# COMMENTARY: The STCA in its "skeleton phase" — real justice or institutional illusion?

> The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine — the STCA — is entering what JusticeInfo.net calls its "skeleton phase." This international tribunal, created on May 15, 2026 by 36 states and the European Union at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Chișinău, is the first such mechanism since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-le-stca-en-phase-squelette-justice-reelle-ou-illusion-institutionnel

## Introduction: 36 states, the EU, and a tribunal without walls or judges

### What exactly is the STCA?

The **Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine** — the **STCA** — is entering what **JusticeInfo.net** calls its "**skeleton phase**." This international tribunal, created on **May 15, 2026** by **36 states** and the **European Union** at a meeting of the **Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe** in **Chișinău**, is the first such mechanism since the **Nuremberg and Tokyo** trials after the Second World War. Its mandate: to try the Russian political and military leaders responsible for the decision to launch and conduct a war of aggression against **Ukraine**.

But as of **June 2026**, the **STCA** is still a tribunal without a building, without judges, without administrative staff. It has an acronym, a founding agreement, and a political intent. It does not yet have the institutional tools to function. This is what the "**skeleton phase**" means — a legal framework laid, but institutional flesh yet to be built. To understand what this truly means, it is worth tracing the history of this project and its stakes.

### First since Nuremberg: the symbolic weight

The historical context is essential. **Nuremberg** (**1945–1946**) and **Tokyo** (**1946–1948**) established the precedent that a state's leaders could be held personally accountable for the crime of aggression — then called "**crimes against peace**." These precedents were incorporated into the **Rome Statute** of the **International Criminal Court** in **1998**. But the **ICC** has a major structural limitation: it cannot try nationals of states that have not ratified the **Rome Statute** for crimes committed on the territory of those states — which excludes **Russia** for the crime of aggression.

The **STCA** works around this limitation through a different structure: it is established by agreement between **Ukraine** and the **Council of Europe**, and will exercise jurisdiction on **Ukraine**'s behalf. This innovative legal architecture will allow it to try senior Russian officials — potentially **Putin** himself — even in their absence, through trials in absentia.

*The first tribunal for the crime of aggression since Nuremberg. Humanity took seventy years to recreate this mechanism — and did so under the pressure of a war unfolding live on our screens. It is simultaneously a remarkable achievement and a confession: without a war in Europe, the political will was not there.*

## The genesis: from idea to founding agreement

### A project reaching back to 2022

The idea of a special tribunal for the Russian crime of aggression against **Ukraine** was launched by **Zelensky** and his legal advisors as early as **2022**. The project advanced step by step. In **2023**, a **Core Group** of **36 countries** formed to work on the tribunal's creation. In **January 2026**, **Council of Europe** Secretary General **Alain Berset** announced the signing of an agreement establishing a preparatory team. On **May 14–15, 2026** in **Chișinău**, the foreign ministers of the **46 members of the Council of Europe** formally adopted the expanded agreement — with **37 countries** supporting the document, according to **Ukrinform**.

This four-year journey, punctuated by legal challenges, political resistance, and complex technical discussions, is remarkable. It reflects a persistent political will rooted in the conviction that the individual accountability of leaders for state crimes must be an effective principle of international law — not merely an aspiration.

### The key roles of Ukraine and the Netherlands

Two actors were central to the creation of the **STCA**. First, **Ukraine**, which initiated the project, negotiated the founding agreement (**signed by Zelensky on June 25, 2025**, **ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament on July 15, 2025**), and pushed relentlessly for its advancement. Second, the **Netherlands**, which offered to **host it** — the tribunal will likely be based in **The Hague**, the world capital of international justice institutions. This geographic placement is not incidental: it anchors the **STCA** in the institutional ecosystem of international criminal justice, alongside the **ICC**, the **International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia**, and the **Special Tribunal for Lebanon**.

The **EU** played an essential catalyzing role: the **European Parliament** voted on **April 30, 2026**, by **446 votes in favor, 63 against, and 52 abstentions**, in favor of establishing the tribunal. This broad, bipartisan vote across **Europe** gave the project a democratic legitimacy that goes beyond a simple intergovernmental agreement.

*446 votes in the European Parliament for a tribunal that will try Putin for the crime of aggression. That is a majority worth acknowledging — and one that says something about the state of European political consciousness in the face of this war. Europe is not abstaining. It is choosing justice.*

## What the STCA can do — and what it cannot

### Trials in absentia: judging without the accused

The **STCA** provides for the possibility of **trials in absentia** — trying the accused even in their absence. This is a practical necessity: it is unlikely that **Putin** or other senior Russian officials will voluntarily appear before the tribunal. This provision is also a powerful symbolic declaration: even if the accused refuse to appear, the evidence will be presented, the crimes documented, and a judgment rendered. Impunity will not be complete.

Historically, trials in absentia have value at multiple levels. They establish a legal record of crimes. They can strip the accused of certain rights in signatory countries. They create lasting international stigmatization. And above all, they keep alive the principle that state crimes — even those committed by "untouchable" leaders — will one day be accounted for.

### The real limits: without the United States or China

The **STCA**'s limitations are as real as its strengths. First, the **United States** — not being a member of the **Council of Europe** — has not joined the tribunal. This does not invalidate it, but reduces its perceived authority. **China**, **Russia**, **India**, and other major powers are not part of it. The tribunal remains essentially a European project and its close allies.

Second, without an effective arrest mechanism, any eventual convictions remain symbolic as long as the accused are not on the territory of a signatory state. **Putin** is already under an **ICC** arrest warrant for child deportation — this warrant has not prevented him from continuing to govern. A **STCA** judgment will have no immediate practical effect on his freedom of movement.

*A tribunal without a prison. Convictions without arrests. This is the cruel limit of international justice when facing nuclear powers. I acknowledge this without cynicism — it is not a reason to give up. History shows that these judgments have a longevity their critics do not anticipate. Milošević ended up before the ICTY. Pinochet was arrested. Calculations change.*

## The crimes covered: the crime of aggression

### What exactly is the crime of aggression?

The **crime of aggression** is one of four crimes falling under **international criminal law** — alongside **war crimes**, **crimes against humanity**, and crimes against protected groups. It designates "the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of an act of aggression" by a state. Unlike other crimes, which can be committed by individuals at any level of the military hierarchy, the crime of aggression can only be committed by those who exercise effective control or direction over a state's political or military action — meaning leaders at the very top.

For **Ukraine**, this means the **STCA** targets specifically **Putin** and his immediate circle — members of the **Russian Security Council**, senior military commanders, ministers who approved or implemented the decision to invade. The tribunal focuses on the decision to invade **Ukraine** — a decision that constitutes the crime of aggression in itself, independently of the methods employed.

### The difference from the ICC: why a separate tribunal was necessary

The **ICC** is already prosecuting individual Russians for **war crimes** — including the warrant against **Putin** and **Lvova-Belova** for child deportation. But the **ICC** cannot handle the crime of aggression against **Ukraine** because **Russia** has not ratified the **Rome Statute**. This legal gap was an obstacle that only the creation of a specific tribunal could resolve.

The **STCA** therefore complements the **ICC** — it does not compete with it. Both institutions can operate in parallel: the **ICC** on war crimes and crimes against humanity, the **STCA** on the crime of aggression. Together, they cover the full spectrum of international criminal accountability for the Russian war against **Ukraine**.

*War crime, crime against humanity, crime of aggression — Ukraine is laying its suffering before three different forums simultaneously. This is the most exhaustive legal strategy any country at war has ever deployed. And it is the right strategy. Even if justice takes decades, it must be pursued.*

## The "skeleton phase": what it means concretely

### A legal framework without infrastructure

The "**skeleton phase**" described by **JusticeInfo.net** is the **STCA**'s current period: the legal framework is in place — the founding agreement, the statutes, the governance structure — but the tribunal does not yet have a physical building, appointed judges, or administrative staff. This is a necessary transition period between the political decision to create the tribunal and its full operationality.

Concretely, this means: ongoing negotiations with the **Netherlands** on hosting; a judge selection procedure to launch (they will serve **nine-year terms**, under rules voted by the **European Parliament**); recruitment of registry staff, prosecutors, and investigators; and the establishment of evidence collection and management protocols. Each of these steps takes time — but each is under way.

### The investigations that can begin now

What is important to understand is that even during the skeleton phase, **preliminary investigations** can begin. Evidence of the crime of aggression — official Russian decisions, speech transcripts, documented communications through the chain of command — is abundant and in the public domain. The **International Centre for the Prosecution of Aggression** (**ICPA**), established in **The Hague**, is already accumulating evidence that will be transferred to the **STCA** once it is fully operational.

Furthermore, member states have national jurisdictions exercising universal jurisdiction for the crime of aggression. Judicial proceedings in **Germany**, **Spain**, and **Sweden** constitute parallel procedures that feed the overall evidentiary base. The **STCA** is therefore born into an already-active legal ecosystem — it does not have to start from scratch.

*A skeleton phase, but a body that is growing. Investigations beginning before the judges are even named. Evidence accumulating in The Hague as the war continues. International justice works at the speed of its institutions — slowly, but inexorably. And Putin must live with that knowledge.*

## Why international justice matters, even when imperfect

### The value of future deterrence

Skeptics of international justice often argue that tribunals like the **STCA** have no practical effect on leaders currently in power. This is partially true — **Putin** will not surrender himself to **The Hague**. But the value of the **STCA** is not only in condemning the current aggressor. It lies in deterring potential future aggressors.

If the decisions of an international court demonstrate that a head of state can be personally convicted for launching a war of aggression — even if that conviction does not materialize in an arrest until after his death or fall — this alters the risk calculus for any future leader considering a similar venture. It is not a guarantee. But it is an additional risk — and a signal to the international community that this type of crime does not go unpunished.

### Collective memory as a function of justice

Beyond deterrence, international justice fulfills a function of **collective memory**. The **Nuremberg** trials established a definitive factual record of Nazi crimes — a record that made the denial or minimization of those crimes impossible. The **STCA** will fulfill the same function for the Russian war against **Ukraine**: a legally established record, with evidence presented and examined according to criminal law standards, findings that will form part of the official history of this conflict.

For **Ukraine** and its victims, this legal memory is of incalculable importance. It says: what happened to you happened. It was a crime. The responsible parties are named. And one day, the world will hold the record of their accountability.

*Nuremberg did not prevent all the wars that followed. But it established a principle. The STCA establishes a principle for the 21st century: that even nuclear great powers can face international criminal accountability. This principle is worth more than any individual conviction.*

## The absent states: when neutrality becomes complicity

### The countries that said no to the STCA

Out of **193 United Nations members**, only **37 states** have joined the **STCA**. The majority of the world — **China**, **India**, **Brazil**, **South Africa**, much of **Africa** and **Asia** — has abstained or actively refused to participate. Some invoke **sovereignty** and non-interference. Others have economic and diplomatic interests with Moscow they are unwilling to jeopardize. The result is a tribunal representing less than a fifth of humanity.

This geopolitical reality limits the **STCA**'s reach, but does not invalidate it. The **Nuremberg Tribunal** was not universal either — it represented the victorious allied powers. Its legitimacy nonetheless survived decades, because the principles it established were just. The **STCA** can follow the same path: beginning with 37, and seeing its legitimacy grow over time.

*China votes against the STCA at the UN General Assembly. India stays silent. South Africa hesitates. This is no surprise — these are the same countries maintaining normal economic relations with Moscow while Ukraine burns. Their absence from the STCA is not a neutral position. It is a choice. And that choice has a name: passive complicity.*

## Russia before justice: scenarios and probabilities

### Will Putin ever face trial?

**Vladimir Putin**, 73 years old in 2026, has governed **Russia** for more than a quarter century. It is quite likely that he will die of old age or another cause before ever physically appearing in a courtroom. The **STCA** can conduct proceedings **in absentia** — a judgment rendered in the defendant's absence — as certain international tribunals allow. This is not ideal symbolically, but it would produce a legally valid verdict and a permanent record of the crimes.

Alternative scenarios exist. A regime change in **Russia** could bring a successor government to cooperate with the tribunal — as West Germany cooperated with **denazification** processes after 1945. Continued economic and diplomatic pressure could isolate **Russia** sufficiently that cooperation becomes a political necessity. And even without extradition, the mere existence of an international arrest warrant transforms Putin into a pariah — as **Omar al-Bashir** or **Ratko Mladić** were before their arrests.

*Will Putin be tried in his lifetime? Probably not. But Slobodan Milošević was not supposed to be either — until he was. Mladić was a fugitive for sixteen years before being caught. International justice operates on decades, not news cycles. The STCA lays the tracks. The train will eventually pass.*

## Conclusion: Ukraine chose the path of law — and that is the right choice

### A three-level strategy: military, diplomatic, legal

The creation of the **STCA** fits within Ukraine's three-level strategy. **Militarily**: resist, counter-attack, reclaim territory. **Diplomatically**: maintain Western support, isolate **Russia**, build coalitions. **Legally**: document crimes, establish accountability, build an international justice architecture that makes Russia answerable for its aggression in a lasting way.

These three strategies reinforce each other. Military resistance creates the conditions in which diplomacy and law can function. Diplomatic pressure sustains support for judicial investigations. And international justice legitimizes military resistance by confirming its legal grounding in the face of illegal aggression.

### The long arc of international justice

The "**skeleton phase**" of the **STCA** should not be read as weakness or delay. It reflects the profoundly institutional nature of international justice — a justice that, to be durable and credible, must be built with rigor. The **Nuremberg** trials began one year after the end of the war. The **International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia** delivered its first judgments years after the crimes. International justice is slow — but it is also tenacious.

*The STCA enters its skeleton phase while the war continues. This is not a contradiction — it is a parallel architecture. Justice is being built at the same time as the defense is being mounted. Crimes are being documented while they are being committed. The tribunal is being prepared while the invaders are being repelled. This is total resistance — military, diplomatic, and legal, simultaneously.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [JusticeInfo.net — Special Tribunal for Crime of Aggression Ukraine enters skeleton phase — June 2026](https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/regions/ukraine)

- [Ukrinform — Council of Europe approves agreement to establish Special Tribunal — May 15, 2026](https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/4123628-committee-of-ministers-of-council-of-europe-approves-agreement-to-establish-special-tribunal.html)

- [Euromaidan Press — European Parliament backs establishment of special tribunal for Russia — April 30, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/04/30/european-parliament-backs-establishment-of-a-special-tribunal-for-russia/)

### Secondary sources

- [The Kyiv Independent — 36 countries in Core Group on Special Tribunal — May 2023 (historical context)](https://kyivindependent.com/presidents-office-36-countries-in-core-group-on-special-tribunal-for-russian-crime-of-aggression/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Russia could face special tribunal by 2026 — May 14, 2025](https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/05/14/russia-could-face-special-tribunal-for-crime-of-aggression-in-ukraine-by-2026-to-hold-senior-officials-accountable/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Austria joins tribunal coalition — April 16, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/04/16/neutrality-doesnt-mean-indifference-austria-joins-tribunal-to-prosecute-russias-aggression/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-le-stca-en-phase-squelette-justice-reelle-ou-illusion-institutionnel