# COMMENTARY: Vance and the foundation of the Iran deal: prudence or blindness?

> On June 22, 2026, at the Bürgenstock luxury resort in the Swiss mountains, U.S. Vice President JD Vance addressed journalists with the air of someone who had just achieved a historic feat. "We have laid a very good foundation for a successful final deal," he declared. The architectural metaphor is flattering to himself. But what are these foundations actually worth? That is the

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-vance-et-la-fondation-du-deal-iranien-prudence-ou-aveuglement

## Introduction: Vance's "good foundation" under the microscope

### The vice president's words and what they reveal

On **June 22, 2026**, at the **Bürgenstock luxury resort** in the Swiss mountains, U.S. Vice President **JD Vance** addressed journalists with the air of someone who had just achieved a historic feat. "We have laid a very good foundation for a successful final deal," he declared. The architectural metaphor is flattering to himself. But what are these foundations actually worth? That is the question this commentary sets out to answer — without either complacency or reflexive cynicism.

To understand what **Vance** calls a "foundation," the context must be recalled: on **June 19, 2026**, the **United States** and **Iran** signed in **Geneva** a **memorandum of understanding (MOU)** — a term carefully chosen to avoid saying "treaty" or "peace agreement" — intended to end the hostilities triggered by U.S.-Israeli strikes on **Iran** in late February **2026**. This MOU opens a **60-day window** to negotiate a final agreement covering Iran's nuclear program, sanctions, and reconstruction. It is significant. It is also insufficient, ambiguous, and carries considerable risks.

### Context of the US-Iran war: the facts

In late **February 2026**, the **United States** and **Israel** launched strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites. The war that followed — roughly **40 days of combat** followed by a precarious ceasefire — was triggered by American and Israeli concerns over Iran's nuclear program and **Tehran**'s support for **Hezbollah** forces in **Lebanon**. The war disrupted global oil supplies via the closure of the **Strait of Hormuz** — the transit point for **20% of the world's oil** — causing an energy price spike and a global economic shock wave. Negotiations on **Ukraine** were suspended for weeks because of this conflict. Iran suffered significantly: its nuclear installations were badly damaged, assets were frozen, its economy was hit.

In this context, the MOU of **June 19** represents the result of mediation led by **Pakistan** and **Qatar**. It provides for a permanent ceasefire, the reopening of the **Strait of Hormuz** within **30 days**, the lifting of the American naval blockade on Iranian ports, the suspension of U.S. oil sanctions for **60 days**, the release of approximately **$24 billion** in frozen Iranian assets during the negotiation period, and discussions on the nuclear program under **IAEA** supervision. This last point — nuclear inspections — is precisely where the American and Iranian versions diverge sharply.

## What the agreement actually contains: between declarations and reality

### The points of convergence: a real ceasefire, an economic opening

To be fair: the MOU of **June 19, 2026** is not without substance. The **reopening of the Strait of Hormuz** is a concrete and immediate step forward. Dozens of vessels blocked since the escalation were able to resume navigation. Oil prices fell. The flow of maritime trade toward the **Persian Gulf** is progressively resuming. This is real, measurable, and important for the global economy. Similarly, the ceasefire in **Lebanon** — where fighting between **Israel** and **Hezbollah** had resumed since March **2026** — appears to be holding, at least provisionally. The "deconfliction" mechanism created in **Lucerne** to avoid incidents in the strait and in **Lebanon** is a useful communication structure.

On the economic front, the **60-day** suspension of oil sanctions allows **Iran** to begin selling its oil — approximately **67 million barrels** stored on vessels in the **Gulf** have been released, according to **Al Jazeera**. **Chinese refineries** are the first buyers. The progressive release of frozen assets — potentially **$24 billion** during the negotiation period, and **$300 billion for reconstruction** ultimately — represents a significant economic incentive for **Tehran** to maintain the process.

### The grey areas: inspections, uranium, contradictory definitions

It is on the nuclear question that **Vance**'s foundations begin to show their cracks. At his press conference, the vice president stated that **Iran** had agreed to the return of **IAEA** inspectors "as early as this week." The following day, Iranian authorities denied it: no set timeline for inspections, no agreement on site access. This contradiction between the American and Iranian statements is not trivial — it illustrates the fragility of the arrangements reached at **Bürgenstock**.

Similarly, **Vance** asserted that **Iran** would never be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon — an assertion **Trump** repeated emphatically on **Truth Social**. But the MOU text does not mention complete and immediate denuclearization. It refers to "permanent denuclearization" as the objective of a future final agreement, and the maintenance of Iran's nuclear program "in its current state" during the **60-day** negotiation. That is not the same thing. Between "never obtaining a bomb" and "maintaining the status quo for 60 days while negotiating," there is a chasm that **Vance**'s optimism glosses over entirely.

*There is something in Vance's communication that reminds me of the spectacular trade deal announcements from the first Trump administration — "deal of the century" moments that later turn out to be far less substantive than advertised. I am not saying the June 19 MOU is nothing. I am saying that between the triumphant declarations and the reality of verifiable Iranian commitments, there is a considerable gap that history will teach us to measure.*

## The structural risks of the deal: what the optimists miss

### The verification question: who controls what?

**IAEA** Director General **Rafael Grossi** summarized the challenge with precision at a press conference in **Geneva** on **June 18, 2026**: "It is positive that the memorandum exists. Now, the technical work begins." And that technical work is precisely what **Vance**'s triumphant declarations pass over in silence. The **IAEA** must have access — physical, immediate, unannounced — to all Iranian nuclear facilities. This includes sites that were bombed in **2026** and whose condition is uncertain. It includes installations that **Iran** may have built in secret during the years when international oversight was limited.

The last time **Iran** accepted a nuclear agreement — the **JCPOA of 2015** — negotiations over verification modalities took years and remained imperfect. In **60 days**, it is structurally impossible to build a robust verification regime. That timeframe may be enough to initiate a process — but **Vance**'s optimism in presenting the foundations as already laid is premature.

### The Obama precedent: the "foundation" that collapsed

**Trump** and **Vance** enjoy presenting this agreement as a superior alternative to **Obama**'s **JCPOA** — the **2015** nuclear deal from which **Trump** himself withdrew during his first term. The criticism of the JCPOA centered on its verification shortfalls, its time-limited duration, and the exclusion of Iran's missile program. Those criticisms were partly legitimate. But does the current deal address those concerns?

It is difficult to know with certainty, because the full MOU text has not been officially published. What has leaked through journalists shows an agreement that, on the nuclear question, defers the most difficult decisions to the final agreement to be negotiated over **60 days**. On missiles, Iranian sources confirm that the subject is explicitly excluded from negotiations — which was precisely one of the major flaws of the JCPOA. **Vance**'s "foundation" therefore reproduces one of the chief defects in the agreement he has criticized.

## Iran's position: between tactical concessions and long-term strategy

### What Tehran obtained and what it conceded

From Iran's perspective, this agreement is objectively advantageous in the short term. **Iran** obtained: the lifting of the American naval blockade, the suspension of oil sanctions, the release of frozen assets, the implicit recognition of its political survival after the U.S.-Israeli strikes, and the prospect of reconstruction funded at **$300 billion** by Gulf states. In exchange, it agreed to a ceasefire, the reopening of Hormuz, and discussions on its nuclear program. The missiles — its primary regional leverage tool — are not on the table.

Iranian Foreign Minister **Abbas Araghchi** stated on X that Iran's main conditions had been met. **Tehran** got what it wanted immediately — economic relief — and preserved what it refuses to negotiate — missiles and strategic autonomy. For **Iran**, this is a favorable deal. The question remains whether American leaders have sufficiently considered the implications of this asymmetry.

### Iran's internal contradictions over the deal

But **Iran** is not monolithic. The agreement faces "skepticism" and even "opposition" internally, according to sources cited by **NBC News**. The Revolutionary Guards, who manage Iran's ballistic capabilities and its regional affiliates, are not necessarily enthusiastic about a deal that might limit their influence. Supreme leader **Ali Khamenei** must arbitrate between the pragmatists who see in this agreement an opportunity for economic reconstruction and the hardliners who see it as an unacceptable capitulation.

This internal tension is a real vulnerability of the agreement. If the hardliner faction gains the upper hand — for example in response to an Israeli action deemed provocative, or if released assets prove less substantial than promised — the agreement could be sabotaged from within. **Trump** has warned that he would resume strikes if **Iran** failed to honor its commitments. That threat is not empty — but it applies to an agreement whose precise terms are still disputed between the parties. **Vance**'s "house" rests on foundations that one of the parties has not clearly validated.

*I think about Ukraine while analyzing this agreement. The U.S.-Iran crisis absorbed American diplomatic energy for weeks, delaying talks on the Russo-Ukrainian war. If this deal holds and stabilizes the Middle East, it will be a relief for Washington, which can devote more attention to Europe. If the deal collapses, the consequences — resumed strikes, the closure of Hormuz, an oil price spike — will be catastrophic for the entire global economy, including the West's capacity to support Ukraine. Geopolitical files are interconnected in ways that the Trump administration's simplistic communication tends to obscure.*

## The IAEA, China, and third parties: a fragile international architecture

### The central role and credibility of the IAEA

The **IAEA** is presented as the central verification body for the future nuclear agreement. **Grossi** welcomed the MOU and said he was ready to define "what we need to observe and what we need access to." But the **IAEA** has a mixed track record in its interactions with **Iran**: between **2022 and 2025**, **Iran** suspended cooperation and blocked access to key nuclear sites. This suspension contributed precisely to the concerns that led to the strikes. Rebuilding a relationship of trust and robust access protocols takes time — far more than **60 days**.

Moreover, the **IAEA** needs active Iranian cooperation to be effective. The precedent of the North Korean nuclear program — where repeated agreements were followed by repeated violations — must remain in mind. Nuclear verification only works if the party being verified plays by the rules. If **Iran** replicates the North Korean strategy — tactical concessions, then a gradual withdrawal from cooperation once economic benefits are secured — the deal will fail, and fail dangerously because it will have legitimized Iran's nuclear program during its reconstruction phase.

### China: between mediator and beneficiary

An actor often underestimated in this deal is **China**. As the primary buyer of Iranian oil under sanctions, **Beijing** directly benefits from the reopening of Hormuz and the lifting of oil sanctions. Chinese refineries absorbed the **67 million** released barrels first. **China** also has an interest in seeing the deal hold because a resumption of hostilities would threaten its investments in **Iran** and its supply agreements. But **Beijing** did not officially participate in the negotiations — meaning it is a beneficiary without corresponding obligations.

This position is characteristic of Chinese strategy: benefiting from the frameworks the **West** constructs at great diplomatic cost, without contributing to them. In the Iranian case, this asymmetry is particularly problematic: if **China** continues to buy Iranian oil without conditions, it deprives future sanctions of much of their effectiveness, reducing the leverage that the **United States** believes it holds over **Tehran**.

*China's role in the Iran deal raises a fundamental question for me: how do you build a durable nuclear security architecture if Iran's largest trading partner is not bound by its obligations? It is the same question that arises with sanctions on Russia — and the answer is the same: without Chinese commitment, any economic pressure on an authoritarian regime has structural limits. Dealing with Iran without dealing with China means building on sand.*

## The implications for regional and global security

### Israel, Lebanon, and the deal's unspoken elements

The agreement includes provisions on **Lebanon**, where a ceasefire between **Israel** and **Hezbollah** must hold. But **Israel** confirmed it is not withdrawing from **southern Lebanon**, which represents a major obstacle to stabilization. **Israel** did not sign the MOU and is not directly bound by its provisions. The configuration is therefore one of an American-Iranian agreement that leaves the most sensitive Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Iran issues unresolved.

**North Korea** and its nuclear program — developed partly with Russian assistance — adds another layer of concern: if a fragile nuclear deal is reached with **Iran** while **Pyongyang** accelerates its arsenal with **Moscow**'s help, non-proliferation as a global principle continues to erode. These crises are not independent — they reinforce one another within a weakened global security architecture.

### Prudence or blindness? My verdict

The question in this commentary's title — prudence or blindness? — deserves a nuanced answer. **Vance** and his teams accomplished something useful: they stopped an active military conflict and opened a diplomatic window. That is prudence. But the triumphant declarations about a "solid foundation" for a final deal, the contradictions on nuclear inspections, the absence of treatment for Iran's missile program, the mechanics of the **60-day window** that creates artificial pressure on decade-long questions — all of that looks more like optimistic blindness than lucid diplomacy.

The real test is not the signing of the MOU — it is what happens at the end of **60 days**. If the negotiations produce a robust agreement on the nuclear question with solid verification mechanisms, this will be a historic achievement. If they stall, if **Iran** resumes enrichment, if inspectors are blocked — then **Vance**'s "foundations" will be those of a house built on sand. And the world will be more dangerous than it was before the war.

*I am skeptical without being nihilistic. The deal can hold — if both parties are serious, if the IAEA has the means to do its work, if China cooperates on future sanctions, and if the 60 days are spent on genuine technical work rather than press releases. That is a lot of conditions. But the alternative — resuming strikes, closing Hormuz, further destabilizing the Middle East — is worse. I support the process while maintaining a critical eye on the substance.*

## The JCPOA precedent and the lessons for the current deal

### 2015-2018: the agreement that collapsed and its lessons

To assess the chances of success of the **June 19, 2026 MOU**, it is instructive to revisit the history of the **JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action)** signed in **2015** under the **Obama** administration. That agreement represented a colossal diplomatic effort involving **six major powers** — the **United States**, the **United Kingdom**, **France**, **Germany**, **Russia**, and **China** — and succeeded in significantly reducing Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles in exchange for a partial lifting of sanctions. But it also had its flaws: expiration clauses (the "sunset clauses"), the exclusion of Iran's missile program, and verification mechanisms that critics found insufficient.

In **2018**, the **Trump** administration unilaterally withdrew the **United States** from the JCPOA, citing precisely these shortcomings. **Iran** responded by resuming uranium enrichment. In **2026**, the same **Trump** is seeking to conclude a deal that, based on available information, excludes Iran's missile program in the same way as the JCPOA — reproducing one of the flaws he had condemned. This irony is worth noting, even if the military context — the strikes of **2026** — is different.

*There is something troubling about a president who withdrew from a nuclear deal for being too weak, then returns with a deal that replicates its chief structural flaw. This is not a criticism unique to Trump — it reflects a deeper truth: nuclear diplomacy with Iran is genuinely hard, and every American administration eventually collides with the same walls.*

### Verification as the cornerstone: what the IAEA can actually do

**IAEA** Director General **Rafael Grossi** recalled on **June 26, 2026** that the agency needs verifiable, physical, and unannounced access to all Iranian nuclear facilities — including those bombed in **2026** whose actual condition remains unknown. Building this verification regime is technically and diplomatically complex. After years of Iranian suspension of cooperation with the **IAEA**, entire control procedures must be rebuilt. **Monitoring sensors** must be reinstalled. **Inspectors** must be accredited. These processes take months, not weeks — and certainly not **60 days**.

**Vance**'s optimism about the "**foundation being laid**" contrasts sharply with **Grossi**'s caution. That is a signal that the real techno-diplomatic underpinnings of this agreement are less solid than the political declarations suggest. In nuclear diplomacy, the **gap between rhetoric and verifiable protections** can have catastrophic consequences.

*What strikes me about this diplomatic sequence is the difference in style between the technical experts — Grossi, the IAEA engineers — and the politicians — Trump, Vance. The experts speak of months of technical work, physical access, sensors to be reinstalled. The politicians speak of foundations and houses being built. In nuclear diplomacy, it is the experts who are right. And their caution should temper our enthusiasm.*

## The impact on the Ukraine war: the geopolitics of simultaneous files

### How the Iranian crisis froze Russian-Ukrainian talks

The **U.S.-Iran** crisis of **2026** had a direct and documented impact on negotiations over **Ukraine**. The trilateral talks scheduled in **Geneva** for March **2026** were suspended during the most intense weeks of the Iranian conflict. The **Rubio** team at the **State Department**, absorbed by negotiations with **Tehran**, no longer had the cognitive capacity or diplomatic resources needed to simultaneously maintain an active mediation on the Ukrainian file. **Zelensky** himself acknowledged this reality: "**The United States has shifted its attention to the Middle East. That is why we have pauses in our diplomatic negotiations.**"

For **Kyiv**, this interruption was not neutral. It gave **Moscow** a precious diplomatic respite — time to consolidate its positions, replenish its missile stocks, let the front stabilize. Every week without diplomatic pressure is an advantage for the side that is betting on time. **Russia** has that strategic patience, financed by a state that devotes more than **40%** of its spending to the war. **Ukraine**, which depends on fluctuating international aid, has less room to wait.

### Iranian deal holding = more attention for Ukraine

The resolution of the Iranian file — if the **June 19 MOU** holds — should theoretically free American diplomatic capacity to return to the Ukrainian file. This is the strongest argument in favor of the deal: by stabilizing the **Middle East**, it allows **Washington** to redirect energy and resources toward pressure on **Moscow**. This logic is real — but it depends on two assumptions that are not guaranteed: that the Iranian deal holds beyond the **60-day** negotiation, and that the American administration is prepared to engage seriously in Ukrainian mediation with positions compatible with **Kyiv**'s red lines.

The interconnection between the Iranian and Ukrainian files illustrates a fundamental geopolitical truth: in an unstable multipolar world, crises feed one another. **Russia** has every interest in keeping American attention dispersed — on **Ukraine**, on **Iran**, on **Asia**. It is its resilience strategy against an American power that cannot be simultaneously present everywhere with equal intensity. **Zelensky** understands this — which is why he presses for rapid decisions, before other crises steal the spotlight.

*I had not originally planned to analyze the link between the Iranian deal and the Ukraine war in this commentary. But thinking it through, it may be the most important point: these files are not separate. What Vance negotiates at Bürgenstock directly affects what Zelensky can hope for in Kyiv. Diplomacy has no watertight compartments. That is a reality Western leaders should constantly keep in mind.*

## Conclusion: a fragile foundation, a house yet to be built

### What the June 19 MOU actually accomplished

Let us give **Vance** and the **Trump** team their due: stopping an active military conflict, reopening the **Strait of Hormuz**, and engaging **Iran** in formal negotiation are concrete accomplishments. The **June 19, 2026 MOU** is not nothing — it is better than continued strikes and the prolonged closure of a vital commercial artery. The **60-day window** is a starting point, not a finish line.

The columnist maintains full editorial responsibility for the analysis and judgments expressed in this article. Any errors of fact, should they be identified by readers, will be corrected in subsequent publications.

*I write this commentary with genuine uncertainty about the outcome. If the Iran deal holds and the IAEA builds a robust verification regime, it will be a genuine achievement worth acknowledging. I am simply asking that we not confuse a promising start with a finished building. Vance laid a foundation. Whether a house stands on it is the question history will answer.*

### The real challenge: turning foundations into lasting architecture

But foundations do not build the house on their own. A robust final agreement on Iran's nuclear program will require months of technical work with the **IAEA**, resolution of the current contradictions on inspections, a treatment of the missile program that remains excluded from discussions, and management of Iranian domestic politics where the **Revolutionary Guards** are not committed to this deal. These challenges are real, substantial, and will not be resolved with optimistic press conferences. Caution is warranted — not triumphalism.

*In the end, this deal tells us something important about diplomacy in the Trump era: spectacular in its staging, fast in its declarations, and deliberately vague on the technical details that make the difference between lasting peace and an extended truce. I wish it success. But I refuse to declare victory before IAEA inspectors have had access to every Iranian centrifuge.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [AP — US and Iran sign initial deal to end war, ease sanctions — June 18, 2026](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-war-oil-deal-june-17-2026-19652f4611b704c0a991bf1f5bc9a4b9)

- [Taipei Times — Vance hails 'good foundation' for Iran deal after talks — June 22, 2026](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2026/06/23/2003859570)

- [CNBC — U.S., Iran agree roadmap for final deal — June 22, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/22/us-iran-roadmap-final-deal-switzerland-talks-lebanon-deconfliction.html)

- [White House — President Trump's Iran Agreement Is America First in Action — June 19, 2026](https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/06/president-trumps-iran-agreement-is-america-first-in-action/)

### Secondary sources

- [Euronews — Vance says Iran talks set 'good foundation' — June 23, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/23/vance-says-direct-talks-with-iran-set-good-foundation-for-deal-to-end-the-war)

- [Al Jazeera — Nuclear inspectors and frozen assets: What Iran and US can't agree on — June 23, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/23/what-the-us-and-iran-agreed-and-disagreed-on-first-day-of-talks)

- [New York Times — U.S.-Iran Agreement: Full Text — June 17, 2026](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/17/us/politics/us-iran-agreement-deal-text.html)

- [Anadolu Agency — US vice president says 'very good foundation' laid for final Iran deal — June 22, 2026](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-vice-president-says-very-good-foundation-laid-for-final-iran-deal-after-burgenstock-talks/3974478)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-vance-et-la-fondation-du-deal-iranien-prudence-ou-aveuglement