# COMMENTARY: Testing Article 5 — why a Baltic state could trigger everything

> There are questions that diplomats avoid raising publicly, because asking them amounts to admitting a fragility one would prefer not to exhibit. Here is one: if Russia deliberately attacked a NATO member state in the Baltic states, would the Alliance truly mobilize to defend that ally, at the risk of open war with a nuclear power? Or would it find legal, political, and strategi

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-tester-l-article-5-pourquoi-un-etat-balte-pourrait-tout-declencher

## Introduction: The scenario nobody wanted to imagine

### Naming the unspeakable

There are questions that diplomats avoid raising publicly, because asking them amounts to admitting a fragility one would prefer not to exhibit. Here is one: if **Russia** deliberately attacked a **NATO** member state in the **Baltic states**, would the Alliance truly mobilize to defend that ally, at the risk of open war with a nuclear power? Or would it find legal, political, and strategic reasons to prevaricate until the window for action closed?

This is no longer a rhetorical question. Western officials, according to **The Guardian** of **June 27, 2026**, are expressing real concerns about the Alliance's capacity to respond to a Russian attack without American support, whose reliability is increasingly questioned under the Trump administration. And on **June 26**, the same newspaper reveals that **Russia** is possibly preparing a provocation in the Baltics or Poland. Will the Alliance's Article 5 — an attack on one is an attack on all — live up to what it was designed to do?

### Article 5: what does it actually say?

**Article 5** of the North Atlantic Treaty is often presented as an absolute guarantee of collective defense. In reality, its text is more nuanced. It stipulates that each party shall assist the attacked state "by such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The use of force is an option, not an automatic obligation. And it is precisely this wording that leaves a margin for interpretation which Russia seeks to exploit with a carefully calibrated provocation.

History has shown that **Article 5** has been invoked only once in the Alliance's history: after the **September 11, 2001** attacks. It has never been tested in the context of direct armed conflict with a state. Nobody knows with certainty how the Alliance's 32 members would react to an ambiguous Russian attack on a Baltic state. And it is precisely this uncertainty that constitutes the most serious risk.

*Article 5 is NATO's keystone. If that keystone proves less solid than advertised when tested, the entire Western security architecture collapses. I am not saying the Alliance would not hold. I am saying that the doubt itself is already a partial victory for Putin.*

## How Russia would test Article 5 without directly triggering it

### The strategy of the partial fait accompli

Russian military doctrine has theorized and practiced the strategy of the **fait accompli**: act quickly to create an irreversible situation before the adversary can respond, then negotiate from that position. This is what happened in **Crimea in 2014**: soldiers without insignia took control of the island within hours, before **NATO** and the **EU** had time to consult on a response. Transposed to the Baltic states, this scenario could resemble a rapid seizure of the **Suwalki Corridor**, cutting the Baltic states off from the rest of the Alliance.

The objective is not necessarily to retain the captured territory — though that would be the ideal starting position for **Putin**. The objective is to create a situation where **NATO** must choose between an escalatory military response and a negotiated capitulation. In either case, Moscow demonstrates that **Article 5** does not protect as absolutely as advertised, and that Russia can impose real costs on the Alliance without paying the ultimate price.

### The ambiguous hybrid attack: the most likely scenario

More probable than a direct military attack are scenarios of deliberately ambiguous hybrid aggression. A massive cyberattack that paralyzes the power grid of **Estonia** or **Latvia** for several days, whose attribution to Russia is technically established but legally contested. Groups of saboteurs who destroy critical infrastructure in a remote area with an obscure claim. Drones of uncertain origin that crash near **NATO** military installations.

Each of these scenarios creates a dilemma for the Alliance: responding militarily to an attack that cannot be attributed with certainty risks appearing aggressive. Not responding signals that **Article 5** has a blind spot. **Russia** wins in either case, at least partially. That is the sinister elegance of hybrid strategy.

*Hybrid warfare is designed to put us in checkmate without fighting. Respond too firmly: we look like the aggressors. Respond too softly: we confirm our weakness. The only way out of this dilemma is a deterrence so robust that the temptation to test is eliminated from the outset. And that deterrence costs money, time, and political will.*

## The American question: the wavering pillar

### Hegseth and the review of American presence in Europe

The solidity of **Article 5** depends, in the minds of many European allies, on American presence and commitment. The **United States** accounts for approximately **70%** of **NATO** defense spending. Their nuclear arsenal is the primary guarantor of strategic deterrence. Their weapons systems, intelligence, and command structures irrigate Alliance capabilities. Without Washington, European **NATO** lacks the means for its policy.

Yet, according to **The Guardian** of **June 27, 2026**, **Pete Hegseth** is conducting a review of American military presence in Europe whose conclusions are expected before the **Ankara** summit. And Alliance leaders openly fear they can no longer count on American assistance if **Russia** attacks. This is not an abstract fear: under the **Trump** administration, the signals sent to allies have been sufficiently contradictory to create real uncertainty about American guarantees.

### Europe without an American guarantee: a scenario in preparation

The uncertainty about American commitment is pushing Europeans into accelerated thinking about their strategic autonomy. The **Ankara** summit will be, according to the **European Parliament** briefing of **June 26, 2026**, an opportunity to address this question frontally: if the United States reduces its contribution to collective defense, what do Europeans do? The honest answer, today, is: not much, because the capabilities are not there.

This is precisely why the Eastern Flank's demands — **5% of GDP**, permanent brigades, autonomous defense capabilities — are fundamental. Not as an alternative to American commitment, but as a complement that would allow European **NATO** to hold alone for the time necessary for American reinforcements to arrive — or to function without them if those reinforcements do not come.

*I am pro-Alliance, but I am not naive about Trump. He has called into question commitments that his predecessors treated as certainties. Whether this challenge is a negotiating tactic or a genuine strategic revision, the result is the same: Europe can no longer indefinitely outsource its security to Washington. That is uncomfortable. It is also healthy.*

## What triggering Article 5 would mean

### Decision mechanisms: institutional slowness versus military urgency

In the event of an attack against a member state, triggering **Article 5** goes through a consultation process within the **North Atlantic Council**. This process, in clear-cut cases of direct armed aggression, can be relatively rapid. In cases of deliberately ambiguous hybrid aggression, it can stretch over hours, even days — during which damage on the ground continues to accumulate.

**NATO** military planners have developed rapid response procedures — the **Very High Readiness Joint Task Force** (VJTF), immediate response units — to reduce this delay. But the fundamental problem is not only technical. It is political: 32 governments must agree on a response, with different national interests, different public opinions, different risk assessments. Poland and the Balts want maximum immediate response. **Germany** and **France** may prefer de-escalation. America — this is now a real question — may not want to engage at all.

### The precedent that does not yet exist

**NATO** has never had to respond to a direct armed attack against a member state since its creation in **1949**. The only triggering of **Article 5** — after the **September 11, 2001** attacks — concerned a terrorist attack, not a state aggression. The precedent of a collective military response to a state attack does not exist. And the absence of precedent is a weakness, because it leaves all questions open about the modalities, intensity, and limits of the response.

This is the procedural void that **Russia** seeks to exploit. By forcing the creation of a precedent at a time and in conditions of its choosing, it can test not only the Alliance's military capabilities but also its political will and institutional cohesion. This is why, as the signatories of the **Gdansk** declaration perfectly understand, the best way to avoid having to test **Article 5** is to make deterrence so credible that the temptation vanishes.

*Article 5 is a moral and political commitment as much as a military one. If the leaders who must uphold it are not sincerely prepared to pay the price — including the risk of nuclear escalation — then it is worth nothing. And Putin knows it. That is why the clarity of Western leaders on their willingness to defend the Baltic states matters as much as the number of tanks deployed.*

## The Ankara summit as a credibility test

### What Ankara must say about Article 5

The **Ankara** summit has a unique opportunity to reinforce the credibility of **Article 5** without waiting for it to be tested. This requires concrete decisions: permanently increasing the Alliance's military presence in the Baltic states, deploying additional missile defense systems, adopting rapid hybrid incident attribution procedures and pre-approved automatic graduated responses accepted by all members.

It also requires a public clarification of the American position. If **Pete Hegseth** and the **Trump** administration maintain the American commitment under **Article 5**, they must say so clearly at **Ankara**, in front of the world's cameras. The current ambiguity is a premium on aggression. If on the other hand they plan to reduce American presence, Europeans need to know now in order to adapt their strategy accordingly.

### The existential stake behind the technical question

Behind the apparently technical question of **Article 5** lies an existential challenge to the international order. If **Russia** demonstrates that it can violate the sovereignty of a **NATO** member state without triggering an effective collective response, the entire system of collective security built since **1945** collapses. **China** is drawing lessons from everything happening around **Taiwan**. **Iran** is drawing lessons from the Western response to its regional aggressions. **NATO**'s weakness today would be a global signal.

This is why testing **Article 5** is not a question that only concerns the Baltic states or Eastern Europe. It is a question that determines the global balance of power for the coming decades. And this is why the decision to genuinely reinforce the defense of the Eastern Flank is a decision each Alliance member makes — or should make — with full awareness of its global implications.

*Beijing is watching. Tehran is watching. Pyongyang is watching. What is happening in the Baltics and at Ankara right now is not a provincial European problem. It is a live demonstration of whether liberal democracies still have the will to defend the order they built. I hold onto the hope that the answer will be yes.*

## Extended deterrence doctrine: nuclear and conventional

### The American nuclear umbrella and its ambiguities

American extended deterrence — the guarantee that the **United States** would use nuclear weapons to defend its allies against a nuclear attack — is the ultimate foundation of **NATO** member states' security. During the **Cold War**, this guarantee was the cornerstone of the balance of terror. Today, under the **Trump** administration, the deliberate ambiguity the American president maintains about his allied commitments weakens this guarantee in the minds of Baltic state decision-makers.

This ambiguity is dangerous on two counts. On one side, it may encourage **Russia** to judge that the American response to a provocation in the Baltics will be hesitant, even nonexistent — thereby increasing the temptation to test the **Alliance**. On the other, it pushes European allies to consider partial nuclear autonomy — on the French model or via a Europeanization of **French deterrence** — which would have considerable political and strategic implications. Neither scenario is desirable.

### What holding a nuclear commitment means

**NATO**'s collective defense commitment implicitly includes the possibility of a nuclear response to a massive conventional attack on a member state. This is the **"first use"** doctrine that the Alliance maintains, unlike other nuclear powers. This doctrine is designed to compensate for the Soviet, then Russian, conventional superiority on Europe's Eastern Flank.

The credibility of this doctrine depends on **Russia**'s conviction that **NATO** would actually honor this commitment. If **Putin** thinks the United States would hesitate to risk nuclear escalation to defend the Baltic states, deterrence loses part of its effectiveness. This is precisely the calculation that **Trump**, through his unpredictability, blurs — with potentially very serious consequences for strategic stability in Europe.

*Nuclear deterrence rests on a paradox: to be effective, it must be absolutely credible — meaning the adversary must believe you are ready to destroy the world rather than back down. Trump, by playing unpredictability, undermines this credibility. That is not strategy. It is poker with millions of lives as chips.*

## Ukrainian resistance as a model for the Baltics

### What Kyiv has taught the world about national defense

Since **2022**, **Ukraine** has given the world an extraordinary demonstration of what determined national resistance can achieve against a superior military power. The Russian army, possessing the world's second largest conventional forces, has been unable in four years to subdue a country that decided to defend itself. This lesson is not lost on the Baltic states, which have developed **total defense** doctrines inspired in part by the Ukrainian experience.

Ukrainian resistance has also demonstrated the importance of **soldier training**, **tactical innovation**, and **combatant motivation**. Soldiers defending their own territory, their own families, their own culture, fight differently from soldiers executing orders in a foreign country. This motivational asymmetry is a force multiplier that quantitative military calculations fail to capture, but which the Baltic states understand perfectly.

### The limits of the Ukrainian model for the Baltics

The comparison between **Ukraine** and the Baltic states has its limits. Ukraine has strategic depth — a vast territory that allows it to yield ground to better resist later. The Baltic states, with surface areas comparable to small French regions, do not have this luxury. A rapid **fait accompli**-style invasion could place the entire territory of a Baltic state under Russian control before reinforcements could arrive — making subsequent resistance far more difficult than in the Ukrainian case.

It is precisely for this reason that the **permanent presence** of **NATO** forces in the Baltic states — not symbolic tripwires, but brigades capable of fighting and holding — is a sine qua non of these countries' defense. Without this preventive presence, the Ukrainian total defense doctrine cannot be transposed wholesale into the Baltic context. Allies must be on the ground before a crisis begins, not only after.

*Ukraine has taught us something essential: the will to fight for freedom can compensate for many military imbalances. But this will needs to be armed, supported, equipped. Resistance alone is not enough against ballistic missiles. The Baltics want the resistance AND the means of defense. Both together.*

## Western public opinion: the internal flank to consolidate

### Public support for NATO and its fragilities

The entire solidity of the **Atlantic Alliance** ultimately rests on the support of public opinion in member countries. Democratic governments cannot maintain costly military commitments — financially and potentially in human terms — without sufficient public support. And that support, in some Western European countries, is not as solid as one might think.

Regular polls in several **NATO** countries show troubling results on the question of whether citizens would support a military intervention to defend an ally. In **Germany**, in **Italy**, in some Central European countries, significant percentages answer in the negative. This is not immutable data — opinions can change, as they changed in **Finland** after the Ukrainian invasion — but it is a reality that decision-makers must factor into their communication strategy.

### The role of media and information in collective defense

**Russian disinformation** targets precisely these fractures in Western public opinion. Narratives amplified via social media — "this war does not concern us," "it is Western provocation," "Russia has legitimate grievances" — seek to erode support for **Ukraine** and **NATO**. These narratives have found resonance in segments of both left-wing and right-wing opinion in Western Europe and the **United States**.

Countering this disinformation is a form of Alliance defense as important as deploying weapons systems. It is about defending the **"internal flank"** of the Alliance — the cohesion of member societies, their trust in institutions, their willingness for collective solidarity. Transparency about the threat — such as the decision to make the Latvian alerts public — is one way of mobilizing public opinion by informing citizens about the real stakes. This is an investment that governments are not yet making sufficiently.

*The information war is as important as the shell war. Putin knows this and invests massively in it. The West responds in an often incoherent, scattered manner, with national agencies that do not coordinate. Consolidating the Alliance's internal flank — its public opinions — is as urgent as consolidating its military Eastern Flank.*

## Conclusion: The Alliance put to the test of its own promise

### Honoring what was signed

**Article 5** is a promise. Not a vague statement of benevolent intent, but a solemn commitment, signed by 32 sovereign states, to collectively defend each of their members against any aggression. Keeping this promise when it costs little — when the threat is distant, when deterrence works — is easy. Keeping it when it is costly, when a nuclear power directly attacks, when public opinion hesitates, when allies doubt: that is where the true value of an alliance is measured.

**Russia** is betting that **NATO** will not go that far. That fear of nuclear escalation will paralyze decision-makers. That public opinions will not accept the necessary sacrifices. That American hesitation will fracture the Alliance before it can respond. These bets are not unreasonable. But they can and must be proved wrong by clear political decisions and real military investments.

### The moment of truth lies ahead

**Zelensky** was right in **2021**: the threat was real, and nobody truly believed him in time. Today, alerts are multiplying, signals are accumulating, experts are converging on a scenario of possible provocation in the Baltics. The Alliance has a unique opportunity: to act preventively to make this scenario unimaginable for **Moscow**. That is not an absolute guarantee. But it is infinitely preferable to discovering, in the urgency of a crisis, whether **Article 5** keeps its promises.

The answer to the question that titles this commentary — why a Baltic state could trigger everything — is simple: because we promised it would not have to do so alone. Keeping that promise is the fundamental test of the Atlantic Alliance in the **twenty-first century**. Ankara can, and must, begin to meet it.

*The Atlantic Alliance is being put to the test of its own promise. Not an old, forgotten promise: a promise that 32 nations consciously renewed knowing that Russia was once again a threat. This promise must hold. It must hold for the Baltics. It must hold for Ukraine. It must hold for everything that the liberal international order represents that is precious in this world.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [The Guardian: NATO leaders fear they can no longer count on the United States — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

- [The Guardian: Russia preparing a possible provocation in the Baltic states — June 26, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/russia-provocation-baltic-states-poland)

- [Army Recognition: Russia rehearses Baltic strike operations from Kaliningrad — June 21, 2026](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/russia-rehearses-baltic-strike-operations-from-kaliningrad-with-su-24m-bombers-and-su-30sm2-fighters)

- [Fox News: Russian hybrid attacks on NATO's Eastern Flank — June 22, 2026](https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-preparing-hybrid-attacks-natos-eastern-flank-intelligence-warns)

### Secondary sources

- [Swedish Government: Gdansk Declaration — June 25, 2026](https://regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/sveriges-internationella-overenskommelser/2026/06/joint-declaration-from-leaders-meeting-in-Gdansk/)

- [European Parliament EPRS: Briefing on the NATO Ankara Summit — June 26, 2026](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2026/789355/EPRS_BRI(2026)789355_EN.pdf)

- [NATO/Atlantic Council: Transcript of conversation with Rutte — June 25, 2026](https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2026/06/25/atlantic-council-front-page-conversation-with-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte)

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-tester-l-article-5-pourquoi-un-etat-balte-pourrait-tout-declencher