# COMMENTARY: London, Paris, Berlin facing Beijing: Europe in the Indo-Pacific

> On June 24, 2026, something unusual happened. The de facto representations — the de facto embassies — of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in Taipei simultaneously issued a joint statement expressing concern about "new Chinese activities" in the waters east of Taiwan. "These actions threaten regional stability and freedom of navigation and the safety of international ship

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-londres-paris-berlin-face-a-pekin-l-europe-en-indo-pacifique

## Introduction: a rare statement that says a great deal

### Three European powers, one common voice in Taipei

On **June 24, 2026**, something unusual happened. The de facto representations — the de facto embassies — of the **United Kingdom**, **France**, and **Germany** in **Taipei** simultaneously issued a joint statement expressing concern about "new Chinese activities" in the waters east of **Taiwan**. "These actions threaten regional stability and freedom of navigation and the safety of international shipping," it read, adding their "opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo, particularly through the threat or use of force or coercion."

This is not the first time Western countries have expressed concerns about the situation in the **Taiwan Strait**. But a tripartite **European** statement, published directly from representation offices in **Taipei**, is a distinct political signal. It indicates that these three governments now consider Taiwan's security — and freedom of navigation in the **Western Pacific** — as directly relevant to their national interests.

### The context that prompted this statement

The statement responded to a specific operation: in early **June 2026**, a flotilla of **five China Coast Guard vessels** had issued radio challenges to merchant ships in the waters east of **Taiwan**, **35 nautical miles** from the island. The U.S. State Department had described these actions as "deeply destabilizing." Taiwan's Foreign Minister had thanked the three countries for their statement — a public acknowledgment of the symbolic importance of the gesture.

These events are set against a backdrop of documented rising Chinese military pressure: in **May 2026**, **274 PLA air sorties** around **Taiwan**, of which **216** entered the **ADIZ**, with a penetration rate of **79%** — the highest of the year. In **June**, the new carrier **Fujian** transited the **Taiwan Strait** precisely while **Taipei** was conducting its combat readiness exercises. The coincidence was deliberate.

*A joint statement from Taipei — not from Brussels, not from the United Nations — carries weight. These governments chose to speak from the island itself. It is a form of symbolic presence that is not without political value, even if it does not constitute a security guarantee.*

## What the statement says — and what it does not say

### Strong words, vague commitments

The tripartite statement is clear on the diagnosis — Chinese actions are destabilizing — but remains deliberately vague on consequences. It mentions no sanctions, no concrete measures, no naval deployments, no commitment to defend **Taiwan** in the event of aggression. It is the language of diplomatic concern, not of a security guarantee. This distinction is fundamental.

**China** knows this. **Beijing** will read this statement for what it is: a signal of European unease, not a red line. The question that immediately arises is therefore: how far is **Europe** prepared to go? What concrete actions does this concern lead to? These are questions that none of the three capitals concerned has answered publicly — and whose answers will determine whether this statement has real strategic impact or remains in the diplomatic archives without ever weighing on geopolitical reality.

### The costly lesson of the South China Sea

In the **South China Sea**, the same Western expressions of concern have been repeated for years, while **China** built artificial islands, deployed missiles, and installed military infrastructure. Today, those islands are operational **PLA** bases. **China** tested Western resolve — and got its answer: words, not actions. It would be dangerous to repeat the same mistake in the **Western Pacific**.

A wargame organized in early **June 2026** whose results were published by the **Washington Times** on **June 19** concluded that the **EU** would not be an effective military respondent in a **Taiwan** crisis. The **EU** "prioritizes internal consensus-building, often at the expense of swift external action." This implicit self-criticism is important — and it should lead European governments to review their strategic preparedness in the region.

*The South China Sea is the mirror in which Europe must look at itself before talking about Taiwan. It did not act there. If it replicates that pattern in the Pacific, the consequences for its economy and security will be incomparably more severe.*

## European interests in the Indo-Pacific: greater than we think

### Taiwanese semiconductors: a critical dependency

**Taiwan** produces more than **60%** of the world's advanced semiconductors and **90%** of the most sophisticated ones, through **TSMC**. These chips are at the heart of every modern electronic device — cars, phones, military equipment, healthcare systems, critical infrastructure. Any disruption to Taiwanese production — through a blockade, an invasion, or even major political instability — would trigger an economic shock without modern precedent.

**Europe** is particularly exposed. Its automotive industries, defense suppliers, and telecommunications networks depend massively on Taiwanese chips. The **EU** launched its **European Chips Act** precisely to reduce this dependency — but its targets for **2030** will still fall far short of current Taiwanese capacity. For now, what happens in the **Taiwan Strait** partly determines what comes out of European factories in a few years.

### Freedom of navigation as a condition for European prosperity

The maritime routes that pass through the **Western Pacific**, the **Taiwan Strait**, and the **South China Sea** carry a substantial share of European world trade — to and from northeastern **Asia**, notably **Japan**, **South Korea**, and mainland **China** itself. A blockade of **Taiwan** or a closure of maritime routes in the region would directly affect European exports and imports. The Franco-British-German declaration on "freedom of navigation" is therefore not merely altruistic — it defends tangible economic interests.

Taiwan's Vice Foreign Minister had explicitly reminded **Europe** of these stakes in an interview given to **Euronews** in **June 2026**: "If **China** attacks **Taiwan**, **France**, **Europe**, the **United States**, and **Japan** will all be affected." This is not dramatization — it is geoeconomics.

*Europeans buy cars whose chips come from Taiwan. They use phones whose processors are made in Hsinchu. The next time a European leader hesitates to condemn China for its actions in the strait, they should think about what is inside their pocket phone.*

## European military presence in the Indo-Pacific: taking stock

### Royal Navy and French Navy deployments

Beyond statements, the **United Kingdom** and **France** maintain a real military presence in the **Indo-Pacific**. The **Royal Navy** regularly conducts freedom of navigation patrols in the **Pacific**, including through the **Taiwan Strait**. The **French Navy** has also transited the strait on several occasions, asserting international freedom of navigation. These symbolic presences have strategic value — they serve as a reminder that the **Pacific** is not a Chinese lake.

**Germany**, for its part, deployed a frigate to the region in **2021** for the first time in decades, provoking protests from **Beijing**. This decision — politically courageous given the importance of Sino-German trade relations — charted a course that subsequent European deployments could follow. The question is whether these one-off initiatives can become a coherent and lasting strategy.

### The challenge of European consensus on China

One of the major obstacles to a coherent European policy in the **Indo-Pacific** is the absence of consensus within the **EU** on how to manage the relationship with **China**. Some countries — notably those in **Central and Eastern Europe** and the **Nordic countries** — adopt a firmer posture toward **Beijing**. Others, such as **Hungary** and several **Southern European** countries, maintain close economic ties with **China** and resist common positions seen as "too provocative."

This internal division partly explains why the tripartite statement of **June 24, 2026** came from three capitals — and not from the **European Union** as a whole. EU institutions, constrained by their consensus logic, struggle to adopt clear positions on questions where member states' interests diverge significantly.

*European consensus on China sometimes feels like quicksand — every time you think a common position has been found, one EU member disappears into Beijing's orbit. This structural weakness is a windfall for Xi Jinping and an existential problem for Europe.*

## London, Paris, Berlin: three approaches, one convergence

### Post-Brexit Britain in search of a global role

For the **United Kingdom**, engagement in the **Indo-Pacific** fits within its post-**Brexit** strategy of asserting itself as a "global" world power. The **Global Britain** doctrine places the **Pacific** at the heart of a strategic reorientation toward the Anglophone axis — **AUKUS** with **Australia** and the **United States**, participation in regional exercises, and recurring naval deployments. For **London**, the statement of **June 24** was not a departure — it was the consistency of a policy maintained for several years.

**France**, for its part, has a unique presence in the **Indo-Pacific** through its overseas territories in **French Polynesia**, **New Caledonia**, and **Réunion**. This territorial presence gives **Paris** legitimate interests in the region that go well beyond declaratory solidarity. **France** watches with concern the Chinese expansion in the **South Pacific** — a region it considers strategically linked to its own security.

### Germany: a progressive but real paradigm shift

**Germany** is perhaps the one among the three that has undergone the greatest paradigm shift. Long reluctant to directly challenge **China** out of fear of commercial losses in the automotive industry in particular, **Berlin** has progressively hardened its posture. The Russian invasion of **Ukraine** accelerated this transformation: if **Russia** demonstrated that economic ties do not guarantee peace, the same logic applies to **China**.

The German Chancellor had stated at a meeting on **Ukraine** in **Gdańsk** in **June 2026** that **Russia** would not win this war. This clear position on **Europe** is an indicator of Germany's growing willingness to defend principles, even when immediate economic interests push in the opposite direction. This same evolution is being progressively observed in the German posture toward **China**.

*Germany shifting its paradigm on China — this may be the most important European geopolitical transformation of this decade. It is slow, hesitant, and incomplete. But it is real. And it deserves to be encouraged rather than mocked.*

## The future: toward a European Indo-Pacific doctrine?

### From statement to coherent strategy

For European engagement in the **Indo-Pacific** to become credible and deterrent, it will need to go beyond one-off declarations. Several conditions are necessary: an increase in European naval capabilities in the region — regular patrols, joint exercises with regional allies; pre-loaded sanction packages ready to be activated in the event of Chinese aggression against **Taiwan**; an agreement on a common policy to reduce critical dependencies on **China**; and a clear communication to **Beijing** that **Europe** considers freedom of navigation non-negotiable.

None of these conditions is easy to achieve. Each involves short-term economic costs and considerable domestic political challenges. But the alternative — continuing to issue statements without follow-through and hoping that **China** will eventually self-regulate — is an illusion that the events of **June 2026** have made even harder to sustain.

### The moment of choice is now

The tripartite statement of **June 24, 2026** may be the beginning of a turning point — or it may be yet another declaration among many, forgotten by the following week. The difference between these two destinies depends on what **London**, **Paris**, and **Berlin** do in the months that follow. Will they follow through on their words? Will they build a lasting presence in the region? Will they accept the economic costs of a firmer posture toward **Beijing**? These questions have no answer yet. But they are urgent.

## The economic paradox: dependence on China vs. engagement in the Indo-Pacific

### Europe torn between trade and security

The Achilles' heel of any European policy in the **Indo-Pacific** has a name: **economic dependence on China**. In 2025, **China** remained the **European Union**'s largest trading partner, with exchanges exceeding **850 billion euros**. For European economies still seeking post-pandemic growth, the idea of compromising that commercial access represents a considerable domestic political risk.

This is precisely the paradox that **Beijing** exploits with consummate skill. Every time a European government raises its voice on **Taiwan** or the **South China Sea**, discreet signals arrive from business circles: contracts could be jeopardized, Chinese investments could be delayed, trade agreements could be suspended. The implicit economic blackmail is real, documented, and sufficiently effective to temper even the firmest declarations.

### The first painful decisions: when values carry a price tag

Several European countries have nonetheless begun to accept these costs. **Lithuania** maintained its Taiwanese diplomatic mission despite a near-complete commercial rupture with **China**. The **Netherlands** maintained restrictions on **ASML** equipment despite pressure. **Germany**, under the new coalition, is reviewing its policy on critical dependencies. These decisions are not trivial: they signal that something is changing in the European calculus.

But these examples remain the exception rather than the rule. The vast majority of **EU** member states continue to place their commercial interests with **China** ahead of their strategic commitments in the **Indo-Pacific**. Until an event sufficiently grave — a real **Taiwan** crisis, an overt military act of aggression — forces a collective decision. And by that point, it may be too late to build a credibility that was not cultivated during the years of peace.

*Economic dependence on China is the trap Europe set for itself over decades of strategic naivety. Today it is paying the price — exactly as it paid for its dependence on Russian gas in 2022. The same lesson, twice. How many times must history repeat before it is truly learned?*

## Regional allies and European credibility: what Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra think

### Allies who doubt European commitment

The tripartite statement of **June 24, 2026** was received with polite scepticism in several Indo-Pacific capitals. In **Tokyo**, **Seoul**, and **Canberra**, European words are noted — but actions are awaited. An unnamed Australian official, cited by several media outlets, reportedly summed up the regional state of mind: "Europe has been declaring its concern for years. What we want to see is naval presence, joint exercises, concrete sanctions commitments. Words deter no one in Beijing."

This stern judgment reflects a reality that European diplomats acknowledge in private. Strategic credibility is not proclaimed — it is built through actions, presences, and accepted sacrifices. **France**, with its Polynesian territory and its naval presence in the South China Sea, benefits from stronger regional credibility than the others. But a joint statement with Berlin and London is only credible if it foreshadows shared operational commitments.

### Military exercises: the real test of solidarity

In **June 2026**, both **France** and the **United Kingdom** were participating in naval exercises in the **Western Pacific**. **Germany**, for its part, had sent frigates through the **South China Sea** on symbolic transits. These gestures matter — not because they represent a decisive military capability, but because they send a political signal to **Beijing**: **Europe** is not disengaging from the regional order. They are insufficient, but they exist.

The real question is whether these one-off presences can evolve into a more durable regional security architecture involving **Europe**. The **AUKUS** partnership excluded **Europe** from submarine cooperation. The Quad dialogue — **United States**, **Japan**, **Australia**, **India** — includes no Europeans. **Europe** thus finds itself in a paradoxical position: it shares the values and interests of the Indo-Pacific democratic alliance, but is not formally a member of it. This architecture of exclusion should push European capitals to accelerate their own regional engagement framework.

*When Tokyo and Canberra are waiting to see whether Europe will match words with deeds, I wonder what we have done with our ambitions as a power. Europe has the size of a global actor — it rarely has the ambition and almost never the political courage. This statement of June 24, 2026 can be a starting point. Or one more footnote in the history of our strategic disappointments.*

## Conclusion: Europe at the crossroads of its Indo-Pacific choices

### From statement to doctrine

The tripartite statement of **June 24, 2026** between the **United Kingdom**, **France**, and **Germany** represents a signal — not yet a policy. For it to become a policy, concrete decisions will be needed: budget resources allocated, naval presences planned, sanctions mechanisms prepared, red lines defined and clearly communicated to **Beijing**. Without these elements, the statement will remain in the diplomatic archives without ever bearing on geopolitical reality.

### What history will retain

The history of Western engagement in the face of expansionist authoritarianism offers clear lessons. Those who signaled their determination early, clearly, and with concrete actions had the best chances of deterring aggression. Those who multiplied statements without honoring them often contributed to creating the illusion that aggression would cost nothing. The **Europe** of **June 2026** stands at that crossroads. The path of credibility is still open. But every week of delay makes it narrower.

*The geography of the Indo-Pacific is far from Paris and Berlin. But the consequences of a Beijing takeover of Taiwan will not be. Semiconductors, maritime routes, the liberal order that makes global trade possible — all of this is at stake. Europe must choose: engage now, at a manageable cost, or wait for the crisis, at a catastrophic cost.*

*The question posed by this statement of June 24, 2026 is simple but vertiginous: is Europe ready to defend the order it claims to cherish? Not with soldiers in Taipei — but with its presence, its sanctions, its diplomatic credibility? This commentary has no certain answer. But I know that time for vague answers is running out.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- ABC News — UK, Germany, France express concern over Chinese actions east of Taiwan — June 24, 2026

- [Washington Post — Joint UK-France-Germany statement on Chinese actions around Taiwan — June 24, 2026](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/24/taiwan-japan-germany-france-uk-china-ships/cb0c3040-6fc8-11f1-8730-e7fd0e2a6404_story.html)

- [ISW — China-Taiwan Update, June 26, 2026 — June 26, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-june-26-2026/)

- [Euronews — "If China attacks Taiwan, you will be affected too," Taiwan's deputy FM warns Europe — June 10, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/next/2026/06/10/exclusive-if-china-attacks-taiwan-you-will-be-affected-too-taiwans-deputy-fm-warns-europe)

### Secondary sources

- [Washington Times — Wargame: Europe unable to respond to Taiwan crisis — June 19, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/19/korea-unwilling-europe-unable-help-taiwan-crisis-war-game-finds/)

- [Washington Times — China patrols seen as rehearsals for Taiwan blockade — June 25, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/25/china-patrols-seen-rehearsals-taiwan-blockade/)

- [Reuters — Taiwan simulates countering a Chinese maritime blockade — June 25, 2026](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/06/25/taiwan-simulates-countering-a-chinese-maritime-blockade-in-tabletop-drill)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-londres-paris-berlin-face-a-pekin-l-europe-en-indo-pacifique