# COMMENTARY: The IMF Unlocks $690 Million for Ukraine — What the EFF Review Really Means

> On June 12, 2026, the teams of the International Monetary Fund and the Ukrainian government concluded a staff-level agreement on the first review of Ukraine's Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. That phrasing — "staff-level agreement" — is the IMF's bureaucratic language for: we have checked the accounts, verified the reforms, assessed the progress, and we recommend to the Ex

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-le-fmi-debloque-690-millions-pour-l-ukraine-ce-que-la-revue-eff-sign

## Introduction: a technical signature that says much about confidence

### When the IMF says yes, it is political as much as economic

On **June 12, 2026**, the teams of the **International Monetary Fund** and the Ukrainian government concluded a **staff-level agreement on the first review** of Ukraine's **Extended Fund Facility (EFF)** program. That phrasing — "staff-level agreement" — is the **IMF**'s bureaucratic language for: we have checked the accounts, verified the reforms, assessed the progress, and we recommend to the Executive Board to release the next tranche. That Board, expected to meet in the following weeks, will then grant access to approximately **$690 million** in additional resources.

In perspective: since the start of the **EFF** program, total disbursements had reached **$2.2 billion**. These additional $690 million bring the **IMF**'s institutional confidence in Ukraine to a level few would have predicted in **February 2022**. Because in the language of the **IMF**, a positive review is not merely a financial transaction — it is a credibility signal. It tells markets, bilateral partners, and multilateral creditors: Ukraine is honoring its commitments, its institutions are functioning, its public finances are being managed seriously despite the war.

*The IMF is not a charitable organization. When it says Ukraine passed its first review, it means its teams have seen the data, verified the reforms, and concluded the program is on track. That is the most credible certificate of institutional seriousness that exists.*

## What is the EFF — and why Ukraine needs it

### The Extended Fund Facility: a structural reform program

The **Extended Fund Facility (EFF)** is the **IMF** instrument designed for countries facing prolonged balance-of-payments imbalances that need an institutional anchor for their structural reforms. It differs from emergency programs (such as the **SBA — Stand-By Arrangement**) through its longer duration (typically 3 to 4 years) and the level of structural reforms it requires: fiscal governance, the banking sector, the business environment, public debt management.

For Ukraine, the **EFF** in force since **2024** replaced and consolidated the successive emergency programs adopted since the start of the full-scale war in **2022**. It anchors Ukrainian reforms in a medium-term framework — valuable not only for credibility with the **IMF**, but also for bilateral partners who condition part of their aid on progress verified by the Fund. The **G7**, the **EU**, and the **UK** all use **IMF** conditionality as a reference for their own assessments of financial support to Ukraine.

### The indicators the IMF verified

The first **EFF** review assessed several key dimensions: **fiscal consolidation** and sustainability of Ukraine's deficit (**Kyiv** seeks to keep the deficit within limits that allow orderly financing despite massive war spending), **macroeconomic stability** (inflation, hryvnia exchange rate, reserves of the **National Bank of Ukraine**), and **progress in structural reforms** (anti-corruption, public sector governance, tax reform).

The positive outcome of the review indicates that Ukraine met its commitments on both fronts — which is no small feat for a country devoting between **50 and 60% of its budget to military spending**. Managing a massive war effort simultaneously with the financial governance standards required by the **IMF** is an achievement that few war economies in recent history have pulled off.

*Devoting 60% of its budget to war and keeping its public accounts solid enough to pass an IMF review — that is fiscal discipline under conditions that would have destroyed most states' economies. Ukraine deserves to have that said clearly.*

## $690 million: where does this money go?

### The circuit of IMF funds in Ukraine

Funds disbursed by the **IMF** under the **EFF** go directly to the reserves of the **National Bank of Ukraine (NBU)**, which uses them to support **hryvnia** stability and maintain foreign currency reserves at a level that guarantees coverage of essential imports — notably fuel and equipment on which Ukraine depends. These funds are not used directly to purchase weapons — that is not the **IMF**'s role — but their existence frees up other budget resources that can be allocated to defence.

The mechanism works as follows: solid foreign currency reserves reduce pressure on the hryvnia and allow the **NBU** to maintain a relatively stable exchange rate without depleting its reserves. A stable rate reduces imported inflation and sustains confidence in the national currency. And contained inflation allows the government to finance its budget with less monetary pressure — meaning less forced borrowing and more margin for priority spending, including defence.

### The $2.2 billion already disbursed in global context

The **$2.2 billion** already disbursed under the **EFF** is part of a far larger flow of international financial aid that Ukraine has received since **2022**. The **Kiel Institute**'s **Ukraine Support Tracker** estimated total financial support (**EU**, **G7**, multilateral institutions) at tens of billions of euros per year since the start of the war. **IMF** funds represent a fraction of that total — but they play a catalytic role: a positive **IMF** review facilitates disbursements from other institutions and partners that use the Fund's conditionality as a reference benchmark.

The **European Commission**, at the **Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026** held in **Gdańsk** in late June, announced additional commitments for defence and reconstruction support. Those commitments are facilitated by the financial credibility Ukraine has maintained through its programs with the **IMF**.

*The IMF as a catalyst — that is its true value for Ukraine. $690 million from it is respectable. But the billions it unlocks from bilateral and multilateral partners — that is the real multiplier effect.*

## The review conditions: reforms during wartime

### What Ukraine had to do to pass its review

The positive **EFF** review was not earned without effort. Ukraine had to demonstrate concrete progress in several areas defined in the program's initial memorandum. Among the measurable actions: maintaining **budget transparency** — regular publication of public accounts in accordance with **IMF** standards — in a context where some military spending is classified; **strengthening anti-corruption mechanisms**, notably maintaining the independence of the **National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU)** and the **Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP)**; and **banking sector reform** to reduce exposure to high-risk assets.

These reforms were pursued under the combined pressure of **EFF** program obligations and the requirements of the **EU** accession process, which sets its own criteria in similar domains. The fact that both sets of requirements overlap substantially allowed Ukraine to rationalize its reform efforts — advancing on one front contributes to the other.

### Political tensions around anti-corruption reforms

Maintaining independent anti-corruption mechanisms has created domestic political tensions in Ukraine. Several corruption cases involving mid- and high-level government officials were prosecuted by the **NABU** during the war — creating political and operational complications for a government seeking to maintain cohesion and effectiveness in a conflict context. The pressure from the **IMF** and the **EU** to maintain the independence of these bodies helped protect their functioning against attempts at political interference.

This is not a comfortable topic for the Ukrainian government — but it is an essential one. Corruption in military procurement and in aid fund management is a systemic risk that weighs on the effectiveness of Ukrainian defence and on partner trust. Independent anti-corruption mechanisms — despite their political friction — are a safeguard against this risk.

*Prosecuting corruption cases during a total war — it is difficult, uncomfortable, politically risky. But the IMF and the EU are right to demand it. A corrupt army loses wars. A corrupt economy cannot be rebuilt.*

## Ukraine's macroeconomic context in June 2026

### An economy that holds, against all odds

The macroeconomic context of Ukraine at the time of the **June 2026 EFF** review was that of a war economy that had managed to avoid the catastrophic collapse many had feared in **2022**. **Ukrainian GDP**, after contracting approximately **30%** in **2022**, had partially rebounded in **2023–2024** before experiencing a new contraction in **2026** — linked to the intensification of Russian strikes on energy and industrial infrastructure.

This contraction, documented by **Euromaidan Press** in June **2026** as "the sharpest since the return of war," reflects the direct effects of strikes on Ukrainian productive capacity. Hundreds of industrial enterprises were partially or completely destroyed, millions of workers displaced, and energy costs — in a context where energy infrastructure is regularly struck — weigh on all economic activity.

### The resilience of Ukraine's financial sector

Despite these macroeconomic pressures, **Ukraine's financial sector** demonstrated remarkable resilience. The **National Bank of Ukraine** maintained foreign currency reserves that allowed it to defend **hryvnia** stability within a reasonable band — without the catastrophic devaluation that some experts had predicted in **2022**. Ukrainian commercial banks maintained operations, enabling payments, wages, and transfers essential to the war economy.

These performances are partly the result of policies imposed by the **NBU** under **IMF** supervision — including capital transfer limits, interest rates calibrated to contain inflation, and bank recapitalization mechanisms for institutions exposed to occupied regions. This framework, far from perfect, helped avoid a systemic banking crisis that would have catastrophically worsened an already dire situation.

*That the Ukrainian National Bank managed to maintain a relatively stable currency for four years of total war — that is a monetary policy miracle. A difficult, costly, imperfect miracle. But a miracle nonetheless.*

## The role of the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026

### Gdańsk and the reconstruction commitments

The **Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026**, held in **Gdańsk** in late June, provided the political context in which the **IMF**'s **EFF** review takes on its full meaning. This conference — the largest international gathering of Ukraine reconstruction support since **Lugano 2022** and **London 2023** — brought together representatives from dozens of governments, international financial institutions, and private companies to discuss the financing of Ukrainian reconstruction over the medium and long term.

The positive **IMF** review provided those participants with a crucial signal: Ukraine is a reliable partner, whose public finances are managed seriously, and whose reform commitments are honored. That signal facilitates investment decisions — both for governments seeking to justify their contributions to their parliaments and for private companies assessing the risks of Ukraine as an investment destination.

### The Gdańsk commitments and their financing

The commitments made at **Gdańsk** in terms of support for Ukrainian reconstruction and defence represented, according to initial available analyses, several tens of billions of euros. These commitments add to existing aid flows — but their materialization depends precisely on the type of institutional credibility that the **EFF** review contributes to building. A Ukraine that passes its **IMF** reviews, maintains its financial governance, and honors its reform commitments will have an easier time mobilizing these resources than a Ukraine whose credibility is contested.

The analysis published by **Euromaidan Press** on the **Gdańsk Conference** noted that while the promises were significant, their conversion into concrete financing still depended on numerous national and multilateral decisions. The **IMF** review is one of the pieces that converts conference promises into real disbursements.

*Reconstruction conferences make for good photos and enthusiastic communiqués. What converts communiqués into real money is institutional credibility. The IMF is the guardian of that credibility — and Ukraine just passed its exam.*

## The EFF program horizon: what remains to be done

### Upcoming reviews and their conditions

The **EFF** review of **June 12, 2026** is only the first in a series of periodic reviews planned under the program. Each review will allow the **IMF** to assess progress, adjust conditions if necessary, and release the next tranche of available resources. Ukraine has committed to a series of objectives for subsequent reviews — including progress on land reform, public enterprise governance, and harmonization of its legislation with European directives as part of the accession process.

These commitments are demanding — but they are also, in large part, aligned with what Ukraine should be doing independently of the **IMF** to prepare its **EU** accession and to rebuild a competitive economy after the war. The **IMF** anchor provides these reforms with external discipline that helps overcome domestic political resistance — a dynamic that other countries, from **Poland** in the 1990s to **Romania** in the 2000s, have used successfully to accelerate their economic transformations.

### Risks to program continuity

Several risks weigh on the continuity of the **EFF** program: an intensification of infrastructure destruction that would push the Ukrainian economic contraction beyond projections; difficulties maintaining the governmental cohesion needed to adopt politically sensitive reforms; or a modification of international financing conditions if donor political fatigue sets in. These risks are real — but they are no greater than those Ukraine has already overcome since **2022**.

The positive review of **June 2026** indicates that Ukraine has, for now, held the course. That is good news — modest, technical, bureaucratic — but good news in a context where good news deserves to be named.

*First EFF review passed. This is not the end of the road — it is confirmation that the road exists and that Ukraine is taking it. In IMF language, that is the highest of compliments.*

## The IMF facing the paradoxes of aid in wartime

### IMF conditionality in a context of national survival

The **International Monetary Fund** operates on a doctrine of conditionality — it ties its disbursements to structural reforms and macroeconomic performance indicators. This approach, designed for "ordinary" economic crises, runs into particular tensions when applied to a country at war for its survival. How do you impose fiscal reforms that reduce deficits when a country needs to spend massively on defence? How do you require long-term anti-corruption reforms when every budget decision is made under military urgency?

Ukraine's **EFF review**, which released **$690 million**, demonstrates that the **IMF** adapted its doctrine to the Ukrainian context. It maintains conditionality principles — fiscal reforms, budget transparency, expenditure controls — while accepting delays and adjustments that account for wartime realities. That flexibility is progress relative to the doctrinal rigidity of some past interventions.

### Coherence between reforms and military effectiveness

The coherence between structural reforms and military effectiveness is stronger than one might think. An efficient tax administration that collects revenue without corruption better finances the military. Transparent public procurement limits waste in defence acquisitions. A credible central bank maintains the financial stability that enables financing the conflict without hyperinflation. The reforms the **IMF** requests are not in contradiction with Ukrainian military needs — they support them indirectly.

The crucial political question is whether **Ukraine** can maintain the political space for painful reforms during a war — reforms that sometimes impose economic sacrifices on populations already under strain. **Zelensky**'s government has generally answered affirmatively: reforms are part of the European identity that **Ukraine** is asserting. But popular pressure limits the possible, and the **IMF** must be aware of that political constraint in calibrating its demands.

*The IMF disbursing $690 million on performance criteria to a Ukraine at war — that is one of the most delicate balancing acts in contemporary international economics. Too much flexibility, and reforms don't happen. Too much rigidity, and financing collapses at the worst moment. This review suggests the IMF has found a workable equilibrium. It must be maintained.*

## Conclusion: institutional confidence as a war asset

### Why the IMF review is an act of resistance

One might be tempted to treat the **IMF**'s **EFF** review as a purely technical event, far from the front lines and drone exchanges. That would be a mistake. Institutional confidence — a government's capacity to honor its financial commitments, respect its programs with international institutions, preserve the credibility of its public finances under the pressure of war — is a strategic asset as important as missiles or armored vehicles.

This confidence allows Ukraine to maintain the flows of international aid it needs to finance its defence. It allows it to attract the private investment that will finance its reconstruction. And it allows it to argue credibly on the international stage for strengthened support. The **EFF** review of **June 12, 2026** confirms that Ukraine has maintained this asset — which is, under the circumstances, a victory in its own right.

### What $2.2 billion represents in the long term

The **$2.2 billion** disbursed under the **EFF** program represents less than **1%** of Ukraine's estimated reconstruction needs. But it represents **100%** of the institutional credibility the **IMF** program creates — and that credibility multiplies across the decisions of thousands of other actors. That is the program's real value: not the dollars, but the signal they send. And Ukraine has understood that from the beginning.

*$690 million more for Ukraine — this is not a gift. It is a conditional loan based on confidence that Ukraine will continue to reform itself. That confidence was earned through concrete actions since 2022. The IMF recognizes it. Allies should take inspiration from it to calibrate their own support: confident, demanding, but real.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [IMF — Press briefing transcript, June 25, 2026 — Ukraine EFF review — June 26, 2026](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/06/26/tr-06252026-imf-press-briefing-transcript-june-25-2026)

- [European Commission — EU steps up support for Ukraine's defence, recovery, and reconstruction at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026 — June 25, 2026](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-steps-support-ukraines-defence-recovery-and-reconstruction-ukraine-recovery-conference-2026-2026-06-25_en)

### Secondary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Rebuilding Ukraine while it burns — what the recovery conference actually delivered — June 28, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/28/rebuilding-ukraine-while-it-burns-calling-it-progress-what-ukraine-recovery-conference-2026-actually-delivered/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Ukraine's economy records its sharpest contraction since the return of war — June 23, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/23/ukraine-economy-contraction-june-2026/)

- [Kyiv Independent — Four years later, the reality checks on Ukraine's EU candidacy are pouring in — June 23, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/four-years-later-the-reality-checks-on-ukraines-eu-candidacy-are-pouring-in/)

- [The Straits Times — Poland and Ukraine tone down dispute at reconstruction conference — June 26, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/poland-ukraine-tone-down-dispute-at-reconstruction-conference)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/commentaire-le-fmi-debloque-690-millions-pour-l-ukraine-ce-que-la-revue-eff-sign