announcement of a police cooperation agreement within the **June 2026** summit framework was not followed by specifics on what it concretely implies for these vulnerable populations. But the trajectory is troubling: every institutional reinforcement of the Sino-North Korean relationship has historically tended to come at the expense of the most exposed North Koreans — those trying to flee, those living in exile, those hoping international pressure will eventually change something.

## Implications for Ukraine and the ongoing war

### Indirect solidarity with Putin's war

For **Ukraine**, the consolidation of the **Beijing-Pyongyang** axis in **June 2026** is not a geopolitical abstraction. North Korean soldiers have fought alongside **Putin**'s forces on Ukrainian territory. By strengthening his ties with **Pyongyang** without conditions, **Xi Jinping** implicitly endorses this military engagement. The **China** that presents itself as a potential peace mediator in Ukraine is the same **China** that is consolidating its ties with one of the active belligerents in the conflict. This contradiction has not escaped **Kyiv**.

**Volodymyr Zelensky** and his government have long identified **China** as an ambivalent actor in this conflict — not a declared enemy, but not a neutral partner either. **Xi**'s visit to **Pyongyang** reinforces this reading. It also invites **Ukraine** and its allies to deepen their cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners who share a similar view of the threats posed by the authoritarian axis.

### The war seen from Kyiv: a global conflict

Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion has long transcended the mere defense of a national territory. It has become the symbol and the front line of a broader confrontation between two visions of the world: that of democracies that believe in sovereignty, international law, and human rights, and that of authoritarian regimes that reject these as interference in their spheres of influence. The fact that **North Korea** chose to fight against **Ukraine**, and that **China** chose in June 2026 to strengthen its ties with that same North Korean regime, is not a detail — it is a revelation of the fundamentally global nature of the ongoing conflict.

**Ukraine** is resisting not only for itself but — whether it wants to or not — for a model of international relations that **Kyiv** hopes to see prevail. **Zelensky** knows this. Western allies should draw practical consequences from it — in military support, in lifting restrictions on the use of weapons supplied, in accelerating the path toward membership in the **European Union**.

## Conclusion: The world that comes next begins now

### A turning point that can no longer be ignored

**Xi Jinping**'s visit to **Pyongyang** on **June 8 and 9, 2026** may not be remembered as a dramatic event. There were no thunderous speeches, no spectacular ruptures, no declarations of war. Two authoritarian leaders quietly consolidated an already solid alliance, silently dropping an international objective they had been pretending to share for decades. The result is just as grave as if it had been announced with a trumpet fanfare.

The **denuclearization** of the Korean Peninsula — an objective that structured much of regional diplomacy for thirty years — is officially dead. **North Korea** is now treated by its main economic supporter as a normal nuclear power with which one can do business. The world that follows — more multipolar, more dangerous, harder to regulate — begins now.

### What this demands of democracies

Faced with this new reality, democracies cannot afford the luxury of nostalgia for a world order that the authoritarian axis is methodically dismantling. They must adapt their institutions, strengthen their alliances, invest massively in defense and in countries defending the same values. They must treat Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security as a single strategic architecture. And they must have the clarity to tell their citizens what is really happening — not to sow fear, but to enable the decisions that are required.

**Ukraine** is resisting. **Zelensky** is holding. But the window in which this conflict can still end in a way favorable to democratic values is not open indefinitely. What the leaders of democracies decide in the coming months — in **Ankara**, in European capitals, in **Washington** — will determine whether the world we leave to our children is the one we want to bequeath them.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Al Jazeera — Kim Jong Un hails "unshakeable will" to develop ties with Xi, July 1, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/1/north-koreas-kim-hails-unshakeable-will-to-develop-ties-with-chinas-xi)

- [The Conversation — International efforts to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program have failed, 2026](https://theconversation.com/international-efforts-to-end-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-program-have-failed-heres-what-comes-next-284083)

- [China Beyond the Wall — The true agenda behind Xi Jinping's trip to Pyongyang, 2026](https://chinabeyondthewall.org/the-true-agenda-behind-xi-jinpings-trip-to-pyongyang/)

### Secondary sources

- [CSIS / ChinaPower — Assessing Xi's visit to North Korea, conversation with Victor Cha, 2026](https://www.csis.org/podcasts/chinapower/assessing-xis-visit-north-korea-conversation-victor-cha)

- [Interfax Ukraine — Coverage of geopolitical developments related to North Korea, July 2026](https://en.interfax.com.ua)

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukrainian context and North Korean prisoners of war, July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-xi-a-pyongyang-une-alliance-de-l-ombre-qui-redessine-l-ordre-mondial