# COMMENTARY: Russian sanctions for 12 months — stated resolve, limited effectiveness

> On June 25, 2026, the Council of the European Union did something unprecedented since the start of sanctions against Russia in 2022: it extended economic restrictive measures for 12 months — through July 31, 2027 — instead of the usual 6 months. This decision, adopted following the June 18–19, 2026 European Council, is presented as a strong signal of European determination. It

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-sanctions-russes-pour-12-mois-une-volonte-affichee-une-efficacite-li

## Introduction: June 25, 2026 and a symbolically strong decision

### A change in duration that sends a political signal

On **June 25, 2026**, the **Council of the European Union** did something unprecedented since the start of sanctions against **Russia** in **2022**: it extended economic restrictive measures for **12 months** — through **July 31, 2027** — instead of the usual **6 months**. This decision, adopted following the **June 18–19, 2026 European Council**, is presented as a strong signal of European determination. It covers key sectors — trade, finance, energy, dual-use technologies — and maintains the embargo on Russian crude oil and restrictions on **Moscow**'s financial institutions.

On paper, the political signal is real and deserves recognition. Moving from **6** to **12 months** means the **EU** will no longer have to renew this semi-annual vote, which each time gave countries like **Hungary** or, now, **Bulgaria** the opportunity to hold the process hostage in exchange for concessions. It is an administrative simplification that strengthens the predictability of the sanctions regime. It is also a message to **Moscow**: do not count on short-term European fatigue.

### But the numbers tell a more nuanced story

The reality behind the political signal is more complex. Russian **Urals** crude was trading at around **$58 per barrel** in mid-June **2026** — above the **$44** cap set by the Russian oil price ceiling mechanism. This cap, designed to limit **Moscow**'s oil revenues, is being circumvented via "ghost fleet" tankers, transactions in yuan and dirham, and third-country intermediaries that do not comply with Western rules. The fact that Russian oil continues to sell above the intended cap without a robust enforcement mechanism is an implicit admission of a structural limit in the architecture.

Moreover, discussions on revising the cap — whether to lower it to match the current market price, or replace it with a new fixed ceiling — are blocked not by disagreement on principle, but by **Bulgaria**'s resistance and tactical divergences among member states. The **12-month extension** is progress in terms of political coherence. The effective enforcement of the capping mechanisms remains an open question.

*There is something almost ritual about European sanctions announcements. "Historically strong" measures are announced, impressive figures cited, and then quarterly reports show Russia found new export channels. I am not saying sanctions serve no purpose — they impose real costs. But the rhetoric routinely outpaces the reality.*

## The Russian economy under sanctions: resilient, but fractured

### What sanctions have accomplished since 2022

Since the start of sanctions in **2022**, **Russia** has indeed suffered substantial economic losses. The ruble's value collapsed. Inflation rose sharply, forcing the Russian central bank to maintain stratospheric interest rates. Access to Western technologies for modernizing industries was severely restricted. Exports to **Europe** — **Russia**'s main commercial outlet before **2022** — collapsed in key sectors. Brain drain and capital flight deprived the Russian economy of talent and resources. These costs are real and documented.

Ukraine's campaign of strikes against Russian refineries added a further dimension: Russian oil production declined for the **sixth consecutive month** in June **2026**, reducing export revenues. Local fuel shortages were reported in regions near the front. The Russian state budget is under growing pressure to simultaneously sustain high military spending and the social programs that maintain popular acceptance of the war.

### What sanctions have failed to do

Sanctions have not collapsed the Russian economy. They did not prevent it from recording growth in **2023** and **2024**, fueled by massive military spending. They did not prevent it from diversifying its trading partners — **China** now absorbs a significant share of Russian exports that **Europe** refused; **India** buys discounted Russian oil; **Turkey** serves as an intermediary for imports of embargoed Western components.

Sanctions have also not stopped the war, as some of their promoters in **2022** hoped they might. **Vladimir Putin** has built a war economy that absorbs the cost of sanctions by distributing them unequally across Russian society — peripheral regions and economically vulnerable layers pay the bill, while the oligarchy connected to the regime adapts or profits from the economic realignment.

*The fundamental problem with sanctions is this: they work on 5-to-10-year horizons, not 6-to-12-month ones. They accumulate structural damage that manifests progressively. But wars are fought on horizons of months. This temporal asymmetry creates permanent frustration among sanctions advocates who expect immediate results.*

## Circumventing sanctions: a global industry

### The ghost fleet and third-party intermediaries

One of the most troubling revelations of the past four years is the scale of the global sanctions-circumvention industry. Hundreds of "ghost fleet" tankers — vessels without identifiable flags, without Lloyd's insurance, without European class certification — transport Russian oil to **Asia**, the **Middle East**, and **Africa**. These vessels operate in low-surveillance zones, conduct ship-to-ship transfers in international waters, and use concealment practices that make tracking extremely difficult.

Countries like the **United Arab Emirates**, **Turkey**, **India**, and several **Central Asian** nations have played the role of intermediaries — purchasing sanctions-subject goods and technologies in the West and reselling them to **Russia**. The **21st package of European sanctions** specifically aims to strengthen mechanisms countering this circumvention — but the effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the cooperation of third countries that the **EU** can hardly compel.

### The price cap revision: the immediate stakes

The automatic revision of the Russian oil price cap — currently set at **$44 per barrel** — was scheduled for **July 15, 2026**. Two options were on the table: revise the cap downward to bring it closer to the current **Urals** market price (around **$58**), which would strengthen the sanctions effect; or postpone the revision to next year, as the Commission recommends. Postponement is the path of administrative convenience, but it leaves in place a cap the market is already systematically circumventing.

The argument for a lower cap is economically sound: if Russian oil is selling at **$58** while the cap sits at **$44**, the capping mechanism is not being enforced. Either it is genuinely enforced — which requires secondary sanctions against third countries ignoring the cap — or it is admitted to be symbolic. The decision the **EU** makes on this question in the coming weeks will say a great deal about the real seriousness of the sanctions regime.

*A price cap at $44 while the market pays $58 is either a broken mechanism or an elaborate diplomatic fiction. I lean toward a mix of both. The EU needs to be honest about this: sanctions are working imperfectly, and improving them requires politically difficult decisions.*

## Arguments for softening: marginal voices, but not silent ones

### The camp of negotiated de-escalation

There exists in **Europe** a discreet but non-negligible current arguing that sanctions should be used as a bargaining chip in ceasefire negotiations rather than as indefinite punishment. This argument is supported by some economists and a few governments that find the economic cost of sanctions on their own economies increasingly heavy as the years pass. **Hungary** under **Orbán** and **Slovakia** under **Fico** are the most visible representatives within the **EU**.

This argument deserves to be taken seriously on its merits, even if its loudest advocates within the **EU** have questionable motivations. Sanctions without any prospect of being lifted create no incentive for behavioral change — they generate resistance. The strategic question is: under what conditions could a partial or progressive lifting of sanctions be considered, and what verifiable guarantees would **Russia** have to provide? This conversation has not yet taken place seriously at the European level. It should.

### The 12-month extension and strategic rigidity

Paradoxically, the decision to extend sanctions for **12 months** — a signal of firmness — also reduces the **EU**'s diplomatic flexibility. With sanctions renewed semi-annually, the **EU** had a natural review point every **6 months** that could theoretically be used to condition partial relief on Russian concessions. With a **12-month extension**, this flexibility point disappears. It is a conscious choice in favor of predictability and resistance to internal blockages — but also a choice against diplomatic flexibility. In a conflict that may require negotiations in the coming months, this rigidity carries a cost.

That said, **Moscow**'s current position leaves little room for diplomatic nuance. **Russia** has not demonstrated a genuine willingness to negotiate on terms that **Ukraine** and its allies could accept. In this context, European firmness has more strategic value than premature flexibility. The **12-month extension** is defensible — provided the **EU** remains prepared to revise its position if conditions on the ground change significantly.

*There is a real tension between firmness and flexibility in managing sanctions. I believe firmness is the right posture for now — but firmness without thinking through exit scenarios is merely rigidity. The EU must hold both simultaneously.*

## Sanctions in the context of Ukrainian military pressure

### The combined effect: economic and military

The most honest analysis of Russian sanctions acknowledges that they cannot, alone, resolve the Ukrainian conflict. But their value lies in their combined effect with Ukrainian military pressure. Ukraine's strikes against Russian refineries — **28 strikes** on oil infrastructure in June **2026** alone, according to the **ISW** — compound the economic pressure already exerted by sanctions. The decline in Russian oil production is not solely due to sanctions: it is also due to the physical destruction of refining capacity by Ukrainian drones.

It is this synergy — economic sanctions **plus** military pressure — that creates the most unfavorable dynamic for **Putin**'s regime. Sanctions alone did not suffice. Military pressure alone did not suffice. Together, they create an equation in which the resources available to finance the war diminish progressively while human costs mount. The goal is not the immediate collapse of **Moscow** — it is to make the continuation of this war increasingly costly until the point where serious negotiation becomes the rational option for the Kremlin.

### The long term: building European resilience

The real achievement of European sanctions since **2022** may not be their impact on **Russia**, but their impact on **Europe**. The break from dependence on Russian gas — which came at a high short-term economic cost — has considerably strengthened European resilience. The development of alternative energy supply routes, diversification of sources, and reduction in consumption: these structural transformations of the European energy economy permanently reduce the **EU**'s vulnerability to Russian coercion. This is a success that sanctions advocates do not cite nearly enough.

The **12-month extension** of sanctions is part of this logic of long-term structural transformation. It signals that **Europe** has absorbed the economic shock of breaking with **Russia** and is prepared to maintain this posture. This is an important message not only to **Moscow**, but also to **Kyiv**, which needs to know its European backers will go the distance.

*The real success of the sanctions may be that Europe is no longer held hostage by Russian gas. Four years after putting them in place, we do not need to negotiate with Putin to heat our homes. That is a strategic victory that the sanctions policy made possible — even if the costs were real.*

## The history of sanctions against Russia: from 2014 to 2026

### The post-Crimea sanctions: the missed precedent

Western sanctions against **Russia** did not begin in **2022**. After the annexation of **Crimea** in **2014** and Russian support for **Donbas** separatists, the **United States** and the **European Union** adopted sanctions regimes targeting Russian individuals, entities, and economic sectors. The **2014–2016** sanctions were real but limited — they did not prevent the progressive normalization of relations between **Europe** and **Russia**, notably in the energy sector with the construction of **Nord Stream 2**.

This precedent is instructive. It shows that in the absence of sustained pressure and a genuine escalation of costs imposed on **Russia**, sanctions function as a political statement rather than a behavioral change tool. **Putin** drew the lesson from **2014**: Western sanctions are politically tenable for **Europe** but economically costly, and pressure to ease them will grow over time. In **2022**, he bet this dynamic would repeat itself. This bet has not — so far — yielded the expected outcome.

### The 2022 rupture: unprecedented sanctions

The full-scale invasion of **2022** produced a sanctions response of unprecedented scale outside of world wars. The freeze on **Russian Central Bank** reserves — **€300 billion** blocked — was a measure no one had dared to contemplate a few years prior. The exclusion of Russian banks from the **SWIFT** system, the freezing of oligarchs' assets, restrictions on oil and gas imports, export controls on advanced technologies — together, they constitute the most sweeping sanctions regime ever imposed on an economy of this size.

These sanctions produced real, measurable effects. The initial collapse of the **ruble**, the lasting depreciation of Russian purchasing power, structural inflation linked to the loss of access to high-technology imports, the contraction of non-military civilian sectors — all of this is documented. That **Russia** nonetheless maintained its war economy through oil revenues, Chinese support, and wartime economic mobilization does not mean sanctions had no impact — it means their impact, though real, has not yet reached the threshold that would alter **Putin**'s calculations.

*I maintain my position: sanctions against **Russia** are necessary and useful — not as a silver bullet, but as a component of a comprehensive pressure strategy. The history of **2014** teaches us that soft sanctions with no follow-through have zero deterrent effect. The June **25, 2026** decision by some allies to consider premature easing risks repeating the same mistake. We must hold the line.*

## The global economy and energy prices: the Russia effect in 2026

### The global oil market: reconfiguration and persistent tensions

The war in **Ukraine** fundamentally reconfigured global oil market flows. **Russia**, formerly a major supplier to **Europe**, had to redirect its exports toward **Asia** — primarily **China** and **India**. This reorientation came at a significant discount: Russian oil sells at a lower price than the international benchmark crude to compensate for the logistical inconvenience and the risk of secondary sanctions. This discount — estimated at **$10–20 per barrel** depending on the period — represents a structural revenue loss for the Russian state.

For **Europe**, the break from Russian natural gas imposed considerable costs but also accelerated an energy transition that had stalled. **American, Qatari, and Norwegian LNG** replaced much of the Russian gas. Renewable energy was developed at an accelerated pace. Energy efficiency improved under pressure. Dependence on Russian gas fell from roughly **40%** of European consumption to less than **10%** in four years — a structural transformation that would have taken a decade without the urgency created by the war.

### The economic consequences for developing countries

The impact of sanctions and war on **developing countries** is an angle frequently overlooked in Western analyses. The surge in grain prices in **2022** — due both to fighting in Ukrainian agricultural zones and export difficulties — created food crises in dozens of countries across **Africa** and **South Asia**. The poorest countries, which import a large share of their food, suffered severe economic shocks that had nothing to do with their own political choices.

This reality complicates support for sanctions in multilateral forums. Many developing countries — which cannot afford to ignore the real economic impact on their populations — refuse to align with Western sanctions without being parties to the conflict themselves. Their neutrality is not necessarily sympathy for **Russia** — it is often a pragmatic response to real economic constraints. The **West** must factor this in when building broader coalitions.

*The question of the global economic consequences of sanctions reminds me that geopolitics does not exist in an economic vacuum. When bread prices explode in **Lagos** or **Dhaka** because of a war those populations did not choose, the resentment accumulating against a **West** perceived as imposing its priorities at everyone else's expense is a real political problem. A credible sanctions strategy must be accompanied by economic solidarity with the countries bearing its indirect effects.*

## The diplomacy of sanctions: negotiating the exit without betraying principles

### The conditions for acceptable relief

The question of "exiting" the sanctions regime is not taboo — it is inevitable. Sanctions cannot last indefinitely without the prospect of conditional lifting: without that, **Russia** has no incentive to change its behavior, and **Russia**'s non-Western trading partners consolidate their positions as replacements for Western commercial relations. A credible sanctions strategy must include a clear definition of the conditions that would permit relief.

These conditions, to be acceptable from the standpoint of the values being defended, should include at minimum: the withdrawal of Russian forces from internationally recognized Ukrainian sovereign territory, a peace agreement acceptable to **Ukraine**, mechanisms for victim compensation and reconstruction, and non-repetition guarantees including a verifiable reduction in Russian offensive capabilities. Less demanding conditions would amount to rewarding aggression — precisely the signal the **West** wanted to avoid sending.

### The architecture of a progressive sanctions lift

A progressive lifting of sanctions — conditioned on measurable progress against defined benchmarks — is more realistic than an instantaneous total lift. This approach has been used in other contexts: the sanctions against **Iran** under the **JCPOA** provided for a progressive lift in exchange for verifiable steps toward rolling back the nuclear program. The principle is sound even if its application to the Iranian file encountered difficulties.

For **Russia**, such an architecture could include: the lifting of certain sectoral economic sanctions in exchange for effective withdrawal from certain territories, the progressive release of frozen assets in exchange for reparation payments to **Ukraine**, and the restoration of certain financial channels in exchange for the release of political prisoners. This approach preserves systemic pressure while offering concrete incentives for progressive behavioral change.

*I close on this note: sanctions are not an end in themselves — they are a tool in service of a political objective. That objective is a sovereign, secure **Ukraine**, free to choose its alliances. Any strategy for exiting sanctions must be evaluated against that objective, not against the short-term economic relief it would bring to Western actors. The pressure must last as long as necessary. But "as long as necessary" must be precisely defined — otherwise it is the **Ukraine**'s partners who tire out before the pressure has produced its effects.*

*I am convinced that history will judge harshly those who sought to ease sanctions against **Russia** before peace was established on just terms. Premature easing sends a catastrophic signal: that aggression carries no lasting cost. This signal would be heard not only in **Moscow**, but in **Beijing**, in **Tehran** — everywhere regimes are calculating the cost of military adventurism.*

## Conclusion: Honesty as the best sanctions policy

### Acknowledging the limits to better build the pressure

The honest commentary on the **12-month extension** of Russian sanctions is as follows: it is a useful political signal that simplifies the governance of sanctions and demonstrates European determination. It is not a solution to the war in **Ukraine**. It is not an instrument that can, by itself, force **Putin** to negotiate. And its enforcement mechanisms — notably the oil price cap — are being circumvented on a scale that merits public honesty about their real effectiveness.

Acknowledging these limits does not weaken the sanctions regime — it strengthens it by directing political energy toward real improvements rather than symbolic communication. The **EU** should be far more aggressive in enforcing the price cap, in combating ghost fleets, in secondary sanctions against third countries serving as intermediaries. These steps are politically difficult — they create friction with partners like **India** or **Turkey** — but they would be far more effective than perpetuating the status quo by simply changing the duration of its renewal.

### Europe's credibility lies in the details

The credibility of the **European Union** as a serious foreign policy actor is not measured by the frequency of its firmness declarations, but by the coherence between its declarations and its actions. Sanctions extended for **12 months** are an action. Tolerance for massive circumvention of the oil cap is a counter-action. **France** and **Italy** blocking the entry ban for Russian veterans is a counter-action. **Bulgaria** protecting **Patriarch Kirill** is a counter-action. The final coherence — or incoherence — between these contradictory actions will determine whether European sanctions are a serious geopolitical instrument or an exercise in diplomatic theater.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ukrainska Pravda — EU extends economic sanctions against Russia for another year — June 26, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/25/8041148/)

- [Euronews — Newsletter: Temperatures rise over sanctions against Russia — June 26, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/26/newsletter-temperatures-rise-over-sanctions-against-russia)

- [Ghana News Agency — EU extends Russia sanctions for the first time by twelve months — June 21, 2026](https://gna.org.gh/2026/06/eu-extends-russia-sanctions-for-the-first-time-by-twelve-months/)

### Secondary sources

- [The Moscow Times — Inside the Ukrainian Deep-Strike Campaign — June 22, 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/22/inside-the-ukrainian-deep-strike-campaign-that-has-moscow-on-the-back-foot-a93061)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Ukraine's long-range strikes against Russia are growing in scale — June 23, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-s-long-range-strikes-against-russia-1782204748.html)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 11, 2026 — June 11, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Russo-Ukrainian war, day 1563 — June 6, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/06/russo-ukrainian-war-day-1563/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-sanctions-russes-pour-12-mois-une-volonte-affichee-une-efficacite-li